The legal aspects of religion in the public school curriculum by NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro & Redmond, David Marshall
INFORMATION TO USERS 
This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI 
films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some 
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be 
from any type of computer printer. 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the 
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality 
illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, 
and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. 
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete 
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if 
unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate 
the deletion. 
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by 
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and 
continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each 
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced 
form at the back of the book. 
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced 
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white 
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations 
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UME directly to 
order. 
UMI 
A Bell & Howell Information Company 
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA 
313/761-4700 800/521-0600 

THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF RELIGION IN THE 
PUBLIC SCHOOL CURRICULUM 
by 
David Marshall Redmond 
A Dissertation Submitted to 
the Faculty of the Graduate School at 
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Education 
Greensboro 
1995 
Approved by 
issertation Advisor 
UMI Number: 9618163 
UMI Microform 9618163 
Copyright 1996, by UMI Company. All rights reserved. 
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized 
copying under Title 17, United States Code. 
UMI 
300 North Zeeb Road 
Ann Arbor, MI 48103 
REDMOND, DAVID MARSHALL, Ed. D. The Legal Aspects of Religion in the 
Public School Curriculum. (1995) Directed by Dr. Joseph E. Bryson. 511 pp. 
The role of religion in the public schools is one of the most controversial 
issues in American education. The vast number of religious groups and their 
widely differing opinions contribute to the controversy. In addition, few topics 
stir human emotions more strongly than the mention of religious activities in 
the public schools. School officials face challenges in trying to follow the laws of 
the land, accommodate local religious customs, protect the rights of minority 
groups, and deal with their own religious beliefs. 
The purposes of this study were (1) to review the history of religion in 
the public school curriculum; (2) to determine from current literature the 
critical legal issues involving religion in the public school curriculum; (3) to 
review and analyze case law related to religion in the public school curriculum; 
and (4) to provide guidelines for practicing school administrators who must 
make decisions on the legality of permitting religious activities as part of the 
public school curriculum. This study is developed in a factual manner based on 
the legal issues involved and will not attempt to address the moral values 
inherent in permitting religious activities in the public school curriculum. 
An analysis of judicial decisions does not always reveal consistent and 
definitive solutions for resolving litigious issues. The time, place, and particular 
set of circumstances involved account for the sometimes varied rulings by the 
courts. However, predicated on an analysis of judicial decisions, it is concluded 
that the following activities are constitutional: 
1. to release students to go off campus for religious instruction 
2. to permit equal access for religious groups to meet on campus 
3. to provide a moment of silence 
4. to teach Bible study courses 
5. to use religious symbols and religious holidays to teach about 
religious customs and cultures and 
6. permit student initiated prayers. 
It is further concluded that the following activities are unconstitutional: 
1. to release students on campus for religious instruction, including 
shared time programs 
2. to teach balanced treatment of creationism and evolution 
3. to distribute religious materials on campus 
4. to use school-sponsored prayers and Bible reading 
5. to display permanent religious symbols 
6. to permit prayers at graduation exercises and athletic events and 
7. to require students to participate in school activities that conflict 
with sincerely held religious beliefs 
APPROVAL PAGE 
This dissertation has been approved by the following committee of the 
Faculty of The Graduate School at The University of North Carolina at 
Greensboro. 
Dissertation Advisor 
Committee Members 
» 
Date of Acceptance by Committee 
l)ate of Final Oral Examination 
ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I wish to sincerely thank Dr. Joseph E. Bryson, who served as the 
chairperson of the doctoral committee, for his many hours of commitment and 
guidance in helping me complete this dissertation. His faith in me encouraged 
me to press forward whenever I waivered. His friendship is extremely valuable 
to me. 
Appreciation is expressed to my remaining committee members 
Dr. Dale Brubaker, Dr. E. Lee Bernick, and Dr. Keith Wright. I appreciate 
their guidance and devotion of time. Dr. James Runkel, a former committee 
member, deserves recognition for this help as a professor and advisor. 
Appreciation is also expressed to my professional colleagues in public 
education who provided encouragement, advice, and cooperation during the 
preparation of this dissertation. Special recognition is given to Dr. Tommy 
Hall, Dr. Jeny Campbell, and Mr. and Mrs. Bob Stone for their special help. 
The writer expresses personal gratitude to his parents, Mr. and Mrs. 
Mott S. Redmond. Finally, I wish to give my deepest appreciation and love to 
the ones who have been by my side through the entire doctoral program, my 
wife, Annette, and our three children, David, Leigh Ellen, and Ben. My wife 
took care of the children, offered personal and professional advice, and was 
there when I needed a hug. Hopefully, I can now give them more attention 
which they all richly deserve. 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
APPROVAL PAGE ii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS i i i 
CHAPTER 
I. INTRODUCTION 1 
Statement of the Problem 4 
Purpose of the Study 5 
Questions to be Answered 5 
Methodology. 6 
Definition of Terms 7 
Significance of the Study 10 
Limitations of the Study 11 
Design of the Study 11 
H. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 13 
Old World Influence on America Education 13 
Colonial Settlement in America 16 
The New England Colonies 17 
The Middle Colonies 25 
The Southern Colonies 26 
Colonial Attitudes 27 
American Education in the Colonial Period 29 
American Education in the Eighteenth Century 3 3 
American Education in the Nineteenth Centuiy. 51 
American Education in the Twentieth Century. 7 5 
Separation of Church and State 79 
Summary 94 
m. THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC 
SCHOOL CURRICULUM 97 
Introduction 97 
History of Church-State Litigation 106 
Curriculum Decisions 107 
iv 
Released Time for Religious Instruction 113 
On Campus 113 
Off Campus 115 
Shared Time 117 
School-Sponsored Prayer and Bible Reading 121 
Patriotic Exercises 151 
Creationism and Evolution: Balanced Treatment 159 
Equal Access and Religious Groups on Campus 166 
Prayer at Athletic Events 185 
Religious Symbols and Holidays 189 
Moment of Silence 194 
Secular Humanism 198 
Graduation Exercises 209 
Distribution of Religious Literature 217 
GideonBibles 217 
Other Materials— 224 
Bible Study Courses 229 
Compulsory Attendance 238 
Immunization 249 
IV. ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS 254 
Introduction 254 
Released Time for Religious Instruction 258 
On Campus 258 
Off Campus 263 
Shared Time 269 
School-Sponsored Prayer and Bible Reading 274 
Patriotic Exercises 297 
Creationism and Evolution: Balanced Treatment 310 
Equal Access and Religious Groups on Campus 321 
Prayer at Athletic Events 339 
Religious Symbols and Holidays 347 
Moment of Silence 359 
Secular Humaniism 37 5 
Graduation Exercises 390 
Distribution of Religious Literature 414 
GideonBibles 414 
Other Materials 421 
Bible Study Courses 433 
Compulsory Attendance 439 
Immunization 444 
v 
V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 455 
Summary 455 
Questions and Answers 461 
Conclusions 463 
Recommendations 465 
Recommendations for Further Study 468 
POSTSCRIPT 470 
TABLE OF CASES 471 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .. 486 
APPENDIX A. IREDELL-STATESVILLE SCHOOLS PRAYER POLICY 505 
APPENDIX B. TEXTBOOKS BANNED IN ALABAMA 509 
vi 
1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
LET US PRAY! Why does a nation that has "One Nation Under God" 
in its pledge of allegiance and "In God We Trust" on its currency rule prayer 
unconstitutional in the public schools? "What many people do not understand 
is that the United States is not a government of religion, but a nation of 
essentially religious people."! 
"The role of religion in the public schools is one of the most controversial 
issues in American education. "2 This controversy is due to the vast number 
of religious groups and their widely differing opinions.̂  In addition to being 
controversial, religion in public schools is a very emotional issued School 
officials face challenges in trying to follow the laws of the land, accommodate 
local religious customs, protect the rights of minority groups, and deal with 
their own religious beliefs. In a country with 1200 different religious bodies,® 
*H. C. Hudgins, Jr. and Richard S. Vacca, Law and Education: 
Contemporary Issues and Court Decisions. 3ded. (Charlottesville, Virginia: 
The Michie Company, 1991), 399. 
2 John David Burkholder, "Religious Rights of Teachers in Public 
Education." Journal of Law and Education 18. no. 3 (Summer 1989): 335. 
^ Ibid. 
4lbid., 336. 
^Nancy Gibbs, "America's Holy Wars," Time 138 no. 23 
(9 December 1991): 62. 
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school officials must be more knowledgeable about the laws governing religious 
issues in the public schools. School oficials must not let pressure groups for 
local religious customs or their own religious beliefs keep them from protecting 
the rights of students. Students do not leave their rights at the "schoolhouse 
gate."6 
For the first one hundred fifty years of America's existence, no one 
seriously challenged the legality of providing religious activities, curricular or 
extracurricular, as part of the public school curriculum. In fact, many states, 
beginning with Massachusetts in 1647, required religious activities as part of 
the public school curriculum.7 Since the 1940s, however, in ever increasing 
numbers, there have been challenges to providing religious activities as a part 
of the public school curriculum. Before this period school officials met little if 
any resistance in designing curricula that provided religious activities on a daily 
basis. 
There are two main groups in the struggle over religious activities in the 
public schools. The "separationists" on one hand argue that church and state 
must remain apart and that government should not be in the business of 
endorsing one faith over another. The "accommodationists," on the other hand, 
believe the "wall of separation" has grown too thick and costs too much. They 
contend that "by isolating God from public life the courts have replaced 
freedom of religion with freedom from religion."® 
^Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 
U.S. 503, 89 St.Ct 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). 
7Neil Gerard McCluskey, Public Schools and Moral Education (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 12. 
8Gibbs, 62. 
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One duty of school officials is to protect the First Amendment religious 
freedoms of each child. The guarantees of religious freedom are expressed in 
the First Amendment to the Constitution in these words: "Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof. "9 When Congress adopted the First Amendment it sought to 
protect citizens from an established state church, since many members of 
Congress and their ancestors had come to America to escape from an 
established state church. At the time the First Amendment was adopted there 
were few denominations; "today there are more than 289 denominations listed 
in the Handbook of Denominations in the United States."1® Over the years 
individuals have used the courts to protect their free exercise of religion and to 
ensure governmental neutrality in matters of religion. 11 Some examples 
follow: 
(1) WfiH* Virginia RnarH of Education v. Barnette. 1943. 
(2) Engel v. Vitale. 1962 
(3) Abinerton School District v. Schempp. 1963 
(4) Yoder v. Wisconsin. 1972 
(5) Lee v. Weisman. 1992 
In Abington School District Schempp the Supreme Court ruled that 
the state laws requiring devotional Bible reading in schools violated the 
9U- S. Constitution. Amendment I. 
l^Kristen J. Amundson, Ttelipinn in £hg Public Schools (Arlington: 
Virginia: American Association of School Administrators, 1986), 3. 
1 llbid., 4-21. 
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establishment clause of the First Amendment as applied to the states by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 12 Even though the Supreme Court first ruled on 
school-sponsored prayer in 1962, the issue is still controversial. From 1962 to 
1985 at least 200 proposals were introduced into the United States Congress 
to overturn the Supreme Court ruling on school prayer. 13 School-sponsored 
prayer and devotional Bible reading in public schools have created the greatest 
sources of litigation and public confusion concerning religious neutrality. 14 in 
order to protect religious freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment school 
boards must be knowledgeable about curriculum activities that have been and 
may be challenged by students under the First Amendment School officials 
must exercise caution in formulating policies that permit local religious 
customs as a part of the public school curriculum. America is a culturally 
diverse society. School districts have to be sensitive to minority rights as well 
as majority rights. It is the responsibility of school boards and school officials 
to protect the rights of all individuals within school districts. 
Statement of the Problem 
School officials face a dilemma today in formulating policy to 
accommodate local religious customs and their own religious beliefs, and at the 
same time comply with their legal duty to protect the religious rights of 
individuals as guaranteed by the First Amendment School officials' knowledge 
12lbid., 19. 
13 James E. Wood, "Church-State Issues in Education in the 1980s," 
Rfilifrinn and Public Education 12, no. 3 (Summer 1985): 77. 
l^Amundson, 15. 
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or lack of knowledge of federal laws, state laws, school board policies, local 
religious customs, and their own religious beliefs concerning religious activities 
as part of the public school curriculum will influence how they deal with 
religious activities, curricular and extracurricular, as part of the public school 
curriculum. This study provides information that may help school officials in 
formulating policies that guarantee that no one's beliefs, religious or 
nonreligious, are infringed upon by the school system. 
Purpoqq pf the gfody 
The purposes of this study are: (1) to review the history of religion in 
the public school curriculum; (2) to determine from current literature the 
critical legal issues involving religion in the public school curriculum; (3) to 
review and analyze case law related to religion in the public school curriculum; 
and (4) to provide guidelines for practicing school administrators who must 
make decisions on the legality of permitting religious activities as part of the 
public school curriculum. This study is developed in a factual manner based on 
the legal issues involved and will not attempt to address the moral values 
inherent in permitting religious activities in the public school curriculum. 
Questions to Be Answered 
This study is limited to litigation regarding religious activities in the 
public school curriculum. A mqjor purpose of this study is to develop practical 
legal guidelines for educational decision makers to have at their disposal when 
faced with decisions concerning permissable religious practices in the public 
school curriculum. 
6 
This study answers the following questions: 
1. What legal guidelines can be set forth to aid school officials 
in policy-making and practices of religion in the public 
schools? 
2. What are the mqjor legal issues regarding religion in the 
curriculum of public schools? 
3. Are there discernible patterns and trends that are 
identified from analysis of judicial decisions? 
4. Based on established legal precedents, what are the legally 
acceptable criteria for permitting religious practices in the 
curriculum of public schools? 
Methodology 
Legal research as defined by Hudgins and Vacca* & was the methodology 
used for tins study. Legal principles were derived from an analysis of judicial 
decisions. 
The framing of a problem as a legal issue is the beginning of legal 
research. In this study, the issue is the legal aspects of religion in the public 
school curriculum. Federal and state court decisions were investigated. A 
bibliography of court decisions was assembled. Each federal and state judicial 
decision was read and analyzed for three mqjor reasons: the facts of the case, 
the decision and rationale, and implications of the decision. 
Federal and state court decisions are the primary sources for this study. Legal 
encyclopedias, law reviews, educational articles, and books are secondary 
l^Hudgins, 25-55. 
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sources used to provide supplemental information for this study. The Current 
American Law Reports, and Resources m Education are included as resources. 
The actual court cases are examined as reported in the National 
Reporter System, which includes decisions rendered by the following courts: the 
United States Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals, the United 
States District Courts, and state appellate courts. Decisions from lower 
courts are included when higher-level judicial decisions are not available for a 
given area of research. Cases were read and categorized according to the 
nature of the involvement of religion in the public school curriculum. 
Shenard's Citations were used to "shepardize" legal cases. This provided 
a history of reported judicial decisions and a treatment of those decisions. This 
also allowed the researcher to depend on the applicable judicial holding. 
Definition of Terms 
For the purposes of this study the following definitions are used: 
Balancing Test: "A constitutional doctrine in which the court 
weighs the right of an individual to certain rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution with rights of a state to protect its citizens from the invasion of 
their rights; used in cases involving freedom of speech and equal protection."! 6 
Certiorari: "A writ from a superior to an inferior court requiring the 
latter to produce a certified record of a particular case tried therein."! 7 
1 ̂Black's Law Dictionary. 5th ed. (St Paul, Minn.: West Publishing 
Company, 1979), 131. 
17lbid.,207. 
8 
Creationism: "The doctrine that ascribes the origin of matter, species, 
etc. to acts of creation by God."18 
f!nrrifni1nm; "All of the interactions among persons as well as the 
interactions between persons and their physical environment. "19 (This 
definition refers to all the interactions persons encounter in school settings.) 
Equal Access Act: "Public Law 98-377 of 1984 which states that it is 
unlawful for any public secondary school which receives federal financial 
assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal access or a fair 
opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a 
meeting within the limited open forum on the basis of the religious, political, 
philosophical, or other content of the speech at such meetings."20 
Evolution: "Biology: a.) the development of a species, organism, or 
organ from its original or primitive state to its present or specialized state; 
phylogeny or ontogeny, b.) the theory now generally accepted, that all species 
of plants and animals developed from earlier forms of hereditary transmission 
of slight variations in successive generations. "21 
Federal Laws: Laws passed by Congress or laws arising as the 
result of federal court decisions. 
Humanism: "Any system of thought or action based on the nature, 
ISWebster's New World Dictionary of the American Language. Second 
College Edition, (New York: New World Dictionaires/Simon and Schuster, 
1984), 332.. 
Practice (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1982), 2. 
2020 USC 4071, Section 802 (a). 
21 Webster's New World Dictionary, p.486. 
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dignity, interests, and ideals of man;specifically, a modern, nontheistic, 
rationalist movement that holds that man is capable of self-fiilfillment, ethical 
conduct, etc. without recourse to supernationalism. "2 2 
Legal Dutv: The legal obligation of a person to follow federal, state, and 
local laws. 
Local Customs: Religious practices that are traditionally permitted on a 
local level in public schools. 
Moment of Silence: "A short period of time, usually a minute in length, 
implemented at the beginning of the school day as a time for completely 
unstructured private thoughts or contemplation. In North Carolina, this 
statute was enacted in 1985."23 
Public Schools: "Schools established under the laws of the 
state (and usually regulated in matter of detail by the local authorities) in the 
various districts, counties, or towns, maintained at the public expense by 
taxation, and open, usually without charge, to the children of the residents of 
the city, town, or other district. Schools belonging to the public and established 
and conducted under public authority."24 
Religion: "As used in constitutional provisions of the First 
Amendment forbidding the 'establishment of religion,' the term means a 
particular system of faith and worship recognized and practiced by a particular 
church, sect, or denomination. "2 5 In public education this means a particular 
22lbid., 682. 
23North Carolina General Statute 115C-47 (29), 1985. 
24filack, 1207. 
25lbid., 1161. 
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system of faith and worship that is practiced within the public schools and 
inclusive of school activities and is subject to litigation. 
School board policies: Policies approved by the board of education. 
Sectarian: "Denominational; devoted to, peculiar to, pertaining to, or 
promotive of, the interest of a sect, or sects. In a broader sense used to 
describe the activities of the followers of one faith as related to those of 
adherents of another."^® 
Secular: "Of or relating to worldy things as distinguished from things 
relating to church and religion; not sacred or religious; temporal; worldly 
[secular music, secular schools]"  ̂
State Laws: Laws passed by the state or laws resulting from state 
courts. 
Sipnifinflnce of the Study 
Increasing numbers of individuals are seeking court redress for their 
grievances regarding religious activities as part of the public school curriculum. 
As the demands for accountability increase, school officials need to understand 
better the implications of recent judicial decisions regarding this issue and the 
factors affecting their decisions to obey or ignore the law of the land. 
School officials, in order to protect religious freedoms guaranteed by the 
First Amendment, must be knowledgeable about federal and state laws 
affecting the public school curriculum. The information gained from this study 
26ibid., 1214. 
^ ̂ Webster's New Word Dictionary. 1288. 
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will enable school officials to understand better what is allowable under the law 
with regard to this issue. 
Limitations of the Study 
This study is limited to an analysis of federal and state court cases 
regarding religious activities in the public schools. The Supreme Court in 1962 
and 1963 held school prayers unconstitutional. The Supreme Court rulings 
should have but did not end controversy over whether to allow prayer in public 
schools. Much has changed during the intervening years in the attitudes of 
society and the courts. 
Design of the Study 
Chapter I contains an introduction, the statement of the problem, the 
purpose of the study, the questions to be answered, the methodology, the 
definition of terms, the significance of the study, the limitations of the study, 
and the design of the study. 
Chapter II presents a review of the literature related to the legal 
aspects of religion in the public school curriculum, as well as a summary 
review of the historical development and growth of public education in United 
States. 
Chapter m is a presentation of religious practices that have been 
litigated in the state and federal courts. Attention is also focused on current 
trends. 
Chapter IV is a review and an analysis of selected judicial decisions on 
religious practices in the public school curriculum. The facts of the cases, 
decisions of the courts, and discussions are presented for each category. 
12 
Chapter V is a summary of the information obtained from a review of 
the literature and from the analysis of the selected court cases. The questions 
asked in the introductory part of the study are answered. Conclusions are 
drawn on the current legal status of religion in the public school curriculum. 
Finally, general conclusions and recommendations are presented. 
13 
CHAPTER H 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Old World Influences on Amprr'nan Education 
American civilization roots are anchored in the ancient Greek and 
Roman civilizations. The Greeks introduced a personal and political freedom 
and initiative by trusting themselves to follow truth as they saw it. Greek 
literature, art, and philosophy were a legacy and cultural heritage for Western 
ciivilization. The Romans contributed law, government, and practical arts. 
Christianity building on Greek philosophical ideas, especially those of Aristotle 
and Plato, and Roman love of law, and with its new ideas evolved from the past, 
form the connecting link and preserving bond between the old and new 
civilizations.28 
In time the Roman Empire fell, Greek was forgotten, Latin was evolved 
into several European languages and knowledge of art and sciences 
disappeared. Moreover, schools disappeared. Though weakened, the Christian 
Church saved civilization. It took ten centuries to reconstruct enough of the 
ancient civilization so the modern world was able to survive.29 
The Renaissance began in Italy, and other city-states and nations 
joined. The Renaissance, is characterized by 
28Ellwood P. Cubberley, Public Education nj the United States (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1934), 1-2. 
29lbid., 3. 
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(1) a wonderful revival of ancient learning; (2) a great 
expansion of men's thoughts; (3) a general questioning of all 
ancient authority; (4) a great religious awakening; (5) a 
wonderful period of world exploration and discovery, (6) the 
founding of new nations on new lands; (7) the reawakening of 
of the old Greek spirit of scientific inquiry, and (8) the 
evolution of our modern civilization. 30 
The development of manufactured paper and the invention of the 
printing press provided a prime opportunity to advance the new learning. 
Paper was in general use throughout Europe by 1450.31 The invention of 
Gutenburg printing as the greatest invention to improve the flow of 
information since the invention of writing.32 Johannes Gutenburg, a goldsmith 
from Maniz, Gennany, used movable type made of a metal alloy, with which 
type could be cast precisely and in large quantities. By 1448, Gutenburg had 
established a large printing office in Mainz, Germ any. 33 The earliest 
documents with printed dates are "letters of indulgence" issued as early as 
1454 "from a press at Mainz and ascribed to Johannes Gutenburg. "3 4 By 
1475, the printing press was established in the all European leading cities and 
paved the way for a rapid extension of schools and learning. In time, the 
30lbid, 3. 
31lbid,5. 
32£dgar W. Knight, Twenty Centuries of Education (Boston: Ginn and 
Company, 1940), 214. 
33Hugh Thomas, & History of the World (New York: Harper and Row, 
1979), 199. 
34Rnight,216. 
15 
printing press was destined "to become one of the world's greatest tools for 
human progress and individual liberty."^ 5 
The changed attitude toward the Roman church's dogmatic and 
repressive rule was very important in American educational history, perhaps 
more important than the Renaissance. Led by Martin Luther and German 
princes, people defied the church's authority and revolted. The revolt spread 
throughout all of Europe and the Roman Catholic Church and Western Europe 
were premanently divided 36 
Even though principles of religious toleration had been established, the 
Western world was not ready for such rapid change. A century and a half of 
religious warfare passed before the people of Western Europe were willing to 
stop fighting and recognize other religious ideas among other people. Even 
though the fighting was concluded, hostile religious ideological camps existed 
long into the nineteenth century. As the progress of civilization slowed, misery 
spread and because of suffering, people fled home to new colonies rather than 
conform. 3 7 
The main idea underlying Martin Luther's, Huldreich Zwingli's, John 
Calvin's, and John Knox's actions was to substitute the Bible authority for 
Church authority. The basis for this action came out of the revival of Greek 
study and recovery of Gospels' written Greek language. In theory at least, to 
be saved meant that one must be able to read God's word, participate in 
S^Cubberley, 5. 
36cubberley, 6-7. 
37Cubberley, 7-8. 
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church service intelligently and live lives predicated on spiritual mandates.38 
Formally salvation was predicated on church authority, thus, it was not 
important for more than a few to be educated. The new theory emphasized 
individual responsibility, thus, a least for Protestants, education of all became 
a vital necessity. To provide public education meant the creation of a 
completely new type of school, the elementaiy school, taught in the native 
language of common people. Elementaiy schools replaced the secondaiy Latin 
schools of the Renaissance. And for church leaders cathedral and monastic 
Latin schools were necessary. A dual school system developed in Europe-
elementary schools for the masses and secondary schools for the classes.39 
With the Renaissance well underway and sweeping new knowledge, 
secondary schools emerged to provide formal reorganization for students. 
Moreover, the Reformation provided a new motive for education in religion not 
intended for either service to state or church. Of all revolting countries, only 
England failed to develop educational institutes for Protestants. In time, 
elementaiy education in England did develop. However, the movement occured 
only as the results of new political and industrial developments in the late 
nineteenth centuiy.̂ O 
Colonial Settlement. in Amm-ira 
"The settlement of America, it has been said, had its origins in the 
38]bid,8. 
39Cubberley, 9. 
40n,id. 
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unsettlement of Europe. "4 1 European upheaval encapsulating political, 
economic, and social conditions, and a result of the Renaissance and the 
ProtestantReformation, set the stage for the American colozination.42 in the 
seventeenth century Englishmen in unprecedented numbers left England 
seeking religious freedom and economic opportunity in the colonies.43 The 
English were not alone in colonizing America. Early colonial settlers included 
Spanish, French, Dutch, Czechs, Swedes, Scottish Presbyterians, Portuguese 
Jews, and Germans. The cultural contact not only included the relationships 
between Europeans and Indians, but also Europeans groups. The rival 
colonies intensified burdens placed on education. 44 
Colonization of America lasted approximately two hundred years, from 
Roanoke Island in 1587 and Jamestown in 1607 to the signing of the 
Declaration of Independence from England in 1776. Every European group 
that came during the two centuries brought customs from the old country. 4 5 
The New England Colonies 
The first permanent settlement in New England, which was the second 
in English America, resulted from discontent of Puritan Separatists. 
4l£,awrence A Cremin, Traditions of American Education (New York: 
Basic Books, Inc., 1977), 3. 
42jbid. 
43lbid. 4. 
44lbid.,6. 
4£>Edwin Scott Gaustad. A Religious History of America (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1966), 27-110. 
18 
Separatists, many imprisoned and some even executed for opposing 
government's Church of England, decided to leave England, which was illegal 
without the consent of the king, and head to America. In 1608 Separatists 
from a congregation in Scrooby, in Nottinghamshire, first emigrated to Holland 
and in time concerned with influence of Dutch culture made plans for the new 
colonies. They intended to establish a colony without interference and where 
they could spread "the gospel of the Kingdom of Christ to those remote parts of 
the  world .6  
In 1620, Separatists with permission from the Virginia Company to 
settle an independent community with ownership of land in Virginia made 
plans to sail. James I said he would "not molest them, provided they carried 
themselves peaceably. "4 7 This historic concession opened English America to 
settlement by dissenting Protestants.^^ Led by William Brewster, the 
Puritans contracted with London merchants to form a joint economic 
adventure in northern Virginia.^® 
In the fall of 1620, the Mayflower, with over one hundred passengers, 
began a difficult voyage, due to rough seas, crowded conditions, and improper 
4®Richard N. Current, T Hany Williams, Frank Freidel, and Alan 
Brink1eyr .American History: A Survey tQ. 1877. vol 1 (New York: Alfred A 
Knopf, 1987), 38. 
47][bicL 
48t. Harry Williams, Richard N. Current, and Frank Freidel, £ History 
of the United States: To 1877.2d ed., rev. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), 
36. 
^^Norman A. Graebner, Gilbert C. Fite, and Philip W. White, & History 
of the United States, vol 1 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970). 49-50. 
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diet Sighting Cape Cod, the Mayflower pilgrims realized they were out of the 
London Company's jurisdiction and thus had no authority for governance. It is 
at this time, especially when some of the non-Puritans began to discuss "their 
own liberty," that William Brewster, John Carver, William Bradford, and 
others insisted that some form of self-government compact be agreed upon. 
This, the Mayflower Compact, was the first self-government in America.50 
The Compact read: 
In ye name of God. We whose names are unwritten, the 
loyall subjects of our dread soveraigne Lord King James, by 
ye grace of God, of Great Britarne, Franc, & Ireland king, 
defender of ye faith, &c. Haveing undertaken, for ye glorie of 
God, and advancements of ye Christian faith and honor of our 
king & countrie, a voyage to plant ye first colonie in ye Northerne 
parts of Virginia, doe by these presents solemnly & mutually in 
ye presence of God, and one of another, covenant, & combine 
ourselves togeather into a Civill body politick; for our better 
ordering, & preservation & furtherance of ye ends aforesaid; 
and by vertue hereof to enacte, constitute, and frame such just & 
equall Lawes, ordinances, Acts, constitutions, & offices, from 
time to time, as shall be thought most meete & convenient for ye 
generall good of ye colonie: unto which we promise all due 
submission and obedience. In witness whereof we have hereunder 
subscribed our names at Cap-Codd ye-ll-of November, in ye 
raigne of our soveraigne Lord King James of England, BVance, 
& Ireland ye eighteenth, and of Scotland ye fiftie fourth. 
Ano. Dom. 1620.51 
The pilgrims landed on December 21,1620, at a site they named 
Plymouth. At the end of a difficult year and a plentiful harvest, the Plymouth 
50lbid. 
5 iThe Worid Book Encyclopedia. (Chicago: World Book Inc., 1991), s. v. 
"Mayflower Compact," by Joan R Gundersen. 
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Colony was a celebrated success.®  ̂
The example set by the Plymouth Colony plus the turbulent events in 
England generated a strong interest in colonization among other groups of 
Puritans. The Massachusetts Bay Colony, which sailed for New England in 
1630 with seventeen ships and one thousand people, was the largest single 
migration of its kind in the seventeenth century. Governor John Winthrop 
brought with him the charter of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, establishing 
colonial authority within the colony. 5 3 
The colonists were seen and indeed saw themselves as God's agents, not 
merely patriots and adventurers. A Puritan preacher, John Cotton, preached 
God's approval for the voyage to New England in his sermon to the Winthrop 
fleet at Gravesend in June, 1630:54 "j will appoint a place for my people 
Israel, and will plant them, that they may dwell in a place of their own, and 
move no more; neither shall the children of wickedness afflict them any more, 
as beforetime."55 Being a part of God's grand design brought a sense of 
purpose to the institutions of colonial education. Colonists were committed to 
creating and maintaining Zion. 5 6 Governor John Winthrop in his famous 
sermon, "A Model for Christian Charity," which he delivered on the ship 
Arabella shortly before it arrived in New England stated: "The eyes of all the 
^Graebner, Fite, and White, 51. 
53current, Williams, Freidel, andBrinkley, 40. 
54cremin, 10. 
55n Samuel 7:10 
56cremin, 10. 
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world are upon us. The new colony would be 'a city on the hill1 an example of 
virtue and godliness to the rest of the world. "57 
Unlike the Mayflower pilgrims, the new Massachusetts migration 
immediately produced several new settlements: Charlestown, Newtown, 
Roxbury, Dorchester, Watertown, Ipswich, Concord, with Boston as the 
colony's capital. The Massachusetts Bay Company soon became the 
Massachusetts colonial government.^ 
Plymouth colonists received a patent for the land from the Council of 
New England but never obtained a royal charter giving them indisputable 
rights of government. With over seventy years of histoiy and as citizens of a 
de facto independent republic, they were annexed by the larger colony of 
Massachusetts Bay.^9 
Different from the original, the Puritans who founded Massachusetts 
had no intention of breaking away from the Church of England. They only 
wanted to purify the church from the evil influence of Rome. Their behavior 
showed little if any enthusiasm for and to the Anglician establishment. The 
community church had complete authority with no connection to the Anglican 
Church. The congregation of each church had complete authority to choose 
the minister and control all goverance and policy, thus a Congregational 
church.60 
5 7 Current, Williams, Freidel, and Brinkley, 43. 
58lbid, 40-41. 
59Williams, Current, and Freidel, 37. 
60ibid.,42. 
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It did not take long for the English settlement to begin colonizing other 
parts of New England. Unproductiveness of the rocky soil around Boston and 
the oppressiveness of the Massachusetts government were reasons to push on 
to new colonies. Later migrations would occur because of the growing 
population pressures in the original settlements.®! 
Not all settlers in Massachusetts were Puritans and as the population 
increased, the proportion of Puritans and others favored nonPuritans.62 Even 
though the leaders were Puritan, most other settlers were small merchants, 
farmers, and artisans who fled England because of hard economic times and 
persecution. Only about one-filth of the settlers were church members.63 
Rhode Island was settled by Soger Williams and Anne Hutchinson and 
both were expelled for opposition to the church in Massachusetts. Roger 
Williams received a charter from Parliament establishing a single government 
for the heterogeneous settlements around Providence. Rhode Island's 
government was patterned after Massachusetts, but it did not restrict vote to 
church members nor tax for church support. In 1663 a royal charter 
confirmed this arrangement and added a guarantee of "liberty in religious 
concernments." For a time Rhode Island was the only colony in which all faiths 
could worship without interference.®^ 
In 1635, Thomas Hooker, a minister from Cambridge, defied the 
6 ̂ Current, Williams, Freidel, and Brinkley, 43 
62ibid. 
Power (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1957), 19. 
^Current, Williams, Freidel, and Brinkley, 44. 
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Massachusetts government and led a congregation 100 miles beyond the 
settled frontier to establish the town of Hartford in the Connecticut Valley. 
Four years later the towns of Hartford, Windsor, and Wethersfield established 
a government known as the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut Even though 
Connecticut's government was similar to that of Massachusetts Bay, more 
people had the right to vote and hold office.®  ̂
John Davenport, a Puritan minister and wealthy merchant from 
England, founded New Haven on the Connecticut coast. In 1639, the colony 
established a Bible-based government, The Fundamental Articles of New 
Haven, which was more ideologically religiously based than Massachusetts 
Bay. In 1662, the governor of Connecticut received a royal charter extending 
his jurisdiction over the New Haven.66 
In 1629, Maine and New Hampshire were established when two English 
proprietors, Captain John Mason and Sir Ferdinando Gorges, divided a grant 
obtained from the Council for New England along the Piscataqua River and 
created two separate settlements. Even with generous marketing efforts, 
especially by Gorges, few people inhibited the northern regions until volatile 
religious activities occurred in Massachusetts Bay. In 1639, John 
Wheelwright, a disciple of Anne Hutchinson, led some of his fellow dissenters to 
Exeter, New Hampshire. Soon other groups, both dissenters and orthodox 
Puritans, settled in Maine and New Hampshire. Even though Massachusetts 
Bay Company attempted to extend authority over the newly settled northern 
region, in time all was lost After a long legal battle in England's highest court, 
65lbid.,43. 
6f>Ibid. 
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New Hampshire became a separate royal province in 1679. Finally, 
Massachusetts bought the claims of the Gorges heirs and gained control of 
Maine which remained a part of Massachusetts until 1820.67 
Puritans continued to exercise absolute influence over all New England. 
StiU, Quakers, Baptists, Presbyterians, and Anglicians who settled in the area 
ventured to challenge the permanent control of Congregationalism.®® 
The influence of the New England Puritans on American culture is 
pervasive. 
No other colonizing people dominated colonial culture as did the 
Puritans. The Catholics in Maryland, the Quakers in Pennsylvania, 
and the Baptists in Rhode Island, as important as those cultures 
were, were only marginal compared to the Puritans.69 
The Middle Colonies 
Since no dominant church group controlled the middle colonies, they 
were a "melting pot" of many religious sects. Prior to the Revolutionary War 
sixteen distinct sects were settled in the middle colonies, including Quakers, 
Mennonites, Lutherans and Reformed Germans, Baptists, Methodists, 
Presbyterians, Anglicans, Catholics, and Jews.70 
"One thing the Protestant sects held in common was their fear and hate 
S^ibid. 
6&V. T. Thayer, Ttelitrinn Public Education (New York: The Viking 
Press, 1947), 10. 
69Joseph e. Bryson and Samuel H. Houston, Jr., The Supreme Court 
and Public Funds for Religious Schools: The Burger Yeare. 1969-1986 
(Jefferson, North Carolina:McFarland and Company. Inc., 1990), 9. 
70 Thayer, 10. 
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of Catholicism."? 1 Catholics as a group were suspected and feared. As 
individuals, they lived almost entirely outside the principal cultural and political 
affairs. They were denied religious freedom, the right to participate in 
government, and to education. On the eve of the American Revolution, many 
of these burdensome disabilities and penalties had been removed, yet the 
record establishes that constitutional conventions of only four of the original 
thirteen states gave Catholics the unrestricted right to vote and hold office. 7 2 
The Southern Colonies 
The Church of England was the dominant faith in Virginia and North 
and South Carolina yet in the western sections of North Carolina, Georgia, and 
Virginia, non-conformists such as Quakers, Baptists, Huguenots, and 
Presbyterian resisted the established church. 7 3 These frontier settlements of 
many different religious sects opposed tax support of the Church of England. 
As long as frontier settlers served as a buffer against the Indians, the Church 
ignored them and allowed congregations to build churches and worship as they 
pleased. ̂  ̂  in time as the Indian threat passed, attempts were made to tax 
them for support of the Church of England and to force them to receive 
Anglican clergymen. 7 5 
71lbid., 11. 
72Neil G. McCluskey, Catholic Education ia America: A Dnmimftnterv 
History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), 3. 
73Thayer, 10. 
74ibid.,20. 
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James Madison and Thomas Jefferson were dominant forces for a 
democratic frontier.?® Virginia was the first state embracing a "declaration of 
rights" which addressed religious freedom and provided stimulus for subsequent 
drafting of religious guarantees included in the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution Bill of Rights. Both Jefferson and Madison were greatly 
influenced by John Locke, who contended that religion is entirely a personal 
matter which should be beyond the reach of civil magistrates. 77 in 1776, 
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson secured the passage of a Virginia bill 
which legalized all forms of worship and exempted dissenters from parish 
rates.78 Xn 1785, the state took the final step in passing the Religious 
Freedom Act, "which disestablished the Episcopal Church, abolished all parish 
rates, and forbade the use of religious tests for office. "7 9 
Following Virginis's lead between 1776 and 1783 most of the original 
thirteen states embraced a formal declaration of rights, and others 
incorporated some guarantee of individual liberties in their constitutions.80 
The North Carolina Constitution of 1776 states in part: "all men have a 
natural and inalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates 
76-rhayer, 20. 
77Leo Pfeffer, "Religion, Education and the Constitution," Lawyers Guild 
Review 8 (1948): 387. 
78xhayer, 20. 
79lbid. 
80Martha M. McCarthy. "Religion and Public Schools: Emerging Legal 
Standards and Unresolved Issues," Harvard Educational Review 55. No. 3 
(August 1985): 289. 
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of their own conscience. "81 In 1777, Vermont approved a like provision, 
adding, however, the importance of scriptures as a guide for conscience.̂  2 
The Articles of Confederation of1777 did not address personal freedoms, the 
assumption being that citizens' rights were a concern of the states.83 
Colonial Attitudes 
Many settlers in the American colonies had crossed the Atlantic to avoid 
persecution or discrimination because of religious belief, yet few of them were 
willing to extend freedom of conscience to others. Whether it was the 
Established Church of England or new and different churches, the concept of 
establishment remained.84 in ail colonies except Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, find New Jersey, efforts were made early in each colony to restrict 
the privilege of residence to religious faithful although the nature of the true 
faith varied from colony to colony. 8 5 Many colonies were so firm in religious 
beliefs and practices that nonbelievers were punished or expelled. 8 6 Roger 
Williams was expelled from Massachusetts for his advocacy of religious 
freedom. He founded Rhode Island as a haven for everyone who wanted a 
choice to believe or not to believe as his conscience dictated. Williams believed 
SlThayer, 21. 
82lbid. 
^McCarthy, 289. 
84David W. Beggs, III and R. Bruce McQuigg, eds., America Schools 
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that the foundation of government should be predicated on popular 
sovereignty, not divine right, and that church was one of many social 
institutions. Roger Williams' ideology, once a minority view, prevailed later 
when the Bill of Rights provided for separation of church and stated 7 
Most Protestants believed that children should read the Bible as a 
source of truth and salvation. Colonists established public sectarian schools to 
ensure that children learned to read. Dissenters were not permitted to 
establish schools for their own children.88 
By late eighteenth century there was a pronounced movement in 
favoring increased religious liberty or toleration, albeit in different degrees, in all 
the colonies. Even before the Revolutionary War, colonists began to realize 
that it was advantageous "to set aside religious differences to facilitate trade 
and commerce among the colonies and as a matter of enlightened, republican 
philosophy. "8 9 Improved communication lessened the isolation of provincial 
America. The exchange of goods and ideas benefited each other. People 
discovered common human interests and a human basis for mutual respect. 
The economic development in colonies encouraged more cosmopolitan ways of 
living and thinking. John Wesley once remarked, "whatever riches have 
increased, the essence of religion has decreased in proportion."^ The 
necessity for unity increased when the divided colonies declared independence 
87Ibid., 38-39. 
88lbid.,39 
89Rodney K Smith, Public Praver and the Constitution (Wilmington. 
Delaware: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1987), 35. 
90rhayer, 15. 
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from Great Britain, the greatest militaiy power in the western world. The 
threat of war with Great Britain mandated at least a momentary setting aside 
of religious differences in the colonies. As experiences at Valley Forge and 
other militaiy engagements illustrated, soldiers and patriots with differing 
religious faiths had to ignore differences and cooperate in the effort against 
Britain. Even though some colonials never coexisted because of religious and 
political thought, cooperation, toleration, and coexistence among followers of 
different religious beliefs came to be a practical necessity in the colonies, "and 
what may have begun largely as an expedient truce among religionists was 
soon to find articulation in principles of religious toleration and liberty. "91 
Amftrinan Education in the Colonial Period 
The colonists transplanted the English village community to America, in 
that they transplanted an educational form of household, church, and school. 
Education was an obligation of the family. Providing the young with their ideas 
about life, home, community, and the world was a family responsibility. Some 
families provided systematic tutoring and communal devotion.92 
The church was less responsible for educating young people. Teaching 
within the church focused on symbolic and metaphoric interpretation of the 
meaning of life, language, and religious beliefs, preaching, catechizing, and 
religion in everday life.® 3 
In the early seventeeth centuiy preaching and catechizing were the 
91Smith, 35. 
92Cremin, 12. 
93Cremin, 12-13. 
most practiced form education. As communities gained greater stability and 
growing self-confidence formal schools were established. Colonists viewed 
schooling alter religion as the most important bulwark against the Devil. 9 4 
Abilities at the College of Cambridge," Jonathan Mitchell ("probably" in 
1663) in "A Modell for the Maintaining of Students and Fellows of Choice" 
described how he felt about the need for education: 
We in this country, being far removed from the more 
cultivated parts of the world, had need to use utmost 
care and diligence to keep up learning and all helps to 
education among us, lest degeneracy, barbarism, 
ignorance and irreligion do by degrees break in upon us.95 
The early Protestant colonial schools were largely instruments of 
religion. Knowledge of the gospels was seen by reformers as a means of 
personal salvation. This meant that children must be taught to read so they 
might become acquainted with the commandments of God and learn what was 
expected of them.96 
In addition to theEnglish, Spanish, French, Czechs, Swedes, Scottish 
Presbyterians, and German sectarians were among early settlers. And even 
though they settled on the frontier with their European customs regarding 
^^Lawrence Cremin, Amfsrinfln Education: The Colonial Experience 
1607-1783 (New York: Harper and Rowe Publishers, 1970), 176-177. 
9 5Jonathan Mitchell, "A Modell for the Maintaining of Students and 
Fellows of Choice Abilities at the College in Cambridge," Publications of the 
Colonial S Society of Massachusetts, XXXI (1935), 311, quoted in Lawrence 
Cremin, American Education: The Colonial Experience. 1607-1783 (New York: 
Harper & Row Publishers, 1970), 177. 
96Cubberley, 12. 
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religion and education, almost from tbe beginning the culture became English--
"English culture triumphed, and with it English law, English language, and 
English custom. 7 
The Puritans had the greatest influence on the course of education. 
They gave direction to the fixture development of the American educational 
system.98 
From 1634 to 1647, the General Court of Massachusetts passed four 
laws that were supremely important in establishing the direction of American 
public education. Two laws, in 1634 and 1638, established common taxation of 
all property for town and colony benefit, a principle that became the basis for 
present-day taxation to support public schools.®** 
The law of 1642 insisted that parents assume responsibility for their 
childrens' education, including the ability to read and understand religion and 
the capital laws of the country. "The law of 1642 is remarkable in that for the 
first time in the English speaking world, a legislative body representing the 
State ordered that all children should be taught to read."!®® 
And the fourth enactment, the famous Law of 1647, the "Old Deluder 
Satan Act," required a town with a least fifty families to 
... appoint one within their towne to teach all such 
children as shall resort to him to write and read.. .wages 
97 Cremin, Traditions of Am^n'rein Education. 6. 
98Cubberley, 13. 
99(Jubberley, 14. 
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shall be paid either to parents or masters of such children, 
or by ye inhabitants in general.. .101 
There were no English precedents for what Massachusetts had done. 
The Law of 1647 established for the first time in Anglo-Saxon history the right 
of the state to require communities to establish and maintain schools. 2 
Many towns obeyed the law. And some towns skillfully evaded the law. 
A teacher would be hired when the court was in session and dismissed when 
adjourned and/or some towns shuttled teachers back and forth between towns 
to make government officials believe that each town was maintaining a school. 
While larger and richer towns continuously maintained schools, the number of 
students enrolled were small. 103 
Regarding the four laws, George Martin, a Massachusetts historian, 
said: 
It is important to note here that the idea underlying 
all this legislation was neither paternalistic nor socialistic. 
The child is to be educated, not to advance his personal 
interests, but because the State will suffer if he is not 
educated. The State does not provide schools to relieve 
the parent, nor because it can educate better than the 
parent can, but because it can thereby better enforce the 
obligation which it imposes. 1^4 
101(Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in 
New England, vol. II, p.203. Boston, 1853), quoted in Ellwood P. Cubberley, 
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More important these four laws established a cornerstone for the 
American public educational system. "Massachusetts educational history is in 
essence the educational history of New England."*^ In the seventeenth 
century, all the New England colonies except Rhode Island which had been 
founded on the principle of religious freedom, used these laws as a basis of 
legislation for established and maintained public schools.Rhode Island was 
the exception because there was no state religious mandate forcing the issue. 
New England had the only public schools before the Revolutionary War. 
Education in the Middle Atlantic and Southern States could best be described 
"as localized religious schools with little lasting significance." 10 7 
American Education in the Eighteenth Century 
The seventeenth centuiy witnessed the transplanting of European ideas 
of government, religion, and education to the new American Colonies. By the 
eighteenth century three types of educational practices were well-established 
American. The first practice was strong Calvinistic religious state, promoting 
a system of common schools, higher Latin schools, and a college, for both 
religious and civic ends-the New England System. From New England the 
concept spread westward and deeply influenced later educational development 
of all westward states settled by New Englanders. The Calvinistic influence on 
lOSjjrygon and Houston, 11. 
lO^Cubberley, 19-20. 
lO^Bryson and Houston, 11. 
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education, and in time the church and state separation "evolved our modern 
state school systems."!®® 
The second was parochial school practice, most notably in the middle 
colonies of the Dutch, Moravians, Mennonites, German and Swedish 
Lutherans, German Reformed Church, Quakers, Presbyterians, Baptists, and 
Catholics. Protestant Pennsylvania and Catholic Maryland best portrayed 
the educational practice of church control of all educational effort, resented 
interference from the state, and was dominated by church standards, and "in 
time came to be a serious obstacle in the way of state organization and 
control."109 
The third type of educational practice, was public supported schools for 
orphans and the poor. There was often little or meager government support for 
these schools. Nevertheless, the Church of England often promoted the 
concept and government support continued to grow. Children of middle and 
upper classes in society attended private or church schools, or were taught by 
tutors in their homes. A tution fee was rendered for instructional services.HO 
The most imperative feature of early colonial schooling was influence of 
religious purpose in instruction. One learned to read mainly for the purpose of 
reading the Catechism and the Bible, and to "know the will of the Heavenly 
Father."! Even though of the religious component was more pervasive in 
lOSCubberley, 25. 
lOSlbid. 
HOjbid. 
Hllbid. 
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Calvinistic New England than in Southern Colonies, but throughout America 
during the early colonial period, the religious purpose was dominant. 
The analysis of textbooks really indicates dominance of religious 
influence in schools. Textbooks books used during the colonial period were the 
Hornbook, the religious Primar. the Psalter, the Tpstamfint. and the Bible. 
supplemented during later years by newer English textbooks, the most notable 
of which were those written by Hodder and Dilworth.l 13 
The New England Primer was first printed about 1660.114 Religious in 
nature, The New England Primer was used in schools and churches and was 
used in all the colonies except those under control of the Church ofEngland—"it 
taught millions to read and not one to sin."l 15 The New England Primer was 
reprinted throughout the Colonies under different names, but the public 
preferred the name New England Primer over all the others. An estimated 
three million more copies were sold. As late as 1806, The New England Primar 
was still in use in the Boston dame schools and even later in the country 
districts. 11® This important little book Ford has well characterized,in the 
followingwords: 
H^Cubberley, 41-42. 
H3Cubberley, 42. 
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As one glances over what may truly be called "The 
Little Bible of New England," and reads its stern lesson, 
the Puritan mood is caught with absolute faithfulness. 
Here was no easy road to knowledge and salvation; but with 
prose as bare of beauty as the whitewash of their churches, 
with poetry as rough and stern as their storm-torn coast, 
with pictures as crude and unfinished as their own 
glacial-smoothed boulders, between stiff oak covers which 
symbolized the contents, the children were tutored, until, 
from being unregenerate, and as Johnathan Edwards said, 
"young vipers, and infinitely more hateful than vipers" to 
God they attained that happy state when, as expressed by 
Judge SewelT's child, they were afraid that they "should goe 
to hell,"and were "stirred up dreadfully to seek God." God 
was made sterner and more cruel that any living judge, 
that all might be brought to realize how slight a chance 
even the least erring had of escaping eternal damnation. 11 ? 
Schooling gradually became more secular during the eighteenth 
century, not completely secular, but more secular. Successive editions of The 
New Enfffanri Primar. and/or textbooks by Thomas Dilworth, which became 
very popular after 1750 indicated a growing secular influence in textbooks. H8 
"The first American secular textbook did not appear until about the time of the 
American Revolution."! 19 
By the middle of the eighteenth century it was clear that European 
culture and types of schools were no longer dominant. A new spirit of 
individualism led Americans to adapt things to meet American needs. The 
growing exasperation with England for foolish colonial policy tended to 
accentuate a feeling for independence. General Braddock's defeat in the 1764 
H^Cubberley. 46. 
H^Kaestle, 161. 
H^Cubberley. 42. 
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war, after his insulting boastfulness, had the satisfactory effect that the 
colonies could care for themselves. 120 
The following colonial directions indicated an approaching end to the 
Colonial period to English domination: (1) development of the public and state 
schools in New England from the original religious school; (2) development of 
an American Common school; (3) rise of the school district system; (4) 
introduction of new types of textbooks; (5) decline of the Latin Grammar 
Schools; (6) rise of the English Grammar School; (7) development of the 
American Academy; (8) establishment of two new colleges (Pennsylvania, 
1749; Kings, 1754), which from the beginning placed themselves in sympathy 
with the more practical studies; and (9) abandonment by Yale in 1767 and 
Harvard in 1772 of listing students in the catalog according to rank and social 
standing of parents. The Revolutionary War hindered continuous progress of 
American education by success in the war closed the colonial period. 121 
At the end of the Revolutionary War, the federal government was 
heavily in debt and struggling to survive. At first, those in the states and 
nation responsible for the government were too preoccupied with problems of 
organization, finance, and order to think much of other things, but soon after a 
partial measure of these had been established, the leading statesmen of the 
time began to express the need for general education. 122 
Prior to the Revolution there had been but one real motive for 
75. 
121Cubberley, 75-76. 
!22cubberley, 88. 
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maintaining schools-the religious-which began to wane after 1750. The 
Declaration of Independence had affirmed that "all men are created equal," 
that "they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights," and 
that "to secure these rights Governments are instituted among men, deriving 
their just powers from the consent of the governed." These new political ideas 
tended to create a new political motive for education, which was destined to 
grow in importance and in time replace the religious motive. 123 
Educated men developed the Constitution of the United States, but the 
word education is not mentioned. Considering the historical period, it is not 
surprising that the founders of the American Republic did not deem the subject 
of public education important enough to warrant consideration in the 
Constitutional Convention or the document. Education was still largely a 
private matter and largely under the control of the Church.124 The 
Constitutional mandate was "to form a more perfect union, establish justice, 
insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the 
general welfare, and secure the blessing of liberty to ourselves and our 
posterity,"- purposes which dealt with secular affairs, matters of this world 
rather than another.125 
Even though founders of the Constitution were educated men, many of 
them were not interested in educating the masses. The leaders were often 
products of aristocratic doctrine of education-that schools were intended for 
123ikid. 
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the leaders -and for those who could afford the privilege of education. 126 
Fortunately, there were notable exceptions-George Clinton, Ezra Stiles, 
Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, Francis Marion, John Jay, John 
Hancock, John Adams, and James Madison, to name a few—who supported a 
general education and promotion of science and literature. They realized that 
education was crucial to the survival of the Republic. 127 
The noted education historian Paul Monroe has suggested that: 
No other single problem connected with education 
presented greater difficulties to our forefathers than 
that of its support. To begin with, most of them agreed 
with Jefferson that government is best which governs 
least. Certainly they believed that government to be best 
which taxes least But they quite generally disagreed with 
Jefferson when he held that the support of education is one 
of the undoubted responsibilities of government. 128 
Publicly supported schools, as we know them today, were only dreams of 
the national and state leaders of the late eighteenth century. No other nation 
in the world has copied the American public education experience. 
Ezra Stiles presented the following challenge and vision at his election 
as governor before the assembly of Connecticut in 1783: 
We shall have a communication with all nations in 
commerce, manners, and science, beyond anything 
heretofore known in the world. Manufacturers and 
artisans, and men of every description, may perhaps 
come and settle among us. They will be few indeed in 
126cubberley, 144. 
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comparison with the annual thousands of our natural 
increase, and will be incorporated with the prevailing 
heredity complexion of the first settlers:—we shall not be 
assimilated to them, but they to us, especially in the 
second and third generations. This fermentation and 
communion of nations will doubtless produce something 
very new, singular, and glorious That prophecy of 
Daniel is now literally fulfilling-there shall be a 
universal traveling to and fro, and knowledge shall be 
increased. This knowledge will be brought home and 
treasured up in America: and being here digested and 
carried to the highest perfection, may reblaze back from 
America to Europe, Asia and Africa, and illumine the 
world with truth and liberty.129 
In 1784, Governor George Clinton of New York presented the following 
message to the legislature: 
Neglect of the Education of Youth is among the Evils 
consequent on War. Perhaps there is scarce any Thing 
more worthy of your Attention, than the Revived and 
Encouragement of Seminaries of Learning; and nothing 
by which we can more satisfactorily express our Gratitude 
to the supreme Being, for his past Favours; since Piety and 
Virtue are generally the Offspring of an enlightened 
Understanding. 130 
As early as 1779 Thomas Jefferson presented a comprehensive plan to 
the state legislature of Virginia for education, but failed to secure approval for 
the bill. Writing to James Madison from Paris in 1787, Jefferson stated: 
Above all things, 1 hope the education of the common 
people will be attended to; convinced that on this good sense 
we may rely with the most security for the preservation of 
129cremin, Amfirican Education: The Colonial Experience. 561. 
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a due degree of liberty. 131 
After his retirement from American presidency, Thomas Jefferson 
wrote Colonel Yancey the following: 
If a nation expects to be ignorant and free in a state of 
civilization it expects what never was and never will be.... 
There is not safe deposit [for the functions of government], 
but with the people themselves; nor can they be safe with 
them without information.132 
In his first address to Congress, in 1790, Friesident George Washington 
stated: 
There is nothing which can better deserve your patronage 
than the promotion of science and literature. Knowledge 
is in every country the surest basis for public happiness. 
In one in which the measure of government receives their 
impressions so immediately from the sense of the community 
as in ours, it is proportionally essential.133 
In his 1796 farewell address, President George Washington said: 
Promote then, as an object of primary importance, 
institutions for the general diffusion of knowledge. In proportion 
the structure of government gives force to public opinion, 
it is essential that public opinion should be enlightened.134 
!31Cubberley, 89. 
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In a statement on the need of popular education in South Carolina, 
General Francis Marion wrote: 
God preserve our legislature from penny wit and pound 
foolishness. What! Keep a nation in ignorance rather than 
vote a little of their own money for education! What signifies 
this government divine as it is, if it be not known and prized 
as it deserves? This is best done by free schools. Men will 
always fight for their government according to their sense 
of value. To value it aright they must understand it. This 
they cannot do without education.135 
Chief Justice John Jay, writing to Benjamin Rush, asserted: 
I consider knowledge to be the soul of the Republic, and 
as the weak and wicked are generally in alliance, as 
much care should be taken to diminish the number of 
the former as of the latter. Education is the way to do this, 
and nothing should be left undone to afford all ranks of 
people the means of obtaining a proper degree of it at a 
cheap and easy rate.136 
James Madison wrote: 
A satisfactory plan for primary education is certainly 
a vital desideratum in our republics. 
A popular government without popular information or 
the means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or 
a tragedy, or, perhaps, both. Knowledge will forever 
govern ignorance; and a people who mean to be their 
own governors must arm themselves with the power 
which knowledge gives. 137 
135ibid, 89-90. 
136ibid. 
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In 1793, Governor John Hancock, delivered a message to the General 
Assembly of Massachusetts in which he declared: 
Amongst the means by which government has been raised 
to its present height of prosperity, that of education has been 
been the most efficient; you will therefore encourage and 
support our Colleges and Academies; but more watchfully 
the Grammar and other town schools. These offer equal 
advantages to poor and rich; should the support of such 
institutions be neglected, the kind of education which a free 
government requires to maintain its force, would be very soon 
forgotten.138 
President John Adams, with true New England thoroughness, forcibly 
stated the new motive for free public education: 
The instruction of the people in every kind of knowledge 
that can be of use to them in the practice of their moral 
duties as men, citizens, and Christians, and of their 
political and civil duties as members of society and 
free men, ought to be the care of the public, and of all 
who have any share in the conduct of its affairs, in a 
manner that never yet has been practiced in any age 
or nation The education here intended is not merely 
that of the children of the rich and noble, but of every 
rank and class of people, down to the lowest and the 
poorest. It is not to much to say that schools for the 
education of all should be placed at convenient distances 
and maintained at the public expense. The revenues 
of the State would be applied infinitely better, more 
charitably, wisely, useftdly, and therefore politically 
in this way that even in maintaining the poor. This 
would be the best way of preventing the existence of 
the poor.... 
Laws for the liberal education of youth, especially of 
lower classes of people, are so extremely wise and useful 
that, to a humane and generous mind, no expense for this 
138IbicL 
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purpose would be thought extravagant. 1^9 
Beryamin Rush summed up the task facing American leaders at the end 
of the American Revolutionary War: 
The American war is over; but this is far from being 
the case with the American revolution. On the contrary, 
nothing but the first act of the great drama is closed. It 
remains yet to establish and perfect our new forms of 
government; and to prepare the principles, morals, and 
manners of our citizens for these forms of government, 
after they are established and brought to perfection.!40 
Over two hundred years later we are still perfecting the American form 
of government. And even though the Constitution does not mention education, 
today the federal government is heavily involved in education. The final 
chapter of the federal government's role in education is yet to be written. 
As already indicated, America was settled by many different religious 
sects. However, after the American Revolution and 1787 Constitutional 
Convention and movement westward religious dominance in every phase of 
American life began to diminish. There are three major events that lead to 
eroding the state-religious concept: (1) European immigration, especially large 
numbers of Irish and German Catholics; (2) developing divisions within the 
established denominations; and (3) the dawning of a pragmatic political and 
religious philosophy best expressed in the opening words of the First 
Amendment to the Constitution! 41.."Congress shall make no law respecting 
139ibid„ 90-91. 
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an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. "142 
In the center of fiery constitutional debates, James Madison had 
promised the opposition, led by Patrick Henry, that if Virginia ratified the 
Constitution, he would enthusiastically work for a constitutional amendment 
concerning individual rights. James Madison, early in life and as a student at 
Princeton, had rejected sectarianism with great concern for what he called the 
"hell-conceived principle of [religious] persecution" adopted by his Anglican 
colleagues. 143 William Cabell Rives, Madison's classmate, close friend, and 
biographer, suggested that Madison may have intentionally selected Princeton 
rather than the College of William and Mary for his education on religious 
grounds, because of the attitude of President Witherspoon, a supporter of 
disestablishment and broad rights of religious exercise, on the "question of an 
American Episcopate."144 
James Madison opposed a Virginia tax for the support of Christian 
religion. In Madison's famous Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments, he insisted: 
Who does not see that the same authority which can establish 
Christianity, in exclusion of all Religions, may establish with the 
same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all 
other sects? That the same authority which can force a citizen 
to contribute threepence only of his property for the support of 
any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other 
142IL & Constitution. Am^nHT«^nt I. 
143Graebner, Fite, and White, History of the Unites States.367. 
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In the very next section, Madison explained that such an establishment 
of Christian preference over non-Christian sects consisted of an improper 
denial of the principle of equal treatment by government of religious beliefs for 
all persons: 
Because the bill violates that equality which ought to 
be the basis of every law, and which is more indispensable, 
in proportion as the validity or expediency of any law is more 
liable to be impeached. Above all are men to be considered 
as retaining an "equal title to the free exercise of Religion 
according to the dictates of conscience." Whilst we assert for 
ourselves a freedom of embrace, to profess and to observe the 
religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we cannot 
deny an equal freedom to those whose minds have not yet 
yielded to the evidence which has convinced us. *46 
Madison was more concerned that the bill aided Christianity to the 
exclusion of other religions, than he was that it aided or accommodated religion. 
Being a Christian, Madison felt that "to deny an equal freedom to those whose 
minds have not yet yielded to the evidence which has convinced us" would 
establish a grave error because all hiunans should be free to choose and act, on 
conscience issues without unequal or preferential treatment at the hands of 
the government. 147 
"And no member of Congress was more influential in shaping the Bill of 
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Rights, the first ten amendments to the Constitution, than James Madison, 
the father of the Constitution."!^® 
Another Virginian, Patrick Henry, strongly argued against ratifying the 
Constitution just because of the absence of individual rights. Early in his 
political career, Patrick Henry had fixed his position with respect to religious 
liberty. During the economic crisis of1758, the Virginia Assembly had 
temporarily suspended payment for church support required by English law. 
Judicial relief was sought by Anglican ministers. The Virginia Assembly's legal 
counsel, Patrick Henry, insisted*4** 
that the Act of 1758 had every characteristic of a good 
law; that a King by disallowing acts of this salutaiy 
nature, from being the father of the people, degenerates into 
a tyrant, and forfeits all right to his subjects' obedience. 
[TJhe only use of an established church and clergy in society, 
is to enforce obedience to civil sanctions.... that when a clergy 
ceases to answer these ends, the community have no further 
need of their ministry, and mayjustly strip them of the 
appointments; that the clergy of Virginia, in this particular 
instance of their refusing to acquiesce in the law in question, 
had been so far from answering, that they had most notoriously 
counteracted, those great ends of their institution; that... 
instead of countenance, and protection and damages, (the clergy) 
very justly deserved to be punished with signal severity.150 
Even though Virginia lost the decision, Patrick Henry became famous 
148Bryson and Houston, 19. 
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as a champion for religious liberty throughout colonial America and 
throughout the pages of history. He wrote the Sixteenth Article of the Virginia 
Bill of Rights, which states 
that religion, or the duty we owe our Creator, and the manner 
of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, 
and not by force or violence; and, therefore, that all men should 
enjoy the fullest toleration in the exercise of religions, according 
to the dictates of conscience, unpunished and unrestrained by the 
magistrate, unless, under color of religion, any man disturb the 
peace, the happiness, or the safety of society, and that it is the 
mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love, and 
charity towards each other.151 
Thomas Jefferson, along with political leaders James Madison, John 
Jay, and Alexander Hamilton, were extremely important in influencing the 
Constitution and the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights. Writing to the 
Baptist Conference in Danberry, Connecticut in 1802, Thomas Jefferson 
stated: 
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely 
between man and his God: that he owes account to none other 
for his faith or his worship; that the legislative powers of the 
Government reach actions only, and not opinion, I contemplate 
with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people 
which declared that their Legislature should "make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between 
Church and State.152 
The solution the founding fathers worked out to handle the religious issue 
was both revolutionaiy and wholesome. The Constitutional Convention simply 
151lbid.,20. 
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incorporated into the Constitution provisions which guaranteed the free 
exercise of their religious faith to all, and forbade the establishment by 
Congress of any state religion, or the requirement of any religious test, or oath 
as a prerequisite for holding office under the control of the federal 
government. 153 
The period from 1776 until the Constitution was ratified in 1789 was a 
tedious period for the political leaders of the fragile government Two states, 
North Carolina and Rhode Island, refused to approve the Constitution and take 
part in the new government until Congress agreed to add a bill of rights. By 
December 1791, enough states had approved ten of the twelve amendments to 
make them a permanent part of the Constitution. The first ten amendments 
to the Constitution are known as the Bill of Rights.1^4 
The federal government's first involvement in education was in the 
settlement of the lands west of the Alleghenies and east of the Mississippi 
River. The original thirteen colonies gave up their claims to this area to the 
new national government. At the end of the war, soldiers and other immigrants 
began to move into this new territory. These new settlers demanded to 
purchase land, but before it could be sold it must be surveyed. In 1785, 
Congress adopted the "Congressional Townships" in which each township 
contained six square miles. Each township was again divided into sections of 
one square mile which were divided into quarter sections. The sixteenth 
township was to be used for school support. In adopting the Northwest 
l^Scubberley, 87. 
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Ordinance of 1787, Congress provided that "Religion, morality, and knowledge 
being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools 
and the means of educations shall be forever encouraged"155 jn the part of the 
territory lying north of the Ohio River. The settlement of this area by people, 
mainly from New England, determined the future attitude toward public 
education in states to be developed from this territory. 156 
The land grant offer continued in each state, except Texas, which owned 
its own land when admitted, and West Virginia and Maine, which were carved 
from other states. Beginning with the admission of California as a state in 
1850, the grant was increased to two sections, the sixteenth and the thirty-
sixth in each state. Utah, Arizona, and New Mexico were each granted four 
sections due to the low value of much of the land.157 
As mentioned earlier, the Constitution of the United States was silent 
on the subject of education. Prom 1776 through 1800 all the states except 
Rhode Island and Connecticut adopted new state constitutions. Several states 
amended or revised their constitutions during this period. Three new states, 
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Vermont were added to Union before 1800. None of 
the state constitutions adopted before 1800 mentioned the matter of schools 
and education. 158 
155cubberley, 92. 
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Outside of New England and New York America before 1820 had not yet 
developed a national educational consciousness. And in spite of national grants 
for education to new states progress in education was limited to cities and a 
few states. In the South many years-mid-eighteenth century and later-
would pass before a commitment to education would be made, 1^9 For many 
education for the masses was still thought to be a luxury. Ellwood Cubberley 
presented several reasons for the lack of interest in education among the 
masses of the people: 
The simple agricultural life of the time, the homogeneity 
of the people, the isolation and independence of the villages, 
the lack of full manhood suffrage in a number of States, the 
continuance of the old English laws, the want of any economic 
demand for education, and the fact that no important political 
question calling for settlement at the polls had as yet arisen, 
made the need for schools and learning seem a relatively minor 
one There was little need for book learning among the 
masses of the people to enable them to transact the ordinary 
business of life. A person who could cipher in that time was an 
educated man, while the absence of these arts was by no 
means a matter of reproach.160 
After the War of 1812, energies were turned toward developing a 
democratic system of public schools. As democratic consciousness began to 
gain emphasis, the demand came for a more practical institution, less 
exclusive and less aristocratic in character and better adapted in its 
instruction to the needs of frontier society.l^l 
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In early eighteenth century churches continued efforts to maintain 
church charity schools. In the meantime, the cry for education grew rather 
rapidly, and developing new educational opportunities became too much for 
religious institutions to handle. Also, religious institutions did not want to give 
up their influence on educating youth. And yet the churches had no interest in 
new curiculum ideas that reflected the needs and wants of the new democracy. 
With the coming of nationality and the slow but steady growth of national 
consciousness, national pride, national needs, and the steady development of 
national resources in the shape of taxable property combined to make secular 
instead of religious schools seem both desirable to a constantly growing 
number of citizens. 162 "in almost every state, citizens banded together to 
fight for the cause of public schools. "163 This change in attitude was aided by 
the work of a number of semi-private philanthropic agencies, the most 
important of which were "(1) the Sunday School Movement; (2) the growth of 
City School Societies; (3) the Lancastrian Movement; and (4) the coming of 
the Infant-School Societies."!®^ 
Finally, there emerged two new motives for schools: 
(1) to advance the idea of progress—that mankind can be 
better by combiningg public institutions, schools, and material 
wealth for human betterment; and (2) to prepare people for 
self government-the general concept that self-government is 
the only political and social organization that offers a reasonable 
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guarantee for liberty. 165 
The noted historians Charles and Mary Beard, writing in the Rise of American 
Civilization in 1927, said the "idea of progress" is the 
most dynamic social theory ever shaped in the histoiy of 
thought-the idea of progress on the continual improvement 
in the lot of mankind on the earth by the attainment of 
knowledge and subjugation of the material world to the 
requirement of human welfare.^®® 
It became apparent, in time, to educational and political leaders that 
liberty and political equality could not be maintained without the general 
education for all. American thinkers such as Thomas Paine, James Madison, 
John Adams, Samuel Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and especially Thomas 
Jefferson (who eloquently wrote in the Declaration of Independence that "life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness," a revolutionary idea, that people are 
supposed to be happy) advanced the "progress " idea. 167 
The transforming power of the "progress" philosophy became a forceful 
tool of American Civilization. In addition, the idea of progress and perfectibility 
of humankind and democratic institutions became the central theme for 
American statesmen and philosophers. It was not by mere chance that 
"progress" democracy and universal public education for all children, regardless 
of socioeconomic condition, emerged hand in glove in the middle of the 
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nineteenth century. The new democracy needed a forceful political-social tool 
that would guarantee America's greatness through continued progress. 
Educational leaders Horace Mann (Massachusetts), Elisha Potter (Rhode 
Island), Henry Barnard (Connecticut), John Pierce (Michigan), Samuel Lewis 
(Ohio), Calvin Wiley (North Carolina), W. T. Harris (StLouis), John Dewey 
(New York) and associates forged the tool: "universal public education-
America's greatest gift to Western Civilization."168 
By 1820, state constitutional recognition of education was found in 
thirteen of twenty-three states. Seven states-Massachusetts, Maine, 
Connecticut, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, and Vermont-had statutes 
establishing school systems. 169 The schools were maintained through an 
ingenious variety of school-finance schemes-property tax, education "fee" or 
tuition, fishing tax, salt-working tax, lotteries, funds from congressional and 
state land grants, occupational tax, insurance-premium tax, bank tax, and 
liquor tax. In 1836, the federal treasury surplus was distributed to the states 
for education purposes. 1^0 
Daniel Webster, in a speech delivered at Plymouth, Massachusetts, in 
1822, and again in a speech delivered at Madison, Indiana, in 1837, expressed 
an idea of importance of education in a nation such as ours. In the Madison 
speech, he said: 
Education, to accomplish the ends of good government, should 
168ibid. 
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be universally diffused. Open the doors of the schoolhouses to all 
the children in the land. Let no man have the excuse of poverty 
for not educating his offspring. Place the means of education 
within his reach, and if he remain in ignorance, be it his own 
reproach... On the diffusion of education among the people rests 
the prescription and perpetuation of our free institutions.l^l 
The second quarter of the nineteenth century was a period in which the 
Union expanded dramatically-from coast to coast. Economic, social, political, 
and religious pressure made extreme demands on church-related education. 
National and state political, economic, educational, and religious leaders 
started clamoring for an education system~a free public-school system. 
Ellwood Cubberley described the second quarter of the nineteenth century in 
the following manner: 
The second quarter of the nineteenth century may be 
said to have witnessed the battle for tax-supported, publicly 
controlled and directed, and non sectarian common schools. 
lii 1825 such schools were the distant hope of statesmen and 
reformers; in 1850 they were becoming an actuality in almost 
every Northern State. The twenty-five years intervening 
marked a period of public agitation and educational propaganda; 
of many hard legislative fights; of a struggle to secure desired 
legislation, and then to hold what had been secured; of many 
bitter contests which church and private-school interests, which 
felt that their "vested rights" were being taken from them; and 
an occasional referenda in which the people were asked, at the 
next election, to advise the legislature as to what to do. Excepting 
the battle for the abolition of slavery perhaps no question has ever 
been before the American people for settlement which caused so 
much feeling or aroused such bitterant agonisms. Old friends and 
business associates parted company over the question, lodges 
were forced to taboo the subject to avoid disruption, ministers and 
their congregations often quarrelled over the question of free schools, 
and politicians avoided the issue. The friends of free schools were at 
first commonly regarded as fanatics, dangerous to file State, and 
l^lCubberley, 156. 
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the opponents of free schools were considered by them as old-time 
conservatives or as selfish members of society. 172 
Horace Mann, father of American public education and secretary of the 
State Board of Education in Massachusetts, established the inevitable 
relationship between education and progress of democracy. Like Thomas 
Jefferson, he believed that democracy's continued existence is a direct 
relationship to an intelligent, educated constituency. Mann insisted that 
"never will wisdom preside in the hall of legislation... until Common Schools 
... create a more far-seeing intelligence and a purer morality than has ever 
existed among communities of men. "173 
For Mann, the public schools were social tools shaping an emerging 
society of the new democracy. Therefore, the goal of the democratic 
government must be "self-discipline, self government, and self-control. "17 4 
Public education was the "great equalizer... balance wheel of the social 
machinery... creator of wealth undreamed of."175 
Under Mann's aggressive offensive leadership, Massachusetts in many 
ways taught the nation the ideals of universal education. With a sense of 
devotion proper to a crusader, Mann had accepted the challenging, unpaid 
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position of secretary of the State Board of Education in Massachusetts, 
which at that time was the most literate and religious section of the United 
States. Mann expressed his feelings: 
Henceforth, so long as I hold this office, I devote myself to the 
supremest welfare of mankind upon earth... Faith is the only 
sustainer. I have faith in the unprovability of the race—in their 
accelerating unprovability... a spirit mildly devoting itself to a 
good cause, is a certain conqueror-Love is a universal solvent. 176 
In general Mann's concept was with sectarianism and not religion. 
Mann himself explained his position. In explaining his position Mann wrote a 
clergyman the following; 
Every one who has availed himself of the means of 
arriving at the truth on this point, knows that I am in favor 
of religious instruction in our schools to the extremist verge 
to which it can be carried without invading those rights of 
conscience which are established by the laws of God and 
guaranteed by the Constitution of the State. 1^7 
Mann, in his final report, after twelve years in office said: 
. . .  I  b e l i e v e d  t h e n ,  a s  n o w  t h a t  r e l i g i o u s  i n s t r u c t i o n  i n  o u r  
schools, to the extent which the Constitution and the laws 
of the State allowed and prescribed, was indispensable to their 
highest welfare, and essential to the vitality of moral education. 
Then, as now, I believed that sectarian books and sectarian 
instruction, if their encroachment were not resisted, would 
prove the overthrow of the schools.... And I avail myself of 
this, the last opportunity which I may ever have, to say in 
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regard to all affirmations or intimations that I have ever 
attempted to exclude religious instruction from the schools, 
or to exclude the Bible from the schools, or to impair the force 
of that volume, that they are now, and always have been, 
without substance or semblance of truth 
. . .  T h a t  o u r  p u b l i c  s c h o o l s  a r e  n o t  t h e o l o g i c a l  s e m i n a r i e s ,  i s  
admitted. That they are debarred by law from inculcating the 
peculiar and distinctive doctrines of anyone religious 
denomination amongst us, is claimed; that they are also 
prohibited from even teaching that what they do teach is the 
whole religion, or all that is essential to religion, is equally 
certain. But our system earnestly inculcates all Christian 
morals; it founds its morals on the basis of religion; it welcomes 
the religion of the Bible; and in receiving the Bible, it allows it 
to do what it is allowed to do in no other system, to speak 
for itself. 178 
To Mann the purpose of religious education in the schools was to provide 
the opportunity for the child 
to judge for himself according to the dictates of his own 
reason and conscience, what his religious obligations are and 
whither they lead. But if a man is taxed to support a school 
where religious doctrines are inculcated which he believes to 
be false, and which he believes that God condemns, then he is 
excluded from the school by the divine law, at the same time 
that he is compelled to support it by the human law. This is 
a double wrong. 179 
Mann's final report, as well as other writings, makes it clear that he 
envisaged a diflference between religion and sectarianism, and that the dividing 
line was the Bible. As long as the Bible was read without comment, it was 
permissible religious instruction. Once the written word was explained or 
178lbid., 232-233 
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interpreted it was impermissible sectarian instruction. 180 
The struggle for free schools was a bitter one and for twenty-five years 
the outcome was in doubt. Local elections were decided on the school issue. 
Legislation passed in one session was sometimes repealed in the next State 
laws mandating public schools were ignored by the local communities that 
were supposed to build them. Time after time "the partisans of popular 
education encountered the bitter disappointment that accompany any effort 
at fundamental social reform."^®! 
By 1860, a majority of the states had created public school systems 
that bore upon them the marks of Mann's ideal. There was great variation 
from state to state and region to region. New England, long a leader in public 
education, also had a tradition of private education, and private schools 
continued to flourish in the region. The Midwest sent a far greater proportion of 
its school children to public schools. "With the exception of North Carolina, the 
Southern area lagged behind, and generally did not establish public schooling 
until after the Civil War."182 
Many educational leaders believed that pauper schools should be 
abolished. The pauper school concept was English based on class and out of 
step in America. And the new Western democracy could not tolerate the 
concept~"all men are created equal, and endowed by their Creator, with certain 
inalienable rights."183 
ISOjbid. 
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Moreover, many paupers would not send their children to pauper schools 
and for many who did send children to pauper schools despised the system. 
The Philadelphia Society for the Establishment and Support of Charity 
Schools made this address in 1818: 
In the United States the benevolence of the inhabitants 
has led to the establishment of Charity Schools, which though 
affording individual advantages, are not likely to be followed by 
the political benefits kindly contemplated by their founders. In 
the country a parent will raise children to ignorance rather than 
place them in charity schools. It is only in large cities that 
charity schools succeed to any extent. These dispositions may 
be improved to the best advantage, by the Legislature, in place 
of Charity Schools, establishing Public Schools for the education 
of all children, the offspring of the rich and poor alike.1^4 
Teaching religion in public schools was a common practice until well into 
the middle of the nineteenth century. Horace Mann, recognizing the value of a 
common core of religious beliefs, attempted to develop a nonsectarian school 
system. William T. Harris, Superintendent of the St. Louis Public Schools, 
joined Mann in his struggle for nonsectarian schools. They differed over the 
use of the Bible in public education. Mann believed the Bible could be used, if it 
were read without comment, explanation, or interpretation. Harris believed 
there was no place for using the Bible in public education. Harris contended 
that only the moral aspect of religion had a place in public education. 
By 1840, church-state separation had occurred in every state in the 
nation. The differences between Protestants and Catholic over separation of 
184Ibid., 190. 
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church and state were becoming an important philosophical issue among 
educational leaders. The secularization of the public schools moved in two 
distinct fronts-(l) the curricular, and (2) school finance. According to Mann, 
public education religious instruction should give to all "so much religious 
instruction as is compatible with the rights of others and with the genius of the 
government. "185 jje believed that there was a common core of Christian 
religious beliefs which could be taught in the common school without objection, 
and that it was up to the home and church to elaborate on these commonly 
held beliefs. He supported a nonsectarian doctrine which would exclude specific 
sectarian doctrines or man-made creeds. He retained the Protestant Bible, 
which "is the acknowledged expositor of Christianity" and "in strictness 
Christianity has no other authoritative expounder." 186 
Mann was not the only one who supported nondenominational 
Christianity in the common school. In 1837, Samuel Lewis, Ohio's first state 
superintendent of common schools, in his First Annual Report to the 
Legislature supported the nondenominational solution to the problem of religion 
in the public school. Lewis believed that schools should "inculcate sound 
principles of Christian morality" which did not encroach upon sectarian 
differences. Being there was "a strong common ground, where all Christians 
and lovers of virtue meet," Lewis encouraged teachers "to train up the rising 
generation in those elevated moral principles of the Bible" as well as "all social 
and relative duties with proper inducements to correct action." 187 
185Neil G. McCluskey, Catholic Education gi America: A Documentary 
History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), 6. 
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The Reverend Horace Bushnell of New York, a liberal Congregational 
minister, published an article in which he defended the Scriptures as an 
essential part of the common school curriculum while denying the legitimacy of 
sectarian teaching. "Nothing is more certain than that no such thing as 
sectarian religion is to find place for the Bible as a book of principles, as 
containing the true standards of character and the best motives and aids of 
virtue."!^® If a parent wanted more than this for his child, it was his 
obligation to do it himself in his own home. "To insist that the state shall teach 
that,... would be folly and wickedness together."189 
William T. Harris, superintendent of the St Louis Public Schools 
separated the church-state education issue into two intellectual spheres: "the 
most fitting occasion for efficient instruction in religion on the one hand, and on 
the other hand the question of guarding the rights of private conscience and the 
separation of church and state."!®® In what is surely the most significant 
philosophical treatise ever written by an educator on church-state separation, 
Dr. Harris maintained that 
the principle of religious instruction is authority; that of 
secular instruction is demonstration and verification. It is 
obvious that these two principles should not be brought 
into the same school, but separated as widely as possible. 
Common Schools (Columbus. Ohio: S. Medary, 1838), 7, quoted in Lannie, 3. 
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Religious truth is revealed in allegoric and symbolic form, 
and is to be apprehended not merely by the intellect, but 
also by the imagination and the heart. The analytic 
understanding is necessarily hostile and skeptical in its 
attitude toward religious truth. 191 
To Harris, the only sensible and sane direction was the complete 
secularization of public education. He contended that Catholic parents would 
adopt public education if they could be protected against proselytizing of their 
children by Protestant influences--a secular purity "where the Catholic may 
feel safe to leave their children. "192 Harris insisted that the spirit of the 
times calls for wider and wider separation of the Church from secular 
institutions, but" such separation does not make them godless nor the Church 
less powerful, but quite the contrary."193 
The push by Horace Mann and other educational leaders for making 
public schools non-sectarian received support from an unlikely source, Catholic 
leaders. In early colonial days Protestants banded together in opposition of the 
Catholics. By the time of the American Revolution many of the restrictions 
placed on Catholics had been removed, but numbers were not sufficientto be a 
serious problem. By the middle of the nineteenth century the number of 
Catholics living along the Atlantic coast, especially in the larger cities, had 
swelled to such numbers that they could no longer be ignored. 
191"The Separation of the Church from the Tax-Supported School," 
Education Review 26 (October 1903): 38. 
192\Villiam T. Harris, Morality ii thg Schools. Tract 12, quoted in Neil 
Gerard McCluskey, Public Schools and Moral Education (New York; Columbia 
University Press, 1958), 169. 
193lbid. 
64 
On the question of nonsectarian schools, Protestants felt that it was 
satisfactory to use the King James Version of the Bible. The disagreement 
over the use of the Bible goes back to the time of the Protestant Reformation. 
Protestants believed that salvation came from studying the Bible; the reason 
for teaching children to read was so they could read the "word." Individuals 
could make their own decisions. They did not have to depend on the church, 
i. e., Catholics on the other hand, put their emphasis not on the word, but on 
the church. They were not dependent on reading the Bible but following what 
the priests imperatives. 
The Irish potato famine had a tremendous influence on shaping the 
schools in America, private and public. The failure of the potato crops forced 
the farmers to emigrate from Ireland to America and in record numbers. 
For a country that prided itself on being a "melting pot", Protestant 
Americans were not very warm to the Catholics from Ireland, Germany, and 
Italy. Most of the Catholics immigrants to were poor and, not having the funds 
to move from the cities where they landed, settled in the poor areas of Boston, 
New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. The Irish were the largest national 
group to settle in New York in the 1840s.194 They were not well received. A 
typical advertisement of the period read: "Woman wanted.-To do general 
housework... English, Scotch, Welsh, German, or any country or color except 
Irish."195 
Ravitch, The Great School Wars: New York City. 1805 -1973: 
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Historically, since Catholic children were not made to feel welcome in the 
public schools, wherever possible, they went to their own schools. By 1840, 
there were over two hundred Catholic schools in America. In some school 
systems, public-school adaptations were made for Catholic children. For 
example, in Lowell, Massachusetts, "Irish" schools were established for 
Catholic children only, and they were taught by Catholic teachers.19? 
other situations public schools were used at the end of the school day and week 
for religious purposes. 
The Protestant educational leaders did not fully understand why 
Catholics were unwilling to accept the public schools. Catholic leaders simply 
tried to neutralize the Protestant influence, thus making the public schools 
more acceptable to Catholic children. Even through the First Provincial 
Council in 1829 had called for the establishment of Catholic schools, the 
bishops meeting in Baltimore in 1840 urged a more far reaching and 
comprehensive "separate system of education for the children of our 
communion."198 in Very frank language, they stated their reasons for 
reaching this decision: 
. . .  w e  h a v e  f o u n d  b y  a  p a i n f u l  e x p e r i e n c e ,  t h a t  i n  a n y  
common effort it was always expected that our distinctive 
principles of religious belief and practices should be yielded 
196Mcduskey, Amm-inn and the Catholic School. 24-25. 
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to the demands of those who thought proper to charge us 
with error. 199 
They ruled that the dogmatic principles of the Catholic Church could never be 
reconciled with a heterogeneous and fluid Protestant theology. They felt that 
Catholic Christianity was true Christianity and had to be protected against 
any possible taint of corruption.200 
The Catholic Church and Catholic parents were not interested in non-
sectarian instruction. Catholicism does not separate religious teaching from 
temporal knowledge. The Catholic Church wanted either the right to bring its 
own dogma into the public schools for the teaching of Catholic children or a 
part of the public school funds for the support of Catholic parochial schools. 
American Protestantism, either because of the principle of separation of 
church and state or because of antagonism to Catholicismm,would not yield to 
either demand. Protestants were willing even to remove Protestant religion 
from the schools which resulted in the secularization of public education in 
America.201 
Governor William Seward was quite serious when he announced that his 
goal was to improve education in New York. In 1839, he visited New York City 
several times to investigate the city's school system, which was not a part of 
the state's district system but was administered by the Public School Society. 
Originally known as the Free School Society, the Public School Society was a 
!99lbid. 
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private, philanthropic, Protestant-oriented organization that was the principal 
recipient of common school funds and thus exercised a virtual monopoly over 
the city's public schools.202 
Seward was sympathetic to the Catholic cause since many of New York 
City's Catholic children did not attend the public schools on religious grounds. 
Seward fought to educate foreign children in their native tongue. He withdrew 
this proposal because he was not afraid of the influence and language of an 
enlightened people. "His message left the impression that he would support 
any reasonable plan to advance universal education in New York City, whether 
secular or sectarian. "203 
In the 1840s, the first and most important battle for religious aid 
occurred in New York City. Finally, the Catholic leadership, led by Bishop John 
Hughes, an acknowledged separatist, asked for a share of the public school 
fund for use in establishing religious elementary and secondary schools. In a 
speech in St Patrick's Cathedral on July 20,1840, he insisted that public 
schools were Protestant institutions with Protestant activities and even a 
Protestant Bible (the King James Version), and in general anti-Catholic204 
He also rejected the social ideology that public schools were necessary for 
maintaining democracy. In August 1840, he wrote to the bishop of New 
Orleans that the struggle against public schools "will cause an entire 
separation of our children from those schools and excite greater zeal on the 
202Lannie> 19-21. 
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part of the people for Catholic education."205 
Bishop Hughes, encouraged by Governor Seward's sympathetic attitude 
toward the plight of immigrant children not attending public schools, led an 
attack on the Public School Society. Despite the angry statements between 
the two groups, the Society hoped they could work out their differences as 
reasonable people. Bishop Hughes had no intention of making the public 
schools more tolerable for Catholic children. In the first petition to the Society, 
he asked for funds based on need, in the second petition, taken directly to the 
Board of Aldermen, he made the major issue the Catholic's right of conscience. 
The Board of Aldermen appointed a committee to try to reconcile the 
differences between the Society and the Catholics.206 
Two other religious groups, the Scottish Presbyterian Church and the 
Jewish community petitioned for a share of the common school fund. They did 
not support the Catholic petition, and both were opposed to any division of the 
school fund among denominational schools. However, if the Council should act 
in favor of the Catholic petition, they wanted to be included in the distribution 
offunds.207 
The committee listened to compromise proposals from the Society and 
the Catholics. At the request of the Society, the committee inspected public 
schools and Catholic schools. There was public debate on both sides of the 
issue, and finally the committee rejected Catholic claims, maintaining that 
205EWA 
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Catholics 
are taxed not as members of the Roman Catholic Church, 
but as citizens of the State of New York; and not for the purposes 
of religion, but for the support of civil government Admit the 
correctness of the {Catholic} claim, that the Common Council of 
the city, or the Legislature of the State, may rightfully 
appropriate the Public Money to the purposes of religious 
instruction of any kind, in any school, and the consequences will 
be, that the People may be taxed by law, for the support of some 
one or other of our numerous religious denominations By 
granting a portion of the School Fund to one sect, to the exclusion 
of others, a "preference" is at once created, a "discrimination" is 
made, and the object of this great Constitutional guarantee is 
defeated. 208 
On January 11,1841, at the urging of the special committee, the 
Board of Aldermen voted fifteen to one to reject the Catholic petition.209 In 
the election campaign of 1842, mobs of Catholics and anti-Catholics roamed 
the streets of New York City fighting each other. The mayor used the militia 
and the police to protect St. Patrick's Cathedral. Bishop Hughes' home was 
damaged, and after failing to gain public funds for Catholic schools, he turned 
away from the political scene, insisting that Catholics establish a separate 
school system. "Let parochial schools be established and maintained 
everywhere... proceed upon the principle that, in this age and country, the 
school is before the church."210 
In 1876, President Ulysses S. Grant, reflecting on past conflicts and 
anticipating future church-state policy, was reflecting the national will when he 
208][,annie> 47.48. 
209Ravitch, 57. 
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Encourage free schools and resolve that not one dollar of 
the money appropriated to their support shall be appropriated 
to the support of any sectarian schools. Resolve that neither 
the state nor the nation, nor both combined, shall support 
institutions of learning other than those sufficient to afford 
eveiy child growing up in the land the opportunity of a good 
common school education, unmixed with sectarian, pagan, 
atheistical dogmas. Leave the matter of religion to the family 
altar, the church, and the private school, supported entirely by 
private contributions. Keep the church and the state forever 
separated.2H 
In 1884, the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore ordered two important 
Catholic education objectives: (1) Catholic priests and bishops were required 
to establish parochial schools, and (2) Catholic parents were bound to send 
their children to Catholic schools, unless a bishop granted an exception for 
serious cause.212 The aim of the Catholic Church was "every Catholic child in 
a Catholic school."213 
In the following years, the majority of support for Catholic schools came 
from parish support, diocesan support, tuition, fees, fluid-raising activities, 
contributed services of religious and lay school staff (especially relatively 
inexpensive salaries of teachers), and in recent years, indirect support from the 
federal and state governments. Catholic schools grew at a rapid rate. By 
1900, five percent of American elementary and secondary school children were 
2HMcCollum v. Board of Education* 33 U. S. 203 (1948), quoted in Leo 
Pfeffer. Church State and Freedom rev, ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1976), 337. 
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attending Catholic schools. By 1940, the percentage had increased to seven 
percent.214 After World War II, Catholic schools grew at three times the rate 
of public schools. By 1963, fourteen percent of American elementary and 
secondary school children were enrolled in Catholic schools^ 15. Due to 
financial and social difficulties, Catholic schools began to decline in the mid-
1960s. From 1963 to 1969 it is estimated that one thousand Catholic schools 
closed with a loss in enrollment of fourteen percental 6 
As the 1970s arrived, Catholic elementary and secondary schools faced 
an uncertain future. Declining enrollment and increasing costs worked against 
them. Also, political, religious, social, and educational transitions were 
changing in American history. The election of President Nixon signaled the 
movement of America in a conservative direction. "In the 1970s there was an 
intensification of legislative church-state activities, thus greater judicial 
response. "217 In addition, "the Supreme Court handed down more church-
state decisions from 1969 to 1986 than in the entire 180 years prior to 
1969. "218 
In the election of 1960, religion was a msyor campaign issue. John 
Kennedy was a Catholic. Protestants, especially in the "Bible Belt," were 
2 l^Andrew M. Greeley and Peter H. Rossi, The Education of Catholic 
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afraid that if Kennedy won the election the Vatican would control the 
presidency. Kennedy was the first Catholic elected president and the Vatican 
did not control the presidency. Their fears of a Catholic takeover were 
unfounded. 
From the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century to the 
present, Catholics and Protestants have been in conflict with each other. In 
Northern Ireland, both sides are still killing each other in the name of 
Christianity. 
By 1860, public education had made tremendous strides toward being a 
success. The main lines for future development had been mapped out, and the 
chief battles had been won. At least one half of the nation's children were 
receiving a formal education. The will of the people was that they planned to 
establish and maintain a state system of free schools. When President Lincoln 
delivered his famous Gettysburg address, he said, "our fathers brought forth on 
this continent a new Nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the 
proposition that all men are created equal. "219 Lincoln could point with pride 
to the free public schools which "guaranteed opportunity and liberty."220 
With the judicial decision in Kfllnmn7.oor221 "that secondary schools are 
a legitimate function of public education and that they can be supported by 
public tax," the American public system was firmly established. Other nations 
219joseph E. Biyson and Samuel H. Houston, Jr., The Supreme Court 
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were taking notice as Americans voiced the opinion in legislative assemblies 
and at local levels that "education was important and part of the very thread 
of American national life. "222 
William T. Harris was undoubtedly the leading figure of his pedagogical 
era. He made significant contributions to education, first as the 
superintendent of the St. Louis public schools and later as the United States 
Commissioner of Education. He entrenched the public-school idea, echoing, 
following in the footsteps of Horace Mann. In 1871 he wrote, 
The spirit of American institutions is to be looked for in the 
public schools to a greater degree than anywhere else. If the 
rising generation does not grow up with democratic principles, 
the fault will lie in the system of popular education. 2 23 
A year later he cautioned: "An ignorant people can be governed, but only a 
wise people can govern itself."224 He realized that more than the school was 
involved in educating a child. "In society, a child is molded by family, church, 
civil community, and state, before it enters school. All these influences 
continue unabated during his years as a student."225 
Harris was firm in his convictions concerning schools. 
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The question of the separation of Church and State,... 
is the deepest political question in modern history.... Let 
the community see to it that our public schools are free from 
sectarian bias of whatever kind, and the church, by its 
appropriate instrumentalities, will best perform its mission.226 
John Dewey has been called the philosopher of democratic education. 
His unparalleled place in history has been sufficiently described by his closest 
disciple, William Heard Kilpatrick: 
Pestalozzi had prepared the ground. Froebel and Herbert 
had helped. Horace Mann, Henry Barnard, William T. Harris, 
Stanley Hall, Francis W. Parker, and others had carried 
America further along the Pestalozzi road. But one thing was 
lacking. Not one of these men, nor all combined, had given an 
adequate theory for a thorough going democratic, science-
respecting education. This Professor Dewey had done.227 
Dewey had an intense interest in the history of philosophy and had a 
first-hand knowledge of the great classics. His critics claimed he was biased in 
his presentation of some traditional ideas. But beyond books or ideas, social 
forces were the fire that forged Deweyan instrumentalism. He was too much a 
Jeffersonian democrat not to be uneasy with the socially conservative 
philosophy of the American neo-Hegelians, especially that represented by 
William T. Harris. Dewey visualized brave new challenges in America's 
transformation from an agrarian democracy to an urbanized industrial society. 
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He wanted all men to freely share in the life of democracy. He devoted his 
talents to promoting a political democracy based upon social, cultural, 
industrial, and economic principles.228 
American Education in the Twentieth Century 
Western migration in the latter part of the nineteenth century brought 
about social and cultural upheaval when masses of people from different 
backgrounds shared ideas. Sectarian religious principles were modified as 
civilization moved westward and developed new cultures.229 
Twentieth-century education emerged from a period of unrest in the 
1890s when there appeared to be a profound realization on the part of 
American leaders and the general public that a major transformation had been 
fashioned in American society. Urbanization, mass immigration, and 
enormous industrial growth were themselves highly significant, but in addition, 
a giant increase in railroad travel and newspaper circulation meant an 
awareness of change being brought home to the American population. The 
ordinary American citizen was beginning to worry about what kind of world the 
twentieth century would be.230 
Americans looked more and more to universal public education as a 
catalyst for addressing social problems. The increasing number of children 
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entering school was reason for concern. In 1890, less than seven percent of 
adolescents from fovirteen to seventeen attended school. Four decades later 
more than half of adolescents fourteen to seventeen were enrolled in high 
school.231 
Industrial and social growth in post-war America caused ordinary people 
and educators to examine curriculum content. Production of automobiles and 
other products through assembly line procedures provided incentive for 
industrial growth, making available a new economy in which there was more 
money to spend on public education. Moreover, there was a new freer 
atmosdphere in America. Education became synonymous with social and 
economic mobility.232 
Many of the previously accepted educational practices were now 
questioned and reassessed by legislative action or judicial action. "American 
schools mirrored the problems that were common in the larger society."233 
Significant changes occurred in the schools in the 1960s. Americans 
had decided, in the late nineteenth century, that education would be the best 
catalyst through which to change society.234 Financed in part by federal 
funds fostering change and innovation, new teaching techniques such as open 
classrooms, team teaching, individualized instruction, new mathematics, and 
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alternative curricula entered American public schools. To many parents 
teaching and curiculum changes brought confusion. The traditional classroom 
which most parents attended had almost disappeared. Educational emphasis 
moved from teaching facts to understanding concepts. Decision making, 
thinking skills, and value clarification were an integral part of the new 
curriculum. In too many cases, students decided what, when, and how they 
wanted to learn. Parents began to question if children were learning 
anything.235 
"Due Process" was a concept with new meaning when applied to rights 
of students in dealing with student discipline. In the 1969 Tinker v. Pes 
Moines^S 6 case> the Supreme Court held, that students do not leave their 
rights at the "schoolhouse gate." 
Since the United States Constitution was silent on education, as 
America grew and the population increased, individual states assumed 
responsibility for public education based on the Tenth Amendment. The Tenth 
Amendment states, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people."237 The states were restricted in action only by 
the provisions of the United States Constitution and by state constitutions 
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and subsequent acts of state's legislatures.238 
In spite of the fact that legislatures generally have constitutional 
authority to construct a state's system of education through statutory 
enactment, their authority was not without legal boundaries. Historically, 
federal courts, using the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee and, armed with 
judicial mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment have placed constraints on 
state authority over public education.239 
As early as 1923, in Mever Vj. Nebraska the Supreme Court conditioned 
state authority over curriculum. The Court suggested, "That the State may do 
much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens, 
physically, mentally, and morally, is clear; but the individual has certain 
fundamental rights. "240 Jn the 1925 Pierce v. Society of Sisters case, an 
Oregon case, the Supreme Court took another step further and made clear 
that children are not mere "creatures of the State. "2 41 
During intervening years federal courts have responded to a variety of 
constitutional issues regarding state authority and public education. State 
authority over public school matters such as compulsory attendance, 
compulsory flag salutes, prayer and Bible reading, teachers' rights, and other 
C. Hudgins, Jr. and Richard S. Vacca, Law and Education: 
Contemporary Issue and Court Decisions. 3rd ed. (Charlottesville, Va: The 
Michie Company, 1991), 17. 
23911,1(1^ is. 
240Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 
(1923). 
241pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 510, 69 L.Ed. 
1070 (1925). 
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issues must always pass constitutional muster.242 
State courts have also delivered decisions limiting educational authority 
of legislatures. For example, as early as 1926, the State Supreme Court of 
Appeals for Virginia said, in Florv v, Smith, that: 
[t]he legislature... has the power to enact any legislation in 
regard to the conduct, control, and regulation of the public free 
schools, which does not deny to the citizen the constitutional right 
to enjoy life and liberty, to pursue happiness and to acquire 
property.243 
Separation of Church and State 
The founding fathers enacted a system of government that hereto 
before existed only in minds of philosophers. Yet their work grew out of more 
than 150 years of a pragmatic experience.in Colonial self-government. The 
political leaders had developed a passion for freedom and wished to extend the 
concept to all citizens. In both the Preamble and Bill of Rights leaders defined 
forever the purpose and limited power of government.244 The First 
Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.. ."245 Since the adoption of 
the First Amendment in 1791, constitutional scholars have engaged in 
extensive debate over exactly what framers of the Constitution did or did not 
242jiudgins and Vacca, 18 
243Flory v. Smith, 145 Va. 164,134 S.E. 360 (1926). 
244Reiipion the Public Schools (Alexandria, Va: American Association 
of School Administrators, 1964), 1. 
245u. S. Constitution. AmpnHmpnt. T 
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mean by those two clauses. No matter what ideological frame member of 
Congress were thinking when they wrote the First Amendment, there was 
probably little consideration regarding church-state relations in public 
schools.246 "The simple truth," Supreme Justice Sandra O'Conner once 
observed, 
is that free public education was virtually non-existent 
in the late eighteenth century.... Since there then existed 
few government-run schools, it is unlikely that the persons 
who drafted the First Amendment, or the state legislators 
who ratified it, anticipated the problems of interaction of 
church and state in the public schools.247 
To James Madison and Thomas Jefferson religious freedom was the 
essential part of the struggle for freedom.248 ft is the Supreme Court's 
responsibility when called on to do so to define what religious freedom means in 
church-state issues. "The Supreme Court has not been consistent in 
establishing a national standard. "249 Religion as used in constitutional 
provisions of the First Amendment forbidding the "establishment of religion," 
means "a particular system of faith and worship recognized and practiced by a 
particular church, sect, or denomination."250 jn public education this means 
246Kristen J. Amundson, Ttelipinn jn fee Public Schools (Arlington: Va: 
American Association of School Administrators, 1986), 7. 
247\Vallace v. Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (1985). 
248Arval a. Morris, The Constitution and American Education (St. 
Paul: West Publishing Company, 1977), 328. 
249BrySOn Houston, 27. 
250Black's Law Dictionary. 5th ed. (St. Paul: West Publishing 
Company, 1979), 1161. 
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religious activities that are practiced within the public schools and are subject 
to litigation. In the 1947 Everson Board of Education case, Justice Hugo 
Black, writing for the majority, gave the first substantial definition to 
establishment clause of the First Amendment: 
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First 
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor 
the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can 
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer 
one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a 
person to go to or remain away from church against his will 
or force him to profess a belief in any religion. No person can 
be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or 
disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance, no tax in 
any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any 
religious activities or institutions, whatever form they may 
adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the 
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the 
affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. 
In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of 
religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation 
between church and state." 251 
A wall of separation between church and state presented a sensible, 
common-sense approach to the difficult church-state question. Yet even the 
Everson Court was able to put a sizeable hole in Jefferson's "wall" by 
upholding a New Jersey statute providing transportation for children attending 
religious schools-hop a ride to the school of choice. The Supreme Court 
predicated its judicial decision on the child benefit theory.252 The Fourteenth 
Amendment states: 
25lEverson V- Board of Education* 330 U.S. 1,15 (1947). 
252Bryson and Houston, 27. 
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Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws.253 
In many challenges to church-state issues in public schools, plaintiffs 
predicate complaints on state constitutions and statutes. It was not until the 
twentieth century that the United States Constitution was used in litigation 
regarding church-state issues. Initially, these cases were based on the 
Fourteenth Amendment, for it restricted state action, unlike the Bill of Rights 
which was applicable to only the federal government. Over the years, and 
through a number of Supreme Court decisions, the Supreme Court gradually 
absorbed the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment—the absorption 
theory or the incorporation doctrine. The free exercise clause was absorbed in 
1940, Cantwell v. Conecticut. and the establishment clause absorbed in 1947, 
Everson v. Board of Education. 254 
The Supreme Court has a long history of involvement in church-state 
decisions dating back to 1908. In the 1908 Quick Bear v. Leupp255 case> the 
Court's first church-state case, the issue was federal money was used in 
contracting with sectarian schools to provide an education for Indian children 
on a reservation. The practic had begun in 1894 and there was oppositin to the 
253xjnited States Constitution. Ampnrimpnt XIV. 
254jjudgins and Vacca, 400. 
Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908). 
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practice even then. Finally, Congress passed federal legislation disallowing the 
practice with the last appropriation in 1899. 
Even though Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Frances E. Leupp, was 
prohibited from using public funds for sectarian education by law, he was 
petitioned by Sioux Indians, Rosebud Agency, South Dakota, to provide a pro­
rata share of an Indian trust fund to contract with St. Francis Mission Roman 
Catholic School for their children's education. The trust fund was established 
in 1868 with Sioux Indians by Congress. The fund existed for the "support and 
maintenance of day and industrial schools, including erection and repairs of 
schoolbuildings."256 Reuben Quick Bear and Associates sought an injunction 
on constitutional grounds prohibiting using the funds; government "shall make 
no appropriation whatever for education in any sectarian schools. "2 5 7 An 
injunction was granted by the District of Columbia Federal Court and 
Commissioner Francis Leupp appealed. The District of Columbia Appeals 
Court reversed, and plaintiff Reuben Quick Bear and Associates appealed. The 
Supreme Court's ruling was was that: (1) the trust fund was private money, 
not public money; (2) the Sioux Indians had asked for a pro-rata share for 
sectarian school support; and (3) this request was in reality a free exercise of 
religion, constitutionally protected. Chief Justice Fuller concluded: 
It seems inconceivable that Congress shall have 
intended to prohibit them from receiving religious education 
at their own cost if they desire it; such an intent would be 
one to prohibit the free exercise of religion amongst the 
Indians, and such would be the effect of the construction for 
256jbid. 
257Ibid., 81. 
which the complainants contend.258 
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In the 1923 Mever v. Nebraska259 case the Supreme Court addressed 
the issue of whether or not parents had a right to determine their child's 
education.260 And in the 1923 Frothingrham v. Mellon.261 case the issue was 
legal standing to litigate where public monies were involved. And legal standing 
is critical to litigate regarding shurch-state public schools issue. Justice 
Sutherland maintained that 
his (the taxpayer's) interest in the moneys of the 
treasury-partly realized from taxation and partly 
from other sources- is shared with millions of others; 
is comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the 
effect upon future taxation of any payment out of the 
funds so remote, fluctuating, and uncertain that no basis 
is afforded for an appeal to the preventive powers of a 
court of equity.262 
In the 1925 Pierce v. Society of Sisters263 case and its companion case, 
Pierce \\ Hill Military Academy the Supreme Court addressed Oregon 
compulsory attendance law required children ages eight to sixteen attend only 
public schools.264 The Supreme Court ruled Oregon's compulsory 
258ibid.,82. 
259Meyer V- Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
260ibid., 400. 
26 lFrothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
262lbid., 490. 
263pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510. 
264jbid., 530. 
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attendance law unconstitutional. Based on Mever. the Supreme Court insisted 
that parents have right to determine direction of education for children- public 
or private.cide where their children will attend school. In affirming a lower-
court decision, the Court concluded: 
Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska... we think 
it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes 
with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing 
and education of children under their control The child is not 
the mere creature of the state; those who nuture him and direct 
his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to 
recognize and prepare him for additional obKgations.265 
So parents have a constitutional guarantee to decide placement of children in 
either public or nonpublic elementary schools. 
In the 1930 Cochran v,. Louisiana State Board ofEducation266 decision 
the Supreme Court upheld a 1928 Louisiana statute forcing the state school 
board to provide "school books for school children free of cost" to all children in 
the state, including children attending private schools,2**? The state 
maintained the legislation was aid to children, not to religious elementary and 
secondary schools. "The schools obtain nothing from them, nor are they 
relieved of a single obligation because of them. The school children and the 
state alone are the beneficiaries."268 Plaintiff Cochran objected on 
265ibid., 534-535. 
266cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370 
(1930). 
267ibid.,374. 
268ibid., 375. 
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Fourteenth Amendment due process consideration that his property was taxed 
for private education purposes which amounted to taxation without due 
process.269 Chief Justice Hughes accepted the state rationale: 
Viewing the statute as having the effect thus 
attributed to it we cannot doubt that the taxing power 
of the state is exerted for a public purpose. The legislature 
does not segregate private schools or their pupils, as its 
beneficiaries, or attempt to interfere with any matters of 
exclusively private concern. Its interest is education, 
broadly; its method, comprehensive. Individual interests are 
aided only as the common interest is safeguarded.270 
The Court created a situation where children and not the institutions benefited. 
This type of expenditure at public expense became known as the "child-benefit" 
theory. 
In the 1940 Cantwell v. Connecticut 271 case the Supreme Court 
decided another landmark church-state education case. It is because the 
Supreme Court maintained that "the fundamental concept of liberty embodied 
in the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First 
Amendment." In essence, the First Amendment religion clause is applicable to 
the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. The "absorption" theory was now 
complete, and the Supreme Court understood what it had been doing since the 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.272 
269jbid., 374. 
270ibid.,375. 
271Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
272ibid„ 303. 
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The First Amendment declares that Congress shall 
make no respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has 
rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as 
Congress to enact such laws.273 
In 1947, the Everson Vj. Board of Education^?4 decision addressed the 
issue of the New Jersey legislature to provide transportation for children 
attending religious elementary and secondary schools~to the religious school of 
choice. Plaintiff Everson objected on bases that: (1) taxation for private use 
without due process is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) the 
First Amendment forbids using tax money for religious schools. State courts 
differed on the decision. Everson won in the lower court and lost in the New 
Jersey Court of Appeals. On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that legislation 
was aid to children (the child benefit theory of Cochran') and satisfied a public 
need. In response to Everson's second charge, the Supreme Court delivered 
perhaps its most memorable description of what First Amendment means (the 
full statement was quoted earlier in this chapter), including Jefferson's words: 
"In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law 
was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and state.1 "275 
The Court's majority (the decision was five to four) maintained the New Jersey 
legislation had never made the slightest breach in the wall of separation. In 
addition, the Court maintained, the First Amendment "requires the state to be 
273fl)id. 
274Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947). 
275ibid., 15. 
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neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and nonbelievers; it 
does not require the state to be their adversary."276 
In dissenting, Justice Jackson contended the mtu'ority's judicial logic 
contradicted its decision. He likened the Court's logic to Julia, who according to 
Byron, "While whispering, 'I will never consent,'-consented."277 Justice 
Jackson also acknowledged the shallow logic upon which the child- benefit 
theory was based: 
Catholic education is the rock on which the whole 
structure rests, and to render tax aid to its Church 
school is indistinguishable to me from rendering the 
same aid to the Church itself.278 
Justice Rutledge also chastened the majority insisting the Court 
"sustained public payment for small concessions to religious schools, while it 
made wholly private in character the larger things without which small could 
have no meaning or use. "2 79 In conclusion, Justice Rutledge maintained the 
Cochran decision paved way for this decision, and the two decisions would 
create a rationale for a third. "Thus with time the most solid freedom steadily 
gives way before continuing corrosive decision."280 Justice Rutledge was 
correct in his prophecy. 
276ibid., 18. 
277ibid>>24. 
278xbid. 
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280jbid., 29. 
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Two landmark cases involving release time for students to attend 
religious activities during regular school hours were decided in 1948 and 1952. 
public school students during regular school hours for the purpose of religious 
instruction helped in establishing standards for ruling on the constitutionality 
of separation of church and state issues. In the 1948 MrfVillnm v Board of 
Education.281 case, students were released from secular instruction to attend 
religious instruction in t public school buildings. Students who did not have 
permission to participate in the religious instruction were assigned to another 
section of the building to continue secular instruction. McCollum asked for a 
court order requiring the school board to 
adopt and enforce rules and regulations prohibiting all 
instruction in and teaching of religious education in ail public 
schools... and in all public houses and buildings in said district 
when occupied by public schools.282 
She contended that public schools were promoting religion in violation of 
the First Amendment. The Illinois State court denied her claim and McCollum 
appealed to the Supreme Court. Justice Hugo Black writing the msgority 
opinion for the Supreme Court stated: "This is beyond all question a utilization 
of the tax-established and tax-supported public school system to aid religious 
groups to spread their faith."283 This decision prohibits use of public school 
facilities for released time for religious instruction during the school day. 
28lMcCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S. Ct. 461 (1948). 
282ibid., 205. 
283ibid., 210. 
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In the 1952 Zorach v Clauson.284 case the Supreme Court addressed 
the issue of released time for off-campus instruction. A New York education 
law allowed students, with permission from their parents, to leave the school 
buildings and grounds to attend religious centers for religious or devotional 
exercises. Plaintiff Zorach and friend maintained the public schools 
manipulated schedules to accommodate religious activities in violation of the 
First Amendment. By a six to three vote the Supreme Court rejected the 
claims of the plaintiffs and sustained New York City's released time program 
for off-campus religious instruction. The three dissenting judges maintained 
the program used "a secular institution to force religion" on school children. 
Justice Jackson insisted that school "serves a temporaryjail for a pupil who 
will not go to church. It takes more subtlety of mind than I possess to deny 
that this is governmental constraint in support of religion. "285 
Prayer and Bible reading have contributed greatly to developing judicial 
standards for ruling on separation of church and state issues. Over half of the 
states have permitted or required prayer at some point in the history of their 
public schools. Prior to 1962, at least twelve states and the District of 
Columbia required Bible reading.286 
In the 1962 Engel v. Vitale287 case the Supreme Court addressed the 
issue of required prayer. The New York State Board of Regents mandated a 
284zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 72 S. Ct. 679 (1952). 
285ibid., 324. 
286Kern Alexander, School Law. (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing 
Company, 1980), 238. 
287Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
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prayer— all twenty-two words—"Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence 
upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and 
our Country. "2 8 8 plaintiffs claimed the mandated prayer violated the 
establishment clause of the First Amendment. After failing in New York 
courts, they were successful in the United States Supreme Court with an eight 
to one vote. The Court maintained the mandated prayer as First Amendment 
establishment- religious minorities must surrender to the beliefs of this 
prayer. Therefore, it is unconstitutional to mandate one group's beliefs on 
another group. The significance ofEngel is that dictated prayer in public 
school classrooms, led by teachers and recited by students, is unconstitutional. 
One year later, another case addressed the constitutionality of Bible 
reading and prayer recitation in the public schools. In Abington School District 
v. Schempp. and a companion case, Murray v. Curlett.289 at issue was the 
Pennsylvania statute mandating Bible reading and recitation of the Lord's 
Prayer at the beginning of the school day. The statute was declared 
unconstitutional by the federal district court. On appeal to the Supreme 
Court, the decision of the district court was upheld. In a concurring opinion 
Justice Douglas stated that "though the mechanism of the State, all of the 
people are being required to finance a religious exercise that only some of the 
people want and that violates the sensibilities of others."290 
Continuing the Court said:: 
288lbid, 422. 
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The test may be stated as follows: What are the 
purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If 
either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then 
the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as 
circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to 
withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there 
must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect 
neither advances nor inhibits religion.291 
This the beginning of the tripartite test which was completed in 
Lgmfin 1.292 The first two parts are: (1) "Does the statute have a secular 
legislative purpose?" (2) "Does the principle of the statute either advance or 
inhibit religion?" These two questions, along with the third question developed 
later, still remain the Supreme Court's standard for ruling on violations of the 
establishment clause of the First Amendment. 
In 1968, a case addressed the issue introduced in the Cochran decision. 
In Board of Education v,. Allen.293 the plaintiff contended that the loaning of 
textbooks to parochial students failed constitutional muster by advancing 
religion at the expense of the taxpayers. The New York trial court ruled in 
favor of the plaintiff, but the Court of Appeals overturned the decision of the 
trial court. On appeal, the Supreme Court concurred with the Court of 
Appeals. Again, the child benefit theory surfaced when the Supreme Court 
said the Board of Education had not established that the "process of secular 
and religious training in religious schools are so intertwined that secular 
291lbid., 222. 
292Lemon Vi Kurtzman, 91 S. Ct. 2111 (1971). 
293]3oard of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
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textbooks furnished to students by the public are in fact instrumental in the 
teaching of religion. "2 94 
The language used by Justice White in speaking for the majority left 
some indecision on the part of both public and parochial school leaders. He 
failed to identify the limitations required by the First Amendment when he 
applied the public purpose theory. He evidently reasoned that the state could 
provide funds to parochial schools as long as the money was used to pay for 
secular services. 
In 1971, the Supreme Court encountered the indecision left by Justice 
Whites remarks when asked to rule on two state statutes which aided 
parochial schools. The two states, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island, were using 
the vagueness issue created by Justice White to apply the secular purpose 
standard in using public funds to pay for such items as textbook, teachers' 
salaries, supplements, and instructional materials in certain secular subjects. 
In Lemon v,. Kurtzman (Lemon 1)^95 the Court declared both states' statutes 
unconstitutional. After applying the Schempp test, the Court then added a 
third test: Does the statute require or foster excessive entanglement between 
church and state? With the addition of this question, the "tripartite test" was 
now complete. In this case, the Supreme Court decided there was excessive 
entanglement between the state and religion. A later challenge of this ruling in 
1973, Sloan Lemon^96 the Supreme Court again denied the practice, this 
294ibid, 248. 
295jjemon v. Kurtzman4 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105. 
296sioan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 472 (1973). 
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time citing that reimbursing parents of nonpublic school students for a portion 
of tuition expenses had the principal effect of advancing religion. 
The tripartite test provided the Supreme Court a standard to use in 
ruling on decisions involving religious issues. It is still applied in many cases 
throughout the nation, and it serves as a guideline for school districts to use in 
planning activities of a religious nature. 
These cases from Quick Bear to Lemon I have provided a foundation for 
litigation in the area of religion and the public schools. The principles 
established in these proceedings have guided courts to the standards that 
currently exists. It is a far cry from local sectarian schools created for 
salvation to the public schools in colonial days to those of today in which any 
reference to religion is often opposed. 
Summary 
Beginning with the early schools in the United States, the American 
public school has been a rallying place for the community. Citizens feel deeply 
committed to their schools. Because citizens claim ownership in schools, they 
see rationale for schools as an appropriate place; therefore, they strongly 
defend schools purposes, often to great length, regardless of the outcomes. 
The idea of ownership, "I can dictate to and control what I own," has led 
to increased conflict within the public schools. However, this perception is the 
opposite of the legal interpretation of what school should represent. Justice 
Frankfurter, writing in the MnCnllnm decision, stated the school's role very 
clearly: 
Designed to serve as perhaps the most powerful 
agency for promoting the cohesion among a heterogeneous 
95 
democratic people, the public school must keep scrupulously 
free from entanglement in the strife of sects. The preservation 
of the community from diverse conflicts, of Government from 
irreconcilable pressures by religion from censorship and 
coercion however subtly exercised, requires strict confinement 
of the State to instruction other than religious, leaving to the 
individual's church and home indoctrination in the faith of 
choice. This development of the public school as a symbol of 
our secular society was not a sudden achievement not attained 
without conflict. While in the small communities of comparatively 
homogeneous religious beliefs, the need for absolute separation 
presented no urgencies, elsewhere the growth of the secular 
school encountered the resistance of feeling strongly against it. 
But the inevitability of such attempts is the veiy reason for 
Constitutional provisions primarily concerned with the protection 
of minority groups. And such sects are shifting groups, varying 
from time to time, and place to place, thus representing in their 
totality the common interest of the nation.297 
Since 1980, there has been an alarming increase in the number of 
attacks on the public schools. Targets have included specific courses, library 
books, textbooks, audio-visual materials, and teaching methodologies. Critics 
have charged the schools with promulgating religion as well as inhibiting the 
free exercise of religion. 
Students are the very reason public schools exist. They are trapped in 
the middle of the religious conflict. Are students who are taught one thing at 
home and in the church, exposed to other ideas in schools? Are students 
"victims" because they are denied the right of access to divergent thinking? Or 
are they "victims" because someone charges the schools are infringing on their 
religious freedoms? 
Public schools are a mirror image of society. They reflect the pendulum 
of history, including judicial decisions. As long as schools are an extension of 
297McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 216-217. 
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the populace which support them, school leaders must remember that schools 
represent all the people. 
The election of President Reagan in 1980 lent support to the 
conservative philosophy which supports calling for prayer in the schools, a 
return to the basics, balanced treatment in biological sciences, emphasis on 
the importance of the traditional family, and tuition credit and vouchers which 
aid private schools. By 1988, President Reagan had nominated approximately 
one-fourth of the federal judges sitting on the bench, and the mood of the courts 
was beginning to change. Some courts appear to be adopting a much more 
lenient attitude with regard to religion in the schools.298 
Today, members of the Supreme Court are not in total agreement on 
religious issues in the public schools. The tripartite test is still used as a 
measurement for ruling on cases involving religion in the schools. Another 
chapter may yet be written on how the Court will swing in the future. 
Attention will now shift in this study from a review of the literature to a 
judicial review of the litigation and court proceedings that have helped define 
"what is" and "what is not" legal regarding religion in the curriculum of public 
schools. By careful scrutiny of the legal ramifications of the conflict, 
recommendations can be made to avoid future conflicts. 
298r. Freeman Butts, "A History and Civics Lesson for All of Us," 
Educational Leadership (May 1987): 21-25. 
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CHAPTER HI 
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL 
CURRICULUM 
Introduction 
The Constitution of the United States does not mention education. 
Individual states through the interpretation of the Tenth Amendment --"The 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited 
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people. "299.. established a system of state supported public schools. 
It was not until the twentieth century that citizens were able to address 
their grievances on religious issues in the federal courts. Federal courts have 
intervened in litigation involving the following two principal issues: "(1) alleged 
violation of constitutionally protected right, privilege, or immunity of an 
individual: and (2) validity questions of state or federal statutes under the 
United States Constitution."300 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states: 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. "301 These sixteen words have induced 
299{J. s. Constitution. AmftnHmpnt. X. 
SOOjoseph e. Bryson and Elizabeth Detty, Censorship of Public School 
Library and Instructional Material (Charlottesville: The Miche Company, 
1982), 72. 
301U. S. Constitution. Amendment I. 
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substantial research and many court cases in attempts to define the First 
Amendment's religious protection.302 There has been and continues to be 
debate as to what the framers of the First Amendment intended. 
When the founding fathers of the United States met in Philadelphia in 
the summer of1787 to write the Constitution, they felt they had a knowledge of 
humankind. This knowledge helped them draft a Constitution suitable to a 
fledgling government. "To them a human being was an atom of self-interest. 
They did not believe in man, but they did believe in the power of a good political 
constitution to control them."303 Consequently, the Constitution was not 
written for the personification of liberty. According toHofstadter, the authors' 
concern was property, not liberty. 
In fact, it was the opponents of the Constitution who were 
more active in demanding such vital liberties as freedom of 
religion, freedom of speech and press, jury trial, due process, 
and protection from unreasonable searches and seizures."^®^ 
"The establishment clause means that government is neutral in 
matters of religion. It does not promote one religious activity over another nor 
302jyiartjia m. McCarthy, "Religion and Public School: Emerging Legal 
Standards and Unresolved Issues." Harvard Educational Review 55. No. 3 
(August 1985): 276. 
303jjichard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men 
Who Made It (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), 3. 
304ibid„ li. 
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does it compel participation in a religious activity."305 Everson 306 
established the principles for interpreting the establishment clause. Justice 
Hugo Black, writing for the majority, stated: 
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment 
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government 
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion 
over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or 
to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess 
a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for 
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church 
attendance or nonattendance. No tax in any amount, large or 
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or 
institutions whatever they may adopt to teach or practice religion. 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly 
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups 
and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against 
establishment of religion by laws was intended to erect a "wall of 
separation between church and state."307 
"The free exercise clause means that a person may believe what he 
wishes. He may believe in his God or no God, and government will not interfere 
with that belief."308 The Abington School District v Schempp and Murray v. 
Curlett 309 cases helped define the free exercise clause. 
305h. C Hudgins, Jr. and Richard S. Vacea, Law and Education: 
Contemporary Issues and Court Decisions. 3rd ed (Charlottesville, Va: The 
Michie Company, 1991), 399. 
306gverson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1,15 (1947). 
307ibid„ 15 
308nU(jgins and Vacca, 399. 
309Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
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[The free exercise clause] recognizes the value of religious 
training, teaching and observance and, more particularly, the 
right of every person to freely choose his own course with 
reference thereof, free of any compulsion from the state 
The Free Exercise Clause, likewise considered many times here, 
withdraws from legislative power, state and federal, the exertion 
of any restraint on the free exercise of religion. Its purpose is to 
secure religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any 
invasions thereof by civil authority. Hence it is necessary in a 
free exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of the 
enactment as it operates against him in the practice of religion.^ 10 
Yet, the balancing test for the free exercise clause outlined in Wisconsin 
v. Yoder^ll differs from the tripartite test used in establishment clause cases. 
The initial question in determining violation of free exercise is whether the 
activity is violating a sincerely held belief of the plaintiff. Next, if it is a sincere 
belief, is it being violated by government action and to what extent? The last 
question is whether the action "serves a compelling interest that justifies the 
burden imposed on the free exercise of religious beliefs."  ̂12 
The distinction between the two clauses appears to be that "a violation 
of the free exercise clause is predicated on coercion, while the establishment 
clause violation need not be so attended. "3 13 
The interpretation of the First Amendment has an important bearing on 
the course of the decision. The establishment clause "protects a person from 
310lbid. 
SllWisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
312Martha M. McCarthy, A Delicate Balance: Church. State, and the 
Schools (Bloomington: Phi Delta Kappa Educational Foundation, 1983), 13. 
313Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963). 
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having his religious identity controlled, changed, or influenced by 
government and that means protecting those persons who currently have a 
religious identity and those other persons who do not. "314 
A broad interpretation of the First Amendment denies a strict 
prohibition of any aid to parochial groups regardless of the impartiality or 
equity of such aid. To put it another way, it urges absolute neutrality toward 
all things religious. Historically, this interpretation has been the position of the 
United States Supreme Court.315 
A narrow interpretation of the First Amendment presumes the addition 
of the letter "a" before the word "religion." 
Under this interpretation government may not recognize a 
single religion of America, and also government would equally 
be prohibited from preferring one or more religions or churches 
over others. But, the point is that government would be permitted 
under this interpretation, to have a specific purpose and primary 
effect of equally aiding all religions or all churches or religious 
groups.316 
It is the responsibility of the Supreme Court when called on to do so to 
define what religious freedom means in church-state issues. The Supreme 
Court has not been consistent in establishing a national standard.^ 17 As the 
members of the Supreme Court change, their rulings change accordingly. Also, 
314Arval A. Morris, "Fundamentalism, Creationism, and the First 
Amendment," West's Education Law Reporter. Vol. 41 (St. Paul: West 
Publishing Company, 1987), 14. 
Sl^ibid. 
316lbid., 15. 
31?Bryson and Houston, 27. 
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the mood of the nation has a great bearing on their decisions. As of 1992, the 
majority of the Court continued to interpret the First Amendment in the broad 
sense. 
The Fourteenth Amendment states: 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.318 
In many challenges to church-state issues in public schools, plaintiffs 
predicate complaints on state constitutions and statutes. It was not until the 
twentieth century that the United States Constitution was used in litigation 
regarding church-state issues. Initially, these cases were based on the 
Fourteenth Amendment, for it restricted state action, unlike the Bill of Rights 
which was applicable to only the federal government. Over the years, and 
through a number of Supreme Court decisions, the Supreme Court gradually 
absorbed the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment--the absorption 
theory or the incorporation doctrine. The free exercise clause was absorbed in 
1940, Cantwell v. Conecticut. and the establishment clause absorbed in 1947, 
Ever son v. Board of Education. 319 
In the early 1960s the Supreme Court in ruling on Bible reading320 ̂  
318united States Constitution. AmftnrimpntXIV. 
319Hudgins and Vacca, 400. 
320Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
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state-sanctioned prayer^21 reiterated that the establishment clause intended 
to erect "a wall of separation between Church and State. "3 2 2 The Court 
applied two criteria in testing the constitutionality of the challenged state 
action: (1) "Does the statute reflect a secular purpose?" and (2) "Does the 
principle of the statute either advance or prohibit religion?" The Court rejected 
the argument that such religious accommodations in public schools are 
necessary to protect free exercise rights, concluding that state-sponsored 
devotional activities-even though nondenominational with voluntary 
participation-have a sectarian purpose and the primary effect of advancing 
religion. 
In 1971, the Supreme Court added a third criterion in establishment 
clause analysis: (3) "Does the legislative action require or foster excessive 
government entanglement with religion?"  ̂23 The three criteria for analyzing 
establishment clause violations formed the tripartite test. The tripartite test, 
commonly known as the Lemon324 test, was first used in an education case, 
Lemon v\ Kurtzman.325 in 1971. Being unable to meet the requirements of 
even one prong of the test prescribes that a policy or activity be ruled 
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court routinely uses this test in ruling on 
32lAbington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
322^verson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1,15-16 (1947). 
323walz. v. Tax Commission of City of New York, 397 U S. 664, 674 
(1970). 
324Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
325jbid. 
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religious matters in the public schools. 
Establishment clause cases center on the legality of the governmental 
action itself, whereas in free exercise claims individuals commonly accept the 
legitimacy of the governmental regulation but claim an entitlement to special 
treatment because the regulation has an adverse effect on the practice of their 
faith. To judge free exercise claims, the judiciary applies a balancing test that 
includes an evaluation of whether practices dictated by a sincere and 
legitimate religious belief hamper the governmental action and, if so, to what 
degree. If such an impairment is confirmed, the court then evaluates whether 
the state action serves a compelling interest that justifies the burden imposed 
on the free exercise of religious beliefs.326 Even if a compelling interest is 
shown, the judiciary will require the government to follow available means to 
accomplish its objective that are less burdensome on free exercise rights. 
Applying this balancing test, the judiciary must make sensitive judgments as 
to what makes up a sincere belief and a burden on its practice and what types 
of governmental interests are required to override free exercise rights.^27 
The most difficult church and state controversies involve conflicting 
claims between free exercise and establishment clauses. Both claims are cast 
as absolute terms, and either if expanded to a logical extreme would tend to 
clash with the other. The principle of governmental neutrality toward religion, 
expressed in the First Amendment, has been easier to state than to apply. 
Accommodations made to protect free exercise rights can be viewed as 
advancement of religion in violation of the establishment clause, but 
326gee Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-215 (1972). 
327McCarthy, 289. 
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overzealous efforts to protect against state sponsorship of religion can 
encroach upon free exercise rights. The boundary is sometimes hazy between 
accommodation and advancement and between separation and hostility. In 
the public school setting, difficult legal questions arise when students' rights to 
attend public school in a climate free from state-imposed religious doctrine are 
pitted against claims that religious accommodations are required to enable 
students to practice their faith.328 
Which should prevail~the government's responsibility to adhere to 
establishment clause prohibitions or one's right to exercise religious beliefs? 
There is some sentiment that the establishment clause is intended mainly to 
implement the free exercise clause, so if they should clash the free exercise 
clause should take precedence. There is also a competing theory that 
nonestablishment is the overriding concern which under some circumstances 
may justify a minimal burden on free exercise rights. The tension between the 
two clauses has complicated the judiciary's task in church and state cases, and 
ultimately the Supreme Court may have to make a decision regarding the 
hierarchy of the First Amendment religious freedoms.̂ 29 
Quick Bear v. Leupp paved the way for the Supreme Court to rule on 
religious activities occurring in the public school curriculum that violated the 
First Amendment as applied to states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Dealing with religious activities in the public school curriculum is a very 
sensitive issue. School officials face challenges in trying to abide by the laws of 
the land, accommodate local religious customs, protect the rights of minority 
328ibid., 290-291. 
329ibid.,291. 
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groups, and deal with their own religious beliefs. The task is no easier for the 
state and federal courts. The ultimate authority, the Supreme Court, is often 
divided in rendering its decisions. Divided or not, the decisions of the Supreme 
Court sets the standard for protecting the First Amendment rights of 
individuals. 
History of Church-State Litigation 
For the first one hundred fifty years of America's existence no one 
seriously challenged the legality of providing religious activities, curricular and 
extra-curricular, as part of the public school curriculum. In fact, many states 
beginning with Massachusetts in 1647, required religious activities as part of 
the public school curriculum.330 Since the 1940s, however, in ever increasing 
number, there have been challenges to providing religious activities as a part of 
the public school curriculum. Before this period, school officials met little if any 
resistance in designing curricula that provided religious activities on a daily 
basis. 
Over the years, even Presidents have expressed different views 
concerning separation of church and state. In 1876, President Ulysses S. 
Grant made a speech in which he stated that not one dollar in public funds was 
to be given to benefit sectarian schools. In 1986, President Ronald Reagan 
asked Congress to provide public funds to parents who enrolled their children in 
religious sectarian schools. President George Bush also supported tax credits 
for parents whose children enrolled in private schools. President Bill Clinton 
does not favor providing tax credits to parents whose children attend private 
330jsjeil Gerard McCluskey, Public Schools and Moral Education (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 12. 
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schools. His only child attends a private school in the Washington, D.C. area. 
From 1948 until 1992 the Supreme Court ruled on more church-state 
cases than in any comparable time segment in the history of the United 
States. As a matter of fact, from 1969, when Chief Justice Warren Burger 
was appointed to the Court until his retirement in 1986, there were more 
church-states cases handed down than in the entire Supreme Court history. 
Since 1970, each term of the Supreme Court has had at least one church and 
state case on the docket. 
Curriculum Decisions 
A state has the right to require a specified curriculum to be taken by all 
students. This authority is inherent in the state's responsibility to prepare all 
students for good citizenship. A local school board has a more limited authority 
bound by parental rights. The selection of curriculum offerings is a joint effort 
between school and parents. Parental objections to specific courses generally 
stem from what parents perceive as ideas which are in conflict with their 
religious beliefs. "It is their contention that the school is sponsoring religion in 
offering the courses and experiences."^ 1 
Several writers have defined curriculum, with the result that some 
definitions are much broader than others. Dale Brubaker defines the 
curriculum as "what persons experience in a setting. "3 3 2 Edmund Reutter 
defines the curriculum as "encompass[ing] all experiences provided for public 
33lHudgins and Vacca, 426. 
332Da]e l. Brubaker, Curriculum Planning The Dynamic of Theory and 
Practice (Glenview. HI.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1982), 2. 
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school students under the aegis of public school authorities."333 Both 
definitions would include the curricular and extracurricular activities within the 
school environment. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines curriculum as "The set of studies or 
courses for a particular period, designated by a school or branch of a 
school."334 Black's definition provides a very narrow interpretation of 
curriculum, which restricts curriculum to the formal set of studies or courses in 
the classrooms. 
Arval Morris uses yet another definition, a two-fold definition, one 
encompassing all of the preceding definitions of curriculum. 
The term "curriculum" can be used in at least two senses. 
One sense refers to the studies prescribed for a given grade, 
the successful completion of which leads ultimately to a high 
school diploma. A second sense of the term refers to the 
whole life-experience program of the school.335 
Morris also points out that in addition to the formally stated curriculum, 
there is a hidden curriculum. The first one is spelled out and is easy to 
recognize by reviewing the specified courses, course content with its 
articulated goals, objectives, outcomes, and the prescribed textbooks that are 
used in order to achieve this purpose. The second is the hidden curriculum. For 
333e. Edmund Reutter, Jr., "Censorship in Public Schools: Some Recent 
Developments,"Current Legal Issues gi Education, ed. M. A. McGhehey 
(Topeka: National Organization on Legal Problems of Education, 1977), 1. 
334 Black's Law Dictionary. 5th Ed., (St. Paul: West Publishing 
Company, 1979), 345. 
335Arval Morris, The Constitution and Amm-inan Education (St. Paul: 
West Publishing Company, 1980), 188. 
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example, the school teaches values by examplesand the communicated word 
through procedures to administer the school discipline policy. The school may 
or may not recognize the hidden curriculum that is portrayed by its image. 
If one accepts each of these definitions, one can accept Boles' assertion 
"that almost every conceivable area of the public school curriculum has been 
challenged at one time or another someplace in the United States."336 
As stated at the beginning of this section, a state has the authority to 
establish curriculum, while local school boards frequently have power granted 
by the state to prescribe curriculum, as long as it does not conflict with state 
mandates. The federal government has no direct control over curriculum, but 
it can exert tremendous pressure on school systems by funding or not funding 
programs. In order to be eligible for the federal grants, school systems must 
agree to abide by certain regulations and conditions .337 
The authority to establish curriculum is not absolute. Courts may 
intervene when a question of constitutional rights arises.338 
In deciding on the constitutionally of a statute or rule, the 
courts will balance the interests of the parties involved. With 
regard to the school curriculum, students, parents, teachers, 
and the state will have interests which must be taken into 
consider ation.3 3 9 
336Donald E. Boles, The Two Swords. Cnmrrmntarips and Cases gi 
Religion and Education (Ames: The Iowa State University Press, 1967), 301. 
337Morrjs. Constitution. 189. 
338Kern Alexander and M. David Alexander, The Law of Schools. 
Students and Teachers ja & Nutshell (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 
1984), 29. 
339ibid., 30. 
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The founding fathers had no way of knowing what schools would be like 
or how many religious groups there would be, or how the courts would interpret 
the "free exercise clause" and the "establishment clause" of the First 
Amendment, two hundred years later. Religion as a part of the school 
curriculum has generated a great deal of controversy in the public schools. 
"Religion can be a strong force, and it can serve either to unify or to divide 
people. "3 40 
As with curriculum, in order to discuss religion in the schools, it is 
necessary to define it. One definition of religion follows: 
Any individual or group belief is religious if it occupies the same 
place in the lives of its adherents that orthodox beliefs occupy in 
the lives of their adherents. Four characteristics should be present: 
(1) a belief regarding the meaning of life. (2) a psychological 
commitment by the individual adherent (or if a group, by members 
generally) to this belief; (3) a system of moral practice resulting 
from adherence to this belief; and (4) an acknowledgment by its 
adherents that the belief (or belief system) is their exclusive or 
supreme system of ultimate beliefs.341 
The Random House College Dictionary defines religion thus: 
a set of beliefs concerning the case, nature, and purpose of the 
universe; a specific and institutional set of beliefs and practices 
generally agreed upon by a number of persons or sects; a deep 
conviction of the validity of religious beliefs and practices.342 
340MorriB. Constitution. 325. 
341"DefiningReligion." University of Chicago Law Review 32 (1965): 
550-51. 
342The Random House College Dictionary, rev. ed. (New York: Random 
House, 1975), 1114-1115.. 
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Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines religion as 
the service and worship of God or the supernatural; commitment 
or devotion to religious faith or observance; a system of beliefs held 
to with an order and faith.343 
Black's Law Dictionary defines religion as 
Man's relation to Divinity, to reverence, worship, obedience, and 
submission to mandates and precepts of supernatural or superior 
beings. In its broadest sense includes all forms of belief in the 
existence of superior beings exercising power over human beings 
by volition, imposing rules of conduct, with future rewards and 
punishments. Bond uniting man to God, and a virtue whose 
purpose is to render God worship due him as source of all being 
and principle of all government of things.344 
As used in constitutional provisions of First Amendment 
forbidding the "establishment of religion," the term means a 
particular system of faith and worship recognized and practiced 
by a particular church, sect, or denomination. 345 
There has been and continues to be debate over what the framers of the 
First Amendment meant by the "free exercise clause" and the "establishment 
clause." "As late as the time of the Revolutionary War, at least eight of the 
thirteen former colonies had established churches, four of the other five had 
343webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, Mass: G. 
and C. Merriam, 1967), 724. 
344gigck|s Law Dictionary. 5th ed., (St. Paul: West Publishing 
Company, 1979), 1161. 
345H)icL 
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established religions."346 
According to one historian, the "wall of separation" metaphor used by 
Thomas Jefferson did not mean complete and absolute separation of church 
and state so that no religion or religious influence was to be permitted in state-
sponsored activities and laws. His chief aim was the protection of one's 
religious beliefs and opinions.347 This is a far cry from the interpretation given 
Jefferson's "wall of separation" metaphor in Everson Board of Education. 
which stated that the First Amendment means " 'at least' that, among other 
things, neither a state nor the federal government can pass laws that aid all 
religions.'348 
This chapter will examine the legal aspects of religion in the public 
school curriculum in the following areas: Released Time For Religious 
Instruction: On campus, Off Campus, and Shared Time; School-Sponsored 
Prayer and Bible Reading; Patriotic Exercises; Creationism and Evolution: 
Balanced Treatment; Equal Access and Religious Groups on Campus; Prayer 
at Athletic Events; Religious Symbols and Holidays; Moment of Silence; 
Secular Humanism; Graduation Exercises; Distribution of Religious 
Literature; Bible Study Courses; Compulsory Attendance; and 
Immunizations. All of the above practices have been litigated in court on 
religious grounds, and precedents have been established. 
346Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,427-428. 
Liberty and the First Amendment (Westchester. 111.: Crossway Books, 1987) 
120. 
348Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 15-16. 
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Released Time for Religious Instruction 
The practice of releasing students for religious instruction in the United 
States can be traced to Gary, Indiana, in 1914.349 Challenges to providing 
released time for religious instruction in public schools had been litigated in 
state courts, which did not find any violation of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. The Supreme Court has ruled on two landmark cases involving 
released time. The first case was MnCnlhim Board ofEducation^SO in 1948. 
The second case was Zorach v. Clauson^Sl in 1952. In 1985 the Supreme 
Court ruled on a shared time program, School District of jhg Citv of Grand 
Rapids v. Phvllis Ball.3 5 2 
On Campus 
In MrCnllum v^ Board of Education353 the local board of education in 
Champaign, Illinois had agreed to provide released time for religious instruction 
in the schools during regular school hours for students whose parents had 
signed a request card. Students not receiving religious instruction were 
assigned to another part of the building to continue their secular studies. 
McCollum, a parent, requested a court order forcing the school board to 
349j£ern Alexander, Ray Corns, and Walter McCann, Public School 
Law: Cases and Materials (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1969) 107. 
350McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461 (1948). 
351Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 72 S.Ct. 679 (1952). 
352gchool District of the City of Grand Rapids v. Phyllis Ball, 473 U.S. 
373, 105 S.Ct. 3216, 87 L.Ed. 267 (1985). 
353Mcc0uum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461 (1948). 
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adopt and enforce rules and regulation prohibiting all 
instruction in and teaching of religious education in all public 
schools... and in all public school houses and building in said 
district when occupied by public schools.354 
Her argument was that tax-supported schools were promoting religion in 
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Illinois state courts 
ruled against McCollum, and she appealed to the Supreme Court. In writing 
the Court's majority opinion, Justice Black stated," This is beyond all question 
a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported public school system to 
aid religious groups to spread their faith."355 Justice Black once again 
expressed views announced by the msg'ority and minority in Everson--even 
repeating Everson's articulate First Amendment definition. Justice Black then 
acknowledged that 
the First Amendment rests upon the premise that both 
religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty 
aims if each is left free from the other within its respective 
sphere. Or, as we said in the Everson case, the First 
Amendment has erected a wall between Church and State 
which must be kept high and impregnable.356 
The MftCollnm decision forbids the use of released time for religious 
instruction on campus during the school day. This landmark case is one of the 
most often quoted cases concerning religious instruction in the public schools. 
In Vaughn VJ. Regd^57 jn 1970, plaintiffs, fathers of children who 
354ibid., 205. 
3551^(1^ 210. 
356ibid., 212. 
357vaughn v. Reed, 313 F.Supp. 431 (W.D.Va. 1970). See also People 
115 
attended the Martinsville School System, sought an injunction against the 
religious education program being held in the Martinsville elementary schools. 
The defendants contended that the program did not violate the First 
Amendment. 
Weekly classes were held by teachers sent in by a private organization 
for students whose parents had given written permission for their children to 
attend the classes. They were purported to teach the students about religion 
rather than to indoctrinate them therein. Students whose parents did not sign 
excusal cards were assigned to a study period. Using McCollum Vj. Board of 
Education as the controlling authority, the Chief Judge of the United States 
District Court of the Western District of Virginia ruled that when those 
students whose parents had not signed cards were excused for study period, the 
First Amendment was violated. 
Off Campus 
The second landmark case dealing with released time was Zorach 
Clauson.358 This 1952 case differed from MnCnlli^m in that it permitted 
released time for off-campus instruction. A New York education law allowed 
ex rel. Lewis v. Graves, 245 N.Y. 195 156 N.E. 663 (1927); People ex rel. 
Latimer v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 394 HI. 228,68 N.E.2d 305 
(1946); Dilger v. School District 24 CJ, 222 Or. 108,352 P.2d 564 (1960) for 
courts upholding discretionary power of board of education to provide released 
time programs. Some court decisions indicated parents had the right to have 
children excused or released from school for religious purposes: Lewis v. 
Spaulding, 193 Misc. 66,85 N.Y.S.2d 682 (1948), appeal dismissed 299 N.Y. 
564, 85 N.E.2d 791 (1949); Gordon v. Board of Education of City of Los Angles, 
78 Cal.App.2d 464,178 P.2d 488 (1947); Perry v. School District No. 81, 
Spokane, 54 Wn.2d 886, 344 P.2d 1036 (1959); Fisher v. Clackamas County 
School District 12, Or.App., 507 P.2d 839 (1973). 
358zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 72 S.Ct. 679 (1952). 
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students, with permission from their parents, to leave the school buildings and 
grounds to attend religious centers for religious instruction or devotional 
exercises. Plaintiff Zorach and friends maintained that public schools 
manipulated schedules to accommodate religious activities in violation of the 
First Amendment. The same law made school attendance compulsory and 
students not released stayed in the classrooms. Churches reported attendance 
of students released from public schools who failed to report for religious 
instruction. By a vote of six to three, the Supreme Court rejected the claims of 
the plaintiff's and sustained New York City's released time for an off-campus 
religious instruction program. The three dissenting judges maintained the 
program used "a secular institution to force religion" on school children. Justice 
Jackson insisted that school "serves as a temporary jail for a pupil who will not 
go to church. It takes more subtlety of mind than I possess to deny that this is 
government constraint in support of religion."359 
In 1975, in Smith v,. Smith360 public school students challenged a 
release-time program whereby public school students were released during 
school hours for religious instruction off school campuses by a nonprofit 
organization supported by the council of churches. The Chief Judge for the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia granted 
injunctive relief and the defendants appealed. On appeal, the United States 
Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, ruled that the release-time program had a 
359lbid., 324. 
360smith v. Smith, 391 F.Supp. 443 (1975), 523 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 
1975), cert, derated, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976). See also State and Holt v. 
Thompson, 66 Wis.2d 659, 225 N.W.2d 678 (1975). 
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secular purpose in accommodating the wishes of students' parents, did not 
excessively entangle state with religion in that public school classrooms were 
not turned over to religious instruction, and, as the primary effect of the 
program did not necessarily advance or inhibit religion, the program did not 
violate the establishment clause. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision 
of the District Court. 
In a 1981 case, Lanner v. Wimmer 361 the United States Court of 
Appeals, Tenth Circuit, held that provisions in a released time program, in 
which students attended church-related seminaries and received public school 
credit for classes that were "mainly denominational" in subject matter, was 
unconstitutional. Also unconstitutional was a procedure that required the 
public schools to collect the seminary's attendance slips. 
Shared Time 
Shared time or dual enrollment is a cooperative agreement between 
public school officials and parochial school officials to share students, teachers, 
and facilities. The intent of such agreements is to better serve the citizens of 
the community. 
In Fisher v. Clackamas County School District 12.362 a sujt fa eauitv 
was bought by plaintiff taxpayers to prohibit the defendants, school district, its 
board clerk, and superintendent from using classrooms in St. John the Baptist 
school to conduct classes for students of the parochial school. St. John's 
^SiLanner v. Wimmer, 662 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1981). 
362pisher v. Clackamas County School District 12,507 P.2d 839 (Ore. 
App. 1973). 
118 
school was a parochial school under the control of the Catholic church. The 
plaintiffs contended that the furnishing of teachers, textbooks and 
instructional materials to the students of St. John's constituted a benefit to 
religion institutions in violation of the Oregon Constitution, Article 1, section 5 
which stated: 
No money shall be drawn from the Treasury for the benefit 
of any religeous (sic), or theological institution, nor shall any 
money be appropriated for the payment of any religeous (sic) 
services in either house of the Legislative Assembly.363 
The defendants and intervenors claimed that the teachers and textbooks were 
not being furnished to St. John's school, but to two bona fide public schools 
using classroom space in St. John's school; namely, Rowe Junior High Annex 
and Milwaukie Elementary Annex. 
The circuit court ruled that the "shared time" program was 
unconstitutional, but approved the "released time" program. On appeal, the 
court of appeals, affirmed that both the "shared time" and "released time" 
programs violated prohibition on benefit to religious instruction, but reversed 
that the public school annexes in parochial school building were "public 
schools" since only parochial school students were enrolled. 
The "shared time" program started in 1968. Seventh and eighth grade 
students attended the program for seven periods. Four periods they had public 
school teachers who taught language arts, social studies, math, and science. 
Four classroom were set aside for the teachers and all religious symbols were 
363jbid., 841. 
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removed. The three remaining subjects, art, music, and religion, were taught 
by St. John teachers in other classrooms in the same building, where there 
were some religious symbols. The parochial school was responsible for 
physical education, study halls, cafeteria, and auditorium used by all students 
enrolled at St. John's school. 
Students in this program were registered by St. John's school, which in 
turn, provided a registration list to Eowe Junior High School Annex. From this 
list students were enrolled in the Annex; thus each student had dual 
enrollment. 
The St. John's school had requested the "shared time" program because 
of financial difficulties. The defendant school board agreed to the program 
because it was less expensive than assuming all the responsibility for the 
parochial students' education. All the students attending Rowe Junior High 
Annex consisted entirely of St. John's students. 
The "released time" program started in 1969. Fifth and sixth grade 
students enrolled in the program were full-time students at Milwaukie 
Elementary Annex. They received instruction in a self-contained classroom. 
Religious symbols were removed from the two classrooms used by the 
program. The students were released for 120 minutes each week for religious 
instruction in accordance with the provisions of ORS 339.420, which provided: 
"Upon application of his parent or guardian, a child attending the public school 
may be excused from school for periods not exceeding 120 minutes in any week 
to attend weekday schools giving instruction in religion."364 There were four 
thirty-minute sessions for religious instruction provided by Catholic Sisters 
364ibid., 842. 
120 
teaching at St John's school. The religious instruction was provided in 
classrooms other than those used by Milwaukie Elementary Annex program. 
There were other fifth and sixth grade students being taught in the 
physical facilities of St. John's school. The administration of St. John's school 
made the decision as to which students attended Milwaukie Elementary School 
and which students attend St. John's school. 
The St. John's school had requested the "released time" program. The 
defendant school district agreed, because it was financially to their benefit. 
Like Rowe Junior High Annex, all the students attending Milwaukie 
Elementary School consisted entirely of students of St. John's school. 
In Grand Rapids School District of the City of Grand Rapids v. Phyllis 
Ball.365 taxpayers filed a suit against the school district, and a number of 
state officials, challenging that the school district's shared time and 
community education programs violated the establishment clause of the First 
Amendment. The programs provided at public expense, offered classes to 
nonpublic school students in classrooms leased from nonpublic schools. The 
Shared Time program made available classes during the regular school day 
that were intended to supplement the "core curriculum" courses required by 
the State. The shared time teachers were full-time employees of the public 
schools, and many of them had previously taught in nonpublic schools. The 
Community Education Program offered voluntary classes at the conclusion of 
the regular school day, some of which were not offered in the public schools. 
365(jrand Rapids School District of the City of Grand Rapids v. Phyllis 
Ball, 105 S.Ct. 3216 (1985). See also Special District for the Education and 
Training of Handicapped Children of St. Louis County v. Wheeler, 408 S.W.2d 
60 (Mo. 1966); Morton v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 69 m.App.2d 
38, 216 N.E.2d 305 (1966). 
121 
Community Education teachers were part-time public school employees, most 
of whom were employed full-time in the nonpublic school where the Community 
Education classes were held. The students enrolled in both programs are the 
same students who otherwise would attend the particular school in which the 
classes were held. Of the forty-one private schools that participated in these 
programs, forty were identifiable religious schools. 
The United States District for the Western District of Michigan, ruled in 
favor of the taxpayers and enjoined further operation of the programs. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth District affirmed the decision of 
the lower court and the defendants petitioned for certiorari. The Supreme 
Court, Justice Brennan delivering the majority opinion, ruled that the shared 
time and community education programs, which offered classes to nonpublic 
students at public expense in classrooms leased from nonpublic schools had 
the "primary or principal" effect of advancing religion and therefore violated 
the dictates of the establishment clause of the First Amendment, thus 
affirming the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
District. 
Released-time programs for religious instruction must be handled in a 
way that such instruction does not interfere with the normal instruction within 
a school nor conflict with the establishment clause of the First Amendment. 
Generally, on-campus released-time and shared time programs will be found to 
be unconstitutional, whereas off-campus released-time programs may be 
found to be constitutional. 
School-Sponsored Praver and Bible Reading 
Prayer and Bible reading in the public schools are as old as the public 
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schools. As the population of the United States grew, so did the diversity 
among religious and nonreligious groups. Initially, the population was basically 
Protestants, Catholics, and non-believers, who came from Europe. Later, large 
numbers of immigrants came from eastern Europe and southeastern Asia, 
bringing with them religious traditions that were foreign to the original settlers. 
An increase in population, coupled with the diversity of religious groups caused 
frequent controversy in the public schools involving religious issues. 
Ultimately, the differences over religious issues in the public schools led to the 
courts for resolution. 
At some point in their history, over half the states permitted or required 
prayer and Bible reading in the public schools. "Prior to 1962, at least twelve 
states and the District of Columbia required Bible reading." 366 The normal 
attitude of the courts was that the Bible and general prayer were not sectarian 
in nature, and their use did not violate constitutional religious guarantees367 
as evident in a North Dakota statute: 
[the] Bible shall not be deemed a sectarian book. It shall not 
be excluded from any public school. It may be the option of the 
teacher to read in school without sectarian comment, not to 
exceed ten minutes daily. No pupil shall be required to read it 
nor be present in the schoolroom during the reading thereof 
contrary to the wishes of his parents or guardian or other 
person having him in charge.^68 
366Kern Alexander and M. David Alexander, American Public School 
Law. 3d ed., (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1992). 
367jjackett v. Brooksville Graded School District, 120 Ky. 608,87 S.W. 
792 (1905). 
368North Dakota Complied Laws, Sec, 1388 (1913). 
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Prayers and Bible reading continues to be a controversial issue in public 
schools. Too long, school systems have disregarded decisions of the Supreme 
Court related to religious issues and continued unconstitutional practices. As 
school officials realize the importance of protecting the religious freedoms of all 
clients, they have begun to develop policies within the framework of the law 
(see Appendix A). 
In Dormeus v. Board of Education of the Borough of Hawthorne.369 the 
New Jersey Supreme Court held that a tate statute which required the 
reading, without comment, of five verses from the Old Testament at the 
opening of each public school day did not violate the Federal Constitution. The 
plaintiffs, one as a parent and both as taxpayers, appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court dismissed the 
appeal for two reasons: (1) By the time the case reached the United States 
Supreme Court it was moot as it related to the rights of the child, since she had 
graduated from the public schools. (2) The plaintiffs failed to show such a 
direct and particular financial interest as is necessary to maintain a 
taxpayer's case within the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court. 
In a 1962 case, Chamberlin v. Dade County Board of Public 
Instruction. 370 parents challenged certain religious practices in the county 
public schools. They brought suit to prohibit religious practices in the county 
public schools that they believed violated the establishment clause of the First 
369Doremus v. Board of Education, 5 N.J. 435, 75 A.2d 880 (1950), 342 
U.S. 429 (1952). 
370chamberlin v. Dade County Board of Public Instruction, 171 So.2d 
535 (Fla. 1965). 
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Amendment of the United States Constitution. The practices in question were 
as follows: 
(1) the regular reading of verses from the Bible in 
assemblies and in classrooms; (2) the regular recitation 
of the Lord's Prayer and other religious sectarian prayers; 
(3) the conducting of religious and sectarian baccalaureate 
programs; (4) the conducting of religious census among 
the children to ascertain their own religious affiliation and 
the religious affiliation of their parents; (5) the conducting 
of religious test as a qualification for the employment of 
teacher s.3 71 
The Circuit Court ruled in favor of the school board and the plaintiffs 
appealed to the Supreme Court of Florida. The Florida Supreme Court 
affirmed the decision of the lower court and the plaintiffs appealed to the 
United States Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court vacated 
the opinion and remanded the case to the Florida Supreme Court. The Florida 
Supreme Court affirmed their original decision and plaintiffs again appealed to 
the United States Supreme Court. This time the United States Supreme 
Court reversed and remanded the case. The Florida Supreme Court, on second 
remand, ruled that in light of the recent ruling by the United States Supreme 
Court relating to prayer issues, that numbers three, four, and five were not 
involved in the Schempp^ ? 2 and Murray  ̂73 cases and nothing therein 
changes our views as expressed in our opinion rendered in June, 1963. 
371lbid., 537. 
372Ajjington School District v. Shempp, 374 U.S. 203, 83 S.Ct. 1560 
(1963). 
373Abington School District v. Shempp, (Murray v. Curlett), 374 U.S. 
203, 83 S.Ct. 1560 (1963). 
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However, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that numbers one and two, Bible 
reading and prayers, in state public schools pursuant to statutes or as 
sponsored by school authorities did violate the establishment of religion clause 
of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
In the 1962 case of Eirnel v. Vitale.374 the Supreme Court addressed 
the constitutionality of the New York State Board of Regents' mandated 
prayer: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg 
Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers, and our country."3 75 
Plaintiffs maintained the prayer violated the First Amendment religious 
establishment clause. They were unsuccessful in the trial court and in the 
New York Court of Appeals, but on certiorari the Supreme Court ruled the 
Regent's prayer unconstitutional: 
When the power, prestige and financial support of government 
is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect 
coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the 
prevailing officially approved religion is plain.3 76 
Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, stated: The point for 
decision is whether the Government can constitutionally finance a 
religious exercise I think it an unconstitutional undertaking whatever 
form it takes.377 
374Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
375ibid.,422. 
376x131(1., 431. 
377ibid., 437. 
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The "finance" issue Justice Douglas refers to is the amount of time 
needed to recite the prayer; there are no other "finance" issues in the case. In 
addition, Justice Douglas apparently realized the judicial dichotomy in E verson 
and recanted his support of Everson: 
The Everson case seems in retrospect to be out of line with the 
First Amendment. Its result is appealing as it allows aid to be 
given to needy children. Yet by the same token, public funds 
could be used to satisfy other needs of children of parochial 
schools-lunches, books, and tuition being obvious examples.378 
The conspicuous point of Engel is that prescribed prayer in public school 
classrooms, with teachers leading the recitation and with children reciting, will 
be ruled unconstitutional. This case is important in school prayer cases, since 
it is used as a measuring instrument for similar cases. 
One year later in Abington School District v. Schempp.379 the Court 
extended the Engel rule. At stake was a Pennsylvania statute requiring Bible 
reading without comment and the Lord's Prayer recited at the beginning of 
each school day. The plaintiff had the statute declared unconstitutional in the 
federal district court, and on appeal by the Abington Township School Board, 
the Supreme Court sustained. 
Analyzing the past two decades of church-state history in public 
education, the Court stated: 
The test may be stated as follows: What are the purposes and 
the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement 
378ibid.,443. 
379Abington School District v. Schempp* 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
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or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of 
legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to 
say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause 
there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect 
that neither advances nor prohibits religion.380 
Continuing, the Court maintained that to allow encroachments even 
though minor would allow that "the breach of neutrality that is today a 
trickling stream may all too soon become a raging torrent, and in the words of 
Madison, 'it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties.' 
"381 
Justice Douglas, in a separate concurring opinion, insisted that "through 
the mechanism of the State, all of the people are being required to finance a 
religious exercise that only some of the people want and that violates the 
sensibilities of others. "382 
The Schempp ruling reinforces Eneel concerning prescribed Bible 
reading and the Lord's Prayer. Another important aspect of Schempp is the 
beginning of the tripartite test that will become completely developed in 
Lemon 1.383 Also, the neutral accommodationist theory is obviously silent in 
curriculum cases dealing with religion. In curriculum cases involving religion, 
where public funds are being used to advance religion, the practice is a violation 
of the First Amendment. 
380ibid., 222. 
381lbid., 225. 
382n,id., 228. 
383]jemon v Kurtzman, 91 S.Ct. 2111 (1971). 
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Stein V;. Oshinsky384 did not involve a State statute requiring the 
children or school personnel to participate in or refrain from acknowledging 
their complete dependence upon God. It was simply a voluntary desire of the 
children without any coercion or pressure to offer a prayer to the Almighty. 
The students were precluded from reciting a prayer by an order of the 
principal. The New York City Board of Education and the Board of Regents of 
The University of the State of New York upheld the principal's ruling. The 
parents of the infant plaintiffs sought a mandatory injunction, requiring the 
defendants to allow the plaintiffs an opportunity to express their love and 
affection for the Almighty God each day through a prayer voluntarily offered in 
the individual classrooms; an injunction prohibiting the defendants from 
interfering with the recitation of this prayer, and to declare such prayers 
constitutional. 
The District Court ruled in favor of the parents and granted an 
injunction to require school officials to permit school children the opportunity to 
pray. The defendants appealed the decision to the United States Court of 
Appeals, Second Circuit. The Court of Appeals, in reversing the District 
Court's decision, stated: 
Determination of what is to go on in public schools is primarily 
for the school authorities. Against the desire of these parents 
that their children "be given an opportunity to acknowledge their 
dependence and love to Almighty God through a prayer each day 
in their respective classrooms," the authorities were entitled to 
weigh the likely desire of other parents not to have their children 
present at such prayers, either because the prayers were too 
religious or not religious enough; and the wisdom of having public 
384gtein v. Oshinsky, 224 F.Supp. 757 (3.D.N.Y. 1963) rev'd. 348 F.2d 
999 (2d Cir. 1965), cert, denied, 382 U.S. 957 (1965). 
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educational institutions stick to education and keep out of religion, 
with all the bickering that intrusion into the latter is likely to 
produce.385 
In Johns Allen386 plaintiffs, who were Protestants, sought to 
prohibit the daily reading of five verses of the Holy Bible and recital of Lord's 
Prayer in unison by pupils in the public schools of Delaware. One statute 
stated: "No religious service or exercise, except the reading of the Bible and the 
repeating of the Lord's Prayer, shall be held in any school receiving any portion 
of the moneys appropriated for the support of public schools."387 The practice 
of reciting the Lord's Prayer in the public school classrooms was ruled 
unconstitutional because it favored the Christian religion over all others. The 
United States District Court, District of Delaware held that even though no 
Delaware statute required the reciting of the Lord's Prayer, a statute gave 
authority to the State Board of Education to enact its directive. The District 
Court issued a permanent injunction against the practice of religious exercises 
in the public schools of Delaware. 
In Adams x. Engelking.388 parents of public school children brought a 
class action suit against the Superintendent of Idaho Public Schools, the 
members of the Idaho State Board of Education and the elected and appointed 
officials of Moscow School District No. 281. The defendants were made 
38J>Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999,1002 (2d Cir. 1965). 
v Allen, 231 F.Supp. 852 (1964). 
38Tibi(j ̂  854 
388Adams v. Engelking, 232 F.Supp. 666 (1964). 
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individual defendants and also defendants as representatives of all public 
school districts in the State of Idaho. 
Plaintiffs sought to have Section 33-1604, of the Idaho Code that 
provided for compulsory daily reading of passages from the Bible in all public 
schools of the State of Idaho, declared unconstitutional. Parents also asked for 
injunctive relief to prohibit the enforcement of the statute. Section 33-1604 
stated: 
Bible reading in public sc/ioo&.—Selections from the Bible, to be 
chosen from a list prepared from time to time by the state board 
of education, shall be read daily to each occupied classroom in 
each school district. Such reading shall be without comment 
or interpretation. Any question by any pupil shall be referred for 
answer to the pupil's parent or guardian.389 
Separately, the plaintiffs and the defendants moved the court for 
summary judgment. The court concluded that plaintiffs1 motion must be 
granted and defendants' motion denied. 
The members of the court unanimously agreed that the issue was 
settled by Shempp.390 Accordingly, Section 33-1604, Idaho Code, was held to 
be in conflict with the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution and hence invalid and unenforceable. 
In a 1965 case, Reed v. Van Hoven.391 parents of public school children 
filed a lawsuit against the superintendent and the school board members to 
389ibid. 
390Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 
10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963). 
39lReed v. Van Hoven, 237 F.Supp. 48 (W.D.Mich. 1965). 
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prohibit religious exercises in the public schools. The suit was instituted under 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States, claiming that certain religious practices in the Jension Public Schools 
violated both the free exercise and establishment clauses of the First 
Amendment. 
After the filing of this suit, a new policy with respect to religious 
practices was adopted and put into effect in the Jension Public Schools. 
Defendants claimed the new policy ended the controversy and sought a 
summary judgment. Plaintiffs asked for an injunction to prevent any exercise 
of a religious nature from being conducted. 
At a hearing, the District Court denied both the summary judgment for 
the defendants and the injunction for the plaintiffs. A suggestion was made by 
the district court to the parties for a substitute policy which laid out the broad 
outlines for a program to allow an accommodation to those children who wished 
to pray, provided such religious exercises were conducted and completed 
beyond the hours of the regular school day. The court directed that a record of 
happenings be kept in order for the court to reach a final judgment on the 
merits of the case. 
The court's proposal provided that the students who wished to pray or 
read scriptures be allowed to do so as long as they met before or after school in 
a room, other than homeroom, and completed their exercise at least five 
minutes before the beginning of the school day or five minutes after the ending 
of the school day. The exercise itself was voluntary and separate from the 
regular school day; therefore, it was the responsibility of the students to find 
the location and attend with no ringing of the bells. When the first bell rang, all 
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students were to be mingling on their way to classrooms to begin the school 
day. 
The Michigan District Court was aware that this approach was by no 
means a final judgment of the court. In suggesting the interim accommodation 
the court attempted to avoid the connection between official authority and 
religion which constitutes a violation of the establishment clause. By keeping 
a record of the happenings during the interim period, the court would have 
something on which to judge the final merits in this case. Apparently the 
accommodation policy worked to the satisfaction of all parties, since there was 
no further litigation. 
In 1967, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire was asked to rule on 
pending bills before the Senate: (1) House Bill No. 6 in its original form would 
require a period of silence meditation at the beginning of the first class each 
day in all public schools, (2) House Bill No. 6 as amended would require all 
public schools to hold some form of morning exercise at the beginning of each 
day in the first class, and (3) House Concurrent Resolution No. 9 would 
require a plaque with the letters "In God We Trust" at least three inches high 
be placed in each classroom in all public educational institutions.392 
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire using Schempp393 and 
Eneel 394 responded to the Senate that: (1) House Bill No 6 would be 
constitutional, (2) House Bill No. 6 as amended would be unconstitutional, and 
392()pinion of the Justices, 228 A.2d 161 (1967). 
393School District of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,83 S.Ct. 
1560,10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963).. 
394Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 82 S.Ct 1261,8 L.Ed.2d 601 (1962). 
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(3) House Concurrent Resolution No 9 would be constitutional.3 95 
In a 1968 case, DeSpain v. DeKalb County Community School 
District.396 action was brought against the school district and others to stop 
the recital of a verse in kindergarten on the contention that the verse was a 
prayer. The verse that the kindergarten teacher required all students to recite 
before morning snack read: "We thank you for the flowers so sweet; We thank 
you for the food we eat; We thank you for the birds that sing; We thank you for 
everything. "397 Judge Edwin A. Robson of Hie United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern District, entered a judgment 
dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The plaintiffs 
appealed the decision. The Court of Appeals, influenced by the prayer 
decisions ofSchempp and Eneel. held that the verse constituted a prayer, and 
its compulsory recitation came within proscription of the First Amendment, 
thus the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of United States District 
Court. 
Tn Manpnlrl y. Albert Gallatin Area School District. Favette County. 
Pftnnsvlvnnifl-398 a parent challenged the constitutionality of Bible reading 
and nondenominational mass prayer in the public school that was adopted by 
the board of education on March 17,1969. The board of education argued that 
395()pinion of Justices, 228 A.2d 161,164-165 (1967). 
396j)eSpain v. Dekalb County Community School District* 384 F.2d 
836 (7th Cir. 1967). 
397ibid.,837. 
398]viangold v. Albert Gallatin Area School District, Fayette County, 
Pennsylvania, 438 F.2d 1194 (1971). 
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the program was voluntary. The federal district ruled that the exercises were 
unconstitutional and prohibited their continuance. On appeal, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third District held that the exercises of Bible 
reading and nondenominational mass prayers violated the establishment 
clause of the First Amendment, even though participation by students was 
allegedly voluntary. 
In Goodwin v^ Cross County School District No. 2^99 public school 
students and their mother filed a suit against the school district, school board 
members, and superintendent of schools for declaratoryjudgment alleging that 
the permitting of sectarian religious activities in the schools under their control 
was in violation of the Constitution. 
The District Court was given the task of determining four basic issues, 
which are: 
(1) The validity of Bible Reading and reciting of the Lord's 
Prayer at Cross County High School. 
(2) The baccalaureate services in connection with the 
graduation exercises at the Cross County High School. 
(3) The distribution of Gideon Bibles at the Cherry Valley 
Elementary School, and 
(4) School Board Policies on religious practices.400 
The District Court concluded that the Bible reading and the reciting of 
the Lord's Prayer and the distribution of Gideon Bibles in the school district 
399Qoodwin v. Cross County School District No. 7,394 F. Supp. 417 
(1973). 
400Ibid. 420. 
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violated the establishment clause. However, the students did not support their 
claim that the baccalaureate services were of a religious nature. 
In 1973, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire was asked to answer 
questions on the constitutionality of bills pending before the Senate: (1) 
Senate House Bill 639 as amended by the House of Representatives would 
permit the voluntary recitation of the Lord's Prayer and the pledge of 
allegiance in public schools at local option. (2) The proposed Senate 
amendment to the already amended House Bill 639 would permit a voluntary 
period of silent meditation and the voluntary pledge of allegiance in the public 
schools.401 
In reaching an opinion, the justices of the supreme court were bound 
with the interpretation of the guaranty of religious liberty found in the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution by decisions reached in the 
Supreme Court of the United States. The Fourteenth Amendment makes the 
decisions applicable to the states. In a test to determine whether or not a law 
offends the First Amendment prohibition on enactments "respecting the 
establishment of religion," the Supreme Court of the United States speaking 
through Chief Justice Burger stated: 
In the absence of precisely stated constitutional prohibitions, 
we must draw lines with reference to the three main evils 
against which the Establishment Clause was intended to 
afford protection: "sponsorship, financial support, and active 
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity. "4 02 
401()pinion of the Justices, 307 A.2d 558 (1973). 
402walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 6C8, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 
L.Ed.2d 697 (1970). 
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Every case must be analyzed in this area to determine the cumulative 
criteria developed by the Court over the years. Three such tests may be 
gathered from our cases: 
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion;403 finally, the 
statute must not foster "an excessive governmental 
entanglement with religion."404 
Tested by these standards, amended House Bill 639 by encouraging and 
authorizing the daily recital of the Lord's Prayer to be conducted by teachers in 
the public schools would violate the First Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States. The amendment proposed by the Senate to House Bill 639 
to provide for "voluntary silent meditation" instead of the Lord's Prayer would 
not violate the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
In Meltzer v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County. Florida.405 
parents of children attending public schools brought suit for injunctive and 
declaratory relief from morning Bible readings, distribution of Bibles, and 
requiring teachers to inculcate the practice of every Christian virtue. The 
District Court denied relief and the parents appealed. 
The Orange County Board of Education had allowed the public schools to 
403goar(j of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,243, 88 S.Ct. 1923,1926, 
20 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1968). 
404\yaiz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674, 90 S.Ct. 1409,1414 
(1970). Lemon Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,612, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2111,29 L.Ed.2d 
745, 755 (1971). 
405Meltzer v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, Florida, 
548 F.2d 559 (1977). 
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begin the day with Bible readings and devotional exercises. For many years, 
Gideon Bibles have been given to students in Orange County Public Schools. 
At the August 24,1970, board meeting the Orange County Board of 
Education adopted a resolution calling for a five- to seven-minute morning 
exercise in every school for "a period of meditation which shall include the 
opportunity for individual prayer and Bible reading or devotional or meditation 
presented by groups or organizations or an individual,"406 followed by a 
patriotic exercise. At the same meeting a member of the Gideon group asked 
for and received approval to distribute Gideon Bibles in the public schools. 
At the next meeting of the Orange County Board of Education on 
September 15,1970, the eventual plaintiffs in this case complained that the 
resolution adopted at the August 24,1970, board meeting violated their 
religious rights. The board deferred action on the complaints until it could 
survey the Orange County Public Schools to see how the August 24,1970, 
resolution was being implemented and to obtain time to confer with their 
counsel regarding the legality of those policies and their implementation. 
At the third board meeting, the results of the survey ordered in the 
September 15,1970, meeting were released. This survey revealed that 
seventy of the ninety-seven schools in Orange County were practicing daily 
Bible reading, generally read aloud by students or the classroom teacher. In 
some public schools, the Bible reading was given over the school public address 
system. Only four of the ninety-seven schools had neither prayer nor Bible 
reading. At this meeting the eventual plaintiffs renewed their complaints 
against the devotional and the distribution of Gideon Bibles. However, counsel 
406ibid., 561. 
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for the Orange County Board of Education gave his opinion that the morning 
exercises were not illegal, citing in part Chapter 231.09(2) of the Florida 
Statutes: 
The policy aids school officials to carry out their specific duties 
set forth in 231.09 among which are to "inculcate, by precept 
and example... the practice of every Christian virtue " 
Those who feel that the policy is unconstitutional should bring 
their case to Court.^07 
Chapter 231.09(2) of the Florida Statutes provides: 
231.09 Duties of Instructional Personnel. - Members of the 
instructional staff of the public schools, subject to the rules 
and regulations of the state board and of the school board, shall 
perform the following functions: 
(2) Example for Pupils. - Labor faithfully and earnestly for the 
advancement of the pupils in their studies, deportment and 
morals, and embrace every opportunity to inculcate, by precept 
and example, the principles of truth, honesty and patriotism 
and the practice of every Christian virtue.^®® 
Taking advice from its counsel, the Orange County Board of Education 
refused to modify its policy regarding opening day exercises or to direct any 
change in its implementation. 
On October 7,1970, the Orange County Board of Education issued 
guidelines concerning the distribution of Bibles or other religious literature. 
TO: ALL ORANGE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOL PRINCIPALS 
FROM: JAMES M HIGGENBOTHAM, DISTRICT 
SUPERINTENDENT 
407ibid., 562. 
408ibid. 
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SUBJECT: RELIGIOUS BOOKS AND LITERATURE 
The following guidelines have been developed by the School Board 
Attorneys and apply to the handling of religious books, doctrine, 
or literature which maybe offered to the schools for distribution. 
These guidelines are to be reviewed by you in detail and are to 
receive immediate implementation. 
The procedures as contained in the attached guidelines are the 
only procedures authorized by this office and shall be the sole 
method of handling material of this nature. 
GUIDELINES 
The following guidelines for the principals of Orange County 
District School Board schools for handling of religious books 
or doctrine offered to the schools for free distribution. We 
emphasize that we are directing these guidelines only toward 
religious books and doctrine not intending to modify general 
present policies or guidelines with regard to other literature. 
1. A place be designated within the school facility 
for all religious books and literature which may be 
supplied by outside groups or organizations. 
2. Books and literature be available to the students 
only at the designated location. 
3. All faiths be allowed to provide books and literature 
under the terms of these guidelines. 
4. No distribution nor allowing of distribution of books 
and literature be undertaken through the classrooms, 
homerooms, in assembly or on any portion of school 
property by the staff, students or outsiders. 
5. Periodic announcements may be made that literature 
is available at the designated place. 
6. No school employee may comment upon the decision 
by any group to make available or not make available 
literature, the content of such literature, or in any way 
influence others concerning the taking or reading of the 
literature.409 
On October 16,1970, the plaintiffs filed their suit in District Court as a 
class action against the Orange County Board of Education claming that (1) 
Florida statute section 231.09(2) is unconstitutional on its face because it 
409ibid., 562-563. 
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requires the inculcation of Christian virtue; (2) that the August 24,1970, 
resolutions requiring morning devotional exercises are unconstitutional; (3) 
that the distribution of Gideon Bible is unconstitutional; (4) that a Southern 
Baptist program planned for October 19 and 20 is unconstitutional, all being in 
violation of the First Amendment as made applicable to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiff sought both injunctive and declaratory 
relief. 
The District Court denied relief to the plaintiffs. The plaintiff had failed 
to show the possibility of irreparable injury or to show findings of fact as to 
morning exercises and the Bible distribution. The District Court went on to 
conclude that reference to the Bible is permitted under the First Amendment, if 
it is inspirational rather than devotional and it is voluntary by an individual 
student instead of school or teacher sponsored. 
The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit. The appeals court held that there was no evidence that the 
statute had been or would be applied; thus, there was no reason for an 
injunction. The appeals court in remanding the case to the District Court 
questioned whether the likelihood that the statute would be enforced was so 
minuscule as to present no case or controversy, thus denying the District 
Court of jurisdiction to grant even a declaratoryjudgment, or whether there 
was still a case or controversy present enough even though the danger of harm 
was not great and imminent enough to warrant an injunction. 
It became apparent during the trial in District Court that the Orange 
County Board of Education had made no changes in its policy, except changing 
devotional to inspirational, concerning Bible reading, devotions, and the 
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distribution of Bibles. 
During the second round of appeal, the United States Circuit Court of 
Appeals agreed with the District Court that the imminency of harm from the 
recurrence of the practices complained of was not sufficient to warrant the 
issuance of injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals disagreed with the District 
Court that there was no case; thus, no reason for declaratory relief. The 
appeals court found the ever-present threat of enforcing the statute to be a 
continuous and brooding presence and issued a declarative judgment against 
the defendant. 
Bible reading and devotional exercises were declared unconstitutional 
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, even though individual students 
were allowed to absent themselves from the exercises upon parental request. 
The practice of handing out Gideons Bibles in the classroom or at a 
central place on campus in this case was more an encroachment of First 
Amendment freedoms than Tudor .410 In Tudor parents were asked to sign for 
their child to receive the Gideon Bible. In Meltzer Gideon Bibles were to be 
distributed without parental permission. In short, the school board's decision 
to use the school system to distribute the Gideon Bible, at least in the eyes of 
the students and perhaps their parents, places its stamp of approval on the 
Gideon version of the Bible, thus favoring one religion over another which is 
unconstitutional. 
The "Christian virtue" clause of the Florida statute 231-09(2) was 
declared unconstitutional as worded. As written it favors the Christian religion; 
the appeals court agreed that if the word "Christian" were deleted, the statute 
410Tudor v. Board of Education, 100 A.2d 857 (1953). 
142 
would probably be constitutional. 
This decision was handed down by the United States Fifth Circuit of 
Appeals on March 11,1977, and a rehearing en banc was granted on May 25, 
1977. On July 31,1978, the Court of Appeals, erj banc, held that the 
resolution requiring Bible reading and prayer in the public schools was 
unconstitutional. In addition, the appeals court, by a equally divided vote, 
affirmed that District Court's rulings that there was no case or controversy or 
threat of imminent harm requiring either injunctive relief or declaratory 
judgment as to the guidelines for distribution of Gideon Bibles and the Christian 
virtue statute. 
The entire course of this case was in the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals for eight years. In 1980, the United States Supreme Court agreed to 
uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals reaffirming the unconstitutionality of 
religious exercises in public school. 
Tn art Arizona rrasft. Collins v. Chandler Unified School District^H a 
mother of a high school student brought suit against school officials seeking to 
restrain them from permitting, authorizing, or condoning prayers at 
assemblies held on public school property because such conduct allegedly 
violated prohibition against governmental establishment of religion. The 
District Court held that: (1) the conduct in question did violate the prohibition 
against governmental establishment of religion, because the saying of prayers 
in public, whether directly or indirectly, approved by school officials, violated 
the establishment clause in light ofEngg]412 and other related cases, and the 
41 ICollins v. Chandler Unified School District, 470 F.Supp. 959 (1979). 
412Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421, 82 S.Ct. 1261, 8 L.Ed.2d 601 (1962). 
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claim by school officials that such prayers were a First Amendment free 
speech protected right was not valid; and (2) where the mother of a high 
school student had not had her civil rights violated within the meaning of 
federal statute governing civil action for loss of rights, she was not entitled to 
attorney fees pursuant to another statute. 
In Kent v* Commissinnftr of Education.413 the plaintiffs objected to the 
new so-called "school prayer law." They sought action to declare the "school 
prayer law" unconstitutional and they sought injunctions forbidding 
enforcement or implementation of the law. The law stated: 
At commencement of the first class of each day in all grades 
in all public schools the teacher in chaige of the classroom in 
which each such class is held shall announce that a period of 
prayer may be offered by a student volunteer, and during any 
such period an excusal provision will be allowed for those 
students who do not wish to participate.414 
Judge Kaplan of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled 
that this "school prayer law" violated the establishment clause of the First 
Amendment. 
In Karen B. v. Treen415 parents of public school students sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief concerning the Louisiana statute and 
derivative Jefferson Parish School Board regulations which established 
guidelines for student participation in prayers in public schools. Louisiana 
^l^Kent v. Commissioner of Education, 402 N.E.2d 1340 (Mass.App. 
1980). 
414Ibid., 1341. 
415Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897 (1981). 
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Revised Statute section 17:2115 (1981) had two parts. Subsection A provided 
for each parish and city school board to permit a brief period of silence at the 
beginning of each day with no reference to a religious exercise. Parents had no 
quarrel with the meditation provision, and it is not part of the litigation. 
The challenged provision, subsection B, was basically enabling 
legislation. It provided that a school board may authorize appropriate school 
officials to allow students and teachers to pray. Prayers were limited to five 
minutes. No student or teacher was compelled to pray. With written 
permission, students who objected to prayers, were not required to participate 
or be present during the time the prayer was being offered. 
The Jefferson Parish School Board adopted a resolution establishing 
guidelines to implement section 17:2115(B) in parish schools. Its guidelines 
permitted a minute of prayer followed by a minute of silent meditation. Under 
the school board guidelines each teacher was to ask if any student wished to 
offer a prayer, if no student volunteered a prayer, then the teacher was allowed 
to offer a prayer on his own. Students had to have written permission from 
their parents and make a verbal request to participate in the exercise. 
Students without permission could either report to class, where they would 
remain seated and quiet throughout the morning exercises, or remain outside 
the classroom under other supervision. 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana 
denied relief and the parents appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit ruled that Louisiana statute section 17:2115 (1981), 
subsection B, and Jefferson Parish guideline permitting student and teacher 
prayers in the public schools violated the establishment clause of the First 
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Amendment. The appeals court reversed and remanded the case to the 
District Court. 
In Jafree y. James.416 plaintiffs brought suit challenging the 
constitutionality of Alabama statutes seeking to return voluntary prayer to 
the public schools. They asked for a preliminary injunction to prohibit 
enforcement of the statutes. 
It was contended by the plaintiffs that Alabama Code Section 16-1-20.1 
and Senate Bill 8, Alabama Act 82-735, popularly known[] as the "James 
Prayer Law," if carried out would be violative of their constitutional rights as 
proscribed by the Constitution. Senator Holmes testified that his purpose in 
sponsoring Alabama Code section 16-1-20.1 (1981) was to return voluntary 
prayer to the public schools. Section 16-1-20.1 provides in pertinent part: 
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades 
in all public schools, the teacher in charge of the room in which 
each such class is held may announce that a period of silence not 
to exceed one minute in duration shall be observed for mediation 
or voluntary prayer, and during any such period no other activities 
shall be engaged in.^17 
Senate Bill 8, provides in pertinent part: 
To provide for a prayer that may be given in the public schools 
and educational institutions of this state. 
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF ALABAMA: 
Section 1. From henceforth, any teacher or professor in any 
public educational institution within the State of Alabama, 
recognizing that the Lord God is one, at the beginning of any 
homeroom or any class, may pray, may lead willing students 
416jaffree v. James, 544 F.Supp 727 (1982). 
41?Ibid., 731. 
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in prayer, or may lead the willing students in the following 
prayer to God: 
Almighty God, You alone are our God. We acknowledge You as 
the Creator and Supreme Judge of the world. May Your justice, 
Your truth, and Your peace abound this day in the hearts of our 
countrymen, in the counsels of our government, in the sanctity 
of our homes and in the classrooms of our schools in the name of 
ourLord. Amen.^18 
There was no testimony presented to the District Court as to whether or 
not the statutes under scrutiny had or had not been enforced. The District 
Court made the following discoveries of fact: 
1. Both statutes were properly enacted and are on the books of 
the State of Alabama. 
2. The plaintiffs children are students of the public schools of 
the State of Alabama. 
3. The statute is drawn in the permissive and would authorize 
students and teachers to pray in the schools if they so desired. 
4. The plaintiff is an agnostic and finds prayer offensive. 
5. The plaintiff contends that he does not desire that his children 
be indoctrinated along religious lines so they can, at some future 
date, open-mindedly consider whether or not religion is for them 
and if anything of a religious nature is given to them now it will 
serve to poison their minds against the open-mindness. 
6. Religion is more than just the Christian faith. Religion can be 
Christianity, Judaism, Mohammedanism, Buddhism, Atheism, 
Communism, Socialism, and a whole host of other concepts. 
7. Students feel deprived if they are not permitted a free expression 
of their religion at any place or time they might elect or choose. 
8. Religious freedoms are denied when the school authorities 
prohibit expression of religious conviction by denying the right to 
418lbid. 
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pray or otherwise express themselves. 
9. Parental authority is abused and parents feel their rights are 
trespassed when their teachings to their children are contradicted 
by the schools or the state when it refuses to allow free expression 
of religious belief on the campuses of the schools or when their 
children are required to hear prayers that they do not wish them 
to hear. 
10. Any governmental activity, be that by the federal government 
through its legislative, judicial or executive branches or any state 
or county legislative or authority, through its board, bureaus, 
legislatures, courts or executives, that prescribes or proscribes the 
conduct of religion is offensive to all citizens and the Constitution.4 
The enactment of the Alabama statutes was an attempt by the State 
of Alabama to encourage religious activity and return voluntary prayer to the 
public schools. The District Court, Chief Judge Hand, ruled that even though 
the statutes were permissive in form, they indicated state involvement 
respecting the establishment of religion and; therefore, since the plaintiffs had 
shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, the enforcement of the 
statutes would be forbidden. The preliminary injunction requested by the 
plaintiffs was granted. 
Smith v. Board of Commisainnprs of Mobile Coiinty420 was a 
continuation of the Alabama school prayer cases, beginning with Jaffree v^ 
Jameg421 jn 1982. In May 1982, Ishmael Jaflfree filed a complaint on behalf 
419lbid., 729-730. 
420smith v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 827 F.2d 
684 (11th Cir. 1987). 
421 Jaffree v. James, 544 F.Supp. 727 (1982). Also see Jaffree v. Board 
of School Commissioners, 554 F.Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala. 1983), affd in part, 
rev'd in part sub nom; Jaflfree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983), cert, 
denied sub nom; Board of School Commissioners v. Jaflfree, 466 U.S. 926,104 
S.Ct. 1707, 80 L.Ed.2d 181 (1984); Jaffree v. James, 554 F.Supp. 1130 (S.D. 
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of his three minor children against the Mobile County School Board, various 
school officials, and three teachers seeking, among other things, a declaratory 
judgment that certain classroom prayer activities conducted in the Mobile 
public school system violated the establishment clause of the First 
Amendment and an injunction against classroom prayer. By his second 
complaint, Jafiree added as defendants the Governor of Alabama and other 
state officials, including Appellant Board, and challenged three Alabama 
statutes relevant to the school prayer issue as violative of the establishment 
clause. Douglas T. Smith and others ("Appellees") filed a motion to intervene in 
the Jafiree action claiming that an injunction against religious activity in the 
public schools would violate their right to free exercise of religion. The district 
court allowed Douglas T. Smith and others ("Appellees") to intervene as 
plaintiffs. Later, Appellees filed a motion entitled "Request for Alternate 
Relief' in which the Appellees asked that, if an injunction were granted in favor 
of Jafiree, that injunction be enforced "against the religious secularism, 
humanism, evolution, materialism, agnosticism, atheism, and others" or, 
alternatively that Appellees be allowed to produce additional evidence showing 
that these religions had been established in the Alabama public schools. 
The District Court divided the claims against Mobile County and local 
defendants and the claims against state officials into two branches. The 
District Court granted Jafiree's motion for a preliminary injunction against the 
enforcement of two of the challenged statutes, Ala. Code Ann., Sections 16-1-
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20.1 and 16-1-20.2,422 but determined after trial on the merits that Jaffree 
was not entitled to relief in either action because the Supreme Court of the 
United States was in error in holding that the establishment clause of the First 
Amendment prohibits the states from establishing a religion.423 Therefore, 
the District Court dismissed Jaffree's compliant for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted.424 
The appeals court reversed the decision of the District Court, finding 
that both the school room prayer activities and sections 16-1-120.1 and 16-1-
20.2 violated the establishment clause, and remanded the action to the District 
Court with directions that the District Court "award costs to appellant and 
forthwith issue and enforce an order enjoining the statutes and activities held 
in this opinion to be unconstitutional."  ̂5 The United States Supreme Court 
Ala. 1983), a f f d  i n  p a r t ,  r e v ' d  i n  p a r t  s u b  n o m ;  Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 
1526 (11th Cir. 1983), affd, 472 U.S. 38,105 S.Ct. 2479, 86 L.Ed.2d 178 
(1984.). 
422jj)id. 
423jaffr.ee v> Board of School Commissioners, 554 F.Supp. 1104,1128 
(S.D.Ala. 1983), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom; Jaflfree v. Wallace, 705 
F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983), cert denied sub nom\ Board of School 
Commissioners v. Jaffree, 466 U.S. 926,104 S.Ct. 1707, 80 L.Ed.2d 181 
( 1 9 8 4 ) ;  J a f f r e e  v .  J a m e s ,  5 5 4  F . S u p p .  1 1 3 0 , 1 1 3 2  ( S . D .  A L A  1 9 8 3 ) .  A f f d  i n  
part, rev'd in part sub nom; Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir 1983), 
affd 472 U.S. 38,1095 S.Ct. 2479, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985), 466 U.S. 924,104 
S.Ct. 1704, 80 L.Ed.2d 178 (1984). 
424 jafft.ee v> Board of County Commissioners, 554 F.Supp. 1104,1132 
(S.D.Ala. 1983). at 1132. 
425jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526,1536-37 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied in part sub nom; Board of School Commissioners v. Jaffree, 466 U.S. 
926,104 S.Ct. 1707, 80 L.Ed.2d 181 (1984), affd in part, 472 U.S. 38,105 S. 
Ct. 2479, 86 L.Ed2d 29 (1985); 466 U.S. 924,104 S.Ct. 1704, 80 L.Ed.2d 178 
(1984). 
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denied certiorari with regard to the nonstatutory school prayer practices^6 
and affirmed the Court's decision with regard to the statutory provisions.427 
In its opinion denying relief in Jaffree. the District Court had stated that 
[i]f the appellate courts disagree with this Court in its 
examination of history and conclusion of constitutional 
interpretation thereof, then this Court will look again at 
the record in this case and reach conclusions which it is 
not now forced to reach.428 
The Appellees claimed that the exclusion from the curriculum of "the 
existence, history, contributions, and role of Christianity in the United States 
and the world"429 violated their constitutional rights of equal protection, free 
speech of teacher and student, the student's right to receive information, and 
teacher and student free exercise of religion. The District Court interpreted the 
position of the Appellees as that 
if Christianity is not a permissible subject of the curriculum 
of the public schools, then neither is any other religion, and under 
the evidence introduced it is incumbent upon this Court to strike 
down those portions of the curriculum demonstrated to contain 
other religious teachings.43 0 
426;jjoard of School Commissioners v. Jaffree, 466 U.S. 926,104 S.Ct. 
1707, 80 L.Ed.2d 181 (1984). 
427wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,105 S.Ct. 2479, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 
(1985); Wallace v. Jaffree 466 U.S. 924,104 S.Ct. 1704, 80 L.Ed.2d 178 
(1984). 
428jafft.ee v. Board of School Commissioners, 554 F.Supp at 1104, 
1129 (S.D.Ala. 1983). 
429ibid. 
430gmith v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County 827 F.2d 
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The District Court voluntarily realigned the parties and ruled that the 
use of home economics, history, and social studies textbooks in the Mobile 
County School System violated the establishment clause of the First 
Amendment in that the textbooks had the primary effect of advancing the 
religion of secular humanism. 
On appeal, the appeals court held that the use of textbooks did not 
advance secular humanism or inhibit theistic religion in violation of the 
establishment clause, even assuming secular humanism was religion. 
Patriotic Exercises 
Over the years there have been situations in public school systems 
involving students who refuse to participate in a salute to the American flag 
and in the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance. In these incidents students 
have often based their defiance of such exercises, most of which were required 
either by state law or school board policy, on religious freedom. The Jehovah's 
Witnesses organization was one religious group that objected to the flag salute 
exercises in public schools. 
The first flag salute case decided by the United States Supreme Court 
was Minersville jr. Gobitis.431 This case involved two children, Lillian Gobitis, 
age twelve, and her brother William, age ten, Jehovah's witnesses who were 
expelled from the public schools of Minersville, Pennsylvania, for refusing to 
salute the national flag as part of a daily school exercise. 
684, 688 (11th Cir. 1987). 
43 lMinersville v Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586,60 S.Ct. 1010, 84 L.Ed. 1375 
(1940). 
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On May 3,1937, counsel for Walter Gobitis filed a bill of complaint in the 
United States District Court, denouncing the Minersville regulation and the 
expulsion thereunder as violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
and requested an injunction against their continued enforcement against the 
Gobitis children. 
From 1937 until 1940, first in the District Court and later in the Circuit 
Court of Appeals, the case was marked with much bickering, confusion, 
conflicting testimony, and presentation of lengthy briefs. Finally, on March 4, 
1940, the United States Supreme Court gave the matter full consideration and 
granted a writ of certiorari. The United States Supreme Court reversed the 
decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and upheld the District Court's 
decision supporting the Minersville School District's requirement that students 
must salute the American flag as a condition for school attendance. 
Justice Felix Frankfurter, who expressed trepidation in tackling the case 
delivered the majority opinion of the Court in these words: 
A grave responsibility confronts this Court whenever in 
course of litigation it must reconcile the conflicting claims 
of liberty and authority. But when the liberty invoked is 
liberty of conscience, and the authority is authority to 
safeguard the nation's fellowship, judicial conscience is 
put to its severest test Of such a nature is the present 
controversy.432 
We must decide whether the requirement of participation 
in a ceremony, exacted from a child who refuses upon sincere 
religious grounds, infringes without due process of law the 
liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.̂  3 
432ibid., 591 
433592-593 
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Our present task then, as so often the case with courts, is to 
reconcile two rights in order to prevent either from destroying 
the other. But, because in safeguarding conscience we are 
dealing with interests so subtle and so dear, every possible 
leeway should be given to the claims of religious faith.^34 
The mere possession of religious convictions which contradict 
the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the 
the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities.^^ 5 
In the lone dissent, Justice Harlan F Stone, strongly emphasized that 
even though the state may exercise considerable control over pupils, that 
control is limited where it interferes with civil liberties guaranteed by the 
Constitution. He stated in part: 
The Constitution expresses more than the conviction of the 
people that democratic processes must be preserved at all 
costs. It is also an expression of faith and a command that 
freedom of mind and spirit must be preserved, which 
government must obey, if it is to adhere to that justice and 
moderation without which no free government can exist. 
For this reason it would seem that legislation which operates 
to repress the religious freedom of small minorities, which is 
admittedly within the scope of the protection of the Bill of Eights, 
must at least be subject to the same judicial scrutiny as 
legislation which we have recently held to infringe the 
constitutional liberty of religious and racial minorities. 
With such scrutiny I cannot say that the inconveniences 
which may attend some sensible adjustment of school 
discipline in order that the religious convictions of these 
children may be spared, presents a problem so momentous 
or pressing as to outweigh the freedom from compulsory violation 
434594 
435ibid 594-595 
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of religious faith which has been thought worthy of constitutional 
protection.436 
The tone of the dissent by Justice Stone suggested an accommodation 
between church and state. 
In 1943, the United States Supreme Court in West Virginia State Board 
of Education v. Barnette437 had another opportunity to rule on the 
constitutionality^ of a flag salute case involving Jehovah's Witnesses. This 
case was the result of a requirement of the West Virginia State Board of 
Education that required the salute to the flag to become a regular part of the 
day's activities in every public school in the state. Students who refused to 
participate in the flag salute were expelled from school. Expelled students were 
denied readmission to the school until they complied with the flag salute 
requirement. 
In Barnette the United States Supreme Court reversed their Gobitis 
decision and by so doing ruled that requiring students to salute the flag of the 
United States while reciting a pledge of allegiance as a requirement to attend 
school was an unconstitutional exercise of governmental authority. To force 
students to participate in flag salute activities in violation of their religious 
beliefs was a violation of students' First Amendment rights. 
Justice Jackson, in expressing the opinion of the court, said: 
It is now a commonplace that censorship or suppression of 
expression of opinion is tolerated by our Constitution only 
436lbid., 606-607. 
437\Vest Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943). 
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when the expression presents a clear and present danger of 
action of a kind the State is empowered to prevent and punish. 
It would seem that involuntary affirmation could be 
commanded only on even more immediate and urgent grounds 
than silence. But here the power of compulsion is invoked 
without any allegation that remaining passive during a flag 
salute ritual creates a clear and present danger that would 
justify an effort even to muffle expression. To sustain the 
compulsory flag salute we are required to say that the Bill of 
Rights which guards the individual's right to his own mind, 
left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is 
not in his mind.438 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, 
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall 
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters 
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein.439 
Justice Frankfurter used the same arguments in dissenting in Barnette 
as he used in expressing the majority opinion in Gobitis. In his lone dissent he 
stated: 
I cannot bring my mind to believe that the "liberty" secured 
by the Due Process Clause gives this Court authority to deny 
to the State of West Virginia the attainment of that which we 
all recognize as a legitimate legislative end, namely the 
promotion of good citizenship, by employment of the means 
here chosen.^40 
He was of the opinion that: "The Court has no reason for existence 
438ibid., 633-634. 
439ibid., 642. 
440ibid., 647. 
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if it merely reflects the pressures of the day. "441 
In 1963, in Sheldon Fannin.442 children of the Jehovah's Witnesses 
faith had been suspended from school for insubordination because they refused 
to stand for the singing of the National Anthem. The United States District 
Court in Prescott, Arizona held that children of the Jehovah's Witnesses faith 
could not be required to stand and participate in the singing of the National 
Anthem. Even though the court saw the anthem as being patriotic rather 
than a religious exercise, it held that students could be excused from singing it 
because of their religious beliefs. 
In a 1970 case, Frain Vj. Baron .443 the court issued a temporary 
injunction enjoining the defendant administrators of the New York school 
system from excluding the plaintiffs from their classrooms for refusing to stand 
and participate in the Pledge of Allegiance. The refusal of the students was 
based on a mixture of religious and political beliefs. The court relied heavily 
upon Barnette and Tinker in supporting its position. 
In a 1979 case, Palmer v. Board of Education of Citv of Chicago 444 a 
probationary kindergarten teacher, who was a member of the Jehovah's 
Witnesses religion, filed civil rights practices challenging her proposed 
discharge for failure to follow the prescribed curriculum as violative of her First 
Amendment right of religious freedom. She had notified her principal that 
441lbid., 665. 
442sheidon v. Fannin, 221 F.Supp. 766 (D.Ariz. 1963). 
443prain v. Baron, 307 F.Supp. 27 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). 
444pa[mer v< Board of Education of City of Chicago, 603 F.2d 1271 
(1979). 
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because of religious reasons she could not teach any subject dealing with 
patriotism, the American flag, or other such matters. For a teacher to pick 
and choose what she was willing to teach would provide students with a 
distorted and unbalanced view of the history of the United States. She had a 
right to her own religious views and practices, but she had no constitutional 
right to force her views on others and to cause them to forego a portion of then-
education they would otherwise be entitled to enjoy. The court stated: 
Parents have a vital interest in what their children are taught. 
Their representatives have in general prescribed a curriculum. 
There is a compelling state interest in the choice and adherence 
to a suitable curriculum for the benefit of our young citizens and 
society. It cannot be left to individual teachers to teach what they 
please.445 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 
entered summaryjudgment for defendants, and the plaintiff appealed. The 
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, in affirming the decision of 
the lower court held that: 
(1) a public school teacher is not free to disregard the prescribed 
curriculum concerning patriotic matters notwithstanding claim 
that adherence thereto would conflict with his or her religious 
principles, and (2) plaintiff had no due process right to an 
adversary hearing prior to dismissal since her religious freedom 
was not being extinguished, no state statute or other rule or policy 
created a protected interest for an untenured teacher in similar 
circumstances and there was no claim that plaintiff had suffered 
stigma by reason of discharge.446 
445ibid., 1274. 
446lbid., 1271. 
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In a 1989 Illinois case, Sherman Community Consolidated 
School District of Wheeling Township.447 the parents of a first grade student 
sued the school district over an Illinois statute that provides the pledge "shall 
be recited each day by pupils in public elementary schools. The suit alleged 
the salute and recitation of the pledge of allegience to the flag violated the 
Constitution's establishment clause, by requiring this ritual with a religious 
element, and the free exercise clause, by, in effect, forcing their first grade son 
to perform a religious act that he otherwise would not have performed. The 
school system asked the court to dismiss the suit. 
The court denied the request of the school system, on the basis that 
even though the school system contends that the first grade student in 
question is not required to recite the pledge, he is too susceptible to suggestion 
and pressure to have a meaningful choice. In other words, the daily recitation 
may, in effect, force the first grade student to join in, and that would violate his 
right to free exercise of religion, which includes the right freely to choose not to 
engage in any religious practice. 
Generally, recent courts have ruled that school boards cannot require 
students to participate in flag salute exercises. In addition, school boards 
cannot force students who refuse to participate in the flag salute to stand 
quietly or leave the place where the exercise is held. As long as the student 
who refuses to participate is quiet and is not disruptive of the exercise itself or 
of the rights of those participating in the exercise, he or she cannot be 
chastised or in some other way punished.448 
447gherman v. Community Consolidated School District 21 of Wheeling 
Township, 714 F.Supp. 932 (N.D.H1.1989). 
448jiudgins and Vacca, 380-381. 
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Creationism and Evolution: Balanced Treatment. 
The most controversial issue of the theory of evolution is that humans 
descended from a lower order of animals. This is in conflict with the Old 
Testament's account of creation. Neither state statutes nor courts have been 
able to settle this issue, applicable to conflicting religious ideologies. 
In the 1927 famous Scopes v. State^49 case, came the first judicial test 
of a state-mandated anti-evolution statute. In 1925, the General Assembly of 
Tennessee enacted the Tennessee Anti-Evolution Act which states in part: 
That it shall be unlawful for any teacher in any of the 
Universities, normals and all other public schools of 
the state which are supported in whole or in part by the 
public school funds of the state, to teach any theory that 
denies the story of the divine creation of man as taught 
in the Bible and to teach instead that man has descended 
from a lower order of animals.450 
John Scopes, a biology teacher, was not prosecuted under the First 
Amendment but for breaking a state statute. He was convicted of teaching a 
theoiy that humanity descended from a lower form of animals, thus denying 
the divine creation of man, as taught in the Bible. This was a violation of the 
Tennessee anti-evolution statute. After a guilty verdict by the jury, the trial 
judge fined Scopes one hundred dollars. Scopes filed an appeal in the nature of 
writ of error to the Tennessee Supreme Court which reversed the decision of 
the trial court on a technicality, it found that a nolle prosequi should be entered 
449gCOpes v. State, 289 S. W. 363 (Tenn. 1927). 
450ibid., 363-364. 
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but it upheld the constitutionality of the statute. The anti-evolution statute 
remained a law in Tennessee for almost forty more years. 
In the 1968 Epperson v. Arkansas^ 1 case the United States Supreme 
Court ruled on the constitutionality of an Arkansas statute. The statute, 
passed in 1928, one year after the famous "monkey trial" in Tennessee, 
reflected a time and region when fundamental thinking was prevalent and 
many people believed in a literal interpretation of the Bible, including the 
creation of man as reported in the book of Genesis. 
Susan Epperson, a public school biology teacher in the state of 
Arkansas, was faced with the dilemma that if she used a new biology textbook 
she would presumably teach a chapter on Darwinian evolution and thus be 
subject to dismissal or criminal prosecution. She brought action in the state 
Chancery Court requesting that the statute be voided. A parent of children 
enrolled in the public schools intervened in support of the action. The 
Chancery Court ruled that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution, but on appeal the Supreme Court of Arkansas 
reversed the decision and confirmed the authority of the state to specify 
curriculum in the public schools. However, the Supreme Court of the United 
States reversed that decision and stated that the statute was contrary to the 
intent of the First Amendment because it had as its purpose the advancement 
of religion. Justice Abe Fortas, in expressing the majority opinion of the 
Supreme Court, said: 
Arkansas' law cannot be defended as an act of religious 
45lEpperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 89 S.Ct. 266, 21 L.Ed. 2d 228 
(1968). 
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neutrality. Arkansas did not seek to excise from the 
curricula of its schools and universities all discussion 
of the origin of man. The law's effort was confined to an 
attempt to blot out a particular theory because of its 
supposed conflict with the Biblical account, literally read. 
Plainly, the law is contrary to the mandate of the First, 
and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution.452 
In 1970, the Mississippi anti-evolution statute was overturned in Smith 
v. State.453 The Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that the statute violated 
the free exercise clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States. 
In the 1972 Wright v. Houston Independent School District^ 4 case 
students brought action to prohibit the school district and the State Board of 
Education from teaching the theory of evolution as part of the district's 
academic curriculum and from adopting textbooks presenting such theory. 
Plaintiffs claimed that the teaching of evolution in the school district inhibited 
the plaintiffs in the free exercise of their religion and constituted an 
establishment of religion. They supported the Biblical account of creation 
which states that man was created by God. Unlike Arkansas, which had a 
statute against teaching the theory of evolution, neither Texas nor the 
Houston Independent School District had expressed any position on the subject 
of evolution. However, the State had a general policy of approving textbooks 
452ibid., 109. 
453smith v. State, 242 S.2d 692 (Miss. 1970). 
454\yright v. Houston Independent School District* 366 F.Supp. 1208 
(1972). 
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which presented the theory of evolution in a favorable manner. The court ruled 
that the plaintiffs failed to show that the teaching of evolution had inhibited the 
free exercise of their religion and that it constituted an establishment of 
religion. Therefore, defendants' request to dismiss for failure to establish a 
claim was granted. 
Another feature in Religious Fundamentalists legal arsenal is either by 
judicial decree or state statute is to require teachers (and textbooks) to present 
evolution by "natural selection" as theory instead of scientific fact. In Daniel v,. 
Waters455 case> the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the 
constitutionality of a Tennessee statute requiring balanced treatment of 
Darwinian evolution and Old Testament account of creation. The state 
specifically insisted that if evolution was taught then creationism must be 
given equal treatment. In effect the practice of teaching Darwinian evolution 
along with scientific creationism was to negate Darwinian evolution. Even 
though, Judge Edwards, writing for the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
expressed hesitancy about intervening in fundamental operation of schools but 
the court must address the constitutional issues presented. After lengthly 
judical debate Justice Edwards concluded the Tennessee statute violated the 
First Amendment establishment clause. 
In 1975, action was brought in Steele v^. Waters456 challenging the 
constitutionality of a Tennessee statute that outlined certain criteria for 
biology textbooks which expressed opinions of or related to theories about the 
origin or creation of man and his world. The part of the Tennessee statute in 
455j)aniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975). 
456steele v. Waters, 527 S.W.2d 72 (1975). 
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question was the second and third paragraphs of Chapter 377 of the Public 
Acts of 1973, codified as an amendment to T.C.A. section 49-2008, which read 
as follows: 
Any biology textbook used for teaching in the public schools, 
which expresses an opinion of, or relates to a theory about 
origins of creation of man and his world shall be prohibited 
from being used as a textbook in such system unless it specifically 
states that it is a theory as to the origin and creation of man 
and his world and is not represented to be scientific fact. Any 
textbook so used in the public education system to which expresses 
an opinion or relates to a theory or theories shall give in the same 
textbook and under the same subject commensurate attention to, 
and an equal amount of emphasis on, the origins and creation of 
man and his world as the same is recorded in other theories, 
including, but not limited to, the Genesis account in the Bible. 
The provisions of this section shall not apply to use of any textbook 
now legally in use, until the beginning of the school year of 1975-
1976; provided, however, that the textbook requirements stated 
above shall in no way diminish the duty of the state textbook 
commission to prepare a list of approved standard editions of 
textbooks for use in the public schools of the state as provided 
in this section. Each local school board may use textbooks or 
supplementary material as approved by the state board of 
education to carry out the provisions of this section. The teaching 
of all occult or satanical beliefs of human origin is expressly 
excluded from this section. 
Provided however that the Holy Bible shall not be defined as a 
textbook, but is hereby declared to be a reference work, and shall 
not be required to carry the disclaimer above provided for 
textbooks.457 
The Chancery Court ruled the statute unconstitutional and the 
defendants appealed. On appeal the Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed 
that the statute, which requires textbooks to state that such theory is not 
represented as scientific fact and that such books are to provide equal 
457ibid., 73. 
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treatment to the origin and creation as the same is recorded in other theories, 
including, but not limited to the Genesis account of the Bible and that teaching 
of all occult or satanical beliefs of human origin is excluded, violates both the 
Federal and State Constitutions. 
In the 1981, Segraves v. State of Cfl1ifnmifl458 case, Kelly Segraves 
initiated action in Superior Court, Sacramento, California, insisting that 
teaching Darwinian evolution established a religion and thus unconstitutional 
as religious advancement. Moreover, maintained Seagraves, Christian public 
school teachers were forced to teach an idea contrary to their Christian beliefs. 
Kelly Seagreaves, who co-authored The Creation Explanation: A Scientific 
Alternative to Evolution, positioned his argument in the following manner: 
Neither evolution nor creationism is purely scientific. They are 
both philosophically founded, and both are part science and part 
religion. Once you start getting into origins, you are out of the 
realm of science. At that point, it becomes philosophical, 
interpretational, a belief system. We are saying the state board 
cannot set policy that mandates a belief system.459 
As trial began in early March 1981, plaintiff Seagraves requested that 
Judge Perluss please narrow his complaint and focus language in State Science 
Curriculum Guideline, i. e., believe or not. Judge Perluss acknowledged that 
"what I visualized as a great constitutional case had evolved itself—excuse me, 
come down to—a question of semantics. "460 Continuing Judge Perluss 
458segraves v. State of California, No. 278978 (Cal.Super.Ct. 1981). 
459Arnstine, Donald, "The Acadamy in the Courtroom: The 
Sacramento Monkey Trail." Journal of Thought 18, no. 1 (Spring 1983): 17. 
460ibid. 
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described the case as "a long road to a little house,"461 Finally, Judge Perluss 
maintained that the State Science Curriculum did not violate plaintiffs 
freedom of religion. However, Judge Perluss ordered the California State 
School Board to distribute copies of a 1973 policy inisisting that evolution be 
taught as theory not fact. 
In a 1982 McLean v Arkansas Board of Education 462 case the 
question at bar was whether or not a state statute requiring "balanced 
treatment" between scientific creationism and Darwinian evolution was First 
Amendment violation as establishment of religion if enforced in public schools. 
The court using the tripartite test maintained that state statute failed the first 
part of endorsing and advancing religion. Judicial logic suggested that Old 
Testament account of creation was a religious ideology and not scientific 
theory. Thus scientific creationism fails the secular values test because it is 
not grounded in scientific theory. Finally, the court maintained that the 
statute failed the third part of the tripartite by excessively entangling 
government in this case (school officials) with religion. 
In the 1987 Edwards v. Aeuillard4^ cage the United States Supreme 
Court addressed the "balanced treatment" issue. The case at bar arose when 
the Louisiana General Assembly enacted into law a statute called "Balanced 
Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School 
461lbid., 18. 
462]y[cLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F.Supp. 1255 (E.D. 
Ark. 1982) 
463Edwardsv. Aguillard, 765 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1985), reh. denied 779 
F.2d (5th Cir. 1985), 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
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Instruction." The statute two parts were: (1) that instruction in human origin 
was not required; and (2) if human origin was taught then instruction must 
include both Darwinian evolution and creation science. Plaintiffs—parents, 
teachers, and religious leaders filed suit insisting the statute violated the First 
Amendment religious advancement Both District and Circuit Court of 
Appeals (5th Circuit) insisted that religious intent permeated the statute. 
Moreover, the statute discredited "evolution by counterbalancing its teachings 
at every turn with the teaching of creationism."464 
The United States Supreme Court in a seven to two vote with Justice 
William Brennan writing for the minority insisted the statute "advanced the 
religious viewpoint that a supernatural being created mankind."465 Moreover, 
the statute conflicted with "the one scientific theory that historically has been 
opposed by certain religious sects. "466 Finally, Justice Brennan maintained 
that statute failed all three prongs of the tripartite test and thus was 
unconstitutional. 
Equal Access and Religious Grouns on Cammis 
In Mergens v. Board of Education of the Westside Community 
Schools.467 Justice Sandra Day O'Conner stated: "[I]f a State refused to let 
464Edwards v. Aguillard, 765 F.2d 1251,1257. (5th Cir. 1985). 
465Tom Mirga, "Creationism Law in Louisiana is Rejected by Supreme 
Court," Education Week 6, No 39 (June 24,1987) :1 
466ibid.,6. 
467Mergens v. Board of Education of the Westside Community Schools, 
110 S.Ct. 2356.2371 (1990). 
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religious groups use school facilities open to others, then it would demonstrate 
not neutrality but hostility toward religion." 
An outcry of public school students who were denied their right to free 
speech on a religious basis resulted in the passage of the Equal Access Act.^68 
The signing of the Equal Access Act^69 by President Ronald Reagan in 1984 
made legal practices several courts had held to be in violation of the 
establishment clause.470 This act stipulates that: 
it shall be unlawful for a public secondary school which 
receives Federal financial assistance and which has a 
limited open forum to deny equal access or a fair 
opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who 
wish to conduct a meeting within that limited open forum 
on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other 
content of the speech at such meetings.471 
This act, as the name implies, allows equal access, or a fair 
opportunity, to use school facilities for group meetings. Since the school prayer 
decisions of the 1960s, school administrators have been overly cautious in 
their decisions about permitting religious groups to use school facilities. They 
468j0hn W. Whitehead, The Rights of Religious Person in Public 
Educaton (Wheaton. HI.: Crossway Books, 1991), 115. 
469pub. Law No. 98-377, 802-805, 98 Stat. 1302 (1984) [codified at 20 
U.S.C. 4071-4074 (1988)]. 
470gee, e.g., Brandon v. Board of Education of the Guilderland Central 
School District, 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), certdenied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981); 
Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal.App.3d 1,137 
Cal.Rptr. 43 (Cal.Ct.App.), cert.denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977): Trietley v. Board 
of Education, 65 A.D.2d 1,409 N.Y.S.2d 912 (N.Y.App.Div. 1978). 
471whitehead, 118. 
168 
have many times denied their use, citing the fact that they cannot allow 
religious groups to meet on school grounds, due to their belief that it would 
constitute a violation of the First Amendment. It may also be said that the 
use of school facilities by religious groups may cause unnecessary 
"entanglement" of a governmental agency (the school) with religion.472 This 
section will examine the circumstances that led to the passage of the 
legislation, the statute's substantive provisions, and the recent Supreme Court 
decisions upholding the act's constitutionality.^3 
In Lemon Kurtz man** 7 4 the Supreme Court devised a series of 
requirements (known as the Lemon test) by which it measures whether a given 
practice or policy sufficiently maintains the separation between church and 
state to use in ruling on the two constitutional provisions that frequently arise 
in the public schools, "the establishment clause" and "the free exercise clause". 
In many situations the two clauses may be in conflict with each other. 
According to the Lemon test, the governmental act is constitutional only if "(1) 
it has a secular legislative purpose, (2) its primary effect does not promote or 
inhibit religion, and (3) the policy does not result in excessive government 
entanglement of religion."475 
Prior to the 1980's many devotional groups were denied permission to 
hold Bible club meetings on school campuses for fear of conflict between 
472Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2111 (1971). 
473jjoard of Education v. Mergens, 110 S.Ct. 2356 (1990). 
474(gee School District of Abington Township v. Schempp 374 U.S. 203, 
220-223 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429-30 (1962). 
475Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
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church and state. Permitting voluntary clubs to meet on school campuses 
during the school day would have the "primary effect" of advancing religion in 
violation of the establishment clause of the First Amendment. 
Throughout the 1980s, many devotional groups were interested in 
having devotional meetings in public schools during noninstructional time. This 
created a nightmare for school administrators who were not sure of what was 
legal and what was illegal based on the First Amendment to the Constitution. 
This period of not knowing what to do created many legal controversies. The 
Supreme Court ruled in 1981 that students attending state-supported 
institutions of higher education could not be denied access unless there was a 
"compelling governmental interest. "^76 ^ Widmar. a distinction was made 
between college students and secondary school students. 
College students were regarded as "young adults" while high school students 
were still regarded as "impressionable." From this interpretation there seems 
to be a double standard permitted by the Court. 
Between 1980 and 1985, student-initiated devotional groups were not 
allowed to have meetings during non-nstructional time on public school 
campuses.477 Five federal appellate courts endorsed this double standard, 
saying, in effect that a minimal amount of restriction on the rights of high 
school students to assemble and express religious views is necessary in regard 
476widmarv. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed. 2d 440 
(1981). 
477Martha M. McCarthy, "Student Religious Expression: Mixed 
Messages from the Supreme Court," In West Education Law Reporter. 64 
(1991): 2. 
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to the establishment clause of the Constitution.478 The Supreme Court 
declined to review all but one of the cases. 
Bender Williamsport Area School District.4 79 the case the Supreme 
Court reviewed, reversed the decision of the lower court which had disallowed a 
devotional group meeting in the public high school. However, the Court did not 
render any opinions on the merits of the case. 
Prior to the passage of the Equal Access Act students were confronted 
with three important hurdles in their attempt to enjoy the full protection of 
their First Amendment rights under the Constitution. First, there was the 
discretion exercised by school administrators who were often overly 
conservative in their interpretation of the law. Second, students and their 
parents, inexperienced in matters of civil rights, often had difficulty finding 
attorneys to defend religious student rights. Third, even when students could 
find competent attorneys, there are conflicting federal circuit decisions on 
different aspects of equal access question, some of which take a narrow view of 
the First Amendment rights of students.480 
478Ben(jer Vi Williamport Area School District, 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 
1984), vacated, 475 U.S. 534,106 S.Ct. 1326, 89 L.Ed. 2d 501 [30 Ed. Law 
Rep. 1024] (1986); Bell v. Little Axe Independent School District No. 70, 766 
F.2d 1391 [26 Ed Law Rep 152] (10th Cir. 1985); Nartowicz v. Clayton County 
School District, 736 F.2d 643 [18 Ed. Law Rep. 273] (11th Cir. 1984); Lubbock 
Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent School District, 669 F.2d 1038 
[2 Ed. Law Rep. 961] (5th Cir. 1982, cert, denied, 459 U.S.1155,103 S.Ct. 800, 
74 L. Ed. 2d 1003 (1983); Brandon v. Board of Education of Guilderland Central 
School District, 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1123.102 
S.Ct. 970, 71 L.Ed.2d 109 (1981). 
479Bencier v. Williamport Area School District, 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 
1984), vacated, 475 U.S. 534,106 S.Ct. 1326, 89 L.Ed. 2d 501 [30 Ed. Law 
Rep. 1024] (1986). 
480\vhitehead, 117-118. 
In a 1980 case, Brandon v. Board of Education of the Guilderland 
Central School Pistrict.481 six students, who were members of a group called 
"Students for Voluntary Prayer," filed suit for declaratory, injunctive, and 
monetary relief against the principal, the superintendent, the board of 
education, and its individual members for denying their group communal 
prayer meetings in the public school immediately before the beginning of the 
school day. The United States District Court for the Northern District of New 
York granted the defendants judgment and dismissed the compliant. The 
students appealed to the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. The 
Court of Appeals, Irving R. Kaufman, Circuit Judge, affirmed the decision of 
, the District Court by ruling that: 
(1) plaintiffs' free exercise rights were not limited by school 
board's refusal to permit communal prayer meetings to occur 
on school premises, and authorization of student-initiated 
voluntary prayer would have violated the establishment 
clause by creating an unconstitutional link between church 
and state, and (2) school board's refusal did not violate 
plaintiffs right to free speech, freedom of association, or 
equal protection,482 
In Wirimnr Vincent 483 a student religious group, Cornerstone, at the 
iBrandon v. Board of Education of the Guilderland Central School 
District, 635 F.2d 971 (1980). See also Hunt v. Board of Education of the 
County of Kanawha, 321 F.Supp. 1267 (1970); Johnson v. Huntington Beach 
Union High School District, 68 Cal.App.3d 1,137 Cal.Rptr. 43 (1977); Trietley 
v. Board of Education of the City of Buffalo, 65 A.D.2d 1,409 N.Y.S.2d 912 
(1978). 
482ibid.,972. 
483\\fidmar v. Vincent, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980), affd, 454 U.S. 
263 (1981). 
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University of Missouri at Kansas City, challenged a regulation that prohibited 
the use of campus facilities for religious work or teaching. The United States 
Supreme Court determined that the university's neutral, open-door policy for 
extracurricular activities in essence established an open forum for student 
groups. The free speech clause of the First Amendment kept the university 
from excluding any group on the basis of their views unless the exclusion was 
necessary to protect a compelling state interest. The Supreme Court held that 
permitting Cornerstone to meet only incidentally promoted religion. Applying 
the tripartite test, Justice Powell, writing for the majority, maintained that a 
policy permitting Cornerstone and all other groups to meet: 
[W]ould have the secular purpose of making campus 
facilities available to all student organizations; it would not 
advance religion because the institution's endorsement 
of religious groups would not be implied any more than its 
endorsement of student political groups; and an "equal access" 
policy would avoid excessive governmental entanglement with 
religion because minimal supervision of student organizations 
is required on college campuses.484 
Correct knowledge of the concept of public forum is critical to an 
understanding of permissible activities. The Supreme Court has grouped 
government property into the following three types of forums: (1) traditional 
public forum; (2) public forum by designation; and (3) traditionally nonpublic 
forum.485 public parks, streets, and sidewalks are examples of a traditional 
^^Martha M. McCarthy, "Religion and Public Schools: Emerging Legal 
Standards and Unresolved Issues," Harvard Educational Review 55, No. 3 
(August 1985), 297. 
m. Murphy, "Access to Public School Facilities and Student 
by Outsiders," School Law Bulletin XVI. No. 1 (Winter 1985), 10-11. 
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public forum. In this realm individuals enjoy the greatest degree of freedom of 
speech with regard to time, place, manner of expression, and content 
Reasonable government regulations are permitted "as long as the regulations 
are neutral in regard to the content of expression, are narrowly tailored to 
serve a significant government interest, and leave alternative channels of 
communication open."486 
Forum by designation include public colleges and universities as well as 
auditoriums in government buildings. In this realm, the governing body of the 
institution uses its own discretion to decide if an open forum will exist. The 
ruling body is not required to provide an open forum, however, once it has done 
so, it is governed by the same standards that apply to a traditional public 
forum. For this reason, Cornerstone was granted permission by the Supreme 
Court to meet at the University of Missouri at Kansas City. 
Historically, nonpublic forums have included places such as public 
schools, government office buildings, and military bases. In this realm, 
government officials may control free speech activity by either retaining 
authority to control the content of all expressive activities or they may create 
a limited public forum within the nonpublic forum. 487 This happens when 
access is open to specific types of groups but closed to others. If, for example, 
a school permits Cub Scouts and the Y.M.C.A to use the school's mailing 
system, a limited public forum is open for groups that provide activities for 
students.488 
486lbid., 10. 
48?ibid., 12. 
488lbid. 
174 
A school board has three options available in granting nonschool groups 
to use school facilities. First, it may prohibit the use of all facilities by 
nonschool groups. This, however, conflicts with the goal of many school 
districts that encourage increased use of school facilities. A second option is to 
permit all outside groups to use school facilities. The third option is to create a 
limited public forum.489 
In Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent School 
District.490 the Civil Liberties Union filed a suit in 1979 claiming that the 
school district had continued unconstitutional religious practices including 
morning Bible reading over the public address systems, classroom prayers led 
by teachers, a period of silent prayer ended by "Amen" over school public 
address systems, and distribution of Gideon Bibles to fifth and sixth grade 
students. The Civil Liberties Union stated that the above practices continued 
even after the school district had in 1971 reflected in a policy letter stating 
neutrality of all personnel regarding religious activities, a discontinuance of 
prayers over the school public address system, a prohibition against the 
encouragement of any particular religious activity, the prohibition of any 
speakers on religion in any assembly, and the discontinuance of Gideons 
placing New Testaments in the hands of students. 
In January 1979, the school district authorized the first written policy 
of religious activities in the school district. The written policy made no attempt 
489ibid., 14. 
490Lubt)Ocic Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent School 
District, 669 F.2d 1038 (1982). 
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to alter the practices about which the Lubbock Civil Liberties Union had 
complained as early as 1971 but rather instructed that the practices should be 
student rather than teacher initiated. 
As the suit filed by the Lubbock Civil Liberties Union proceeded toward 
trial, the school district adopted a new and detailed policy. The new policy 
stated: 
Wishing not to infringe either upon the belief of any student 
in a Supreme Being or upon the right of any student not to 
believe, The School Board places in effect the following policies 
relating to religion in the school which supersede the policy on 
religion adopted on January 25,1979. 
1. The School Board permits the teaching of religion when 
presented objectively as part of a secular program of education. 
2. The School Board permits study of the Bible and other 
religious materials for their literary and historic qualities. 
3. Other than as stated in Section 1. and 2. above, the 
School Board does not permit prayer or reading passages from 
religious materials aloud or over the loudspeakers during class 
hours or at functions which students are required to attend.. 
a.. Except as limited above, this policy permits any 
student to pray in the school silently or audibly when it is not 
disruptive. 
b. School administrators may set aside a short period for 
silent thought or meditation by students during the school day. 
c. This policy permits teachers to explain the background 
or significance of religious content and beliefs where appropriate 
to the subject matter they are teaching. 
d. This policy permits both teachers and students to 
recognize, reiterate or read aloud or over the loudspeakers 
historical documents or portions thereof or statements from 
recognized figures, even though such statements include 
personal religious beliefs. 
4. The School Board permits students to gather at the 
school with supervision either before or after regular school 
hours on the same basis as other groups as determined by 
the school administration to meet for any educational, moral, 
religious or ethical purposes so long as attendance at such 
meetings is voluntary. 
5. Religious literature other than necessary for 
classroom work shall not be disseminated during class hours 
but may be purchased, indexed, shelved and circulated as 
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library material. 
a. This policy permits one student to offer religious 
literature to another student on a private non-intrusive, 
non-disruptive basis. 
b. This policy permits volunteer groups of students 
to disseminate religious literature on a non-disruptive basis 
to the members of the group. 
c. This policy permits any teacher to use historical 
documents or patriotic materials in the classroom where 
appropriate to the subject matter being taught. 
6. There shall be no religious tests required of 
applicants for employment.^®! 
The Lubbock Civil liberties Union also challenged the new 
August 1980 policy, especially paragraph four of the policy which stated: 
The school board permits students to gather at the school 
with supervision either before or after regular school hours 
on the same basis as other groups as determined by the 
school administration to meet for any educational, moral 
religious or ethical purposes so long as attendance at such 
meetings is voluntary.492 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas 
upheld the constitutionality of a school district policy permitting students to 
gather before or after regular school hours to voluntarily meet for religious 
purposes. The Lubbock Civil Liberties appealed. The United States Court of 
Appeals, Fifth Circuit ruled that: (1) school district policy permitting students 
to assemble at school with supervision either before or after school hours to 
voluntarily meet for educational, moral, religious or ethical purposes was 
violative of the establishment clause of the First Amendment and was not 
491lbid., 1041. 
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necessary to avoid violation of free exercise, and (2) school districts would not 
be enjoined from continuation of past practices declared to be violative of 
establishment clause of First Amendment or current policy which was also 
found unconstitutional where the past practices declared unconstitutional had 
ceased. 
In a 1984 case, Nartowicz v. Clavton County School Pistrict.493 a civil 
rights suit was brought against the school district, alleging that certain of the 
school district's practices contributed to the establishment of religion, in 
violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The 
plaintiffs sought to prohibit the defendants from: 
(1) permitting a Youth For Christ Club or any other 
religious student group to meet on school permises under 
faculty supervision; (2) authorizing announcements of church 
sponsored activities by means of the schools' public address 
systems and bulletin boards; (3) permitting the placing of 
religious signs on school property, and (4) authorizing student 
student assemblies that promote or advance religion.494 
The District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary 
injunction with respect to all four practices at issue, and the defendants 
appealed from the injunction as it applied to the first two practices. The 
school district conceded that it may not grant permission for religion-promoting 
assemblies, and it has discontinued its practice of placing allegedly religious 
signs on school property. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed the District Court by stating that: (1) the school district's 
practice of permitting a student religious group to meet on school property 
493Nartowicz v. Clayton County School District, 736 F.2d 646 (1984). 
494ibid., 647. 
178 
under faculty supervision, when judged in light of the school district's apparent 
support of religious assemblies, religious signs, and announcements of church-
sponsored activities via bulletin boards and public address systems, had the 
effect of enhancing or promoting religion in violation of the establishment 
clause of the United States Constitution, thus justifying preliminary injunctive 
relief, and (2) the school district's policy of permitting several schools' public 
address systems and bulletin boards to be used by churches to announce 
church-sponsored secular activities and other messages of "public importance" 
created excessive entanglement with religion in absence of written polity 
guidelines to assist administrators at different schools in deciding which 
messages could properly be announced, thus justifying preliminary injunctive 
relief. 
In Bell v. Little Axe Independent School District.495 parents filed a 
section 1983 action against public school officials, seeking injunctive relief 
against the school district for permitting religious meetings to be held on the 
school premises of the public elementary school during school hours and 
distribution of Bibles at school, and seeking an injunction against enforcement 
of the Oklahoma voluntary prayer statute, and challenging the equal access 
policy subsequently adopted by the school district. 
The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma 
prohibited the religious meetings, found the Bible distribution claim to be moot, 
decided that the equal access policy was not at face value unconstitutional and 
that the state prayer statute was not at issue, and refused to award either 
compensatory or punitive damages. Both sides appealed. The United States 
495j}eu v Little Axe Independent School District, 766 F.2d 1391 (1985). 
Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit ruled that: 
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(1) parents, who had moved from school district and enrolled 
their children in a neighboring district, had standing to bring the 
action; (2) religious meetings were properly prohibited; (3) equal 
access policy promulgated by district was unconstitutional insofar 
as the school district or school construed the policy to permit 
concerted religious activity on the school grounds during the school 
day; (4) discretion was not abused by refusing to enjoin the 
enforcement of the prayer statute or the Bible distribution; 
(5) parents were entitled to an award of compensatory damages 
for the violation of their First Amendments without proof of 
consequential harm; and (6) the action would be remanded for 
reconsideration of the issue of punitive damages.^®® 
In Mav Evangville-Vanderburgh School Corporation.497 Mary May 
and several other teachers had been meeting before school at Harper 
Elementary School, kindergarten through fifth grade, to pray, sing hymns, and 
discuss the Bible. The administration was unaware of the meetings until a new 
principal started a teachers' newsletter, and Mrs. May asked him to put a 
notice about the meetings in it. He refused and, after contacting his superiors, 
ordered the meetings stopped, and he was supported in his decision by the 
school board. 
Mrs. May sued the board, its members, and the superintendent of the 
school district under section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now 42 U.S.C. 
section 1983, asking they drop the ban on religious meetings and to recover 
$300,000 in damages. The only issue that she pressed was that the ban 
496ibid., 1392. 
497May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corporation, 787 F.2d 1105 
(7th Cir. 1986). 
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violated her constitutional right of free speech. She made no free exercise 
claim. Even though no written policy was evident, the superintendent and the 
school board had been consistent in prohibiting religious meetings in school 
facilities. The teacher and the school board asked the district court to grant 
summary judgment in the case. The reason the teacher requested summary 
judgment was to avoid the expense of a jury trial. The United States District 
Court for Southern District of Indiana granted the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment, and the teacher appealed. 
On appeal Mrs. May offered two arguments. First, as an employee of 
the school, she had the right to exercise free speech on school grounds provided 
she did not disrupt the school's activities; since the meetings took place before 
school and the students did not participate, nor as far as anyone knew were 
even aware of meetings, there was no disruption. Second, her argument was 
that even if the school authorities could have stopped the meetings not directly 
related to school business, they didn't do so. The defendants replied that even if 
they created a public forum, which they denied, they were justified in excluding 
religious discussion from it because to permit it would have violated the 
establishment clause of the First Amendment. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh District affirmed 
the decision of the District Court by stating that: (1) the teacher had no right 
under the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause to hold prayer meetings on 
school property before school opened and students arrived, and (2) the 
Districts Court's decision that school authorities had consistently applied a 
policy that prohibited school facilities to be used for religious activities, despite 
the teachers' contention that the school authorities had made the school a 
181 
"public forum" by permitting meetings on any subject except religion, was not 
clearly erroneous. 
Bender v, Williamsnnrt. Area School District^ 8 began in September 
1981 when a group of high school students in Williamsport, Pennsylvania 
formed a club called "Petros" for the purpose of promoting "spiritual growth 
and positive attitudes in the lives of its members. "499 The group obtained 
permission from the principal to hold an organizational meeting during activity 
period on school premises. At the meeting Bible verses were read and students 
prayed. There was no evidence that anyone objected to future meetings of 
Petros; nevertheless, the principal told the group they could not meet again 
until he had discussed the matter with the superintendent. The superintendent 
informed the students that he would respond to the written request for 
recognition when he received legal counsel from the school district solicitor 
concerning the formation of a religious club on campus. 
In November 1981, the principal and the superintendent met with 
Petros and advised the group that based on the legal opinion of the school 
district solicitor their request must be denied. The students were informed that 
they could meet off school premises and would be given released time during 
activity period if they could find a meeting place and an adult, preferably a 
clergyman, for their meetings. 
The students appealed in writing to the chairman of the Williamsport 
498Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, 563 F.Supp. 697 (M.D. 
Pa. 1983), 741 F.2d 538 (3rd Cir. 1984) vacated, 475 U.S. 534, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 
89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986). 
499]$ender v. Williamsport Area School District, 106 S.Ct. 1326,1327 
(1986). 
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Area School Board. At a board meeting in January 1982, the board upheld the 
superintendent's decision and denied the appeal based on the solicitor's opinion. 
In June 1982, ten of the students filed suit in the United States District 
Court against the Williamsport Area School District, the nine members of the 
school board, the superintendent of the school district, and the principal of the 
high school. The suit alleged that the refusal to allow them to meet on the 
same basis as other student groups because of their religious activities 
violated the First Amendment, and they asked for declaratory and injunctive 
relief. The District Court, on motions for summary judgment ruled in favor of 
the students but entered no injunction and granted no relief against any 
defendant in his individual capacity. 
The school district did not appeal and complied with the judgment and 
permitted the students to hold their meetings as requested. However, one 
member of the school board did appeal. No one questioned his standing to 
appeal and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled in his 
favor. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the school board 
member did not have standing to appeal; and therefore, the Court of Appeals 
had no jurisdiction to hear his appeal. 
In Garnett v. Renton School District No. 403.500 students at 
Lindbergh High School brought action against the high school and the school 
district to permit religious meetings on school property. The district made 
classrooms available for students to use for approved "cocurricular" activities 
during noninstructional time. The district's board of directors and the 
50®Garnett v. Renton School District No. 403, 865 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 
1989). 
183 
superintendent determined whether to approve an activity based on District 
Policy 6470 which stated: 
[t]he criteria to be used for approving co-curricular activities 
should include but not be limited to: 
1. the purposes and/or objectives shall be an extension 
of a specific program or course offering, 
2. the activity shall be acceptable to the community, 
3. the activity should have carry-over values for 
lifetime activities, 
4. the group shall be supervised by a qualified 
employee, 
5. the cost of the activity must not be prohibitive 
to students or District, 
6. the activity must comply with Title IX 
requirements, 
7. the activity must take place on school premises 
unless approved in advance by the school principal, and 
8. the activity must not be secretive in nature.501 
Policy 6470 also states that the district "does not offer a limited open 
forum. "502 
Richard Garnett and other students asked permission of the principal 
and the school district to use a classroom in the high school for weekday 
morning meetings of their nondenominational Christian student group. The 
group planned to discuss religious and moral issues, read the Bible, and pray. 
The principal and the school district denied their request because their club 
was not curriculum related and because permitting the proposed meetings 
would violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment. 
The United States District Court for the Western District of 
SOllbid., 1123. 
502ibid. 
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Washington denied the preliminary injunction, and judgment was later entered 
for the school district on the merits. The students appealed. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth District affirmed the ruling of the 
District Court by stating; 
(1) allowing student religious group to hold meetings in the 
public high school classroom prior to the opening of the school 
day would violate the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment; (2) school district's refusal to allow student 
religious group to meet on public high school campus did not 
violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment; 
(3) public high school did not have a "limited open forum," 
as defined by the Equal Access Act, and school was accordingly 
not required by mandatory provisions of the Act to allow student 
religious groups to hold meetings.503 
In Mergens v. Board of Education of Westside Community Schools.504 
Bridgett Mergens, a student at Westside High School, a public secondary 
school in Omaha, Nebraska, met with the principal and asked for permission to 
form a Christian club at school. The club was to be nondenominational and 
open to all students. Its purpose was to permit students to read and discuss 
the Bible, enjoy fellowship, and pray together. It would have the same 
privileges as all other Westside clubs, but it would not have a faculty sponsor. 
Her request was denied, first by the principal and then by the superintendent 
on the grounds that a religious club at school would violate the Establishment 
Clause. 
Mergens appealed to the school board which supported the decision of 
503ibid., 1122. 
504Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 110 
S.Ct. 2356 (1990). 
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the superintendent. She then challenged the decision in Federal District Court 
on the basis that it violated the Equal Access Act and her First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion. The school board 
responded that the Equal Access Act did not apply because Westside did not 
maintain a limited open forum, and even if the school did maintain such a 
forum, the act was unconstitutional. The District Court supported the school 
board after determining that the act did not apply because all student clubs at 
Westside were curriculum related. 
The students appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
which reversed the decision of the District Court. The Court of Appeals ruled 
that the purpose of the Equal Access Act was to prohibit discrimination 
against respondents' proposed club on the basis of its religious content, and 
that the Act did not violate the establishment clause. On certiorari, Justice 
O'Conner delivered the opinion of the United States Supreme Court which held 
that: "(1) the scuba diving club, chess club, and service club were 
noncurriculum-related student groups, triggering district's obligations under the 
Equal Access Act, and (2) the Act does not violate the establishment 
clause."505 
Praver at Athletic Events 
Out of tradition as much as anything, many school districts have 
continued to permit team members and spectators to participate in prayers 
and other religious activities at athletic contests in public schools in violation of 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States. Many school administrators have been reluctant to eliminate 
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religious activities in public schools for numerous reasons, one of the chief 
being their own personal beliefs. 
Parents unable to get sufficient satisfaction after appearing before 
boards of education have turned to the courts for help in eliminating religious 
practices at athletic events that are in violation of the Establishment Clause 
of the First Amendment. Such was the case in Doe v^ Aldine Independent 
School District.506 The following prayer was the source of controversy; "Dear 
God, please bless our school and all it stands for. Help keep us free from sin, 
honest and true, courage and faith to make our school the victor, In Jesus' 
name we pray, Amen. "5 07 These words were posted in block letters on the 
wall over the entrance to the gymnasium at Aldine Senior High School and 
recited or sung by students to music played by the Aldine School band at 
athletic events, pep rallies, and at graduation ceremonies. These school-
sponsored events took place before or after regular school hours in the school 
gymnasium and at the football stadium which were the property of the school 
district. Frequently, the school principal or other school employees would 
initiate the recitation or singing of the school prayer. Even though students 
were required to assemble in the gymnasium for certain school programs, 
attendance at any event during which the prayer was to be recited or sung was 
voluntary. In addition, no one was forced to sing or recite the words, nor was 
anyone required to stand when the words were recited or sung. 
Action was brought by an anonymous plaintiff against the Aldine 
506dO6 v. Aldine Independent School District, 563 F.Supp. 883 (1982). 
507ibid., 884. 
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Independent School Pistrict.508 a Texas school district, for violation of 
constitutional rights based on recitation and singing of a school prayer on 
school district property. The District Court held that the practice or policy of 
reciting or singing of a school prayer violated the establishment clause of the 
First Amendment, notwithstanding that the singing or recitation occurred at 
extracurricular events on school property where practice was state-initiated, 
encouraged, and supervised. Summary judgment was issued for the plaintiff. 
In the fall of 1985 in Jaeer v. Douglas County School Pistrict.509 a 
member of the marching band, Doug Jager, objected to his school principal 
about the practice of having pregame invocations delivered at home football 
games. In the Spring of 1986 the Douglas County School superintendent, the 
school system attorney, the Jagers, and their counsel, and two ministers met 
and discussed two alternative proposals for changing the invocation practices. 
One proposal was a secular inspirational speech, which was acceptable to the 
Jagers. The other was an "equal access" plan that would retain some religious 
content which was rejected by the Jagers. 
In the Fall of 1986, the Jagers filed a complaint in the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The District Court issued a 
temporary restraining order prohibiting the Douglas County School District 
from conducting or permitting invocations prior to any athletic event at the 
school stadium. 
The case was tried in the Fall of 1986 and on February 3,1987, the 
508ibid. 
509jager v. Douglas County School District 862 F.2d 824 (11th Cir. 
1989). 
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District Court 
(1) declared the pregame invocations unconstitutional, 
(2) denied the Jagers' request for a permanent injunction, 
(3) rejected the Jagers' claim based on the Free Exercise of 
Religion Clause of the First Amendment, and (4) rejected the 
Jagers' claim that the school district violated the Georgia 
Constitution.5 10 
Doe v. Duncanville Independent School District511 is a case that 
involved team prayer. Jane Doe's family moved to Duncanville, Texas, when 
she was twelve years old. She tried out and made the girls' basketball team. 
Jane learned that the coach regularly began or ended practice with the Lord's 
Prayer. Jane participated, even though she was uncomfortable and opposed to 
the practice, so as not to create dissension. At the end of the Jane's first 
basketball game, the Lord's Prayer was recited in the center of the court, girls 
on their hands and knees, with the coaches standing over them, heads bowed. 
In the weeks that followed, prayers were either started by the coaches' signal 
or at their verbal requests. Prayers had been conducted in this manner for the 
past seventeen years. 
After attending a game and seeing his daughter participate in the 
prayer, her father asked her how she felt about participating. She told him she 
preferred not to participate in team prayers. Her father told her she did not 
have to participate in team prayers .whereupon she resolved to cease her 
participation. Her father complained to school authorities and the assistant 
SlOlbid., 827. 
51 iDoe v Duncanville Independent School District, 994 F.2d 160 (5th 
Cir. 1993). 
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superintendent agreed to stop prayers at pep rallies but not postgame prayers. 
Unable to get sufficient satisfaction from the board of education, he 
turned to the courts for help. In deciding for the Does, the trial court concluded 
that the School District's prayer failed all three prongs of the Lemon test. On 
appeal the School District contended that Board of Education of Westside 
Community Schools Vj. Mergens controls. By allowing students and teachers to 
participate in spontaneous prayer, it is merely accommodating religion in a 
constitutionally permissible manner. However, the Fifth Circuit distinguished 
Doe from Mergens for three reasons. (1) Mergens involved non-curriculum-
related activities; (2) the prayer as practiced in this case could not be 
considered student-initiated; and (3) the school district had not established a 
limited open forum. 
Religious Symbols and Holidays 
Printed materials, audio-visual materials, dress, jewelry, and religious 
scenes have caused controversy in the public schools. It is impossible to allow 
different religious groups to express their religious preference without offending 
some other group, religious or nonreligious. In 1894 in a Pennsylvania case, 
Hvsong et al. v. School District of Oalifain Borough et al..512 John Hvsong and 
others through a bill in equity sought to restrain the school district from 
permitting sectarian teaching in the common schools and from employing as 
teachers sisters of the Order of St. Joseph, a religious society of the Roman 
Catholic Church. A preliminary injunction was granted. 
Despite their dress (religious garb), the court reported that there was no 
512Hysong et al. v. School District of Gallitzin Borough et al., 164 Pa. 
629, 30A. 482 (1894). See also Commonwealth v Herr et al., 229 Pa. 132. 
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evidence of any religious instruction or religious exercises of any character 
during school hours. However, the court did find that after school hours the 
school room was used by the teachers to impart Catholic religious instruction 
to children of Catholic parents, with the consent of or by request of the 
parents. 
The display of religious symbols-such as a cross, nativity scene, or 
menorah—is permitted, provided the symbols are used as instructional tools or 
resources, displayed on a temporary basis, and exhibited as examples of the 
cultural and religious heritage. 
In Lawrence v Buchmueller^lS action was brought by a group of 
parents of public school children in Hartsdale, New York, for declaration that 
the board of education of the school district had no authority to permit a 
display on school grounds of symbols of any deity belonging to any and all 
religions. The complaint was filed by members of the same faith as the group 
that had erected the creche. 
The plaintiffs were not opposed to the religion depicted by the symbol; 
their only objection was to the fact that the creche was erected on public land. 
They stated their position in the complaint as: 
Let there be no mistake, either, about the position of those 
plaintiffs who follow Christian theology; objection is made therein, 
not on the basis of any religious antagonism with the cr6che as a 
symbol~but, rather, precisely because it is symbolic of a basic 
tenet of the Church and, as such, has no place in a secular 
atmosphere. * * * We contend most vigorously that one may 
follow the Christian religion and object most emphatically that his 
own constitutional rights and liberties are infringed by the display 
&13Lawrence v. Buchmueller, 243 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1963); See also Allen v. 
Hickel, 424, F.2d 944 (1970). 
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of a religious symbol upon public property.514 
The Supreme Court of New York held that resolution of the school 
board permitting the erection of a creche on the school grounds during a portion 
of school Christmas recess at no expense to the school district did not 
constitute unconstitutional establishment of religion. 
A court case often cited in the use of religious symbols in public schools 
is Stone Vj. Graham.515 This Kentucky statute required the posting of a copy 
of the Ten Commandments on the wall of each school classroom in the State. 
The sixteen-inch by twenty-inch posters were purchased with private 
contributions. The state trial court upheld the statute passed by the State of 
Kentucky. The Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Kentucky affirmed 
the decision of the trial court. 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Kentucky 
commandment case. The Supreme Court ruled that the Kentucky statute 
violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment. 
In a South Dakota case, Florev v. Sioux Falls.516 action was brought 
contending that the school board's policy violated the establishment clause and 
seeking injunction requiring that city public school officials be instructed that 
all Christmas assemblies be absolutely and unalterably secular. The court 
Sl^ibid., 90. 
Sl^Stone y. Graham, 449 U.S. 39,101 S.Ct. 192, 662 L.Ed. 2d 199 
(1980); See also Ring v. Grand Forks Public School District No. 1,483 F.Supp. 
272 (D.N.D. 1980). 
51f>Florey v. SiouxFalls School District 49-5,464 F.Supp. 911 (1979). 
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upheld the school board policy which permitted the use of religious decorations 
such as crosses, menorahs, crescents, Stars of David, creches, and symbols of 
Native American religions--"provided such symbols are displayed as an 
example of the cultural and religious heritage of the holiday and are temporary 
in nature."^ ̂  
Although not an education case, Lvnch v. Donnellv^lS is important to 
public education because it established that Christmas displays do not 
advance religion or create an excessive entanglement between church and 
state. Each year the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island sponsored a Christmas 
display in a park owned by a nonprofit organization. The display, a tradition for 
forty or more years, included a Santa Claus house, a Nativity scene, a 
Christmas tree, and a "SEASONS GREETINGS" banner. The respondents 
challenged the Nativity scene in the display on the basis that it violated the 
establishment clause of the First Amendment. The District Court upheld the 
challenge and permanently forbade the city from including the Nativity scene 
in the city display which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 
The Supreme Court explained that the purpose of the First 
Amendment religious clauses is "to prevent as far as possible, the intrusion of 
either [the church or the state] into the precincts of the other. "519 However, 
at the same time the Court has recognized that "total separation is not 
possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship between government and 
517lbid., 918. 
Sl^Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
519Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971). 
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religious organizations is inevitable."520 Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the city of Pawtucket had not violated the establishment clause of the 
First Amendment and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
Another non-education case of significance is County of Allegheny v. 
American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter.521 The 
American Civil Liberties Union challenged the constitutionality of the creche in 
the county courthouse and the menorah outside the city and county building as 
violations of the First Amendment made applicable to state government by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court, relying heavily on Lynch v^ 
Ponnellv.522 which ruled that a city's use of a creche in a Christmas display 
did not violate the establishment clause, entered a judgment in favor of the 
defendants. The Court of Appeals, also used Lvnch v. Ponnellv.523 
distinguishing it from the current case held that the creche and menorah must 
be understood as an impermissible governmental endorsement to Christianity 
and Judaism and reversed and remanded the case. Certiorari was granted. By 
a five to four decision the Supreme Court prohibited the inclusion of the creche 
in the Pawtucket display, ruling that the inclusion of the crdche did have the 
impermissible effect of advancing or promoting religion. 
520fl}id. 
521County of Alleghany v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater 
Pittsburgh Chapter, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (1989). 
522Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
^23jbid. 
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Moment of Silence 
The controversy over prayers in public schools is a continuing debate. 
A moment of silence is a compromise; neither side wins. Conservatives, such 
as North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms, want to return open prayer to the 
classrooms. On Thursday, January 21,1993, Senator Jesse Helms introduced 
a resolution proposing an amendment to the United States Constitution; 
specifically, to restore the right of voluntary prayer in the public schools, 
including the offering of prayers at public school graduation ceremonies and 
sports events, such as football and basketball.524 The Republican landslide 
in the elections on Tuesday, November 8,1994, has already given support to 
introducing a constitutional amendment on voluntary school prayer in the 
public schools. Newt Gingrich, House Majority Leader, has already stated that 
he plans to have a vote in the House of Representatives for a constitutional 
amendment to return voluntary prayer to the public schools. On the other 
hand, liberals say that religious training is not a matter for the government but 
a matter for the home. 
One misleading assumption often quoted is that prayer has been taken 
out of the public schools when in reality prayer has never been taken out of 
the public schools. Students and teachers are free to pray or meditate as long 
as they do not compel or coerce others to participate. Justice Sandra 
O'Connor, in an occurring opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree. stated: "Nothing in the 
United States Constitution as interpreted by this Court... prohibits public 
school students from voluntarily praying at any time before, during, or after 
524congreSg) Senate, Helms Proposes Constitutional Ampnrimpnt. To 
Allow Voluntary School Praver. 103rd Cong, 1st sess., S.R. 3, Congressional 
Record, vol. 139, No. 5, daily ed. (21 January 21993) SI. 
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the school day. "52 5 
In a 1976 case, Gaines v Anderson.526 students challenged the 
Massachusetts statute requiring observance of a period of silence for prayer or 
meditation at the beginning of the school day in public schools. The Three-
Judge District Court, District of Massachusetts, ruled that parents of the 
students would be permitted to join as plaintiffs. 
The District Court ruled that the statute did not violate the First 
Amendment; that the statute did not violate students' rights of free exercise of 
their religion; and that the statute did not prohibit or inhibit parental right to 
guide and instruct children in regard to religion. The District Court dismissed 
the complaint. 
In Beck v. McElrath.527 Duffy y. Las Cruces Public Schools.528 an(J 
Walter v. West Virginia Board of Education^ 9 case had a state statute 
authorizing a moment of silence to be held at the beginning of each school day 
in the public schools for quiet and private contemplation or introspection. In 
each state the District Court ruled the statute unconstitutional on the basis 
that the statute caused excessive entanglement between church and state. 
Three cases including a moment of silence were reviewed in an earlier 
525wallace v. Jaflree, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (1985). 
526(jaines y Anderson, 421 F.Supp. 337 (1976). 
52?Beck v McElrath, 548 F.Supp. 1161 (1982). 
528Duffy v< Las Cruces Public Schools, 557 F.Supp. 1013 (1983). 
529\yalter v. West Virgina Board of Education, 610 F.Supp. 1169 
(D.C.W.Va. 1985). 
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section of Chapter III. See Karen B. Treen. pages 143-145; Jaffree 
James, pages 145-147; and Smith v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile 
County, pages 147-151. 
One of the most noted moment-of-silence cases is Wallace v\ 
Jaffree.530 it is a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court. 
Appellees challenged the constitutionality of three Alabama statutes. 
Progressive legislation over a period of years supported this allegation; the 
1978 statute, section 16-1-20, authorized a one-minute period of silence for 
meditation; the 1981 statute, section 16-1-20.1 authorized the same moment 
of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer;" and the 1982 statute, section 
16-1-20.2, gave teachers permission to conduct a voluntary prayer for those 
students who wished to participate. Even though finding that sec. 16-1-20.1 
was a concerted attempt to encourage a religious activity, the District Court 
ruled that the establishment clause of the First Amendment does not prohibit 
a State from establishing a religion. After review, the District Court dismissed 
Jaffree's complaint. The case was appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals in regard to statutes enacted in 1981 and 1982. The Court of Appeals 
ruled both statutes unconstitutional. The case was further appealed to the 
United States Supreme Court. In 1984, the Supreme Court unanimously 
affirmed the decision of the District Court and stated that the 1982 Alabama 
statute, section 16-1-20.2, was unconstitutional. In 1985, the Supreme Court 
in a six to three vote, struck down the 1981 prayer statute, 16-1-20.1. 
In December 1982 the New Jersey Legislature passed, over the 
Governor's veto, a statute requiring the State's elementary and secondary 
530wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S 38 (1985). 
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public educators to allow their students to observe a minute of silence before 
the start of each school day. The statute reads as follows: 
Principals and teachers in each public elementary and 
secondary school of each school district in this State shall 
permit students to observe a one minute period of silence to 
be used solely at the discretion of the individual student, before 
the opening exercises of each school day for quiet and private 
contemplation or introspection. N.J.S.A. 18A:36-4.531 
Immediately, the New Jersey Attorney General said he would not 
defend the statute if it were challenged. Within a month after the statute 
became effective, a New Jersey public school teacher, several public school 
students, and parents of public school students challenged its constitutionality 
in federal court. The appellees sued under 42 U. S. C. sec. 1983, alleging that 
the statute violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment. 
After a five-day trial, the District Court ruled the New Jersey statute 
unconstitutional. Applying the Lemon test in Lemon v Kurtzman.532 the 
court held the statute failed all three prongs because (1) its purpose was 
religious rather than secular; (2) it both advanced and inhibited religion; and 
(3) it fostered excessive government entanglement with religion. 
North Carolina is one of twenty-five states that permits public school 
teachers to have students observe a moment of silence in their classrooms. In 
1985, North Carolina Legislature passed as a general statute a provision 
allowing a moment of silence.̂ 33 Dr. Wayne Thompson Hall surveyed selected 
531-May v. Cooperman, 572 F.2d 240, 241 (3rd Cir. 1985). 
532Lemon v Kurtzman4 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
533j»jorth Carolina General Statutes 115C-47 (29), 1985. 
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principals in public middle and high schools in North Carolina to determine 
religious practices present in the public schools. He reported that seventy 
percent of the respondents indicated that their school did not observe a 
moment of silence.534 With no mention of prayer, it is reasonable that the 
North Carolina moment of silence statute will pass constitutional muster. 
fipmlar Humanism 
"To be or not to be, that is the question. "53 5 And that is always the 
question. Is secular humanism a religion? It all depends on whom you ask. 
The supporters for religion in the schools frequently base their arguments on 
the premise that public schools are advancing a religion called "secular 
humanism" at the expense of theistic religions. Areas and topics in the 
curriculum that are susceptible to such a challenge are evolution, values 
clarification, sex education, globalism, death education, journal entries, 
situation ethics, and any topic dealing with self-analysis. The religious 
fundamentalists focus on The Humanist. Manifesto I and II, and A Secular 
Humanist Declaration, as an emphasis. They also alude to John Dewey, the 
father of American Education, who signed Manifesto I, and the other noticeable 
educators who signed subsequent documents. The imperative influence of 
these documents, especially The Humanist Manifesto I, is presented in the 
following: 
534\\rayne Thompson Hall,"Legal Aspects of the Practice of Religious 
Activities in Selected Public Schools in North Carolina" (Ed. D. University of 
North Carolina at Greensboro, 1993), 77. 
535william Shakespeare, Hamlet. With an introduction by Sylvan 
Barnet (New York; New American Library, 1982), 93. 
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It reflected all of the influences of science, evolution and the 
new psychology which were reshaping American education. 
It called for the abandonment of traditional religion and replaced 
it with a new secular religion better able to accommodate the new 
moral relativism inherent in a man-centered, godless world.536 
Religion is an emotional issue and secular humanism complicates the 
issue. Critics from both sides of the issue have joined the ideology battle. 
Some humanists have asserted that the absolutist morality 
championed by conservative evangelicals poses a threat to 
reason, democracy, and freedom. 
On the other hand, some fundamentalists have referred to 
humanism as "Satan's philosophy," which promises ultimate 
doom unless it is completely eradicated.^1? 
There are two issues that emerge when religious fundamentalists 
insist that public schools are advancing a new religion called secular 
humanism: (1) legally schools cannot teach religion and (2) public education 
is a human activity supporting the philosophy that schools should always be 
sensitive to student needs.538 The major argument develops from the lack of 
a definition of secular humanism which is accepted by religious 
536 Samuel LBlumenfeld, NEA Troian Horse in American Education 
(Boise: Paradigm, 1984), 226. 
537Martha M. McCarthy. A Delicate Balance: Church. State, and the 
Schools (Bloomington, Ind.: Phi Delta Kappa Educational Foundation, 1993), 
90. 
538joseph e. Bryson, "Conservative Pressures on Curriculum," in 
School Law Update. (Topeka: National Organization for Legal Problems of 
Education, 1982), 138. 
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fundamentalists and humanists scholars, school boards, and school 
administrators. The fundamentalists define secular humanism as follows: 
Humanism is faith in man instead of faith in God. 
Humanism was officially ruled a religion by the U. S. 
Supreme Court. Humanism promotes: (1) situation 
ethics, (2) evolution, (3) sexual freedom, including 
public sex education courses, and (4) Internationalism. 
Humanism centers on "self' because it recognizes no 
higher thing to which man is responsible 
This eliminates coming to Christ for forgiveness of sin. 
It eliminates the Christian attributes of meekness and 
humility. Where does self-esteem end and arrogance begin? 
Such terms as self-concept, self-esteem, self-awareness, self-
acceptance, self-fulfillment, self-realization, body awareness, 
etc., are frequently used. All leave the students occupied 
primarily with themselves and this is wrong. There are others to 
consider. Self-centered persons are seldom an asset to themselves, 
to friends, family, or country.539 
Religious fundamentalists view secular humanist as: 
Anti-God. The secular humanist wants to tear God down from 
His throne and make Man the sovereign of the universe. 
Anti-democracy. The secular humanist hopes to do away 
with present governments and make the world one huge, 
totalitarian state. 
Anti-family. The secular humanist undermines the family 
concept, denies Christian values that are taught in the home, 
and preaches to the youth of America that there are no 
absolute morals. 
Anti-Christian. The secular humanist preaches the religion 
539eh M. Oboler, ed, Censorship and Education. Tne Reference Shelf, 
Vol. 53, No 6 (New York: H. W. Wilson, 1981), 59. 
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of Secular Humanism through textbooks and by means of the 
following teaching techniques: value clarification, moral 
education, human development, family life and human 
relations, affective education, and psychological learning, to 
name a few.^40 
Religious fundamentalists are supported by such well known groups as 
Jerry Falwell's Moral Majority, and Phyllis Schlafiy's Eagle Form. The 
humanists on the other hand are equally advanced by sound scholarship. 
Alfred Braunthal in Salvation and the Perfect Society: The External Quest 
defines secular humanism as: 
The ultimate goal of secular humanism-the perfection of 
society through human efforts-presupposes not the gratuitous 
grace of God, but rather the full responsibility of man for his 
own thoughts or deeds.541 
Paul Kurtz, a humanist scholar who was an expert witness in Smith v^ 
Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, said 
Humanism as a philosophy is opposed to all forms of 
mythological illusions (religious or ideological) about man 
and his place in the universe Any theistic interpretation 
of the universe and any eschatological drama about divine 
beginnings and ends is rejected because it is logically 
meaningless and empirically unverified.542 
H Rhodes, "Is Secular Humanism the Religion of the Public 
Schools?" Ttenlinpr with Censorship, ed. James E. Davis (Urbana: National 
Council of Teachers of English, 1979), 120. 
54 lAlfred Braunthal, Salvation and the Perfect Society: The Eternal 
Quest (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1979), 279. 
542pavQ Kurtz, "Is Everyone a Humanist?" The Human Alternative: 
Some Definitions nf Hiimflniflm. ed, Paul Kurtz (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 
1973), 178. 
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In Smith. Judge Brevard Hand maintained that secular humanism was 
a religion and Alabama schools could no longer promote such. Continuing, 
Kurtz inisted that humans were capable of creating, guiding, and directing the 
human destiny.543 
In arguing cases in which secular humanity is an issue, attorneys rely 
heavily on a 1961 case, Torcaso v. Watkins.544 This case dealt with a man 
who challenged the Office of Notary Public of Maryland when denied a job 
because he did not express a belief in God. The Supreme Court held that 
Torcaso denial was an improper and impermissible denial basis for job 
exclusion. Justice Hugo Black in writing the majority insisted: 
We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor 
the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person 
"to profess a belief or disbelief in religion." Neither can it 
constitutionally pass belief laws to impose requirements 
which can aid all religions as against non-believers, and 
neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the 
existence of God as against those religions founded on 
different beliefs.545 
The Supreme Court inadvertently advanced the religious 
fundamentalists cause in footnote eleven by suggesting that: 
Among religions in this country which do not teach what 
would generally be considered a belief in the existence of 
God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Cultures, Secular 
Humanism, and others.546 
543ibid., 178-186. 
544r0rcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1981). 
545ibid. 
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Many Buddhists and Taoists would take issue with Justice Black's 
mandate, for they do believe in God. At any rate, religious fundamentalists 
have relied heavily on footnote eleven in secular human pursuits. 
Moreover, religious fundamentalists often refer to Abinerton School 
District v. Schempp547 as additional judicial support regarding secular 
humanism in schools In that case, the Court held: 
[IJt is insisted that unless these religious exercises are 
permitted, a "religion of secularism" is established. We 
agree of course that a State may not establish a "religion 
of secularism" in the sense of affirmatively opposing or 
showing hostility to religion, thus "preferring those who 
believe in no religion over those who do believe."548 
In Malnak Vj. Yogi.549 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals attempted to 
narrow the meaning of footnote eleven in Torcaso regarding religions that do no 
teach what would generally be a belief in God. The Third Circuit Court 
maintained that footnote eleven's meaning should be that "Torcaso does not 
stand for the proposition that 'humanism' is a religion although an organized 
group of 'Secular Humanists' may be. "550 
546jbid.,495. 
547Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
548ibid.,225. 
549Mainak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3rd. Cir. 1979). 
550ibid., 212. 
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United States Vj. See#er551 js another case often presented by religious 
fundamentalists. In Seeder the Court held the plaintiff--in this case a 
conscientious objector wished to be excused from mitilary duty predicated on "a 
sincere and meaningful belief' instead of "filled by God." The Supreme Court 
held that such belief ran "parallel to belief in God" thus the plaintiffs were 
excused from military duty.^52 The case suggests that religion may be God 
filled or moral based. The religious fundamentalists maintain that Seeger 
levels the playing field between secular humanism and theisim. 
Regardless of cases cited above, fundamentalists were unable to 
establish the fact that humanism in public school was the same ideology 
presented in Humanist Manifesto I and II. Moreover, there is no ideological 
nexus between educational parameters in schools and those of the 
publications. Yet throughout America the controversy continued to accelerate. 
In 1974 a textbook ideological battle developed in Kanawha County, West 
Virginia. Fundamentalists maintained they were victims of a decaying 
society-the liberal left was in charge of schools and old-fashioned values and 
religion were being crushed.^53 
Parents, Giy and Shonet Williams, challenged the school district 
maintaining that certain textbooks and other materials were anti-religious and 
in effect violated their rights to free religion and privacy. The challenged 
551United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
552n,id. 
553joe l. Kincheloe, Understanding the New Right and Its Impact on 
Education (Bloomington, Ind.: Phi Delta Kappan Educational Foundation, 
1983), 7. 
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textbooks were alleged to contain "stories promoting and encouraging disbelief 
in a Supreme Being, and encouragement to use vile and abusive language, and 
encouragement to violate the Ten Commandments."554 The court ruled that 
even though some of the subject content might be offensive to the sincerely 
held beliefs of the plaintiifs, the use of the textbooks was not a violation of their 
constitutional rights. Justice Hall insisted that First Amendment "does not 
guarantee that nothing about religion will be taught in the schools nor that 
nothing offensive to any religion will be taught in the schools." 555 Judge Hall 
insisted school boards were only prohibited from advancing or inhibiting a 
religion. In spite of judicial decision for the school district, Kincheloe 
maintained that national attention awarded the case "gave conservatives 
around the country a new sense of confidence."556 
In the 1982 Fink v. Board of Education of the Warren County School 
Pistrict557 case the court implied that even though secular humanism was a 
religion the court did not indicate any First Amendment prohibition. 558 
In the 1983 Crockett v. Sorenson559 case Judge Kiser held that a 
Bible class for fourth and fifth grade students staffed and controlled by a 
ministerial alliance organization was in Constitutional violation-there was no 
554\viHiams v. Board of Education, 388 F.Supp. 93, 95 (S.D.W.V. 1975). 
555ibid.,96. 
556iQncheloe, 7. 
557p,ink v. Board of Education of the Warren County School District* 
442 A.2d 837 (Pa. Commonwealth 1982). 
558ibid.,853. 
559cr0Ckett v Sorenson, 568 F.Supp. 1422 (1983). 
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secular purpose. Even though Justice Kiser said schools should not be 
insulated from any mention of God, the Bible or religion, he maintained that 
"when such insulation occurs, another religion, such as secular humanism, is 
effectively established."^®® 
In the 1985 Grove v. Mead School District No. 354.561 case both 
mother and daughter objected to reading material required by the teacher as 
anti-Christian values and offensive language. The TiP-nmintr Tree was written 
by black writer Gordon Parks. Even though the student was given an 
alternate assignment and did not otherwise participate in classroom activities 
regarding the book, the mother filed action against the school board insisting 
the reading assignment was a religion-secular humanism- an establishment 
of religion prohibited by the Constitution. Justice Eugene Wright insisted that 
legal counsel had misinterpreted Torcasp562 footnote eleven and reading 
materials violated neither First Amendment free exercise or establishment 
clauses. 
In the 1986 Mozert v^ Hawkins County Public Schools563 case 
parents contested the Holt basal reading series predicated on values 
clarification, witchcraft, idol worship, situational ethics, and euthanasia-a 
secular humanists reading series. Even though, early on, the schools provided 
560ibid., 1425. 
56lQrove v. Mead School District No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528 (1985). 
562>porcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488. 
563]y[ozert v. Hawkins County Pubic Schools, 647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. 
Tenn 1986). 
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alternative reading assignments, without school board approval the 
alternative ceased. At this point students fled the public school for a Christian 
private school and initiated legal action. 
Educators testified to the value of the individualized education program. 
The court ruled that the state did not require uniformity. The school district 
should be allowed to accommodate the beliefs of the students involved and such 
accommodation "would not wreak havoc in the school system."564 
Judge Hull's ruling (1) prohibited the school board from assigning the 
Holt reading series; (2) allowed home schooling (a statute provided for such) 
for reading; and (3) limited his decision to plaintiffs involved-all others must 
be made "on a case by case basis."565 
While not specifically raised as an issue in this case, 
religious objections to a humanistic education seem 
to be couched in the argument that humanistic values, 
of which some are non sectarian in nature, are being 
taught as a religion of secular humanism.566 
In the 1987 Smith v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile 
County567 case plaintiffs filed action against a local school board for 
564jQrsten Goldberg, "Textbook DecisionFuels Debate on Role of 
Religion in Schools, Rights of Parents," Education Week 6, No. 9 (November 
5,1986): 18. 
565ibi(jt> 19, 
566i£enneth Nuger, "Accommodating Religious Objections to State 
Reading Programs: Mozert v. Hawkins County Schools," Mozert v. Hawkins 
County Public Schools." West's Education Law Reporter. Vol. 36 (St. Paul: 
West Publishing Company, 1987) 255. 
567smith v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 655 
F.Supp. 939 (S. D. Alabama 1987). 
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advancing secular humanism as religion through the use of history, home 
economics, and social studies textbooks. Furthermore, plaintiffs insisted the 
textbooks left out important documents regarding the contributions of religion 
to American life. Finally, plaintiffs suggested that secular humanism religion 
constrained their own religious beliefs and practices. 
This case is punctuated with a lengthy list of expert witnesses on both 
sides of the argument and a judge-Justice Brevard Hand- who was willing to 
make not only the talk, but the walk. Justice Hand held: (1) that secular 
humanism was a religion, with a belief system that exalted humankind as 
moral but denied the "transcendent and/or supernatural: there is no God, no 
creator, no divinity";568 (2) "that theistic religions were effectively 
discriminated against";^69 (3) and  ̂thus the textbooks involved violated the 
establishment clause of the First Amendment of religious advancement. 
Justice Hand stated: 
The question arises how public schools can deal with 
topics that overlap with areas covered by religious 
belief. Mere coincidence between a statement in a 
textbook and a religious belief is not an establishment 
of religion. However, some religious beliefs are so 
fundamental that the act of denying them will completely 
undermine that religion. In addition, denial of that belief 
will result in the affirming of a contrary belief and result 
in the establishment of an opposing religion.570 
568ibid.,979. 
569ibid., 981. 
570ibid., 987 
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In 1995, secular humanism is still a topic of converstion in the public 
schools. Religious fundamentalist groups want to return prayer to the 
classroom to combat what they perceive as the nonreligion of secular 
humanism. 
If the Supreme Court eventually should rule that it is a 
religious belief and that public schools are unconstitutionally 
advancing this dogma... the implications would be staggering. 
Practically all facets of the public school curriculum would seem 
vulnerable to First Amendment challenge.® ̂  1 
Graduation Exercises 
In America the graduation tradition began in 1642 at Harvard. The 
president of the institution prayed and members of the graduating class 
delivered addresses. Public high school commencement exercises began in 
1842 and followed the same university format which included prayer. 5^2 
Following long established traditions, public schools continue to open 
the commencement exercise with an invocation and close the program with a 
benediction even after the school prayers decisions of the 1960s.573 Beginning 
in the 1970s, some students and their parents began challenging the 
constitutionality of the inclusion of prayers in graduation exercises. 
In a 1972 Pennsylvania case, Wood Mt. Lebanon Township School 
57 iMartha M. McCarthy, "Emerging and Reemerging Issues in 
Church-State Relations," School Law m Changing Times, ed. M. A. McGhehey 
(Topeka: National Organization on Legal Problems of Education, 1982), 66. 
572 j0hn w. Whitehead, The Rights of Religious Persons in Public 
Education (Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway Books, 1991), 209. 
573Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) and Abington School District v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
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Pistrict.574 the plaintiffs claimed that having an invocation and a benediction 
as parts of the graduation ceremony violates the establishment clause, and is 
an improper use of tax monies. Based on the fact that attendance is not 
compulsory at graduation ceremonies, the District Court ruled that the 
practice of including invocation and benediction by a clergyman did not violate 
establishment or free exercises clauses, and the complaint was dismissed. 
The issue in Lemke v Blackfi75 was where to hold graduation. The 
1973 graduating class of the Ashwaubenon High School voted to hold their 
graduation at the Nativity Roman Catholic Church. The 1974 graduating 
class also voted to hold its ceremony at the same church. Two graduating 
seniors and the father of one of the students objected to holding a public school 
graduation in a Roman Catholic church. They sought and were granted a 
preliminary injunction to halt graduation in the church. The District Court held 
that the proposed use of the Roman Catholic church for graduation was 
unconstitutional; therefore, the superintendent and the board members were 
ordered not to hold the graduation ceremony at the church involved. 
Both Grossberg v Deusebio^76 and Weist v Mt. Lebanon School 
Pistrict.577 filed complaints seeking to enjoin their respective school districts 
5^4Wood v. Mt. Lebanon School District* 342 F.Supp. 1293 (1972). 
575jjemke v. Black, 376 F.Supp. 87 (1974). See also Miller v. Cooper 
244 P.2d 520 (1952). 
576(jrosgkerg v. Deusebio, 380 F.Supp. 285 (E.D.Va. 1974). 
5 77Weist v. Mt. Lebanon School District, 457 Pa. 166, 320 A.2d 362, 
cert, denied, 419 U.S. 967 (1974). 
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from including an invocation and benediction from the high school graduation 
ceremonies. In Grossberg v. Deusebio. the District Court ruled that the school 
district had not violated the Establishment Clause. In Weist v. Mt. Lebanon 
School District, the District Court dismissed the complaint, and the plaintiffs 
appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. However, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the decision of the District Court. The decision 
was technically moot because the plaintiffs had already graduated. 
In Graham v. Central Community School District of Decatur.578 a cjyil 
rights action was filed challenging the constitutionality of including invocation 
and benediction as a part of the high school graduation ceremonies conducted 
by the school district. For at least twenty years the defendant's graduation 
ceremonies have been opened by an invocation prayer by a Christian minister 
and closed by Christian minister's benediction. The plaintiff asked that the 
invocation and benediction be removed from the graduation ceremonies. 
Plaintiff Robert Graham testified that he is a Unitarian Universalist, 
and that he is personally offended by the use of Christian prayers at public 
school functions including graduation exercises. Three expert witnesses were 
called by the plaintiff, and all of them opined that invocations and benedictions 
at graduation exercises serve a religious purpose, not a secular purpose. All 
three opined that a public school offering an invocation and benediction at 
public school events, such as graduation exercises, is advocating religion. 
Only two witnesses testified for the defendant, Virginia Webb, a 
member of the defendant's board of directors, and Thomas Spear, the 
5 7 8Graham y Central Community School District of Decatur, 608 
F.Supp. 531 (D.C.Iowa 1985). 
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defendant's new superintendent. Mrs. Webb gave no opinion as to the purpose 
of the invocation and benediction at graduation exercises. She stated as far as 
she knows the school has always done it. Superintendent Spear testified that 
during his education career he has attended many graduation exercises, and 
each one began with an invocation and ended with a benediction. He opined 
that the main purpose of having an invocation and benediction in graduation 
exercises is "tradition." He also testified that he believes that it lends a 
"serious note" to the ceremony. He also stated he does many things in school 
requiring a "serious note," and that he does them without an invocation in 
advance. He also testified that in his opinion the invocation and benediction 
also serve a religious purpose. 
The court decision in this case was based on the evidence developed at 
the hearing and on applying the evidence to the three-part Lemon test The 
District Court ruled that the inclusion of the religious invocation and 
benediction violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment. It was 
the judgment of the court that the defendant is prohibited from including in its 
graduation exercises this year and subsequent years any religious invocation 
or religious benediction. 
Three other courts, Doe v. Aldine Independent School District.^ 79Rav 
v. David Douglas School District No. 40.580 and Bennett v. Livermore TTnifipd 
School Pistrict.581 have held that graduation prayer violates the 
579Doe v. Aldine Indepedent School District, 563 F.Supp. 883 (1982). 
580]£ay v. David Douglas School District No. 40, 738 P.2d 1389 (Or. 
1987). 
58lBennett v. Livermore Unified School District, 193 Cal. App. 3rd 
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establishment clause. The courts ruled that the practice violates all three 
parts of the Lemon test. 
In Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools^ 2 a federal district court 
upheld the use of prayers as invocations and benedictions in high school 
graduation exercises in two Michigan Communities. The practice in Steinwell 
High School permitted a brief invocation and benediction by a graduating 
senior, with no censorship of the prayers by the school administration. The 
custom in Portage Central High School called for recitation of an invocation 
and a benediction by members of the clergy selected by representatives of the 
graduating class. The minister was not asked to present the prayers for 
approval, but he was asked to keep them brief and "nondenominational." In 
supporting these practices, the court stressed four general factors: 
. . .  a t t e n d a n c e  a t  g r a d u a t i o n  i s  v o l u n t a r y ,  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  
parents and other adults minimizes the proselytizing potential 
of the prayers; the prayers are isolated events that take only 
a few moments once a year, rather than daily rituals; and no 
evidence suggested that speakers had intended to use prayers 
to promote a particular religious beliefs.583 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that "non-
sectarian" and "nonproselytizing" prayers could be delivered as invocations. 
The court decision was based on the public nature of graduation, the buffering 
1012, 238 Cal Rptr. 819 ( Cal. Ct. App, 1987). 
582gtein v. Plainwell Community Schools, 610 F.Supp 43 (W.D. Mich. 
1985), rev'd, 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987). 
583]Beryamin B. Sendor, "Religion and the Public Schools," Education 
Law in North Carolina 1 (January 1988): 16-7. 
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presence of parents, and the fact that graduation exercises are just ceremonial 
functions rather than instructional activities designed to transmit knowledge 
or values. In this particular case, however, the court found that the prayers 
used violated the establishment clause because of their specific Christian 
content.584 
In 1989, in Sands v,. Morongo Unified School District.585 plaintiffs 
brought suit against the school district to restrain it from including invocations 
and benedictions in the district's graduation exercises. The Superior Court 
prohibited the school district from having invocations and benedictions in the 
graduation exercises in the district's four high schools. The school district 
appealed the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeal held that 
nonsectarian invocations and benedictions did not violate the establishment 
clause of the First Amendment or provisions of the California Constitution 
forbidding the school district from aiding religious or sectarian purpose or 
teaching. 
In a recent landmark decision Lee Weisman.586 the Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of prayers at graduation exercises. Deborah Weisman, a 
middle school student, and her parents had sought a temporary restraining 
order forbidding public school officials from incorporating prayers in the 
graduation ceremony. Shortly before the ceremony, the District Court denied 
the motion of the Weisman family for lack of adequate time to consider it. 
584^ 
585sands v. Morongo Unified School Dist., 262 Cal.Rptr. 452 (Cal.Ct. 
App. 1989). 
586L.ee v. Weisman, 112 S.Ct. 1649 (1992). 
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Deborah and her family attended the graduation exercise, and the rabbi gave 
the prayers. The rabbi gave thanks to God for "the legacy of America, where 
diversity is celebrated and the rights of minorities are protected."587 
Subsequently, Weisman sought a permanent injunction barring 
Providence public school officials from inviting clergy to deliver invocations and 
benedictions at future graduations. It seemed likely that such prayers would 
be conducted at Deborah's high school graduation. The District Court forbade 
school officials from continuing the use of invocations and benedictions on the 
grounds that it violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the District Court. Petition for 
certiorari was granted. In a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court held that 
allowing prayers at graduation exercises is unconstitutional. 
In Jones v,. Clear Creek Independent School Pistrict.588 graduating 
seniors and their parents brought suit to prohibit the school district from 
permitting invocations and benedictions at public high school graduation 
exercises. The District Court ruled in favor of the school district and appeal 
was taken. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the District Court. 
The students and their parents petitioned for writ of certiorari. The Supreme 
Court of the United States granted the petition, vacated the judgment, and 
remanded. On remand, the Court of Appeals held that: 
(1) primary effect of resolution was secular; (2) resolution's 
587Nancy Gibbs, "America's Holy War," "rime 138, no. 23 (December 9, 
1991) 62. 
588jones v Clear Creek Independent School District 930 F.2d 416 (5th 
Cir. 1991), 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992). 
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proscription of sectarianism did not in itself excessively 
entangle government with religion; (3) resolution was not an 
unconstitutional endorsement of religion by the government, as 
it merely permitted nonsectarian, nonproselytizing invocation 
if the seniors chose to have one; and (4) resolution did not 
unconstitutionally coerce participation of objectors in a 
government-directed formal religious exercise.589 
In a 1994 case, Harris v. Joint School District590 students and a 
parent of students challenged the inclusion of prayer in their high school 
graduation ceremony. They asserted that the inclusion of prayer violated the 
Idaho Constitution and the establishment clause bf the United States 
Constitution. Although the District Court declined to review state law claims, 
it concluded that prayers did not violate the establishment clause. 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, relying on Lee ̂  Weisman.591 considered 
the extent of state involvement in the graduation program as well as the 
obligation of students to participate in the activity. Using Lee.592 the court 
concluded that the facts demonstrated state involvement and obligatory 
student participation in the religious activity. The court ruled that the 
inclusion of school prayer in the high school graduation program violated the 
establishment clause of the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. 
The conflict over prayers at graduation exercises is not over. The Lee 
589ifeid. 
590jjarris v. Joint School District No. 241,821 F.Supp. 638 (9th Cir. 
1994). 
59lLee v. Weisman, 112 S.Ct. 2649 (1992). 
592Ibid. 
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Court593 decision only ruled that school officials cannot invite a member of the 
clergy to offer a prayer at a school-sponsored event. While the Court held that 
it violated the establishment clause for school officials to invite clergy to pray 
at school-sponsored events, the Court reaffirmed the Mergeng594 decision 
which allows student-initiated prayer and Bible study on campus: "there will 
be instances when religious values, religious practices, and religious persons 
will have some interaction with the public schools and other students. See 
Westside Community Bd. of Ed. v. Mergens. 496 U.S. 226 (1990). "595 
Nothing in the Lee opinion decreases students' rights with regard to 
voluntary prayer and Bible Clubs. Instead, by reaffirming Mergens. the Lee 
Court, in effect, repeated its concern over perceived hostility to religious speech 
on campus: "The establishment clause does not license government to treat 
religion and those who teach or practice it, simply by virtue of their status as 
such, as subversive of American ideals and therefore subject to unique 
disabilities."596 
Distribution of Religious Literature 
Gideon Bibles 
Gideon International is a nonprofit corporation organized under the laws 
593jj)i(j 
594westgide Community Board of Education v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 
(1990). 
595Lee v. Weisman, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 2661 (1992). 
596westside Community Board of Education v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 
248 (1990) (citing McDaniel v Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 641 (1978). 
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of the State of Illinois, whose object is "to win men and women for the Lord 
Jesus Christ, through... (c) placing the Bible-God's Holy Words-or portions 
thereof in hotels, hospitals, schools, institutions, and also through the 
distribution of same for personal use."597 The Gideon Society has been 
distributing portions of the Bible in elementary schools since 1908. Gideon 
Bibles distributed contain the New Testament, Psalms, and the Book of 
Proverbs from the King James Version of the Bible. Customarily, the Gideons 
would write the school superintendent requesting permission to go into 
individual schools and give one of the books to each student in grade five 
through high school.598 Such was the case in 1951 when the Gideon Society 
sent a letter to the Rutherford, New Jersey Board of Education requesting 
permission to furnish free a copy of God's word to each public school student in 
grades five through high school. The school board approved the proposal and 
each child whose parents signed a letter granting permission for his child to 
receive a Gideon Bible was given one without obligation on the part of the 
parent or the board of education. However, there was opposition at the 
meeting from a Catholic parent and a Jewish parent. Both claimed that the 
Gideon Bible is "a sectarian work of peculiar religious value and significance to 
members of the Protestant faith."599 
The plaintiff, Bernard Tudor, of the Jewish faith, claimed that the 
distribution of the Gideon Bible to children of the Jewish faith violated the 
597Tudor v. Board of Education, 100 A.2d 857,858 (1953). 
598Tudor v. Board of Education, (N.J.) 348 U.S. 857, 75 S.Ct. 25 (1954). 
599Tuclor v. Board of Education, 100 A.2d 857,859 (1953). 
219 
teachings, tenets and principles of Judaism, while plaintiff Ralph Lecoque, of 
the Catholic faith, claimed its distribution to children of the Catholic faith 
violated the teaching, tenets and principles of Catholicism. After the action 
was commenced, the child of Ralph Lecoque transferred from public school to a 
Catholic parochial school; therefore, his action as a parent became moot. 
Originally, the State of New Jersey was named as a defendant party, but the 
action was dismissed. 
On the advice of legal counsel, the school board developed a distribution 
system for the Gideon Bibles. Before the books were distributed, a temporary 
injunction was granted to halt distribution. After a hearing, the New Jersey 
Superior Court, Law Division, ruled in favor of the school board and lifted the 
injunction. On appeal, the court reinstated the injunction as requested, and the 
case was heard by the New Jersey Supreme Court. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court saw the practice as sectarianism. The 
defendant school board was accused of showing a preference by permitting the 
distribution of the King James Version which was unacceptable to Catholics 
and Jews. This violated the mandate of the First Amendment, as applied to 
states by the Fourteenth Amendment prohibiting the making of any law 
"respecting an establishment of religion,"600 and the requirement of Article I, 
paragraph 4 of the New Jersey Constitution that "there shall be no 
establishment of one religious sect, in preference to another."® 01 As stated by 
Mr. Justice Black in his majority opinion in Everson: " The 'establishment of 
religion1 clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state 
600ibid., 864. 
601jbid. 
220 
nor the Federal Government can set up a church, Neither can pass laws which 
aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."602 jyjj. 
Justice Douglas in his mtyority opinion in Zorach stated: "The government 
must be neutral when it comes to competition between sects."603 
The court insisted that activities, especially those of a religious nature, 
which separated and excluded some children from the mainstream were 
constitutionally questionable. 
When... a small minority of the pupils in the public school 
is excluded, for any cause, from a stated school exercise, 
particularly when such cause is apparent hostility to the Bible 
which a majority of the pupils have been taught to revere, from 
that moment the excluded pupil loses caste with his fellows, and 
is liable to be regarded with aversion, and subjected to reproach 
and insult. But it is a sufficient refutation of the argument that 
the practice in question tends to destroy the equality of the pupils 
which the constitution seeks to establish and protect, and puts a 
portion of them to serious disadvantage in many ways with respect 
to the others. (At 44 N.W. 975)604 
Distribution of the Gideon Bible was judged to be more than an 
accommodation of religion. The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the 
distribution of the Gideon Bibles violated the constitutions of New Jersey and 
the Federal Government. 
In Brown Orange County Board of Public Instruction.605 parents 
602Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1,15,67 S.Ct. 504,91 
L.Ed. 711 (1947). 
GO^Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314, 72 S.Ct. 679,684,96 L.Ed. 
954, 962 (1952). 
604state ex rel. Weiss v. District Board, 76 Wis. 2177,44 N.W. 967, 7 
L.R.A. 330 (S.Ct. 1890). 
605j}rown V- Orange County Board of Public Instruction, 128 So.2d 181 
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brought action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against school officials 
who approved the distribution of the King James version of the Bible in the 
public schools. The plaintiffs claimed that as taxpayers and as parents of 
children attending public schools in Orange County they had standing in the 
case. The plaintiffs' complaint covered the history of the Gideon Society, and 
claimed that the distribution of the Gideon Bible violated the tenets of their 
religious faith and favored the tenets of the Protestant faith. The defendants' 
distribution of this book also violated certain rights of the defendants under the 
United States and Florida Constitutions. 
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on the grounds that 
the plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action; that the plaintiffs had no 
standing in the case; that the plaintiffs had failed to allege sufficient facts 
entitling them to declaratory or injunctive relief; and that the plaintiffs had not 
alleged any facts tending to show a violation by the defendants of any rights 
guaranteed to the plaintiffs by the Constitutions of the United States and the 
State of Florida. 
The lower court chose to dismiss the defendants' motion but did not 
give any particular reason for dismissal. The plaintiffs chose not to amend 
their complaints; a final judgment was entered on the dismissal and the 
plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court transferred the case to the District Court of 
Appeal. The District Court of Appeal ruled that the distribution of Gideon 
Bibles tended to impair the rights of the plaintiffs and their children to be free 
from governmental action which discriminated in their free exercise of 
(Fla. 1960). 
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religious belief, thus reversing the decision of the lower court. 
Two cases involving the distribution of Bibles were reviewed earlier in 
Chapter HI. See Goodwin v,. Cross County School District No. 7, pages 134-
136 and Meltzer v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County. Florida. 
pages 136-142. 
In Bereer y* Rensselaer Central gphpoj Corporatjon.606 a father 
challenged the school's policy for the distribution of religious literature in the 
classrooms. The written policy stated: 
5501.1 In the best interest of the student body, no person, 
group, or other organization shall distribute, display, or 
exhibit any book, tract, map, picture, sign, or other 
publication of any type on the Rensselaer Central 
School Corporation premises unless authorized by the 
superintendent and the building principal. 
5501.2 Approval for the distribution, display or exhibit of any 
materials by any persons, group, or organization not 
sponsored by the school must be cleared 72 hours (three (3) 
school days) in advance of any distribution, display, or exhibit 
through the superintendent and the building principal[']s offices. 
If permitted, the time and location of distribution, display, or 
exhibit is to be determined by the administration. * * * 
5505.5 Any person, group, or organization not a part of the 
Rensselaer Central School Corporationf ] that does not abide 
by the above policy, at the request of school officials, shall be 
considered guilty of trespass and reported to local civil 
authorities. 
5505.6 Questions concerning the distribution of materials on 
school premises that are not answered by the above policy 
shall be presented to the Board of School Trustees for 
clarification. ̂ 0 7 
606gerger v. Rensselaer Central School Corporation, 982 F.2d 1160 
(7th Cir. 1993). 
607ibid., 1162-1163. 
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The superintendent and the principal had total discretion to grant or 
deny access to school property. There were no guidelines in the policy to assist 
the superintendent and the principal on how to exercise their discretion except 
the general reminder to act in students' best interests. The policy did not cover 
when non-school personnel could make presentations and distributions during 
times ordinarily reserved for instruction. 
In the fall of 1989, Allen Berger sent a letter to the Rensselear Central 
School Corporation requesting they discontinue the practice of permitting 
Gideons to distribute Bibles to fifth grade students. The board of education 
discussed the letter and decided not to alter its policy regarding the Gideons. 
Unable to get the school board to change its policy of distribution of Bibles by 
the Gideons, Allen Berger filed a suit on behalf of his children, Moriah and 
Joshua Berger, seeking to have the Corporation's practice declared 
unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment directive that 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof."®®® The District Court dismissed the 
Bergers' suit on summary judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit ruled that the District Court had erred in finding no 
establishment clause violation under L§mon.609 The Court of Appeals 
reversed the decision of the circuit court in ruling that classroom distribution of 
Gideon Bibles to fifth grade public school students violated the establishment 
clause of the First Amendment. The Rensselaer Central School Corporation 
608u. Constitution. Amendment I. 
609Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 
(1971). 
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petitioned for a rehearing en banc, and the petition was denied. 
Other Materials 
Distributing religious literature on school grounds is more than a 
religious issue. It is a part of the right of free speech. Both are protected by 
the First Amendment. 
In Burch y± Barker ,610 present and former students and parents sued 
the school district, the principal, the superintendent, and the board of directors 
challenging high school policy requiring prior approval before distribution of 
student-written materials. Five students had distributed an anonymous 
newspaper, Bad Astra, without knowledge of school authorities. The general 
content of the articles in the paper was critical of the school administration 
policy. It contained no profanity or obscene language. 
Several days after the distribution of the newspaper, school authorities 
identified the student authors who had used pen names. The students were 
disciplined in the form of a letter of reprimand to be placed in each student 
author's school record. The student authors appealed to the superintendent 
who supported the principal's disciplinary action. They did not appeal to the 
School Board as required by the old policy. Before, during, and after the 
distribution of Bad Astra, the Renton School Board and School Superintendent 
were in the process of revising the old policy. The new policy also required prior 
approval of student writings before distribution. 
The United States District Court for the Western District of 
Washington held that: (1) the new high school prior approval policy, as a 
610gurch v. Barker, 651 F.Supp. 1149 (W.D.Wash. 1987) 
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whole, was substantially constitutional; (2) that section of the policy 
prohibiting distribution of unapproved written material on school premises or in 
a manner reasonably calculated to arrive on school premises was 
unconstitutional; (3) that section of policy prohibiting expression that 
encourages actions which endanger health and safety of students was 
unconstitutionally vague; (4) that section of policy governing procedure was 
unconstitutional to the extent it did not provide time limits for decision making 
at every level of the appeal process; (5) the question of facial 
constitutionality of old policy was moot; (6) failure of present and former high 
school students and parents to exhaust administrative remedies did not 
preclude consideration of constitutionality of policy as applied to student 
authors; and (7) the old policy was constitutionally applied. 
In Thompson v. Waynesboro Area School District.^ ̂  students 
brought suit against the school district alleging that limitations placed on 
students' distribution of religious newspapers violated their First Amendment 
rights. On April 28,1986, Bryan Thompson and Marc Shunk, students at 
Antietam Junior High School, distributed copies of a newspaper entitled Issues 
and Answers in the hallway before school began. Issues and Answers is a 
religious newspaper, published in Illinois by a group known as "Student Action 
for Christ." The newspaper contains articles and cartoons which supports 
religious tenets such as a personal relationship with God and the adherence to 
the principles of the Bible. Thompson's and Shunk's reason for distributing 
Issues and Answers was to communicate the Christian message to fellow 
SllThompson v. Waynesboro Area School District, 673 F.Supp. 1379 
(MJD.Pa. 1987). See also Hemry and Hemry v. School Board of Colorado 
Springs School District No. 11, 760 F.Supp. 856 (D.Colo. 1991). 
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students. 
A teacher gave the principal, Robert Mesaros, a copy of the newspaper. 
The principal consulted the superintendent and met with Biyan Thompson and 
Thompson's father on April 28,1986, concerning the newspaper. The principal 
claimed that there was a school policy which required prior preview before 
distributing literature. 
The next day the principal wrote a memorandum to the Thompsons 
outlining certain restrictions which would be imposed on further distributions of 
Issues and Answers. Bryan would only be permitted to distribute Issues and 
Answers before 7:50 a.m. outside the school building, on the sidewalk and the 
parking lot. During the school day Bryan would be required to keep extra 
copies in his locker. The reason for this action was a policy which required prior 
approval before materials could be displayed, posted, or distributed on school 
property. In the past, the principal had generally prohibited nonstudent groups 
from distributing literature which was not sponsored by the school. 
On May 8,1986, Bryan Thompson, Marc Shunk, and Christopher 
Eakle again distributed copies of Issues and Answers in the hallways before the 
opening of school. A teacher asked the three boys to stop giving out the 
newspapers. They continued to distribute papers and were approached by an 
assistant principal. They were placed on in-class suspension and informed by 
the principal that if they continued to disregard his instructions for distributing 
the newspapers, they would no longer be allowed to distribute Issues and 
Answers at any time. 
On May 12,1986, Marc Shunk and Bryan Thompson again distributed 
Issues and Answers in the hallways before school. Again they were confronted 
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by a teacher and taken to the principal's office. This time they were placed in 
in-school suspension for the entire day and the principal informed the parents 
in writing that the reason for the boys' suspension was "willful disregard for 
school district policy and direct disobedience of [Mesaros'] directive. "612 The 
three distributions listed above did not cause any disturbance. 
In addition to the conditions surrounding the plaintiff distribution of 
Issues and Answers, other issues were relevant to the claims made by the 
plaintiffs. For example, students at Antietam Junior High School had the 
opportunity to participate in noncurriculum activities, such as student clubs 
which met after school. The Newspaper Club was one such club, which 
published a school newspaper entitled Round-Up . A faculty member from the 
English curriculum supervised the Round-Up staff which was made up of 
students. The school newspaper was distributed to students during homeroom. 
It contained articles, poems, and lists prepared by students. The school 
principal supervised its content for the purpose of removing or editing 
materials which were obscene, libelous, or substantially disruptive. The 
plaintiffs did not request permission to form a club or to meet during the after-
school activity period. 
On motions for summary judgment the United States for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania ruled that: 
(1) students' distribution of religious newspapers in the 
hallways of junior high school during noninstructional time 
was not a "meeting" under the Equal Access Act and was not 
protected by the Act; (2) school district violated the students' 
freedom of speech in violation of First Amendmentby restricting 
612lbid., 1381. 
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students' distribution of religious literature to area outside the 
school; and (3) school district did not violate students' First 
Amendment right to free exercise of religion by requiring the 
students to distribute religious newspapers outside school 
building.613 
In Millar ̂  Cooper .614 the plaintiffs bought suit as taxpayers and 
members of the Board of Directors of the Lindrith School District in Rio Arriba 
County against the officers of the State Board of Education, the County Board 
of Education, the State Director of the Department of Certification, the 
principal of the school, three of its teachers, its janitor and the minister of the 
Baptist Church at Lindrith. The plaintiffs sought to have the principal and 
teachers permanently barred from teaching in the public schools of New 
Mexico because they claimed teachers were teaching religion in the public 
school at Lindrith and distributing religious magazines among the pupils and 
other acts which they claimed violated provisions of the federal and the state 
constitution relating to the separation of church and state. They sought to 
invoke the penalty of Section 55-1102 of the New Mexico Constitution, which 
reads: 
No teacher shall use any sectarian or denominational books 
in the schools or teach sectarian doctrine in the schools, and 
any teacher violating the provisions of this section shall be 
immediately discharged, his certificate to teach school revoked, 
and be forever barred from receiving any school moneys and 
employment in the public schools of the state. Provided, that 
this section shall not be construed to interfere with the use 
of school buildings for other purposes authorized by the county 
613ibid., 1379. 
614Miller v. Cooper, 244 P.2d 520 (1952). 
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board after school hours.615 
The trial court entered judgment of dismissal against all defendants 
except against the principal and one teacher. The judgment enjoined the 
principal and the teacher from teaching religion in the school but denied the 
other relief sought against them, and that denial was the sole bases of the 
appeal. On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Mexico reversed in part the 
decision of the trial court by ruling that the trial court had erred when it refused 
to enjoin the distribution of sectarian religious magazines among the pupils, 
and affirmed in part the decision of the trial court, by ruling that it had acted 
properly in refusing to permanently bar the principal and the teacher from 
teaching in the public schools. The case was remanded to the trial court with 
instructions to enter a new judgment prohibiting the distribution of religious 
literature in the school. 
Bible Study Courses 
It is constitutional to teach about religion, but it is unconstitutional to 
teach religion in public schools. Numerous secondary schools in North 
Carolina teach a course in the Bible. The Iredell-Statesville Board of 
Education voted in March 1994, to add a Bible course at each of the four high 
schools. A private community organization agreed to raise the funds for the 
teachers of the Bible classes. The Iredell-Statesville Board of Education will 
control the curriculum to be taught and the hiring of the teachers. The Bible 
course will be offered as a social studies elective and will teach the historical 
615ibi(L 
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and literacy influence of the Bible.® 16 
In Wilev Vj. Franklin.617 students and their parents initiated action 
against the boards of education and their members for declaratory and 
injunctive relief to prohibit the permitting and sponsoring a course of Bible 
study and instruction in the city and county elementary schools. The cases 
were combined for trial. The plaintiffs contended that the defendant Boards of 
Education of Chattanooga and Hamilton County, Tennessee and their 
membership had violated their religious freedom. 
The Bible study courses were first offered in 1922 by a citizens' group 
who agreed to fund the Bible teachers' salaries. Over the years the citizens' 
sponsoring group organized itself into a committee known as the "Public 
School Bible Study Committee." This committee raised funds for the payment 
of the Bible teachers, selected and assigned teachers, prepared the Bible 
study curricula, and conducted teacher-training sessions. Though assigned and 
paid by the Bible study committee, the Bible teachers were subject to 
supervision and removal by the principals of school where they served. While 
it appeared no certain religious commitment was required for membership in 
the Public School Bible Committee, membership was made up principally, if 
not entirely, of persons associated with the Christian religious faith and with 
Protestant evangelical churches within that faith. 
The Bible study courses were financed by contributions from churches 
61®Audrey Montgomery, "Bible Course Will Be Offered In Schools," 
Statesville Record and Landmark. 15 March 1994, sec. 1A, p. 3. 
617wiley v. Franklin, 468 F.Supp 133 (1979), 474 F.Supp. 525 (1979), 
497 F.Supp. 390 (1980). 
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and "Love Offerings" from the parents of those children who participated in the 
Bible study classes. In 1977, the committee raised and expended $230,000 in 
financing the public school Bible study courses. No public funds were spent for 
the Bible study classes except for incidental expenses associated with cleaning 
and supervising the classes used by the Bible teachers. 
The policy statement of the Chattanooga School Board regarding the 
Bible study course was set forth as follows: 
In the study of the heritage of America, which is a significant 
facet of the instructional program for Chattanooga Public 
Schools, the Bible is considered in its relations to history, 
literature, and social thought. The teaching of Bible as religious 
doctrine, however, is not viewed as the prerogative of schools, 
since the public schools serve students of many religious 
backgrounds. Therefore, in consideration for the total school 
program, the laws governing religious freedom, and the right 
of every individual to exercise free choice in such matters 
without personal embarrassment to himself or his family, Bible 
may be offered as an elective subject but not as a requirement.618 
The policy of the Hamilton County School Board regarding the 
Bible study course was set forth as follows: 
The Rules. Regulations and Minimum Standards of the 
Tennessee State Board of Education sets forth as two of the 
goals for education in this state that the students gain 
'knowledge and appreciation of the histoiy of the community, 
state, nation, and world,' and 'knowledge of a variety of moral 
and ethical values and use of this knowledge for establishing 
a personal value system free from bias and prejudice.1 In 
studying American heritage in Hamilton County Schools, 
the Bible is presented in relation to its place in the origin of 
the republic, the establishment and development of the 
public education, the emphasis on individual worth, and its 
618wiley v. Franklin, 468 F.Supp. 133,137. 
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pervading influences in the country's government, history, 
and the very fabric of American society.619 
During the 1977-78 school year and in prior years the policies governing 
the Bible study courses by both school boards provided that the courses were 
to be elective only and that students were to be enrolled only upon written 
request from their parents. Grading students was to be optional with the Bible 
teacher, but such grades were not to be a part of the student's academic 
record. Students not attending the Bible classes were to remain in the regular 
classroom and be under the instruction and supervision of the regular 
classroom teacher. In compliance with theses policies, Bible study courses 
were offered in all fifty of the City and County elementary schools during the 
1977-78 school year. A total of 19, 924 students out of 21,356 elementary 
students in the two school systems were enrolled in the Bible study courses 
during that school year. The classes were taught in kindergarten through sixth 
grades for thirty minutes each week for a total of thirty two weeks thus 
providing a total of eight hours per semester or sixteen hours each school year. 
Prior to the 1978-79 school year a number of Bible courses were taught 
in regular classrooms in violation of Board policy, and in some cases there 
were students in the class who had not elected to take the course. These 
students were sent elsewhere and often given busy work assignments or were 
otherwise omitted from any meaningful classroom assignment or supervision. 
After the filing of the lawsuit and upon advice of trial counsel, and in an 
effort to correct these matters, both boards modified their policies for governing 
the offering of Bible courses during the current school year. Students in Bible 
Gl^ibid. 
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classes were to be taught in a classroom other than the student's regular 
classroom with programs and activities of educational value being conducted in 
the regular classrooms. To accomplish this, only one-half of the students who 
were enrolled in the Bible classes were to receive such instructions in any one 
school semester, thus assuring that the students who did not enroll in the Bible 
classes would remain in their regular classrooms with a majority of their fellow 
students. These modifications in effect reduced the amount of Bible instruction 
at each grade level by one-half for the current school year. 
Although Bible teachers were under the supervision of the principals 
and other supervisory personnel, the selection of the teachers was made by the 
Public School Study Committee. There were no set standards for the selection 
of such teachers other than that they had previously taken Bible study 
courses either in religious or secular schools or colleges. The State of 
Tennessee did not have certification standards in the elementary level in the 
specific subject of Bible instruction. There was no sectarian religious test 
given in selecting Bible teachers, but one member of the selection team stated 
that in interviewing prospective teachers she inquired as to whether they had a 
"love of God."620 a majority of the 18 teachers teaching Bible courses in the 
elementary schools had some college training, and a few were college 
graduates. Two or three held teacher's certificates either in Tennessee or other 
states. All were members of Protestant churches. All of the Bible teachers 
had attended at least one workshop conducted by the Public School Committee 
with the following basic instruction: 
620ibid„ 138. 
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We are to let the Bible speak for itself. Under no circumstances 
are we to give a slant toward any denomination. No sectarian 
doctrines or church rituals or creeds are to be taught. Criticism 
is not to be made of anyone's faith or religion. The Bible alone is 
to be taught without interpretation.621 
Bible teachers were not required to use any particular translation or 
version of the Bible, although the King James version was most frequently 
used. The most frequently used method of instruction was story-telling. 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee 
found the Bible study courses were not primarily history, literature, or 
otherwise secular, but rather were of a religious nature, that the courses 
tended to advance the Christian religious faith. Also, with a Bible study 
committee independent of the boards setting curriculum, and selecting, training 
and supervising teachers, the Bible study programs constituted an excessive 
entanglement between government and religion. The District Court held that 
the Bible study courses previously taught, including the modifications made in 
the 1978-79 school year violated the religious freedom provisions of the First 
Amendment. The Bible study courses were stayed for forty-five days to permit 
the boards of education to devise, adopt, and submit to the District Court the 
following changes in the elementaiy school Bible study courses: 
(1) Establish uniform minimum standards for the selection 
and employment of persons teaching Bible study courses in 
the elementary grades, which standards shall specifically 
exclude as a condition of selection for employment any 
religious test, any profession of faith or any prior or present 
religious affiliation. 
(2) Establish a procedure for the release and replacement 
621lbid. 
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of all teachers currently teaching Bible study courses in the 
elementary grades who do not meet the minimum standards 
adopted pursuant to paragraph (1) above, such release and 
replacement to be accomplished within a period of 30 days 
after the Court shall have approved the uniform minimum 
teacher standards. 
(3) Establish a plan whereby the school board or some 
duly designated school staff member or other school personnel 
shall, without participation by any nonschool personnel or 
organization, select and employ all Bible study course teachers 
and effect the placement, training and supervision of all such 
teachers. 
(4) Revise the Bible study course curriculum currently 
used in elementaiy school grades so as to eliminate all lesson 
titles whose only reasonable interpretation and message is 
a religious message and which lessons are not reasonably 
capable of being taught within the confines of a secular 
course in history, literature or other secular subject matter 
normally included within or recognized as suitable for an 
elementary school curriculum.622 
None of the foregoing instructions prevented the defendant school 
boards from entering into an agreement with any individual or organization 
including the Public School Study Committee for the funding of the elementary 
school courses. Also, the instructions of the District Court did not bother with 
elective polices and practices already in effect. 
The school board made the instructed revisions. In the second stage of 
the suit, Wilev v,. Franklin .623 the District Court reviewed the revised Bible 
course guidelines. The District Court held that the proposed curriculum 
guidelines would be approved if: (1) under the teacher standards, the part that 
gave permission for employment of Bible teachers with only 12 hours in Bible 
622ibid., 152. 
623Wiley v. Franklin, 474 F.Supp. 525 (1979). 
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literature were eliminated; (2) the court retained jurisdiction of the lawsuit 
during the initial year of operation of the court-approved plan for Bible Studies; 
(3) the proposed lesson on teaching of the resurrection of Jesus as recounted in 
the New Testament were eliminated. The District Court warned the school 
boards that: 
The ultimate test of the constitutionality of any course of 
instruction founded upon the Bible must depend upon classroom 
performance. It is that which is taught in the classroom that 
renders a course so founded constitutionally permissible or 
constitutionally impermissible. If that which is taught seeks 
either to disparage or to encourage a commitment to a set of 
religious beliefs, it is constitutionally impermissible in a public 
school setting. If that which is taught avoids such religious 
instruction and is confined to objective and non-devotional 
instruction in biblical literature, biblical history, and biblical 
social customs, all with the purpose of helping students gain 
'a greater appreciation of the Bible as a great work of literature' 
and source of'countless works of literature, art, and music' or 
of assisting students acquire 'greater insight into the many 
historical events recorded in the Bible' or of affording students 
greater insight into the 'many social customs upon which the 
Bible has had a significant influence', all as proposed in the 
Curriculum Guide, no constitutional barrier would arise to 
classroom instruction.624 
After the school boards used the revised guidelines for Bible study 
courses for one year, the District Court in the third stage of Wilev v. 
Franklin.625 found no violation of the First Amendment in the Bible study 
courses as taught and conducted in the Chattanooga public elementary 
schools; therefore, they denied the plaintiffs motion to prohibit that program. 
On the other hand, the District Court found that three lessons taught in the 
624^(1., 531. 
625wiley v. Franklin, 497 F.Supp. 390 (1980). 
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elementary schools of Hamilton County were religious in nature; therefore, 
they granted the plaintiffs motion to prohibit that program. 
In the case of Crockett Sorenson.626 the issue was the 
constitutionality of a Bible study program for fourth and fifth grade students in 
the public schools of Bristol, Virginia. The Bible teaching classes had been 
provided for over forty years. The classes were taught for forty-five minutes 
once a week in six elementary schools. Students did not receive a grade or 
academic credit for the classes. 
A ministerial alliance had complete control over staffing and curricular 
decisions for the program. In 1978, another private group, the Bristol Council 
of Religious Education, began sponsoring the program. In 1982, the group was 
renamed Bible Teaching in the Public Schools. Members of the group were 
ministers and lay representatives from the different Protestant denominations 
in the area. 
The Ministerial Association had prepared a course of study outline, 
objectives to be taught, materials to be used, and the portions of the Bible to be 
taught. Teachers used the outline from its inception until 1982 with no 
substantial modifications. Until February 1982, the class routine consisted of 
Bible teaching, prayers and singing of hymns. After February 1982, the 
prayers and singing of hymns were discontinued from the program. Although 
not specified by the Ministerial Association, teachers used the King James 
version of the Bible. 
Classes were voluntary and parents signed a request card to enroll 
children in Bible classes. Until 1982, students not attending the Bible classes 
626crockett v Sorenson, 568 F.Supp. 1422 (1983). 
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were assigned to the principal's office or the library. Since 1982, an attempt 
was made to give the nonparticipating students a more meaningful experience. 
They were sent to the extension center where, in theory, they choose one of 
several options. In reality, their choice was study hall or physical education 
because the other options were classes the students had already 
attended in regular curriculum. 
There was a certain amount of pressure for the students to enroll in the 
Bible classes, not from school officials or Bible teachers, but peer pressure 
from fellow students. This was demonstrated during the 1982-83 school year 
when only eighteen of589 fourth and fifth grade students in the elementary 
schools chose not to participate in the Bible classes. 
Though attendance was voluntary, Justice Kiser concluded that the 
courses were a violation of the United States Constitution because there was 
no secular purpose and control had been relinquished by the state. However, 
Justice Kiser maintained: 
The First Amendment was never intended to insulate our 
public institutions from any mention of God, the Bible or religion, 
because when such insulation occurs, another religion, such as 
secular humanism, is effectively established.®^? 
The court did support the legality of Bible study in the schools when the 
purpose was educational and not religious. 
Compulsory Attendance 
Over the years, courts have supported the idea that states have the 
627ibid., 1425. 
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right to establish compulsory attendance laws. There is a commonly held 
belief that an enlightened citizenry is necessary for the progress and stability 
of the United States. "Between 1918 and 1954, all states had statutes of 
compulsory attendance."®28 The integration movement, beginning in the 
fifties, caused some states to abandon compulsory attendance statutes. 
Today, home schooling had added a new dimension to compulsory attendance 
statutes. 
An Illinois case in 1901, State Yr TfoiW-629 set the precedent for the 
foundation for compulsory attendance laws. In upholding the state's authority 
to compel school attendance, even with parent opposition, the court said: 
The welfare of the child and the best interest of society require 
that the state shall exert its sovereign authority to secure to the 
child the opportunity to acquire an education. Statutes making 
it compulsory upon file parent, guardian, or other person having 
the custody and control of children to send them to public or 
private schools for longer or shorter periods during certain years 
of the life of such children have not only been upheld as strictly 
with the constitutional power of the legislature, but have generally 
been regarded necessary to carry out the express purposes of the 
constitution itself.®30 
In a 1925 case, Pierce v. Society of Sistersffi 1 at issue was an Oregon 
statute which required every child, ages eight to sixteen, to attend public school 
only. A private Catholic school challenged the Oregon attendance statute as 
628jjudgins and Vacca, 263. 
629state v. Bailey, 61 N.E. 730 (111. 1901). 
630ibid., 731-732. 
631pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 510,69 L.Ed. 
1070 (1925). 
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violative of their property rights and business interests as private schools and 
the right of teachers to practice in their profession. In declaring the Oregon 
statute unconstitutional, the Supreme Court of the United States declared: 
"[T]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union 
rest excluded any general power of the state to standardize its children by 
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only."632 
Wisconsin YJ. Yoder^33 js a landmark decision on compulsory 
attendance handed down by the Supreme Court in 1972. In this case, parents 
were seeking voluntary exclusion from public school after the eighth grade. 
Wisconsin's compulsory attendance law required students attend public or 
private school/until reaching the age of sixteen. 
Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller, Old Order Amish members, and Adin 
Yutzy, a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, refused to 
send their children to school beyond the eighth grade. The men were charged 
and convicted of violating Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance law. 
They defended their position on the basis that Wisconsin's compulsory school 
attendance law violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. On appeal the Wisconsin Circuit Court also ruled against Yoder, 
Miller, and Yutzy. 
When the case was appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the 
Amish brought in expert witnesses to testify on their way of life. Dr. John 
Hostetler testified that: 
632jbid. 
633wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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Amish society emphasizes informal learning-through-
doing; a life of "goodness," rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, 
rather than technical knowledge; community welfare, rather 
than competition; and separated from, rather than integration 
with, contemporary worldly society. 
Formal high school education beyond the eighth grade is 
contrary to Amish beliefs, not only because it places Amish 
children in an environment hostile to Amish beliefs with 
increasing emphasis on competition in class work and sports 
and with pressure to conform to the styles, manners, and 
the ways of the peer group, but also because it takes them 
away from their community, physically and emotionally, 
during the crucial and formative adolescent period of life.® 3 4 
It was pointed out that the Amish were not opposed to schooling, since 
their children did attend elementary school. They agreed that their children 
needed the basic skills in the "three R's" in order to the read the Bible, be good 
farmers and citizens, and be able to communicate with the non-Amish people 
in the course of daily life. 
It was further emphasized that sending Amish children to high school 
may not only cause psychological harm to Amish children, but may eventually 
destroy their way of life which had remained constant for many years. Aided 
by a three hundred year history as an identifiable religious group and a long 
history as a successful and self-sufficient segment of American society, the 
Amish have demonstrated their religious beliefs and their way of life. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized the importance of the state's 
compulsory school-attendance laws and, at the same time, recognized the 
importance of the Amish being able to keep their children out of school beyond 
the eighth grade. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the decision of the 
lower courts. 
634ibid., 211. 
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On petition by the State of Wisconsin, the Supreme Court of the United 
States granted a writ of certiorari to review a decision of the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court which ruled that convictions of Amish parents for violating the 
State1 s compulsory school-attendance law were invalid under the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment as applied to the States by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. After reviewing the case, the United States Supreme 
Court agreed with the ruling of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 
In a 1981 case, Church of God (Worldwide Texas Region) v. Aitiflrillo 
Independent School District.635 members of the church brought suit against 
the school board to prohibit the school board from enforcing an attendance 
policy which limited the number of excused absences for religious holidays to 
two days each school year. In granting the plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment the United States District Court, Northern District Texas, Amarillo 
Division held that the school district attendance policy, which limited the 
number of excused absences for religious holidays to two days each school year 
and provided that students receive zeros for days for which they had unexcused 
absences, violated free exercise of religious beliefs of plaintiffifs, who were 
members of a church which required abstinence from secular activity on seven 
annual holy days. 
The students belonged to the Church of God which is a religious 
organization with congregations throughout the United States, Canada, and 
fifty other countries. The church traces its beginning to the establishment of 
the New Testament Church as recorded in Chapter Two of the Book of Acts of 
635church of God (Worldwide Texas Region) v. Amarillo Independent 
School District, 511 F.Supp 613 (1981). 
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the New Testament. The present era of the church started with a 
congregation in Eugene, Oregon in 1934, and the broadcast of the Radio 
Church of God. The current church membership is 68,000, not including 
children and unbaptized family members who also attend the church. 
A fundamental belief of the Church of God is that members must 
abstain from secular activity on seven annual holy days. The foundation for 
these holy day is the Book of Leviticus in the Old Testament and they are fixed 
in accordance with the Hebrew calendar. Members are also required to attend 
a seven-days convocation on the Feast of Tabernacles. With the exception of 
the seven-day convocation all holy days are observed in each local church. The 
seven-day convocation is observed at a regional site designated by the church. 
Failure to participate in the annual holy days and the seven-day convocation is 
considered a sin and may result in the loss of membership in the church. 
Students who are members of the Church of God miss from eight to ten 
school days while observing the annual holy days and seven-day convocation. 
Sometimes an additional two days of school is missed in travel to and from the 
seven-day convocation depending on its date and location. Before the adoption 
of the new policy on March 5,1979, there was no set number of excused 
absences for religious holidays. Instead, it was left up to the discretion of the 
principals in the school district to determine if an absence would be considered 
excused. Routinely, principals had excused absences and permitted students 
to make up school work missed while observing the holy days and seven-day 
convocation and to receive a grade for that work. 
Under the new policy adopted on March 5,1979, school work missed 
may be made up whether an absence was excused or unexcused; however, 
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students with an unexcused absence would not be given credit for work made 
up. If a daily or test grade was recorded for the day of the absence, the student 
whose absence was unexcused received a zero for a grade. If no grade is 
recorded for students in attendance no grade will be recorded for students who 
are absent. Work missed for an excused absent must be made up within five 
school days after a student returns to school from an absence. Exceptions 
would be granted for a student absent for an extended period of time due to 
illness. 
The new policy granted students a maximum of two days for religious 
holidays in each school year. During thel980-1981 school year the plaintiffs 
were given only two excused absences for school days missed while observing 
their holy days and seven-day convocation. The plaintiffs were given zeros for 
tests and daily work missed on the remaining days of absence. 
The plaintiffs contended that the district's excusal policy was 
unconstitutional because: 
(1) it violated the free exercise of their religion as 
guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments to the 
United States Constitution; (2) it violates the equal protection 
clause of the first and fourteenth amendment of the United States 
Constitution by discriminating against the Plaintiffs on the 
basis of their religious beliefs, and; (3) it violates the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution by creating an irrebuttable presumption that 
the Plaintiffs are absent without justification.63 6 
The court concluded that the school district's policy imposed a real and 
substantial burden on the plaintiffs' right to the free exercise of their religion as 
636ibid., 615 
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guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court did not find 
that the interests advanced by the defendants in support of the policy justified 
that burden. The court further concluded that the school district did not foster 
the establishment of the Church of God by accommodating the religious belief 
of the plaintiffs. Due to the court's resolution of these issues it was not 
necessary for the court to decide the plaintiffs' equal protection and due 
process arguments. 
The plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was granted. The 
judgment rendered prohibited the enforcement of the Amarillo Independent 
School District's excusal absence policy insofar as it limited the number of 
excused absences for religious holidays. 
In State of West Virginia v. Bobbv E. Riddle and State of West 
Virginia Ester Riddle.637 parents Bobby and Ester Riddle were arrested on 
information given to the school attendance officer for failing to send their 
children to the public schools. Trial before a magistrate resulted in a conviction 
and a fine of ten dollars each. Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court of 
Harrison County where a trial de novo involving extensive expert testimony 
was held. The second trail resulted in a conviction. The appellants appealed to 
the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia on the grounds that West 
Virginia Code, 18-8-1 [1951], the Compulsory School Attendance Law, was an 
unconstitutional violation of their rights under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution because it abridged their free 
exercise of religion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court by holding 
637state of West Virginia v. Bobbie E. Riddle and State of West Virginia 
v. Ester Riddle, 285 S.E.2d 359 (W.Va. 1981). 
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that: (1) no person may ignore the compulsory school attendance law and 
then claim the First Amendment free exercise of religion defense to a criminal 
prosecution for violation of that law, and (2) sincerely held religious beliefs are 
never a defense to total noncompliance with the compulsoiy school attendance 
law. 
Bobby and Esther Riddle were "Biblical Christians" who belonged to a 
Methodist sect, the Wesley, which broke away from the mainstream Methodist 
communion before the Civil War. Biblical Christian means they believe in the 
Bible as God's holy word. Bibical Christians dress plainly and do not wear 
makeup or jewelry. One of the very important tenets of their belief is that one 
who sins after being saved loses his/her salvation. In essence they find 
themselves separated from, and at odds Math, the values of the world. 
The Riddles had two children of compulsory school age. Briefly, they 
enrolled the children in a school called Emmanuel Christian Academy but 
withdrew them because they disagreed with the school's teaching that once 
saved always saved. They strongly believed that a person may be saved, once, 
but if he/she sins again, he/she "will be lost." They were committed to having 
their children totally indoctrinated and educated in their beliefs. 
According to all accounts, the Riddles did an excellent job of educating 
their children at home. The head of the Christian academy that furnished the 
teaching aids praised the Riddles' for their work with the children. A member of 
a Christian school in Florida testified that the achievements of both children as 
measured on tests were excellent. 
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Duro v. District Attorney. Second Judicial District of North 
Carolina^ 8 jg a North Carolina court case where Peter Duro, parent, initiated 
action against the district attorney because he alleged that the North Carolina 
compulsory attendance law infringed on his religious beliefs. Duro and his wife 
were members of the Pentecostal Church which did not require children to be 
taught at home. In fact, the majority of the members who attended the 
Pentecostal Church with the Duros enrolled their children in a public school. 
Duro and his wife had six children. Five of whom were of school age. 
He refused to enrolled his children in either a public or private school. Duro 
stated that exposing his children to those of different religious beliefs would 
corrupt his children. He was opposed to what he termed the "unisex movement 
where you can't tell the difference between boys and girls and the promotion of 
secular humanism "639 Duro also objected to physicians and refused 
medical attention for all physical ailments because he believed the Lord would 
heal any problem. 
Mrs. Duro attempted to teach the children in the home; even though, 
she did not posses a teaching certificate and had never been trained as a 
teacher. She used the same self-teaching program that was used by the only 
private school in the county. 
The District Court granted summary judgment for Duro and the district 
attorney appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth District 
ruled that North Carolina had shown enough interest in compulsory education 
638DUTO v< District Attorney, Second Judicial District of North 
Caroilina, 712 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983). 
639ibid.,97. 
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to override the religious interest claimed by Duro. Therefore, the Court of 
Appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court. The Supreme Court of the 
United States denied certiorari to the case. 
In a 1988 case, Jefferv v^ 0'Connell.640 parents and children brought 
suit against public school superintendents to challenge the constitutionahty of 
Pennsylvania's Compulsory Attendance Law, 24 P.S., Section 13-1327, 
specifically the private tutorial provision. Plaintiffs initiated a civil rights 
action under 42 U.S.C., Section 1983 in which they sought both declaratory 
and injunctive relief. 
Plaintiffs were Bible-believing Christians who chose to educate their 
children at home because of their deeply held religious beliefs. None of the 
religious sects to which they belonged required the children be educated at 
home. In fact, many of the plaintiffs as well as their children had been 
educated in the public schools. 
Defendants counterclaimed asking for declaratory and injunctive relief 
against plaintiffs to require them to obey the Pennsylvania statute. The 
District Court decided the tutorial provision was unconstitutionally vague and 
refused to grant defendants relief. 
The District Court ordered, adjudged, and decreed that: 
(1) the tutorial provision of the Pennsylvania Compulsory 
Attendance Law, 24 P.S. 13-1327, was unconstitutionally vague; 
(2) the counter claims of the defendants were dismissed; 
(3) the defendants were prohibited from prosecuting the plaintiffs 
for violating provisions of the Pennsylvania Compulsory Attendance 
640jeffery v. O'Connell, 702 F.Supp. 516 (M.D. Pa. 1988). 
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Law; 
(4) the effective date of this Order, except for the part pertaining 
to the criminal prosecution of plaintiffs, was stayed until December 31, 
1988, or until legislature enacts new legislation or the Secretary of 
Education makes new regulations, whichever comes first; 
(5) the right of appeal available to both parties was unaffected by this 
Order if it was determined than no new enactments will occur or the 
making of new regulations will not take place; 
(6) the Clerk of Court will close the case. 
TmmiiTviEfltinn 
For years states have set conditions for enrollment in the public 
schools. One such condition is immunization against certain contagious 
diseases. This requirement is an attempt by the states to protect the health 
and well-being of its citizens. Most objections to immunization are based on 
religious beliefs. 
Avard v. Dupuis641 is a 1974 case in which a six-year old-child was 
dismissed from kindergarten in New Hampshire because his parents had failed 
to comply with the state's immunization laws. The father challenged the 
constitutionality of the standard which allowed religious exemptions. The 
plaintiff sought an injunction prohibiting the dismissal of his child for failure to 
comply with the state statute. The court ruled that the portion of the state 
statute which allowed local units to exempt children for religious reason was 
unconstitutional. The religious exemptions were vague for lack of standards, 
G^lAvard v. Dupuis, 376 F.Supp. 479 (D.N.H. 1974). See also Jacobson 
v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 S.Ct 358, 49 L.Ed. 643 (1905). 
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and thus, in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The remaining portion of the statute remained in effect; thus, the court denied 
the plaintiff an injunction against the local school board. 
Brown Vj. Stone642 js a Mississippi case brought by a father seeking an 
injunction to compel a local school district to admit his son without being 
immunized against certain diseases as required by the state. The Mississippi 
statute stated: 
Except as provided hereinafter, it shall be unlawful for 
any child to attend any school, kindergarten or similar type 
facility intended for the instruction of children (hereinafter 
called "schools"), either public or private, unless they shall 
first have been vaccinated against those diseases specified 
by the State Health Officer. 
A certificate of exemption from vaccination for medical 
reasons may be offered on behalf of a child by a duly licensed 
physician and may be accepted by the local health officer when, 
in his opinion, such exemption will not cause undue risk to the 
community. A certificate of religious exemption may be offered 
on behalf of a child by an officer of a church of a recognized 
denomination. This certificate shall certify that parents or 
guardians of the child are bona fide members of a recognized 
denomination whose religious teachings require reliance on 
prayer or spiritual means ofhealing.643 
A certificate of exemption was filed by the minister of the Church of 
Christ in which he stated that the Church of Christ as a religious body does not 
teach against the use of medicines, immunization or vaccination as prescribed 
by a duly licensed physician. He also emphasized that their local chiropractor, 
642jjrown v stone, 378 So.2d 218, 219 (Miss. 1979). See also Cude v. 
State, 237 Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964). 
643ibid., 219. 
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a member of the Church of Christ, had strong convictions against the use of 
any kind of medications and they respected his views. 
The father's strong and sincere religious beliefs did not permit him to 
allow his son to receive immunizations. The county court ruled in favor of the 
local school board, and the father appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court. 
The Mississippi Supreme Court held that: 
(1) statute requiring immunization against certain crippling 
and deadly diseases before child could be admitted to school 
served overriding and compelling public interest; (2) to extent 
that statute could conflict with religious beliefs of parents, 
interest of school children prevailed; (3) statute was reasonable 
and constitutional exercise of police power; and (4) provision of 
statute providing exception for immunization requirement 
based on religious beliefs was in violation of equal protection 
clause.® ̂  4 
The Mississippi Supreme Court held that to exempt from immunization 
for religious reason was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. They 
further held that all other provisions of the statute were valid and 
constitutional, thus they affirmed the decision of the lower court. 
Hanzel v. Arter^^5 js a 1935 case where parents challenged the state 
statute of requiring immunization before children could enter public school. 
The Ohio statute gave local boards of education the authority to make rules to 
insure the immunization of public school students. There was an exemption to 
644Ibid., 218. 
645Hanzel v. Arter, 625 F.Supp. 1259 (S.D.Ohio 1985). See also Dalli v 
Board of Education. 358 Mass. 753, 267 N.E.2d 219 (1971); State v. Miday, 
263 N.C. 747,140 S.E.2d 816 (1964); Itz v. Penick, 393 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. 
1973); and Kleid v. Board of Education, 406 F.Supp. 902 (W.D. Ky. 1976). 
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the immunization requirement which provided: 
A pupil who presents a written statement of his parent 
or guardian in which the parent or guardian objects to the 
immunization for good cause, including religious conviction, 
is not required to be immunized.®^® 
The parent's belief in "chiropractic ethics" did not permit them to allow 
their children to receive immunizations. Chiropractic ethics is a belief which 
teaches that injection of foreign substances into the body is of no benefit and 
can only be harmful. Stanley and Tisha Hanzel's mother met with the 
superintendent and explained why her children could not be immunized. She 
also sent two letters to the superintendent in which she repeated that her 
personal philosophy and belief in chiropractic ethics had lead her to refuse 
immunization for her children, and she requested an exemption from 
vaccination under provision of Ohio statute related to exemptions. An informal 
hearing was held in which she repeated her views against immunization. After 
the hearing, the superintendent informed the plaintiffs in writing that their 
belief in chiropractic ethics did not constitute "good cause" for their children 
under Ohio statute, and that their children would have to be immunized in order 
to remain in the public schools. 
Parents filed a complaint seeking either that the Ohio immunization 
laws be declared unconstitutional or that declaratoryjudgment be issued that 
parents' personal belief amount to good cause for children to be exempted from 
immunization. They also complained that their rights to privacy, due process, 
and equal protection were infringed upon by the Ohio statute requiring 
646ibid., 1260. 
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immunization. Parents also sought a permanent injunction against expulsion 
of their children from the public schools. Plaintiffs' children would be allowed to 
remain in school without being immunized pending a decision in the case. 
The District Court rejected motion for summary judgment for the 
plaintiffs but agreed to accept motion for summary judgment from the 
defendant. The District Court held that: 
(1) statute did not violate privacy rights of the children; 
(2) no fundamental right was burdened to implicate due 
process; and (3) grant of "good cause" exemptions to those 
with religious reasons did not make denial to those children 
an equal protection violation.647 
647ibid. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OP SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS 
Introduction 
This chapter presents an in-depth analysis of significant judicial 
decisions, including all landmark Supreme Court decisions relating to religious 
activities in public schools. The methodology ofreporting the cases include (1) 
facts of the case, (2) decision of the court, and (3) a discussion of the 
significance of the ruling. Categories and cases are listed below: 
1. Released Time For Religious Instruction 
On CampiiR 
McCollum v. Board of Education. 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461 
(1948). 
Vaughn v. Reed. 313 F.Supp. 431 (W.D.Va. 1970). 
Off Campus 
Zorachv. Clauson. 343 U.S. 306. 72 S.Ct. 679 (1952). 
Smith v. Smith. 523 F.2d 121 (1975). 
Shared Timp 
Fisher v. Clackamas County School District. 507 P.2d 839 
(1973). 
Grand Rapids School District of the City of Grand Rapids 
v. Phvillis Ball. 473 U.S. 373,105 S.Ct. 3216, 87 L.Ed.2d 
267 (1985). 
2. School-Sponsored Praver and Bible Reading 
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Released Tim p For Religious Instruction 
On Campus 
MnCnlhim v. Board of Education. 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. (1948) 
Facts 
The local board of education in Champaign, Illinois, had agreed to provide 
released time for religious instruction in schools during regular school hours for 
students whose parents had signed a request form. Outside religious teachers 
were furnished by a religious council representing various religious faiths, 
subject to the approval of the superintendent. Attendance records were 
maintained and reported to school authorities in the same way as for other 
classes. Students not attending religious instruction classes were required to 
continue with their regular secular classes. 
Vashti McCollum had a child enrolled in a public school in Champaign, 
Illinois. She requested a court order forcing the school board to 
adopt and enforce rules and regulations prohibiting all instruction 
in and teaching of religious education in all public schools... and in 
all public school houses and buildings in said district when occupied 
by public schools.648 
Her argument was that tax-supported schools were promoting religion in 
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Decision 
The Illinois state courts denied her petition and she appealed to the 
Supreme Court of the United States where the decision of the state supreme 
court was reversed. The Court held, in an opinion by Justice Black, released time 
648McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203,205. 
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arrangement was in violation of the constitutional provision of separation of 
church and state, as expressed in the First Amendment, and applied to the states 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, the state courts had acted erroneously 
in refusing to deny relief to the complainant, parent and taxpayer, against the 
continued use of school buildings for released-time religious instruction. 
Discussion 
In writing the Court's majority opinion, Justice Hugo Black stated, 
"this is beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-
supported public school system to aid religious groups to spread their 
faith."649 Justice Black once again expressed views announced by the 
majority and minority in Everson-even repeating Everson's articulate First 
Amendment definition. Justice Black then acknowledged that: 
the First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion 
and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each 
is left free from the other within its respective sphere, Or, as we 
said in the Everson case, the First Amendment has erected a wall 
between Church and State which must be kept high and 
impregnable.650 
Justice Felix Frankfurter, in concurring with the majority opinion, said, 
Separation means separation, not something less. Jefferson's 
metaphor in describing the relation between Church and State 
speaks of a "wall of separation," not of a fine line easily 
overstepped. The public school is at once the symbol of our 
democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting our 
common destiny. In no activity of the State is it more vital 
to keep out divisive forces than in its schools, to avoid confusing, 
649ibid.,210. 
650ibid., 212. 
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not to say fusing, what the Constitution sought to keep strictly 
apart. "The great American principle of eternal separation"'-Elihu 
Root's phrase bears repetition-is one of the vital reliances of our 
Constitutional system for assuring unities among our people 
stronger than our diversities. It is the Court's duty to enforce 
this principle in its full integrity.® 5 1 
In dissenting, Justice Reed stated that "the co-operative 'released-time' 
arrangement did not involve either an 'establishment of religion' or 'aid' to 
religion by the state, sufficient to justify the Supreme Court in interfering with 
local legislation and customs."® 5 2 
Vaughn v. Reed. 313 F.Supp. 431 (W.D. Va. 1970). 
Facts 
Since 1942, a private organization, the Week-Day Religious Education 
Council, had sent teachers into grades three, four, and five of the Martinsville 
elementary schools for religious instruction. These programs were conducted 
weekly for one hour. These classes were held in regular classrooms during 
school hours. The regular teacher was temporarily replaced by the teacher 
employed by the Council. At the beginning of the school year, the regular 
teachers gave out cards prepared by the Council for the purpose of obtaining 
permission of the parents to permit their children to participate in this 
program. Students without permission to take the religious program were sent 
to a study hall. 
Decision 
Action to prohibit religious education program in elementary schools. 
661lbid.,231. 
652ibid., 203. 
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The District Court held: 
that weekly classes which were conducted by teachers sent 
to school by outside private organization and purported to teach 
about religion rather that to indoctrinate students and from 
which students whose parents had not signed cards were excused 
for study period violated the First Amendment.® 
Discussion 
In 1970, plaintiffs, fathers of children who attended the Martinsville 
School System, sought an injunction against the religious education program 
being held in the Martinsville elementary school. Defendants claimed that the 
program did not violate the First Amendment because it is an attempt to 
teach the students about religion rather than to indoctrinate to religion, even 
though they admitted that the textbook, Mv Adventure in Christian Living. 
amounted to the practice of religion. 
The District Court decided that the controlling authority for this case 
was MrCnllnm Board of Education.654 Justice Black, in writing the 
majority opinion for the Supreme Court, found that the First Amendment was 
violated when tax-supported public schools are used by religious groups to 
spread their teachings. The following is his objection to the religious program in 
M^CoUnm: 
Here not only are the state's tax-supported public school 
buildings used for the dissemination of religious doctrines. The 
State also affords sectarian groups an invaluable aid in that 
653yaughn v. Reed, 313 F.Supp. 431 (W.D.Va. 1970). 
654McCollum v. Board of Education, 33 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461,92 L.Ed. 
649 (1948). 
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it helps to provide pupils for their religious classes through use 
of the state's compulsory school machinery. This is not 
separation of Church and State.655 
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Jackson laid the foundation for 
what may be taught in the public schools concerning religion: 
The fact is that, for good or for ill, nearly everything in our 
culture worth transmitting, everything which gives meaning to 
life, is saturated with religious influences, derived from paganism, 
Judaism, Christianity-both Catholic and Protestant~and other 
faiths accepted by a large part of the world's peoples. One can 
hardly respect a system of education that Would leave the 
student wholly ignorant of the currents of religious thought that 
move the world society for a part in which he is being prepared.®®® 
Justice Clark, writing the majority opinion for the Supreme Court in 
Schempp. refined and expanded Jackson's language: 
[I]t might well be said that one's education is not complete 
without a study of comparative religion or the history of religion 
and its relationship to the advancement of civilization. It 
certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its 
literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have said here 
indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when 
presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, 
may not be effected consistently with the First Amendment. 
But the exercises here do not fall into those categories. They 
are religious exercises, required by the States in violation of 
the command of the First Amendment that the Government 
maintain strict neutrality, neither aiding nor opposing religion.®57 
655ibid., 212. 
656ibid.4 236. 
657vaughn v. Reed, 313 F.Supp. 431, 433 (1970). 
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Returning to the facts in this case, the facts are very similar to those of 
McCollum. The following changes, mainly procedural, would have to be made 
to the present program constitutional. First, the fact that students were 
permitted to leave made the court question the religious indoctrination. If the 
course were taught within constitutional limits, then every child should be 
required to attend. Second, the fact that state-supported schools were being 
used by teacher paid and controlled by an outside religious group suggested 
that is supporting religion in violation of the establishment clause of the First 
Amendment. It would be better for the school board to employ and control the 
teachers. Finally, the teachers would have to consciously refrain from any 
action which would amount to the indoctrination or practice of religion and 
should keep the program free from criticism on this basis. 
The defendants were free to develop a constitutional plan to replace the 
present plan. The court suggested, but did not require, the system used in 
Zorach v» Clauson 658 as an alternative. 
In issuing the injunction against the present program the court stated 
that if the defendants, or those in authority, wish to have a 
religious educational program, they must comply with the above guidelines. 
Off Campus 
Zorach v. Clauson. 343 U.S. 306, 72 S.Ct 679 (1952). 
Facts 
Zorach is similar to Mr.CnHiiTn .659 except for the location of the classes. 
658z<,rach v. Clauon, 343 U.S. 306, 72 S.Ct. 679, 96 L.Ed. 954 (1952). 
659McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 68 S.Ct. 461, 92 
L.Ed. 649 (1948). 
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A New York City education law permitted students, with permission from their 
parent, to leave the school buildings and grounds to attend religious centers for 
religious instruction or devotional exercises. The same law made school 
attendance compulsory and students not released stayed in the classrooms. 
Churches reported attendance of students released from public schools who 
failed to report for religious instruction. 
Tax-payers and residents of New York City whose children attended the 
public schools challenged the New York Education Law that permitted 
students to leave school for religious instruction. They contended the released 
time law was not different from McCollum because the school program was 
dictated by a program for religious instruction. 
Decision 
The New York Court of Appeals sustained the New York Education Law 
which permitted students to leave school during regular school hours for 
religious instruction. On appeal the United States Supreme Court in a six to 
three vote sustainted the lower court decision that released time program for 
religious instruction was not unconstitutional and did not violate religious 
freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment. 
Discussion 
The majority in Zorach did not see where the New York City School 
System had either prohibited the free exercise of religion or made a law 
respecting an establishment of religion within the meaning of the First 
Amendment. Justice William O. Douglas writing for the majority maintained: 
It takes obtuse reasoning to inject any issue of the "free exercise" 
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of religion into the present case. No one is forced to go to the religious 
classroom and no religious exercise or instruction is brought to the 
classrooms of the public schools. A student need not take religious 
instruction. He is left to his own desire as to manner or time of his 
religious devotions, if any. 
There is a suggestion that the system involves the use of coercion 
to get public school students into religious classrooms. There is no 
evidence in the record before us that supports that conclusion.®®® 
The present record indeed tells us that the school authorities are 
neutral in regard and do no more than release students whose 
parents so request. If in fact coercion were used, if it were established 
that any one or more teachers were using their office to persuade or 
force students to take the religious instruction, a wholly different case 
would be presented.®® * Hence, we put aside that claim of coercion, 
both as respects the "free exercise" of religion and "an establishment 
of religion" within the meaning of the First Amendment®® 2 
®®0Nor is there any indication that the public schools enforce 
attendance at religious schools by punishing absentees from the released time 
programs for truancy. 
®® ^Appellants contend that they should have been allowed to prove 
that the system is in fact administered in a coercive manner. The New York 
Court of Appeals declined to grant a trial on this issue, noting, inter alia, that 
appellants had not properly raised a claim in the manner required by state 
practice. 303 N. Y. 161,174 100 N. E. 2d 463,469. This independent state 
ground for decision precludes appellants from raising the issue of 
maladministration in this preceding. See Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v 
Woodford, 234 U.S. 46,51; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v Mims, 242 U.S. 532, 
535; American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156,169. 
The only allegation in the complaint that bears on the issue is that the 
operation of the program "has resulted and inevitably results in the exercise of 
pressure and coercion upon parents and children to secure attendance by the 
children for religious instruction." But this charge does not even implicate the 
school authorities. The New York Court of Appeals was therefore generous in 
labeling it a "conclusory" allegation. 303 N. Y. at 174,100 N. E. 2d at 469. 
Since the allegation did not implicate the school authorities in the use of 
coercion, there is no basis for holding that the New York Court of Appeals 
under the guise of local practice defeated a federal right in the manner 
condemned by Brown v. Western R. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, and related 
cases. 
®®2Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 311-12 (1952). 
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Moreover, Justice Douglas insisted than Zorach was different than 
McCollum: 
In the Mflfjnlliim case the classrooms were used for religious 
instruction and the force of the public school was used to promote 
that instruction. Here, as we have said, the public schools do no 
more that accommodate their schedules to a program of outside 
religious instruction.®®^ 
The three dissenting justices maintained the program used "a secular 
institution to force religion" on school children. Justice Jackson stated that: 
Here schooling is more or less suspended during the "released 
time" so the nonreligious attendants will not forge ahead of the 
churchgoing absentees. But it serves as a temporary jail for a 
pupil who will not go to Church. It takes more that subtlety of 
mind to deny that this is governmental constraint in support of 
religion. It is as unconstitutional, in my view, when exerted by 
indirection as when exercised forthrightly.664 
Smith v. Smith. 523 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1975), cert.denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976). 
Facts 
For forty years the Harrisonburg school system had permitted a religious 
organization, Rockingham Council of Week-Day Religious Education (WRE), to 
present religious instruction in the classrooms. WRE was a nonprofit organization 
supported by the Virginia Council of Churches. In 1963, the program moved from 
public school classrooms to trailers parked on city streets adjacent to schools, or 
in nearby churches. The trailers were not permitted to park on school property. 
The challenged program was operated in three elementary schools. WRE 
663ibid.,315. 
664ibid.,324. 
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obtained a list of students from school administrators at the beginning of the 
school year and mailed cards to parents asking permission for their children to 
participate in the program. The children deposited the cards at school. WRE 
collected the cards and informed the school which students should be released. 
Public school officials did not encourage the children to attend WRE classes. WRE 
officials were not permitted to enter the schools to solicit students. 
Twenty-seven classes of children received approximately one hour of WRE 
instruction each week. Public school principals and WRE officials worked together 
to coordinate schedules. Each WRE class was taken from a regular class. The 
small number of students not attending the program remained in the regular class 
with the teacher but with no formal instruction. 
Decision 
Action was brought to challenge a "release-time" program. The United 
States District Court held that the WRE program as administered was First 
Amendment establishment and issued an injunction disallowing the release-time 
program in Harrisonburg, Virginia. On appeal, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held: 
that the release-time program had a secular purpose in 
accommodating wishes of students' parents, did not excessively 
entangle state with religion in that public school classrooms 
were not turned over to religious instruction, and, as the 
primary effect of the program did not necessarily advance 
or inhibit religion, the program did not violate the establishment 
clause.®®^ 
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the District Court. 
665smith v. Smith, 523 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1975). 
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Discussion 
The Harrisonburg School Board approved the WRE program by allowing 
the schools to accommodate the scheduling of religious instruction during the 
school day. No public school funds were spent directly on the program and school 
personnel were not used in the program. 
Plaintiffs challenged that the WRE program violated the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Although, the District Court 
concluded that the WRE program was invalid, they admitted that the WRE 
program was "not readily distinguishable" from the New York City program which 
the Supreme Court held Constitutional in Zorach v. Clauson.666 The District 
Court pointed out that the Supreme Court did not have the benefit of the 
tripartite test in ruling on Zorach. The challenged state action was valid if it had a 
"(1) secular purpose, (2) its primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion, 
and (3) it does not excessively entangle the state with religion."667 In applying 
the tripartite test the District Court found the Harrisonburg release-time program 
unconstitutional, because its effect was to advance the WRE's religious training. 
The Court of Appeals found that, although Zorach was decided many years 
before the Supreme Court fashioned the tripartite test, the Meek^S citation 
shows that Zorach is not inconsistent with the tripartite test. The District Court 
found that the Harrisonburg public school's cooperation with the WRE program 
by itself did not necessarily advance or prohibit religion. Therefore, the 
666zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 72 S.Ct. 679, 96 L.Ed. 954 (1952). 
667smith v. Smith, 523 F. 121,122-123 (4th Cir. 1975). 
668Meek v. Pittenger,421 U.S. 349,95 S.Ct. 1753,44 L.Ed.2d 217 
(1975). 
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Harrisonburg release-time program was not unconstitutional as applied to the 
tripartite test or as understood by the continuing validity of Zorach. The Court of 
Appeals reversed the decision of the District Court. 
Shared Time 
Fisher v. Clackamas County School District 12. 507 P.2d 839 (Ore. App. 1973). 
Fqcts 
A suit in equity was bought by plaintiff taxpayers to prohibit the 
defendants, school district, its board clerk, and superintendent from using 
classrooms in St. John the Baptist school to conduct classes for students of 
the parochial school. St. John's school was a parochial school under the control 
of the Catholic church. The plaintiffs contended that the furnishing of 
teachers, textbooks, and instructional materials to the students of St. John's 
constituted a benefit to religion institutions in violation of the Oregon 
Constitution, Article 1, Section 5 which stated: 
No money shall be drawn from the Treasury for the benefit 
of any religeous (sic), or theological institution, nor shall any 
money be appropriated for the payment of any religeous (sic) 
services in either house of the Legislative Assembly.®®® 
The defendants and intervenors claimed that the teachers and 
textbooks were not being furnished to St. John's school, but to two bona fide 
public schools using classroom space in St. John's school, namely, Rowe Junior 
High Annex and Milwaukie Elementary Annex. 
Decision 
669pisher v. Clackamas County School District 12, 507 P.2d 839, 840-
841 (Ore. App. 1973). 
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The Circuit Court ruled that the "shared time" program was 
unconstitutional, but approved the "released time" program. On appeal, the 
Court of Appeals, affirmed that both the "shared time" and "released time" 
programs violated prohibition on benefit to religious institution, but reversed 
that the public school annexes in parochial school building were "public 
schools" since only parochial school students were enrolled. 
Discussion 
The "shared time" program started in 1968. Seventh and eighth 
students attended the program for seven periods. Four periods they had public 
school teachers who taught language arts, social studies, math, and science. 
Four classroom were set aside for the teachers and all religious symbols were 
removed. The three remaining subjects, art, music, and religion, were taught 
by St. John teachers in other classrooms in the same building, where there 
were some religious symbols. The parochial school was responsible for 
physical education, study halls, cafeteria, and auditorium used by all students 
enrolled at St. John's school. 
Students in this program were registered by St John's school, which in 
turn, provided a registration list to Rowe Junior High School Annex. From this 
list students were enrolled in the Annex, thus each student had dual 
enrollment. 
Testimony at the trial indicated St. John's school had requested the 
"shared time" program because of financial difficulties. The defendant school 
board agreed to the program because it was less expensive than assuming all 
the responsibility for the parochial students' education. All the students 
attending Rowe Junior High Annex consisted entirely of St. John's students. 
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The "released time" program started in 1969. Fifth and sixth grade 
students enrolled in the program were full-time students at Milwaukie 
Elementary Annex. They received instruction in a self-contained classroom. 
Religious symbols were removed from the two classrooms used by the 
program. The students were released for 120 minutes each week for religious 
instruction in accordance with the provisions of ORS 339.420, which provided: 
"Upon application of his parent or guardian, a child attending the public school 
maybe excused from school for periods not exceeding 120 minutes in any week 
to attend weekday schools giving instruction in religion."670 There were four 
thirty-minute sessions for religious instruction provided by Catholic Sisters 
teaching at St. John's school. The religious instruction was provided in 
classrooms other than those used by Milwaukie Elementary Annex program. 
There were other fifth and sixth grade students being taught in the 
physical facilities of St. John's school. The administration of St. John's school 
made the decision as to which students attended Milwaukie Elementary School 
and which students attend St. John's school. 
The St. John's school had requested the "released time" program. The 
defendant school district agreed, because it was financially to their benefit Like 
Rowe Junior High Annex, all the students attending Milwaukie Elementary School 
consisted entirely of students of St. John's school. 
The trial judge held that the "shared time" program for the seventh and 
eighth grade violated the constitutions of Oregon and the United States. He 
issued an injunction prohibiting continuation of the program. 
He found the "released time" program constitutional except the 
670ibid.,842. 
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administration of St. John's school decided which of its students should attend 
the public school program. The injunction against the "released time" program 
was denied, except that the defendants were prohibited from permitting St. 
John's school to participate in selecting students for the program. 
Both programs in effect used religious affiliation as a requirement for 
admission. This was true whether or not the St. John's school administration 
decided which of its students shall attend which program, so long as only St. 
John's students were eligible for the "public" school program. 
No matter what the defendants claimed, the exclusion of all but 
parochial school students from consideration for enrollment, and deciding 
placement of students on religious rather than the customary geographical 
criteria were fatal to their claim that Rowe Junior High School Annex and 
Milwaukie Elementary Annex were public schools. Under these programs the 
state paid the salaries of the teacher who taught only parochial school 
students. This subsidy to a parochial school violated Article 1, section 5 of the 
Oregon Constitution. 
Grand Rapids School District of the Citv of Grand Rapids v. Phvilis Ball. 
10 S.Ct. 3216 (1985). 
Facts 
Shared time programs had been operated in Michigan for sixty years. 
Initially the shared time programs provided instruction for nonpublic school 
students at public school locations in mathematics, reading, physical 
education, and art-subjects widely regarded as secular. Grand Rapids School 
District began its variation of the shared time program in 1976. In the 1981-
82 school year of forty-one private schools in the Grand Rapids shared time 
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program, forty were identifiable religious schools. Over the years twenty-eight 
Roman Catholic schools, seven Christian schools, three Lutheran schools, and 
one Seventh Day Adventist school and one Baptist school participated in the 
challenged programs. 
The Shared Time Program, provided at public expense, offered classes to 
nonpublic school students in classrooms leased from nonpublic schools. The 
programs made available classes during the regular school day that were 
intended to supplement the "core curriculum" courses required by the State. 
The shared time teachers were full-time employees of the public school, many 
of whom had previously taught in nonpublic schools. The Community 
Education Program offered voluntaiy classes at the conclusion of the regular 
school day, some of which were not offered in the public schools. Community 
Education teachers were part-time public school employees, most of whom 
were employed full-time in the nonpublic schools where the Community 
Education classes were held. The students enrolled in both programs are the 
same students who otherwise would attend the particular school in which the 
classes were held. Taxpayers filed a suit against the school district and a 
number of state officials, challenging that the school district's shared time and 
community education programs violated the establishment clause of the First 
Amendment. 
Decision 
The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, 
ruled in favor of the taxpayers and enjoined further operation of the programs. 
On appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth District affirmed 
the decision of the lower court and the defendants petitioned for certiorari. On 
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certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower 
court. 
Discussion 
Justice Brennan, in delivering the majority opinion of the Supreme 
Court, stated that the shared time and community education programs, which 
offered classes to nonpublic students at public expense in classrooms leased 
from nonpublic religious institutions, had the "primary of principal" effect of 
advancing religion and therefore violated the dictates of the establishment 
clause of the First Amendment. The shared time and community education 
programs violated the establishment clause by impermissibly advancing 
religion in three ways: 
first, the teachers involved may intentionally or inadvertently 
become involved in inculcating particular religious beliefs; second, 
the programs may create a symbolic link between government and 
religion, giving students an impression of government support of 
their religious denomination; and third, the program may directly 
promote religion by subsidizing the religious institutions involved.® ̂  1 
School-Sponsored Praver and Bible Reading 
Eneel v. Vitale. 370 U.S. 421,82 S.Ct. 1261, 8 L.Ed.2d 601 ( 1962). 
Facts 
Acting in its official capacity under state law, the Board of Education of 
Union Free School District No. 9, New Hyde Park, New York, directed the 
School District's principal to have the following prayer be said aloud by each 
class in the presence of a teacher at the beginning of each school day: 
67 lSchool District of the City of Grand Rapids v. Phyllis Ball, 87 L.Ed. 
267, 268 (1985). 
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"Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy 
blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers, and our Country."672 The daily 
procedure was adopted by the New York State Board of Regents, a 
governmental agency created by State Constitution to which the New York 
Legislature had granted extensive supervisory, executive, and legislative 
powers over the State's public school system. 
Soon after the practice of reciting the Regents' prayer was adopted by 
the School District, the parents of ten students brought action in a New York 
Court insisting that the use of the official prayer in the public schools was in 
conflict with their beliefs, religions, or religious practices of both themselves 
and their children. They challenged the constitutionality of the state law 
authorizing the use of the prayer and the recitation of the prayer on the 
ground that the actions of state officials violated the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
Decision 
Parents were unsuccessful in the trial court and in the New York Court 
of Appeals. On certiorari the Supreme Court of the United States ruled the 
Regent's prayer unconstitutional. Justice Black in expressing the majority 
view of five members of the Court, ruled that by using its public school system 
to encourage recitation of the prayer, the state of New York adopted a 
practice completely inconsistent with the establishment clause of the First 
Amendment, made applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Discussion 
672Engei v> Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422 (1962). 
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In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Black stated: 
Neither the fact that the prayer may be denominationally 
neutral nor the fact that its observance on the part of the students 
is voluntary can serve to free it from the limitations of the 
Establishment Clause, as it might from the Free Exercise Clause, 
of the First Amendment, both of which are operative against the 
States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.® 73 
When the power, prestige and financial support of government 
is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive 
pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing 
officially approved religion is plain. But thepurposes underlying 
the Establishment Clause go much further than that. Its first 
and most immediate purpose rested on the belief that a union of 
government and religion tends to destroy government and to 
degrade religion.® ? 4 
Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, stated: 
The point for decision is whether the Government can 
constitutionally finance a religious exercise I think it an 
unconstitutional undertaking whatever form it takes.®? 5 
The "finance" issue Justice Douglas refers to is the amount of time 
needed to recite the prayer; there are no other finance issues in the case. In 
addition, Justice Douglas apparently realized the judicial dichotomy in Everson 
and recanted his support of Everson: 
The Everson case seems in retrospect to be out of line with the 
®73ibid., 430 
®74ibid.,431. 
675lbid., 437 
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First Amendment. Its result is appealing as it allows aid to be 
given to needy children. Yet by the same token, public funds could 
be used to satisfy other needs of children of parochial schools-
lunches, books, and tuition being obvious examples. 6 
The lone dissenter, Justice Stewart, had this to say: 
I do not believe that this Court, or the Congress, or the President 
has by the actions and practices I have mentioned established an 
'official religion' in violation of the Constitution. And I do not believe 
the State of New York has done so in this case. What each has 
done has been to recognize and to follow the deeply entrenched and 
highly cherished spiritual traditions of our Nation-traditions which 
come down to us from those who almost two hundred years ago 
avowed their 'firm Reliance on the Protection of divine Providence' 
when they proclaimed the freedom and independence of this brave 
new world.® 
The conspicuous point ofEneel is that prescribed prayer in public school 
classrooms, with teachers leading the recitation and with children reciting, will 
be ruled unconstitutional. This case is important in school prayer cases, since 
it is used as a measuring instrument for similar cases. 
Abington School District v. Schempp. 374 U.S. 203, 83 S.Ct. 1560 (1963). 
Facts 
At the beginning of each school day at Abington Senior High School ten 
verses were read over the intercommunications system from the Holy Bible, 
followed by the reciting of the Lord's Prayer, also over the 
intercommunications system. Students in the classrooms were asked to stand 
676ibid., 443. 
677ibid., 450. 
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and repeat the Lord's Prayer in unison. The exercises were closed with the flag 
salute and announcements of interest to students. 
Students could select the verses to be read from any version of the 
Bible, although the school only furnished the King James version, copies of 
which were given to each teacher by the school district. During the time in 
which the exercises were conducted, the King James, the Douay and the 
Revised Standard versions of the Bible were used, as well as the Jewish Holy 
Scriptures. There were no comments or interpretations presented during the 
exercises. Students and parents were informed that any student could absent 
himself from the class or remain in the class without being required to 
participate in the exercises. Participation in the opening exercises, as outlined 
in the statute, was voluntary. 
The opening exercises were conducted in accord with Pennsylvania 
Statute Number 15-1515, as amended Public Law 1928 which required: 
At least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without 
comment, at the opening of each public school on each school day. 
Any child shall be excused from such Bible reading, or attending 
such Bible reading, upon the written request of his parent or 
guardian.678 
The Schempp family brought suit to prohibit the enforcement of the 
above statute. Roger and Donna were students of the Abington, Pennsylvania 
school district. An older brother, Ellory Schempp, had graduated from high 
school and was voluntarily dismissed from the action. Their parents were 
Edward Lewis and Sidney Schempp. They were all active members of the 
678Abington School District v.Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963). 
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Unitarian Church. The Schempps claimed that the statute violated their 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and would continue to do so unless 
the statute was declared unconstitutional as violating these provisions of the 
First Amendment. 
Decision 
A three-judge statutory District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania held that the statute violated the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment as applied to the States by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and direct appropriate injunctive relief. The trial 
court found that: 
The reading of the verses, even without comment, possesses 
a devotional and religious character and constitutes in effect a 
religious observance. The devotional and religious nature of the 
morning exercise is made all the more apparent by the fact that 
the Bible reading is followed immediately by a recital in unison 
by the pupils of the Lord's Prayer. The fact that some pupils, 
or theoretically all pupils, might by excused from attendance at 
the exercises does not mitigate the obligatory nature of the 
ceremony for... Section 1516... unequivocally requires the 
exercises to be held every school day in every school in the 
Commonwealth. The exercises are held in the school buildings 
and perforce are conducted by and under the authority of the 
local school authorities and during school sessions. Since the 
statute requires the reading of the 'Holy Bible.' a Christian 
document, the practice... prefers the Christian religion. The 
record demonstrates that is was the intention of... the 
Commonwealth... to introduce a religious ceremony into the 
public schools of the Commonwealth.679 
The school district appealed the decision of the federal district court to 
the United States Supreme Court, which upheld the decision of the federal 
679lbid., 210-211. 
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district court by a vote of eight to one. 
Discussion 
Justice Clark drew heavily from Engel.680 Everson.681 and Zorach®82 
in writing the opinion of the Court. He pointed out in Cantwell v. 
Connecticut^83 that the Court had decided that the Fourteenth Amendment 
embraced the freedoms guaranteed in the First Amendment. Justice Clark 
pointed out that the separation of state from any form of religious 
entanglement outlined in the First Amendment was specifically first because it 
was foremost on the minds of our forefathers. 
The wholesome "neutrality"' of which this Court's cases speak 
thus stems from a recognition of the teaching of history that 
powerful sects or groups might bring about a fusion of 
governmental and religious functions or a concert or dependency 
of one upon the other to the end that official support of the State 
or Federal Government would be placed behind the tenets of one 
or of all orthodoxies. This the Establishment Clause prohibits. 
And a further reason for neutrality is found in the Free Exercise 
Clause, which recognizes the value of religious training, teaching 
and observance and, more particularly, the right of every person to 
freely choose his own course with reference thereto, free of any 
compulsion from the state. This the Free Exercise Clause 
guarantees. Thus, as we have seen, the two clause may overlap. 
As we have indicated, the Establishment Clause has been directly 
considered by this Court eight times in the past score of years and, 
with only one Justice dissenting on the point, it has consistently 
held that the clause withdrew all legislative power respecting 
religious belief or the expression thereof.®84 
680Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 82 S.Ct. 1261 (1962). 
68lEverson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947). 
682zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 725 S.Ct. 679 (1952). 
GSScantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
684Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). 
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In Schempp a state statute required the reading of at least ten Bible 
verses and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer at the beginning of each day. 
The Supreme Court held that requiring the religious exercises was in violation 
of the establishment clause of the First Amendment. 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan wrote: 
When John Locke ventured in 1689, "I esteem it above all things 
necessary to distinguish exactly the business of civil government 
from that of religion and to settle the just bounds that lie between 
the one and the other," he anticipated the necessity which would be 
thought by the Framers to require adoption of a First Amendment, 
but not the difficulty that would be experienced in defining those "just 
bounds." The fact is that the line which separates the secular from 
the sectarian in American life is elusive. The difficulty of defining 
the boundary with precision inheres in a paradox central to our 
scheme of liberty. While our institutions reflect a firm conviction 
that we are a religious people, those institutions by solemn 
constitutional injunction may not officially involve religion in such a 
way as to prefer, discriminate against, or oppress, a particular sect 
or religion. Equally the Constitution enjoins those involvements 
of religious with secular institutions which (a) serve the essentially 
religious activities of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs 
of government for essentially religious purposes; or (c) use 
essentially religious means to serve governmental ends where 
secular means would suffice. The constitutional mandate 
expresses a delicate and considered judgment that such matters 
are to be left to the conscience of the citizen, and declares as 
a basic postulate of the relation between the citizen and his 
government that "the rights of conscience are, in their nature, 
of peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest touch of 
governmental hand."685 
In dissenting, Justice Stewart wrote that the two cases before the Court 
were so ftmdamentally deficient that it was impossible to make an informed or 
685!bid., 231. 
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responsible determination of the constitutional issues presented. He went on 
to write: 
The First Amendment declares that "Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof " It is, I think, a fallacious oversimplification 
to regard these two provisions as establishing a single 
constitutional standard of "separation of church and state," 
which can be mechanically applied in every case to delineate the 
required boundaries between government and religion. We err in 
the first place if we do not recognize, as a matter of history and as 
a matter of the imperatives of our free society, that religion and 
government must necessarily interact in countless ways. 
Secondly, the fact is that while in many contexts the Establishment 
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause fijlly complement each other, 
there are areas in which a doctrinaire reading of the Establishment 
Clause leads to irreconcilable conflict with the Free Exercise Clause. 
A single obvious example should suffice to make the point. 
Spending federal funds to employ chaplains for the armed forces 
might be said to violate the Establishment Clause. Yet a lonely 
soldier stationed at some faraway outpost could surely complain 
that a government which did not provide him the opportunity for 
pastoral guidance was affirmatively prohibiting the free exercise 
of his religion. And such examples could readily be multiplied. 
The short of the matter is simply that the two relevant clauses 
of the First Amendment cannot accurately be reflected in a sterile 
metaphor which by its very nature may distort rather than 
illumine the problems involved in a particular case.®®® 
Analyzing the past two decades of church-state history in public 
education, the Court stated: 
The test may be stated as follows: What are the purposes 
and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the 
advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds 
the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. 
That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment 
Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary 
686lbid., 308-309. 
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effect that neither advances nor prohibits religion.687 
Continuing, the Court maintained that to allow encroachments even 
though minor would allow "the breach of neutrality that is today a trickling 
stream may all too soon become a raging torrent, and in the words of Madison, it 
proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties ."688 
Justice Douglas, in a separate concurring opinion, insisted that "through the 
mechanism of the State, all of the people are being required to finance a 
religious exercise that only some of the people want and that violates the 
sensibilities of others."689 
The Schempp ruling reinforces Eneel concerning prescribed Bible 
reading and the Lord's Prayer. Another important aspect of Schempp is the 
beginning of the tripartite test that will become completely developed in Lemon 
1.690 Also, the neutral accommodations theory is obviously silent in 
curriculum cases dealing with religion. In curriculum cases involving religion, 
where public funds are being used to advance religion, the practice is a violation 
of the First Amendment. 
687Ibid., 222. 
688ibid., 225. 
689ibid., 228. 
690Lemon v. Kurtzman, 91 S.Ct. 2111 (1971). 
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Meltzer v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County. 548 F.2d 559 (1977), 
577 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1978) {en banc) {per curiam)cert, denied, 439 U.S. 1089 
(1979). 
Facts 
The Orange County Board of Education had allowed the public schools to 
begin the day with Bible readings and devotional exercises. Parents of children 
attending public schools brought suit for injunctive and declaratory relief from 
morning Bible readings, distribution of Bibles, and requiring teachers to 
inculcate the practice of every Christian virtue. 
Decision 
The United States District Court denied relief and the parents appealed. 
The United States Fifth Circuit of Appeals handed down its decision on March 
11,1977, and a rehearing en banc was granted on May 25,1977. On July 31, 
1978, the court of appeals, en banc, held that the resolution requiring Bible 
reading and prayer in the public schools was unconstitutional. In addition, the 
appeals court, by a equally divided vote, affirmed that District Court's rulings 
that there was no case or controversy or threat of imminent harm requiring 
either injunctive relief or declaratoryjudgment as to the guidelines for 
distribution of Gideon Bibles and the Christian virtue statute. The entire 
course of this case was in the District Court and the Court of Appeals for eight 
years. In 1980 the United States Supreme Court agreed to let stand the ruling 
of the court of appeals reaffirming the unconstitutionality of religious exercise 
in public school. 
Discussion 
At the August 24,1970, board meeting the Orange County Board of 
Education adopted a resolution calling for a five- to seven-minute morning 
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exercise in every school for "a period of meditation which shall include the 
opportunity for individual prayer and Bible reading or devotional or meditation 
presented by groups or organizations or an individual,"®® 1 followed by a 
patriotic exercise. At the same meeting a member of the Gideon group asked 
for and received approval to distribute Gideon Bibles in the public schools. 
At the next meeting of the Orange County Board of Education on 
September 15,1970, the eventual plaintiffs in this case complained that the 
resolution adopted at the August 24,1970, board meeting violated their 
religious rights. The board deferred action on the complaints until it could 
survey the Orange County Public Schools to see how the August 24,1970, 
resolution was being implemented and to obtain time to confer with their 
counsel regarding the legality of those policies and their implementation. 
At the third board meeting, the results of the survey ordered in the 
September 15,1970, meeting were released. This survey revealed that 
seventy of the ninety-seven schools in Orange County were practicing daily 
Bible reading, generally read aloud by students or the classroom teacher. In 
some public schools, the Bible reading was given over the school public address 
system. Only four of the ninety-seven schools had neither prayer nor Bible 
reading. At this meeting the eventual plaintiffs renewed their complaints 
against the devotional and the distribution of Gideon Bibles. However, counsel 
for the Orange County Board of Education gave his opinion that the morning 
exercises were not illegal, citing in part Chapter 231.09(2) of the Florida 
Statutes: 
69lMeltzer v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, Florida, 
548 F.2d 559, 561 (1977). 
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The policy aids school officials to carry out their specific duties 
set forth in 231.09 among which are to "inculcate, by precept 
and example... the practice of every Christian virtue... 
Those who feel that the policy is unconstitutional should bring 
their case to Court.®92 
Chapter 231.09(2) of the Florida Statutes provides: 
231.09 Duties of Instructional Personnel. - Members of the 
instructional staff of the public schools, subject to the rules 
and regulations of the state board and of the school board, shall 
perform the following functions: 
(2) Example for Pupils. — Labor faithfully and earnestly for the 
advancement of the pupils in their studies, deportment and 
morals, and embrace every opportunity to inculcate, by precept 
and example, the principles of truth, honesty and patriotism 
and the practice of every Christian virtue.693 
Taking advice from its counsel, the Orange County Board of Education refused 
to modify its policy regarding opening day exercises or to direct any change in 
its implementation. 
On October 16,1970, the plaintiffs filed their suit in District Court as a 
class action against the Orange County Board of Education claming that 
(1) Florida statute section 231.09(2) is unconstitutional on its 
face because it commands the inculcation of Christian virtue; 
(2) that the August 24,1970, resolution the morning excerises 
conducted pursuant to it are unconstitutional; (3) that the 
distribution of Gideon Bible is unconstitutional; and (4) that a 
Southern Baptist program planned for October 19 and 20,1970, 
is unconstitutional, all being in violation of the First Amendment 
as made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
692ibid., 562. 
693fl)icL 
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Amendment. 694 
The plaintiff had failed to show that the possibility of irreparable injury 
or to show findings of fact as to morning exercises and the Bible distribution. 
The District Court went on to conclude that reference to the Bible is permitted 
under the First Amendment, if it is inspirational rather than devotional and it 
is voluntary by an individual student instead of school or teacher sponsored. 
The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit. The appeals court held that there was no evidence that the 
statute had or would be applied; thus, there was no reason for an injunction. 
The appeals court in remanding the case to the District Court questioned 
whether the likelihood that the statute would be enforced was so minuscule as 
to present no case or controversy, thus denying the District Court of 
jurisdiction to grant even a declaratory judgment, or whether there was still a 
case or controversy present enough even though the danger of harm was not 
great and imminent enough to warrant an injunction. 
It became apparent during the trial in District Court that the Orange 
County Board of Education had made no changes in its policy, except changing 
"devotional" to "inspirational," concerning Bible reading, devotions, and the 
distribution of Bibles. During the second round of appeal, the United States 
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that the imminency of 
harm from the recurrence of the practices complained of was not sufficient to 
warrant the issuance of injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals disagreed with 
the District Court that there was no case and thus, no reason for declaratory 
694Ibid. 563. 
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relief. The appeals court found the ever-present threat of enforcing the statute 
to be a continuous and brooding presence and issued a declarative judgment 
against the defendant. 
Bible reading and devotional exercises were declared unconstitutional 
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, even though individual students 
were allowed to absent themselves from the exercises upon parental request. 
The practice of handing out Gideon Bibles in the classroom or at a central place 
on campus in this case was more an encroachment of First Amendment 
freedoms than Tudor.695 Jn Tudor parents were asked to sign for their child to 
receive the Gideon Bible. In Meltzer Gideon Bibles were to be distributed 
without parental permission. In short, the school board's decision to use the 
school system to distribute the Gideon Bible, at least in the eyes of the 
students and perhaps their parents, places its stamp of approval on the 
Gideon version of the Bible, thus favoring one religion over another which is 
unconstitutional. 
The "Christian virtue" clause of the Florida statute 231-09(2) was 
declared unconstitutional as worded. As written it favors the Christian religion, 
but the appeals court agreed that if the word "Christian" were deleted, the 
statute would probably be constitutional. 
Karen B. v. Treen. 653 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1981), a f f d  m e m . ,  455 U.S. 913,107 
S.Ct. 1267 (1982). 
Facts 
The Jefferson Parish School Board adopted a resolution establishing 
695>Tudor v. Board of Education, 100 A.2d 857 (1953). 
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guidelines to implement section 17:2115(B) in parish schools. Its guidelines 
permitted a minute of prayer followed by a minute of silent meditation. Under 
the school board guidelines each teacher was to ask if any student wished to 
offer a prayer; if no student volunteered a prayer, then the teacher was allowed 
to offer a prayer on his own. Students had to have written permission from 
their parents and make a verbal request to participate in the exercise. 
Students without permission could either report to class, where they would 
remain seated and quiet throughout the morning exercises, or remain outside 
the classroom under other supervision. Parents of public school students 
sought declaratory and injunctive relief concerning the Louisiana statute and 
derivative Jefferson Parish School Board regulations which established 
guidelines for student participation in prayers in public schools. 
Decision 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana 
denied relief and the parents appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit ruled that the Louisiana statute section 17:2115 (1981), 
subsection B, and Jefferson Parish guideline permitting student and teacher 
prayers in the public schools violated the establishment clause of the First 
Amendment. The appeals court reversed and remanded the case to the 
District Court. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on 
January 25, 1982. 
Discussion 
Louisiana Revised Statute section 17:2115 (1981) had two parts. 
Subsection A provided for each parish and city school board to permit a brief 
period of silence at the beginning of each day with no reference to a religious 
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exercise. Parents had no quarrel with the meditation provision, and it is not 
part of the litigation. 
The challenged provision, subsection B, was basically enabling 
legislation. It provided that a school board may authorize appropriate school 
officials to allow students and teachers to pray. Prayers were limited to five 
minutes. No student or teacher was compelled to pray. With written 
permission, students who objected to prayers, were not required to participate 
or be present during the time the prayer was being offered. 
School District officials defended the policy by stating: 
The purpose of the school prayer program was to increase 
religious tolerance by exposing school children to beliefs different 
from their own and to develop in students a greater esteem for 
themselves and others by enhancing their awareness of the 
spiritual dimensions of human nature.696 
Justice Clark, as noted in the following statement, asserted that the 
purpose of the prayer activity was basically religious and not secular: 
Prayer is perhaps the quintessential religious practice for 
many of the world's faiths, and it plays a significant role in the 
devotional lives of most religious people. Indeed, since prayer 
is a primary religious activity in itself, its observance in public 
school classrooms has, if anything, a more obviously religious 
purpose than merely displaying a copy of a religious test to 
the classroom.®^ 7 
The court concluded that the statute and policies served to create excessive 
government entanglement. 
696Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897, 899 (5th Cir. 1981). 
697jbid., 901. 
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Jaffree v. James. 544 F.Supp 727 (1982), 554 F.Supp, 1130 (S.D.Ala.1983), 
affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. 
Facts 
In this case plaintiffs brought suit challenging the constitutionality of 
Alabama statutes seeking to return voluntary prayer to the public schools. 
They asked for a preliminary injunction to prohibit enforcement of the 
statutes. 
Decision 
The District Court, Chief Judge Hand, ruled that even though the 
statutes were permissive in form, they indicated state involvement respecting 
the establishment of religion, and therefore, since the plaintiffs had shown a 
substantial likelihood of success on the merits, the enforcement of the statutes 
would be forbidden. The preliminary injunction requested by the plaintiffs was 
granted. 
Discussion 
It was contended by the plaintiffs that Alabama Code Section 16-1-20.1 
and Senate Bill 8, Alabama Act 82-735, popularly known as the "James 
Prayer Law," if carried out would be violative of their constitutional rights as 
proscribed by the Constitution. Senator Holmes testified that his purpose in 
sponsoring Alabama Code Section 16-1-20.1 (1981) was to return voluntary 
prayer to the public schools. Section 16-1-20.1 provides in pertinent part: 
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades 
in all public schools, the teacher in charge of the room in which 
each such class is held may announce that a period of silence not 
to exceed one minute in duration shall be observed for meditation 
or voluntary prayer, and during any such period no other activities 
shall be engaged in.698 
698ibid., 731. 
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Senate Bill 8, provides in pertinent part: 
To provide for a prayer that may be given in the public schools 
and educational institutions of this state. 
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF ALABAMA* 
Section 1. From henceforth, any teacher or professor in any 
public educational institution within the State of Alabama, 
recognizing that the Lord God is one, at the beginning of any 
homeroom or any class, may pray, may lead willing students 
in prayer, or may lead the willing students in the following 
prayer to God: 
Almighty God, You alone are our God. We acknowledge You as 
the Creator and Supreme Judge of the world. May Your justice, 
Your truth, and Your peace abound this day in the hearts of our 
countrymen, in the counsels of our government, in the sanctity 
of our homes and in the classrooms of our schools in the name of 
ourLord. Amen.®®® 
There was no testimony presented to the District Court as to whether or 
not the statutes under scrutiny had or had not been enforced. The District 
Court made the following discoveries of fact: 
1. Both statutes were properly enacted and are on the books of 
the State of Alabama. 
2. The plaintiffs children are students of the public schools of 
he State of Alabama. 
3. The statute is drawn in the permissive and would authorize 
students and teachers to pray in the schools if they so desired. 
4. The plaintiff is an agnostic and finds prayer offensive. 
5. The plaintiff contends that he does not desire that his children 
be indoctrinated along religious lines so they can, at some future 
date, open-mindedly consider whether or not religion is for them 
and if anything of a religious nature is given to them now it will 
serve to poison their minds against the open-mindness. 
699lbid. 
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6. Religion is more than just the Christian faith. Religion can be 
Christianity, Judaism, Mohammedanism, Buddhism, Atheism, 
Communism, Socialism, and a whole host of other concepts. 
7. Students feel deprived if they are not permitted a free expression 
of their religion at any place or time they might elect or choose. 
8. Religious freedoms are denied when the school authorities 
prohibit expression of religious conviction by denying the right to 
pray or otherwise express themselves. 
9. Parental authority is abused and parents feel their rights are 
trespassed when their teachings to their children are contradicted 
by the schools or the state when it refuses to allow free expression 
of religious belief on the campuses of the schools or when their 
children are required to hear prayers that they do not wish them 
to hear. 
10. Any governmental activity, be that by the federal government 
through its legislative, judicial or executive branches or any state 
or county legislative or authority, through its board, bureaus, 
legislatures, courts or executives, that prescribes or proscribes the 
conduct of religion is offensive to all citizens and the Constitution. 700 
The enactment of the Alabama statutes was an attempt by the State 
of Alabama to encourage religious activity and return voluntary prayer to the 
public schools. 
Smith v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County. 655 F.Supp. 939 
(S.D.Ala. 1987), 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987). 
Facts 
This case was a continuation of the Alabama school prayer cases, 
beginning with Jaffree v. James7**1 in 1982. In May 1982 Ishmael Jaffree 
700ibid., 729-730. 
701 Jaffree v. James, 544 F.Supp. 727 (1982). Also see Jaffree v. Board 
of School Commissioners, 554 F.Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala. 1983), affd in part, 
rev'd in part sub nom; Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983), 
Cert, denied sub nom; Board of School Commissioners v. Jaffree, 466 U.S. 926, 
294 
filed a complaint on behalf of his three minor children against the Mobile 
County School Board, various school officials, and three teachers seeking, 
among other things, a declaratory judgment that certain classroom prayer 
activities conducted in the Mobile public school system violated the 
establishment clause of the First Amendment and an injunction against 
classroom prayer. By his second complaint, Jaffree added as defendants the 
Governor of Alabama and other state officials, including Appellant Board, and 
challenged three Alabama statutes relevant to the school prayer issue as 
violative of the establishment clause. Douglas T. Smith and others 
("Appellees") filed a motion to intervene in the Jaffree action claiming that an 
injunction against religious activity in the public schools would violate their 
right to free exercise of religion. The District Court allowed Douglas T. Smith 
and others ("Appellees") to intervene as plaintiffs. Later, Appellees filed a 
motion entitled "Request for Alternate Relief' in which the Appellees asked 
that, if an injunction were granted in favor of Jaffree, that injunction be 
enforced "against the religious secularism, humanism, evolution, materialism, 
agnosticism, atheism, and others" or, alternatively that Appellees be allowed 
to produce additional evidence showing that these religions had been 
established in the Alabama public schools. 
Decision 
The District Court divided the claims against Mobile County and local 
defendants and the claims against state officials into two branches. The 
104 S.Ct. 1707, 80 L.Ed.2d 181 (1984); Jaffree v. James, 554 F.Supp. 1130 
(S.D. Ala. 1983), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom; Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 
F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983), affd, 472 U.S. 38,105 S.Ct. 2479, 86 L.Ed.2d 178 
(1984.). 
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District Court granted Jafiree's motion for a preliminary injunction against the 
enforcement of two of the challenged statutes, Ala. Code Ann., Sections 16-1-
20.1 and 16-1-20.2,702 but determined after trial on the merits that Jaffree 
was not entitled to relief in either action because the Supreme Court of the 
United States was in error in holding that the establishment clause of the First 
Amendment prohibits the states from establishing a religion.703 Therefore, 
the District Court dismissed Jafiree's compliant for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted. 7 04 
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the District Court, finding 
that both the school room prayer activities and sections 16-1-120.1 and 16-1-
20.2 violated the establishment clause, and remanded the action to the District 
Court with directions that the District Court "award costs to appellant and 
forthwith issue and enforce an order enjoining the statutes and activities held 
in this opinion to be unconstitutional. "705 The United States Supreme Court 
702jt)kL 
703jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners, 554 F.Supp. 1104,1128 
(S.D.Ala. 1983), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom\ Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 
F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983), cert denied sub nom; Board of School 
Commissioners v. Jaffree, 466 U.S. 926,104 S.Ct. 1707, 80 L.Ed.2d 181 
( 1 9 8 4 ) ;  J a f f r e e  v .  J a m e s ,  5 5 4  F . S u p p .  1 1 3 0 , 1 1 3 2  ( S . D .  A L A  1 9 8 3 ) .  A f f d  i n  
part, rev'd in part sub nom; Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir 1983), 
affd 472 U.S. 38, 1095 S.Ct. 2479, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985), 466 U.S. 924,104 
S.Ct. 1704, 80 L.Ed.2d 178 (1984). 
704jaffi.ee v. Board of County Commissioners, 554 F.Supp. 1104,1132 
(S.D.Ala. 1983). 
705jafft.ee v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526,1536-37 (11th Cir. 1983), cert, 
denied in part sub nom; Board of School Commissioners v. Jaffree, 466 U.S. 
926,104 S.Ct. 1707, 80 L.Ed.2d 181 (1984), affd in part, 472 U.S. 38,105 S. 
Ct. 2479, 86 L.Ed2d 29 (1985); 466 U.S. 924, 104 S.Ct. 1704, 80 L.Ed.2d 178 
(1984). 
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denied certiorari with regard to the nonstatutory school prayer practices?06 
and affirmed the Court's decision with regard to the statutory provisions. 70 7 
Discussion 
In its opinion denying relief in Jaffree. the District Court had stated that 
"[i]f the appellate courts disagree with this Court in its examination of history 
and conclusion of constitutional interpretation thereof, then this Court will 
look again at the record in this case and reach conclusions which it is not now 
forced to reach. "708 
The Appellees claimed that the exclusion from the curriculum of "the 
existence, history, contributions, and role of Christianity in the United States 
and the world"709 violated their constitutional rights of equal protection, free 
speech of teacher and student, the student's right to receive information, and 
teacher and student free exercise of religion. The District Court interpreted the 
position of the Appellees as that 
if Christianity is not a permissible subject of the curriculum 
of the public schools, then neither is any other religion, and under 
the evidence introduced it is incumbent upon this Court to strike 
down those portions of the curriculum demonstrated to contain other 
706Board of School Commissioners v. Jaffree, 466 U.S. 926,104 S.Ct. 
1707, 80 L.Ed.2d 181 (1984). 
707wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,105 S.Ct. 2479, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 
(1985); Wallace v. Jaffree 466 U.S. 924,104 S.Ct. 1704,80 L.Ed.2d 178 
(1984). 
708 jaffi>ee v- Board of School Commissioners, 554 F.Supp at 1129 
(S.D.Ala. 1983). 
709ibid. 
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religious teachings. 710 
The District Court voluntarily realigned the parties and ruled that the use of 
home economics, history, and social studies textbooks in the Mobile County 
School System violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment, in 
that the textbooks had the primary effect of advancing the religion of secular 
humanism. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the 
use of textbooks did not advance secular humanism or inhibit theistic religion 
in violation of the establishment clause, even assuming secular humanism was 
religion. 
Patriotic Exercises 
Minersville v. Gobitis. 310 U.S. 586, 60 S.Ct. 1010, 84 L.Ed. 1375 (1940). 
Facts 
Minersville v,. Gobitis? 11 was the first flag salute case decided by the 
United States Supreme Court. This case involved two children, Lillian Gobitis, 
age twelve, and her brother William, age ten, Jehovah's witnesses who were 
expelled from the public schools of Minersville, Pennsylvania, for refusing to 
salute the national flag as part of a daily school exercise. 
The local board of education required both teachers and students to 
participate in the pledge of allegiance ceremony. The right hand was placed 
over the breast and the following pledge was recited in unison: "I pledge 
710Smith v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 827 F.2d 
684, 688 (11th Cir. 1987). 
TUMinfcrsville v Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 60 S. Ct. 1010,84 L.Ed. 1375 
(1940). 
298 
allegiance to my flag, and to the Republic for which it stands; one nation 
indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."712 (Note that the words "Under 
God" were not a part of the pledge. They were added in 1954.) While the words 
were spoken students extended their right hands in salute to the flag. The 
Gobitis family were affiliated with "Jehovah's Witnesses," for whom the Bible 
as the Word is the supreme authority. The children had been brought up to 
believe that their only allegiance was to Jehovah. 
The Gobitis children were of age to be under the compulsory attendance 
law of Pennsylvania. They were denied a free education and their father had to 
enroll them in a private school. To obtain relief from the financial burden of 
private school, their father, on behalf of the children and his own behalf brought 
this suit. 
On May 3,1937, counsel for Walter Gobitis filed a bill of complaint in the 
United States District Court, denouncing the regulation and the expulsion 
thereunder as violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and 
requested an injunction against their continued enforcement against the 
Gobitis children. 
Decision 
From 1937 until 1940, first in the District Court and later in the Circuit 
Court of Appeals, the case was marked with much bickering, confusion, 
conflicting testimony, and presentation of lengthy briefs. Finally, on March 4, 
1940, the United States Supreme Court gave the matter full consideration 
and granted a writ of certiorari. The United States Supreme Court reversed 
the decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and upheld the District 
7l2Ibid., 591. 
299 
Court's decision supporting the Minersville School District's requirement that 
students must salute the American flag as a condition for school attendance. 
Discussion 
Justice Felix Frankfurter, who expressed trepidation in tackling the case 
delivered the majority opinion of the Court in these words: 
A grave responsibility confronts this Court whenever in 
course of litigation it must reconcile the conflicting claims 
of liberty and authority. But when the liberty invoked is 
liberty of conscience, and the authority is authority to 
safeguard the nation's fellowship, judicial conscience is 
put to its severest test. Of such a nature is the present 
controversy. 713 
We must decide whether the requirement of participation 
in a ceremony, exacted from a child who refuses upon sincere 
religious grounds, infringes without due process of law the 
liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.? 14 
Our present task then, as so often the case with courts, is to 
reconcile two rights in order to prevent either from destroying 
the other. But, because in safeguarding conscience we are 
dealing with interests so subtle and so dear, every possible 
leeway should be given to the claims of religious faith.? 15 
The mere possession of religious convictions which contradict 
the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the 
the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities.? 
714Ibid., 592-593. 
?15lbid., 594. 
716lbid., 594-595. 
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In the lone dissent, Justice Harlan F Stone, strongly emphasized that 
even though the state may exercise considerable control over pupils, that 
control is limited where it interferes with civil liberties guaranteed by the 
Constitution. He stated in part: 
The Constitution expresses more than the conviction of the 
people that democratic processes must be preserved at all 
costs. It is also an expression of faith and a command that 
freedom of mind and spirit must be preserved, which 
government must obey, if it is to adhere to that justice and 
moderation without which no free government can exist. 
For this reason it would seem that legislation which operates 
to repress the religious freedom of small minorities, which is 
admittedly within the scope of the protection of the 
Bill of Rights, must at least be subject to the same judicial 
scrutiny as legislation which we have recently held to infringe 
the constitutional liberty of religious and racial minorities. 
With such scrutiny I cannot say that the inconveniences 
which may attend some sensible adjustment of school 
discipline in order that the religious convictions of these 
children maybe spared, presents a problem so momentous 
or pressing as to outweigh the freedom from compulsory violation 
of religious faith which has been thought worthy of constitutional 
protection.^ 
The tone of the dissent by Justice Stone suggested an accommodation 
between church and state. 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette. 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 
1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943). 
Facts 
In 1943, the United States Supreme Court in West Virginia State Board 
717lbid., 606-607. 
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of Education v± Barnette? 18 had another opportunity to rule on the 
constitutionality of a flag salute case involving Jehovah's Witnesses. This 
case was the result of a requirement of the West Virginia State Board of 
Education that required that the salute to the flag become a regular part of the 
day's activities in every public school in the state. Students who refused to 
participate in the flag salute were expelled from school. Expelled students were 
denied readmission to the school until they complied with the flag salute 
requirement. 
On January 9,1942, the Board of Education adopted a resolution 
containing recitals taken mainly from the Court's Gobitis? 19 opinion and 
ordering that the salute to the flag become a part of the program of activities 
in all public schools. All teachers and students were required to participate in 
the salute honoring the nation represented by the flag. Refusal to participate 
would be regarded as an act of insubordination and would be dealt with 
accordingly. 
Objections to the salute as being too much like the Nazi salute were 
raised by the Parents and Teachers Association, the Boy and Girl Scouts, the 
Red Cross, and the Federation of Women's Clubs. Some modification seems to 
have been made for these groups, but no concession was made to Jehovah's 
Witnesses. The salute required a stiff arm with the right arm raised and the 
palm turned up while repeating the following: "I pledge allegiance to the Flag of 
718west Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943). 
719Minersville v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586,60 S.Ct. 1010, 84 L.Ed. 1375 
(1940). 
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the United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands; one 
Nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."? 20 
Failure to conform with the salute was insubordination dealt with by 
expulsion. Readmission was denied by statute until compliance. An expelled 
child was unlawfully absent and parents were subject to prosecution. If 
convicted the maximum fine was fifty dollars and a jail term not to exceed 
thirty days. 
Appellees, citizens of the United States and West Virginia, brought suit 
in the United States District Court asking for an injunction to restrain 
enforcement of these laws and regulations against Jehovah's Witnesses. Their 
religious belief required that they give their allegiance to Jehovah. Their belief 
includes a literal interpretation of Exodus, Chapter 20, verses 4 and 5, which 
states: "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of 
anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in 
the water under the earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself to them nor serve 
them."721 They refused to salute the flag because they considered it an 
"image" with this command. 
Decision 
In Barnette the United States Supreme Court reversed their Gobitis 
decision and by so doing ruled that requiring students to salute the flag of the 
United States while reciting a pledge of allegiance as a requirement to attend 
school was an unconstitutional exercise of governmental authority. To force 
720West Virgina State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
628-629 (1943) 
721lbid.,629. 
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students to participate in flag salute activities in violation of their religious 
beliefs was a violation of students' First Amendment rights. 
Discussion 
Justice Jackson, in expressing the opinion of the court, said: 
It is now a commonplace that censorship or suppression of 
expression of opinion is tolerated by our Constitution only 
when the expression presents a clear and present danger of 
action of a kind the State is empowered to prevent and punish. 
It would seem that involuntary affirmation could be 
commanded only on even more immediate and urgent grounds 
than silence. But here the power of compulsion is invoked 
without any allegation that remaining passive during a flag 
salute ritual creates a clear and present danger that would 
justify an effort even to muffle expression. To sustain the 
compulsory flag salute we are required to say that the Bill of 
Rights which guards the individual's right to his own mind, 
left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is 
not in his mind.722 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, 
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall 
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters 
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein. ̂  23 
Justice Frankfurter used the same arguments in dissenting in Barnette 
as he used in expressing the majority opinion in Gobitis. In his lone dissent he 
stated: 
I cannot bring my mind to believe that the "liberty" secured 
by the Due Process Clause gives this Court authority to deny 
to the State of West Virginia the attainment of that which we 
all recognize as a legitimate legislative end, namely the 
722ibid., 633-634. 
723ibicL) 642. 
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promotion of good citizenship, by employment of the means 
here ch.osen.724 
He was of the opinion that: "The Court has no reason for existence 
if it merely reflects the pressures of the day. "725 
Palmer v. Board of Education of Citv of Chicago. 603 F.2d 1271 (1979). 
Facts 
In a 1979 case, Palmer v. Board of Education of Citv of Chicago.726 a 
probationary kindergarten teacher, who was a member of the Jehovah's 
Witnesses religion, filed civil rights practices challenging her proposed 
discharge for failure to follow the prescribed curriculum as violative of her First 
Amendment right of religious freedom. She had notified her principal that 
because of religious reasons she could not teach any subject dealing with 
patriotism, the American flag, or other such matters. 
Decision 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 
entered summary judgment for defendants, and the plaintiff appealed. The 
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, in affirming the decision of 
the lower court held that: 
(1) a public school teacher is not free to disregard the prescribed 
curriculum concerning patriotic matters notwithstanding claim 
724ibid., 647. 
7 25^(1^ 06g 
726paimer v Board of Education of City of Chicago, 603 F.2d 1271 
(1979). 
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that adherence thereto would conflict with his or her religious 
principles, and (2) plaintiff had no due process right to an 
adversary hearing prior to dismissal since her religious freedom 
was not being extinguished, no state statute or other rule or policy 
created a protected interest for an untenured teacher in similar 
circumstances and there was no claim that plaintiff had suffered 
stigma by reason of discharge.?27 
Discussion 
For a teacher to pick and choose what she was willing to teach would 
provide students with a distorted and unbalanced view of the history of the 
United States. She had a right to her own religious views and practices, but 
she had no constitutional right to force her views on others and to cause them 
to forgo a portion of their education they would otherwise be entitled to eiyoy. 
The court stated: 
Parents have a vital interest in what their children are taught. 
Their representatives have in general prescribed a curriculum. 
There is a compelling state interest in the choice and adherence 
to a suitable curriculum for the benefit of our young citizens and 
society. It cannot be left to individual teachers to teach what they 
please.728 
The court went on to say; 
In this unsettled world, although we hope it will not come to pass, 
some of the students may be called on to defend and protect our 
democratic system and Constitutional rights, including plaintiff s 
religious freedom. That will demand a bit of patriotism. 729 
727ibid., 1271. 
728lbid., 1274. 
729ibid. 
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Sherman v. Community Consolidated School District 21 of Wheeling Township. 
714 F.Supp. 932 (N.D.D1.1989). 
Facts 
In a 1989 flag salute case from Illinois, the parents of a first grade 
student sued the school district over an Illinois statute that provides that the 
pledge "shall be recited each day" by pupils in public elementary schools. In 
this case the principal announced to all classrooms over the intercom for all 
students to: "Please rise for the all-school pledge. I pledge allegiance to the flag 
of the United States of American and to the republic for with it stands, one 
nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."? 30 
Richard Sherman, a first grade student, is publically asked to stand, put 
his hand over his heart, and pledge allegiance to the flag. His parents are 
practicing atheists, who belong to the Society of Separatists. The Society is a 
Maryland corporation licensed to conduct business in Illinois. Historically, the 
Society had played a role in government-coerced Church and State separation 
issues for many years. 
The suit alleged that the salute and recitation of the pledge violated the 
Constitution's establishment clause, by requiring this ritual with a religious 
element, and the free exercise clause, by, in effect, forcing their first grade son 
to perform a religious act that he otherwise would not have performed. 
Decision 
The school system asked the court to dismiss the suit. The court denied 
the request of the school system. The District Court held that the parents' 
730gherman v< Community Consolidated School District 21 of Wheeling 
Township, 714 F.Supp. 932,933 (N.D.I11.1989). 
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allegations justified civil rights claim against school district and school officials. 
Discussion 
The defendants claimed the Society did not have standing to act a party 
plaintiff on its own behalf. The defendants were right. The Society itself did not 
have a right to claim the constitutionally protected rights curtailed by the 
statute. However, the Society could bring suit on behalf of its members if 
(a) the membership would otherwise have standing to sue 
in their own right; (2) the interests it seeks to protect are 
germane to the organization's purpose; and (3) nether the 
claim asserted not relief requested requires the participation 
of individual members in the lawsuit. 731 
Given the facts of the complaint the court was unable to determine at 
this point whether the Society had standing to continue claims on behalf of its 
membership. The Shermans did have standing and were pursuing the case on 
their own. 
The plaintiffs contended that Illinois Revised Statute, Chapter 122, 
Section 27-3 violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment. The 
third clause of the statute provided that- "The Pledge of Allegiance shall be 
recited each school day by pupils in elementary educational institutions 
supported or maintained in whole or in part by public funds.32 The court did 
uphold the establishment clause claim of the plaintiffs. 
"Other courts have found that the inclusion of the phrase 'In God We 
?31lbid., 934. 
732ibid., 934. 
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Trust' on coinage and currency does not violate the establishment clause."733 
The reason given was that reference to the Deity in our ceremonies and our 
coinage and seals reflect our history and no longer have any potentially 
entangling theological reference. In Aronow. the Ninth Circuit stated that; 
[i]t is quite obvious that the national motto and slogan 
on coinage and currency "In God We Trust" had nothing to 
do with the establishment of religion. Its use is of a patriotic 
or ceremonial character and bears no true resemblance to 
government sponsorship of a religious exercise.̂  4 
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on this question, 
the Court has strongly intimated that the recitation of the Pledge by public 
school students does not violate the establishment clause. The Court 
repeatedly has stated that: "[w]e are a religious people whose institutions 
presuppose a Supreme Being."735 
The plaintiffs also claimed the statute violated the free exercise clause 
by requiring Richard Sherman to recite the Pledge of Allegiance. In a seminal 
pledge of allegiance case, the Supreme Court ruled that the compulsory flag 
salute and pledge required by local authorities were unconstitutional. In that 
case the Court stated that: 
733Ar0n0W v.United States, 432 F.2d 242,243 (9th Cir. 1970); Hall v. 
Bradshaw, 630 F.2d 1018,1022 (4th Cir. 1980, cert, denied, 450 U.S. 965,101 
S.Ct. 1480, 67 L.Ed.2d 613 (1981). 
734Aronow v.United States, 432 F.2d 242,243 (9th Cir. 1970). 
735Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,313, 72 S.Ct.679, 684, 96 L.Ed. 
954 (1952); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 675,104 S.Ct. 1355,1360, 79 
L.Ed.2d 604 (1984). 
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[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, 
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein.^36 
The finding in Barnette had been repeatedly applied and reaffirmed by 
numerous lower courts. 
The defendants tried to distinguish this case from Barnette. They 
claimed that Richard Sherman was not required to recite the pledge. However, 
under Illinois law Richard Sherman was required to attend school. The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that school children are impressionable 
and often influenced by peer pressure. Justice Brennan in a concurring opinion 
in Abington stated: "even devout children may well avoid claiming their right 
and simply continue to participate in exercises distasteful to them because of 
an understandable reluctance to be stigmatized as atheists or 
nonconformists."737 effect, the daily recitation may force the first grade 
student to join in, and that would violate his right to free exercise of religion, 
which includes the right freely to choose not to engage in any religious practice. 
736\Vest Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943). 
737AbjI1gta)n School District v. Shempp, 374U.S. 203,290,83 S.Ct. 
1560, 1607 (1963). 
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Creationism and Evolution: Balanced Treatment 
Scopes v. State. 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927). 
Facts 
In 1927, C.J. Scopes was convicted in a Tennessee state circuit court 
for teaching Darwinian evolution in public schools instead of Biblical 
creationism. His conviction was based on his failure to follow chapter 27 of the 
Acts of 1925, known as the Tennessee Anti-Evolution Act, which stated: 
An act prohibiting the teaching of the evolution theory in all 
Universities, normals and other public school of Tennessee, which 
are supported in whole or in part by the public school funds of the 
state and to provide penalties for the violations thereof. 
Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the state 
of Tennessee, that it shall be unlawful for any teacher in any of the 
Universities, normals and all other public schools of the state 
which are supported in whole or in part by the public school funds 
of the state, to teach any theory that denies the story of the divine 
creation of man as taught in the Bible and to teach instead that 
man has descended from a lower order of animals. 
Section 2. Be it further enacted, that any teacher found guilty of 
the violation of this act, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon 
conviction shall be fined not less that one hundred ($100.00) dollars 
nor more than five hundred ($500.00) dollars for each offense. 
Section 3. Be it further enacted, that this act take effect from 
and after its passage, the public welfare requiring it. ̂ 3 8 
His conviction was appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court. 
Decision 
The jury found Scopes guilty, but assessed no fine. The trial judge imposed 
a maximum one hundred dollar fine authorized by statute. The judge erred 
however, because the Constitution of Tennessee required any fine above fifty 
dollars must be levied by a jury. Since Scopes was no longer a teacher, the 
738Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363-364 (Tenn. 1927). 
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Supreme Court of Tennessee saw no reason to prolong the case. The state would 
be better served to enter nolle prosequi and move on to more important matters of 
the state. 
Discussion 
The two well-known lawyers added to the excitement of the celebrated 
"monkey trial." Charles Darrow, the foremost lawyer of his time, represented 
the defense. William Jennings Bryan, a former presidential nominee, 
represented the prosecution. The case was initiated as a statutory violation. 
However, defense counsel insisted the statute violated the First Amendment 
establishment clause. Since this case focused on Darwinian evolution verses 
creationism, it was not necessary to determine the exact religious scope of the 
religious preference clause of the Constitution. 
Epperson v. Arkansas. 393 US. 97, 89 sect. 266, 21 228 (1968). 
Facts 
Susan Epperson was a graduate of the Arkansas' school system and 
obtained a master's degree in zoology from the University of Illinois. She was 
employed as a biology teacher by the Little Rock school system in fall of 1964 
to teach tenth grade biology at Central High School. In fall of 1965 she was 
faced with the dilemma that if she used a new biology textbook she would 
presumably teach a chapter on Darwinian evolution and thus subject to 
dismissal or criminal prosecution. She brought action against the State of 
Arkansas in the state Chancery Court requesting that the statute be voided. 
A parent of children enrolled in the public schools intervened in support of the 
action. The Arkansas statute stated: 
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80-1627.—Doctrine of ascent or descent of man from lower 
order of animals prohibited.~It shall be unlawful for any teacher 
or other instructor in any University, College, Normal, Public 
School, or other institution of the State, which is supported in 
whole or in part from public funds derived by State and local 
taxation to teach the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended 
or descended from a lower order of animals and also it shall be 
unlawful for any teacher, textbook commission, or other 
authority exercising the power to select textbooks for above 
mentioned educational institutions to adopt or use in any such 
institution a textbook that teaches the doctrine or theory 
that mankind descended or ascended from a lower order of 
animals. 
80- 1628.~Teaching doctrine or adopting textbook 
mentioning doctrine-Penalties-Positions to be vacated.-Any 
teacher or other instructor or textbook commissioner who is 
found guilty of violation of this act by teaching the theory or 
doctrine mentioned in section 1 hereof, or by using, or 
adopting any such textbooks in any such educational 
institution shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon 
conviction shall be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars; 
and upon conviction shall vacate the position thus held in 
any educational institutions of the character above mentioned 
or any commission of which he may be a member. 739 
Decision 
The plaintiffs' challenge was based on constitutionality of the anti-
evolution statute that was anchored in the 1925 Tennessee "monkey law." 
The Arkansas Chancery Court held the statute violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. On appeal the Arkansas 
Supreme Court reversed the Chancery Court. The Arkansas Supreme Court 
insisted that statute was a legitimate exercise of state authority establishing 
public school curriculum. On appeal the United States Supreme Court (seven 
to two) reversed the Arkansas Supreme Court based on the First and 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Justice Abe 
739Epperson v. Arkansas, 393, U.S. 97, 99, (1968). 
313 
Fortas delivered the Court's majority opinion. Justice Fortas maintained that, 
"plainly the law is contrary to the mandate of the First and in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution."?  ̂Continuing, Justice Fortas 
asserted that: 
1. State and the Federal government must remain neutral in 
religious theory, doctrine and practices. Government may 
not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory 
over another. Government may neither oppose religion 
nor advocate non-religion. 
2. Courts are reluctant to interfere with the daily operation 
of public schools. However, where there is violation of 
basic constitutional values the judiciary must intrude. 
The First Amendment "does not tolerate laws that cast 
a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. "741 They are 
a violation of the freedom of religion provision of the 
First Amendment. 
3. The Supreme Court is always concerned with the invasion 
of academic freedom. 
4. Study of the Bible and religions from a historical and 
literary viewpoint is a legitimate exercise of the secular 
program of education. However, the First Amendment 
insists that states may not adopt curriculum programs 
and/or practices that foster or oppose any religion. 
5. Finally, the state's authority to prescribe curricula does 
not include punishing teachers, on pain of criminal penalty, 
if the prohibiting--in this case teaching Darwin's theory of 
evolution-is flawed with First Amendment violations.742 
740Ibid., 109. 
74lKeyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
742]3pperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,103-109 (1968). 
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Discussion 
In Epperson, there was little doubt that Arkansas sought to prevent 
teachers from discussing Darwinian evolution because it was contrary to the 
Old Testament Book of Genesis and must be the only source regarding human 
origins. While the Arkansas General Assembly legislative action is the center 
point of Epperson, other states have enacted "Genesis" statutes. In 1968, 
only Arkansas and Mississippi had such "anti-evolution" or "monkey" laws on 
the books. Tennessee (repealed in 1967) and Oklahoma (repealed in 1926) 
had such laws but they had been repealed. Florida and Texas had passed 
resolutions against the teaching of evolution between 1921 and 1929. In all, 
twenty states had introduced bills against teaching the theory of evolution. 
Thus, whenever there are legislative mandates, school board policies, and/or 
school administrator discretion governing religion and the education process-
regardless of the complaint- the Epperson dictum provides a judicial guideline 
for avoiding conflict regarding the advancing of one religion over another in the 
public schools. 
Finally, in early 1981 the Arkansas General Assembly passed another 
"Genesis" statute known as the "balanced treatment statute." The statute 
required that balanced treatment be given when teaching human origins-
balanced treatment between scientific evolution theory and scientific 
creationism. In McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education.?43 ciyii rights 
action was initiated to prohibit state education officials from enforcing the 
balanced treatment statute. The Federal District Court in Little Rock, with 
743]\icLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F.Supp. 1255 
(E.D.Ark. 1982). 
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Justice Overton writing the opinion declared the statute unconstitutional as 
First Amendment religious advancement. 
Daniel v. Waters. 399 F.Supp. 510 (M.D. Tenn. 1975), 515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 
1975). 
Facts 
In 1973, a newly enacted Tennessee statute required that all public 
school biology textbooks give equal treatment to evolution and the Biblical 
account of the origin of man and expressly to that evolution be labeled as mere 
theory. The part of the Tennessee statute in question was Chapter 377 of the 
Public Acts of 1973. 
Section 1. Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 49-2008, was amended 
by adding the following paragraph: 
Any biology textbook used for teaching in the public schools. 
which expresses an opinion of. or relates to a theory about 
origins or creation of man and his world shall be prohibited 
from being used as a textbook in such system unless it 
specifically states that it is a theory as to the origin and 
creation of man and his world and is not represented to be 
scientific fact. Any textbook so used in the public education 
system to which expresses an opinion or relates to a theory or 
theories shall give in the same textbook and under the same 
subject commensurate attention to. and an equal amount of 
emphasis on. the origins and creation of man and his world as 
the same is recorded in other theories, including, but not limited 
to. the Genesis account of the Bible. The provisions of this 
section shall not apply to use of any textbook now legally in use, 
until the beginning of the school year of 1975-1976 provided, 
however, that the textbook requirements stated above shall in 
no way diminish the duty of the state textbook commission to 
prepare a list of approved standard editions of textbooks for 
use in the public schools of the state as provided in this section. 
£ach local school board may use textbooks or supplementary 
material as approved by the state board of education to carry 
out the provisions of this section. The teaching of all occult or 
316 
satanical beliefs of human origan is expressly excluded from this 
Act. 
Section 2. Provided, however, that the Holv Bible shall not be 
defined as a textbook, but is hereby declared to be a reference 
work and shall not be required to carry the disclaimer above 
provided for textbooks.?44 
The underlined sections above were the parts which the plaintiffs-
appellants asserted were violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of 
the Constitution of the United States. The Tennessee statute, while not 
prohibiting the teaching of evolution, specified that if evolution were taught, 
then creationism must be given equal treatment. Even though Creationism 
was exempt—the Bible was a reference book not a science book—to teach 
Darwinian evolution a teacher had to teach it as a theory only, not a fact. In 
practice, instruction in evolution was required to deny it entirely as a theory, 
while the statute exempted the creation story in Genesis from such a 
disclaimer on the basis that the Bible was a reference book, not a textbook. 
Decision 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit with Justice 
Edwards writing the opinion concluded that the Tennessee law was violative of 
the establishment clause of the First Amendment. Continuing Justice 
Edwards stated that: 
The requirement that some religious concepts of creation, 
adhered to presumably by some Tennessee citizens, be 
excluded on such ground in favor of the Bible of the Jews and 
the Christians represents still another method of preferential 
treatment of particular faiths by state law and, of course, is 
forbidden by the Establishment Clause of the First 
744Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485,487 (6th Cir. 1975). 
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Amendment. 745 
Discussion 
Justice Edwards of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals expressed 
hesitancy about intervening in daily operation of schools, but maintained that 
such action must be taken when statutes and regulations infringe upon 
constitutionally protected rights. Justice Edwards maintained that 
government must be neutral in religion and nonreligious matters. Justice 
Edwards farther maintained that government "may not aid, foster, or promote 
one religion or religious theory against another or against the militant 
opposite."74® 
Finally, Justice Edwards suggested that it would be next to imposible for 
the the Tennessee Textbook Commission to determine which religious theories 
should be considered satanical or occult without first resolving theological 
arguments which have embroiled and frustrated theologians through the ages. 
Justice Edwards maintained that throughout human history "the God of some 
men has frequently been regarded as the Devil incarnate by men of other 
religious persuasions."747 
745ibid., 491. 
74®Ibid., 490. 
747Ibid., 491. 
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Edwards vAgnillard. 765 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1985), reh'g denied, 779 F.2d 225 
(5th Cir. 1985), 482 U.S. 578,106 S.Ct. 1947 (1987). 
Facts 
In 1987 the Supreme Court handed down a landmark decision in 
AgnillflrH-748 The case arose when the Louisiana Legislature enacted a law 
entitled the "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science 
in Public School Instruction." The statute maintained that instruction on the 
human origins would not be required in any public school. However, in the 
event that such instruction was presented, it must include teaching of both 
evolution and creation science. Parents, teachers, and several religious leaders 
joined in challenging the statute as violation of the state and federal 
constitutions. 
Decision 
The United States District Court (Eastern District of Louisiana) held 
that the statute violated the state constitution. However, on appeal the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeal reversed and remanded. Justice Adrian Duplantier, Jr. 
writing for the District Court "reasoned that the doctrine of creation-science 
necessarily entailed teaching the existence of a divine creator and the concept 
of a creator was an inherently religious tenet. "^49 Thus, said Justice 
Duplantier the purpose of Louisiana's statute was to promote religion-and 
that was First Amendment establishment. 
The state had argued the statute promoted academic freedom. The 
Court of Appeals rejected that argument and Justice Jolly maintained the 
748Edwards v. Aguillard, 765 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1985). 
749Ibid., 1254. 
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statute had a different purpose of discrediting "evolution by counterbalancing 
its teaching at every turn with the teaching of creationsim."?50 
Plaintiffs had argued that statute was "simply another effort by 
fundamentalist Christians to attack the theory of evolution and to 
incomporate in the public school education the Bible theory of creation 
described in the Book of Genesis. "751 Regarding the secular purpose prong of 
the tripartite test Justice Jolly acknowledged that many religious groups 
embraced creationism. However, after reviewing Karen BJ52 and 
Lubbock753 Justice Jolly concluded the statute was without secular purpose. 
Justice Jolly lamented "the act continues the battle William Jennings Bryan 
carried to his grave,"754 anc[ was intended to "discredit evolution by 
counterbalancing its teachings at every turn with the teaching of creationism, 
a religious belief."755 Thus, the statute failed the first prong of the Lemon 7 56 
test. 
The Supreme Court voted seven to two with Justice Brennan writing 
750ibid., 1257. 
751lbid., 1254. 
752j£aren g v Treen, 653 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1981), affd mem, 455 U.S. 
913, 107 S.Ct. 1267 (1982). 
753]jUbbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent School 
District, 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982), reh. denied, 680 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 
1982cert denied, 459 U.S. 1155,103 S.Ct. 800, 74 L.Ed. 1003 (1983). 
754Edwards v. Aguillard, 765 F.2d 1251,1257 (5th Cir. 1985). 
755ibid. 
756Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 
(1971). 
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the majority opinion that state advanced religion. 
Discussion 
Justice Brennan reviewing history of Louisiana's statute maintained 
that primary intent was religious advancement--the 1981 statute " 'was 
clearly to advance the religious viewpoint that a supernatural being created 
humankind' and not to advance the cause of academic freedom as the state 
maintained."^ 7 Continuing Justice Brennan acknowledged that of all 
scientific subjects taught in schools this one emerged in legislation~"Out of 
many possible science subjects taught in the public schools, the legislature 
chose to effect the teachings of the one scientific theory that historically has 
been opposed by certain religious sects."^58 Thus maintained Justice 
Brennan, the statute fails all three prongs of the Lemon tripartite test. 
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented. In his 
dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia suggested that the Court had an "intellectual 
predisposition created by the facts and legend"759 of the famous 1925 Scopes 
trial. In expressing his amazement, Justice Scalia concluded the following: 
"We have... no adequate basis for disbelieving the purpose set forth in the act 
itself, or for concluding that it is a sham enacted to conceal the legislators' 
violation of their oaths of office."? 60 
757Tom Mirgo, "Creationism Law in Louisana is Rejected by Supreme 
Court," Education Week 6, No 39 (June 24,1987): 1. 
758ibid.,6. 
759lbid. 
760ibid. 
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Equal Access and Religious Groups on Campus 
Brandon v. Board of Education of Guilderland Central School District. 635 
F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1123,102 S.Ct. 970, 71 L.Ed.2d 
109 (1981). 
Facts 
In 1978, several students at Guilderland High School organized a group 
called Students for Voluntary Prayer. In September 1978 they requested 
permission from the principal to hold communal prayer meetings in a 
classroom before the beginning of the school day. The group noted that it was 
not requesting supervision or faculty involvement. Its activities were 
voluntary and would not interfere with any other school activities. 
In a letter dated September 23,1978, the principal denied their request. 
Lister, the superintendent also refused their request. On December 19,1978, 
and again on March 19,1979, the Guilderland Board of Education voted to deny 
the group's request. In June 1979, six members filed suit individually and on 
behalf of the group for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief against the 
principal, the superintendent, the board of education and its individual 
members for denying their group communal prayer meetings in the public 
school immediately before the beginning of the school day. They claimed their 
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion, freedom 
of speech, freedom of association, and equal protection were being violated. 
Decision 
On April 16,1980, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of New York, Judge McCurn presiding, granted the defendants 
judgment and dismissed the complaint. The students appealed to the United 
States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. Irving R. Kaufman, Circuit Judge, 
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affirmed the decision of the District Court by ruling that: 
(1) plaintiffs' free exercise rights were not limited by school 
board's refusal to permit communal prayer meetings to occur 
on school premises, and authorization of student-initiated 
voluntary prayer would have violated the establishment clause 
by creating an unconstitutional link between church and state, 
and (2) school board's refusal did not violate plaintiffs' right to 
free speech, freedom of association, or equal protection. 761 
The Supreme Court decided not to review the decision of the Appellate Court. 
Discussion 
The District Court found that the establishment clause restricted the 
school from permitting the students to hold prayer meetings in a classroom. In 
applying the Lemon? 62 test, Judge McCurn found that even though a school's 
decision might have a secular purpose, the granting of the group's request 
would have the impermissible effect of advancing religion. In addition, if prayer 
meetings were held the school would need to provide supervision. School 
supervision would cause excessive entanglement between a supposedly secular 
school and clearly religious activities. 
Further, Judge McCurn found that the school's denial did not violate the 
students' rights to freely exercise their religious beliefs. Moreover, even if some 
infringement occurred, it was justified by the state to protect the interest of 
maintaining separation between church and state. The arguments of freedom 
of speech and association were rejected by Judge McCurn. Finally, the court 
found that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
761ibid., 972. 
762Lemon v, Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613, 91 S.Ct. 2105 (971). 
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demand that a religious organization be treated in the same maimer as secular 
student groups permitted to use the school facilities. 
Wirimar v. Vincent. 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980), a f f d ,  454 U.S. 263, 102 
S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 44 (1981). 
Facts 
Cornerstone, a student religious group, wished to conduct public 
meetings at the University of Missouri for prayer, Bible reading, and sharing 
religious experiences. A university policy prohibited use of university buildings 
for religious purposes. Eleven students litigated the policy on grounds that 
policy violated their First Amendment religious rights. 
Decision 
The United States District Court in Chess v. WiHmflr763 held that the 
university policy was not only permissible but required by the establishment 
clause of the United States Constitution. The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit rejected the analysis of the District Court and reversed 
the decision. 
The Supreme Court, with Justice Louis Powell writing the majority 
opinion-eight to one vote- crafted the Court's decision in the following manner. 
First the decision must be narrow: 
Having created a forum generally open to student 
groups, the University seeks to enforce a content-based 
exclusion of religious speech. Its exclusionary policy violates 
the fundamental principle that a state regulation of speech 
should be content-neutral, and the University is unable to 
763chess v. Widmar, 480 F.Supp. 907 (1979) 
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justify this violation under applicable constitutional standards.764 
Discussion 
The University of Missouri at Kansas City had a stated policy to 
encourage participation by student groups. Over one hundred groups were 
officially recognized by the University. Students paid an activity fee to help 
defray the costs to the University. A registered religious group named 
Cornerstone had asked and received permission from 1973-1977 to conduct 
meetings in University facilities. In 1977, the group was informed it could no 
longer conduct meetings on the campus because of a University regulation 
passed in 1972 which prohibited the use of University buildings or grounds for 
the purpose of religious worship or religious teaching. The Supreme Court ruled 
that it was discriminatory to exclude from such a forum any group on the 
religious content of the group's speech unless it could justify that "its regulation 
is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that is narrowly drawn to 
achieve that end."?65 Such was not the issue in this case. 
Justice Powell applied the Lemon J7 tripartite test. The Supreme 
Court maintained that the first and third prongs were met when the District 
Court and the Court of Appeals held that an open-forum policy, including 
nondiscrimination against religious speech, would have a secular purpose and 
would avoid entanglement with religion. The Court further maintained that the 
primary effect of a public forum was not to advance religion; thus the second 
764widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
765jbid. 
76&Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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prong was cleared. It was also stated that "an open forum in a public 
university does not confer any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects 
or practices.11?67 Since any impact would be both incident and minimal, the 
decision of the Appellate Court could be affirmed. 
In an effort to establish limits on the ruling, the Court noted the 
following: 
University students are, of course, young adults. They are 
less impressionable than younger students and should be able 
to appreciate that the university's policy is, one of neutrality 
toward religion. 768 
Justice Powell is thus suggesting that if students were younger-elementary 
and secondary students~the decision would have been different. 
Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent School District. 
669F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982), reh. denied 680 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1982) cert, 
denied, 459 U.S. 1155,103 S.Ct. 800, 74 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1983). 
Facts 
The Lubbock Independent School District adopted a policy prohibiting 
student activities lacking a secular purpose during school. However, students 
were allowed to schedule voluntary secular activities, if scheduled before and 
after school. The Lubbock Civil Liberties Union, which had objected to the old 
policy, also objected to the new policy, especially paragraph four of the policy 
which stated: 
767widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981) 
768jj)id. 
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The school board permits students to gather at the school 
with supervision either before or after regular school hours on 
the same basis as other groups as determined by the school 
administration to meet for any educational, moral, religious or 
ethical purposes so long as attendance at such meetings is 
voluntary. ̂  69 
The Lubbock Civil Liberties Union also challenged the new policy on the basis 
that allowing voluntary student religious activities was a violation of the 
establishment clause of the First Amendment. 
Decision 
The trial court held that the new policy was not facially 
unconstitutional. The court specifically noted that paragraph four was not 
unconstitutional because it permitted student groups of all types to gather at 
the school as long as attendance at the meetings was voluntary. The Lubbock 
Civil Liberties Union appealed to United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit. That court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in refusing to enter 
an injunction with respect to the practices in effect before the adoption of the 
new policy. By applying the tripartite test, the Appellate Court reversed the 
decision of the District Court on the constitutionality of the new policy. 
Discussion 
The Court of Appeals (Fifth Circuit) after reviewing past history which 
included distributing Gideon Bibles in elementary schools, classroom prayers 
led by staff members, and morning Bible readings over the school public 
address systems found that board policy was First Amendment advancment. 
7 69Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent School 
District, 669 F.2d 1038 (1982). 
327 
Bender v. Williamsport Area School District. 563 F.Supp. 697 (M.D. Penn. 
1983), 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated, 475 U.S. 534, 105 S.Ct. 1167 
(1985), reh'gdenied, 476 U.S. 1132 (1986). 
Facts 
In September 1981, a group of high School students in Williamsport, 
Pennsylvania formed a club called "Petros" for the purpose of promoting 
"spiritual growth and positive attitudes in the lives of its members."7^0 The 
group obtained permission from the principal to hold an organizational meeting 
during activity period on school premises. At the meeting Bible verses were 
read and students prayed. There was no evidence that anyone objected to 
future meetings of Petros; nevertheless, the principal told the group they could 
not meet again until he had discussed the matter with the superintendent. 
The superintendent informed the students that he would respond to the written 
request for recognition when he received legal counsel from the school district 
solicitor concerning the formation of a religious club on campus. 
In November 1981, the principal and the superintendent met with 
Petros and advised the group that, based on the legal opinion of the school 
district solicitor, their request must be denied. The students were informed 
that they could meet off school premises and would be given released time 
during activity period if they could find a meeting place and an adult, preferably 
a clergyman, for their meetings. 
The students appealed in writing to the chairman of the Williamsport 
Area School Board. At a board meeting in January 1982, the board upheld the 
superintendent's decision and denied the appeal based on the solicitor's opinion. 
770lJender v. Williamsport Area School District, 106 S.Ct. 1326,1327 
(1986). 
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In June 1982, ten of the students filed suit in the United States District 
Court against the Williamsport Area School District, the nine members of the 
school board, the superintendent of the school district, and the principal of the 
high school. The suit alleged that refusal to allow them to meet on the same 
basis as other student groups because of their religious activities violated the 
First Amendment, and they asked for declaratory and injunctive relief. 
Decision 
The District Court, on motions for summary judgment ruled in favor of 
the students but entered no injunction and granted no relief against any 
defendant in his individual capacity. The school district did not appeal and 
complied with the judgment and permitted the students to hold their meetings 
as requested. However, one member of the school board did appeal. No one 
questioned his standing to appeal and the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit ruled in his favor. The Supreme Court of the United States 
held that the school board member did not have standing to appeal; and 
therefore, the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to hear his appeal or to 
decide the merits of the case. The Supreme Court ordered the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals vacated and the case was remanded with instructions to 
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
Discussion 
Willamsport High School held an activity period for thirty minutes on 
Tuesdays and Thursdays for student groups to conduct meetings. It was a 
part of the school day. Students not participating in a club were allowed to 
study in the library, visit the school's computer room, examine career or college 
placement materials, or remain in their homerooms until time for the next 
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class period. Participation in activities was completely voluntary, although 
each student was required to be on school grounds and accounted for during 
activity period. 
Each student club was required to have a sponsor which was usually a 
faculty member. The only qualification for an activity was that it "contribute 
to the intellectual, physical or social development of the students and is 
otherwise considered legal and constitutionally proper. "771 
Petros, a student group, requested permission to meet during activity 
period. To the knowledge of the principal Petros was the only student group 
ever denied permission to meet. Petros had a monitor present at its 
organizational meeting who used the time to grade papers and did not 
participate in the meeting. 
The appellate court used the following questions in analyzing the 
constitutionality of Petros meeting during activity period: 
1. Did the student members of Petros have a free speech right 
guaranteed by the first amendment? 
2. If we conclude, the Williamsport school district did create a 
forum limited to accommodating student activities which 
would promote the intellectual and social development of 
of its students as part of the secondary school educational 
process, then did the students in the Petros program come 
within the prescribed parameters of the limited open forum 
so created? 
3. Assuming an affirmative answer to the preceding inquiries, 
may the school district validly object to the presence of 
Petros within the school, based on the potential violation 
of the Establishment Clause? 
77lBender v. Williamsport Area School District, 741 F.2d 538, 544 
(1984). 
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4. If we conclude, as we do, that allowing Petros to meet within 
the school would violate the Establishment Clause, then 
which of two provisions of the first amendment should 
control, where the students, on the one hand, have a free 
speech right, but the school district, on the other hand, 
would be in violation of the Establishment Clause if it 
permitted the religious activity and speech ofPetros?772 
The appellate court concluded that since the parameters for student 
group meetings were so broad, the activities of Petros were within the bounds 
of a "limited forum" as it existed at Willaimsport High School. Therefore, the 
student members of Petros had a valid First Amendment interest to 
participate in their proposed activity. 
With the limited forum issue settled, the issue turned to determining if 
the school could constitutionally impose restrictions on the free speech rights 
of the students. The only reason given by WilliamsportHigh School for denying 
permission for Petros to organize was that such permission might be a 
violation of the establishment clause. 
In applying the tripartite test the appellate court concluded that 
Williamsport failed two of the three prongs. The general activity period at 
Williamsport High School had no religious objective or nonsecular purpose. 
Allowing Petro to meet would have the effect of advancing religion. Meeting on 
school property and providing supervision for Petros would create an 
unavoidable excessive governmental entanglement in religion. 
A case was presented in this litigation to apply the Wiriiwar773 decision 
772ibid. 
773widmar v. Vincent, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980), affd, 454 U.S. 
263 (1981). 
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to secondary schools. Williamsport and Widmflr were similar but in general the 
secondary school is a more restrictive environment than the university. 
Another important factor was the maturity level of the students. 
It is worth noting that the Williamsport case started in the District 
Court before the passage of the Equal Access Act?74 an(j concluded in the 
Supreme Court after its passage. It is surprising that the Equal Access Act 
did not become more involved in the Williamsport decisions. 
Garnett v. Renton School District No. 403. 675 F.Supp. 1268(1988), 865 
F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1989), appeal filed, 110 S.Ct. 362 (1989). 
Facts 
Richard Garnett and other students asked permission of the principal 
and the school district to use a classroom in the high school for weekday 
morning meetings of their nondenominational Christian student group. The 
group planned to discuss religious and moral issues, read the Bible, and pray. 
The principal and the school district denied their request because their club 
was not curriculum related and because permitting the proposed meetings 
would violate the establishment clause of The First Amendment. Members of 
the Christian group brought action against the high school and the school 
district to permit religious meetings on school property. 
Decision 
The United States District Court for the Western District of 
Washington denied the preliminary injunction, and judgment was later entered 
for the school district on the merits. The students appealed. The United 
774pub. Law No. 98-377, 802-805, 98 Stat. 1302 (1084) [codified at 20 
U.S.C. 4071-4074 (1988)]. 
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States Court of Appeals for the Ninth District affirmed the ruling of the 
District Court by stating: 
(1) allowing the student religious group to hold meetings in 
public high school classroom prior to start of the school day 
would violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment; 
(2) school district's refusal to allow student religious group to meet 
on the public high school campus did not violate First Amendment 
free speech clause; and (3) public high school did not have a 
"limited open forum," as defined by the Equal Access Act, and 
school was accordingly not required by mandatory provisions of 
the Act to allow student religious groups to hold meetings.775 
Discussion 
Lindbergh High School is a public high school in the Renton School 
District. The district made classrooms available for students to use for 
approved "cocurricular" activities during noninstructional time. The district's 
board of directors and the superintendent determined whether to approve an 
activity based on District Policy 6470 which stated: 
[t]he criteria to be used for approving cocurricular activities 
should include but not be limited to: 
1. the purposes and/or objectives shall be an extension 
of a specific program or course offering, 
2. the activity shall be acceptable to the community, 
3. the activity should have carry-over values for 
lifetime activities. 
4. the group shall be supervised by a qualified 
employee, 
5. fiie cost of the activity must not be prohibitive 
to students or District, 
6. the activity must comply with Title IX 
requirements, 
7. the activity must take place on school premises 
unless approved in advance by the school principal, and 
^^Garnett v. Renton School District No. 403, 865 F.2d 1121,1123 (9th 
Cir. 1989). 
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8. the activity must not be secretive in nature.77** 
Policy 6470 also states that the district "does not offer a limited open 
forum."777 
Permitting the Christian group to meet in a public high school 
classroom at a time closely associated with the school day would violate the 
establishment clause. It could be argued that the action might have a secular 
purpose by permitting equal access to school facilities. This argument fails 
because the school district had a written policy which stated the school district 
did not offer a limited open forum. It would also violate the establishment 
clause because it fails the second and third prongs of the Lemon 77® test. It 
would both advance and entangle the high school with religion. 
Other circuits in exploring use of school facilities for religious meeting 
have held that such meetings unconstitutionally advance religion. Even under 
a neutral equal access policy, the Brandon77** court found that permitting 
prayer meetings in a high school would impressionably advance religion. The 
court pointed out the appearance of school sponsorship that would arise: 
Our nation's elementary and secondary schools play a 
unique role in transmitting basic and fundamental values to 
our youth. To an impressionable student, even the mere 
appearance of secular involvement in religious activities 
776lbid., 1122. 
777Ibid. 
778Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2111, 
29 L.Ed2d 745 (1971). 
77^Brandon v. Board of Education 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980). 
334 
might indicate that the state has placed its imprimatur on 
a particular religious creed. This symbolic inference is too 
dangerous to permit.780 
Refusing to permit a student religious group to meet on campus did not 
violate the free speech clause of the First Amendment. Lindbergh High School 
did not have a public limited forum. As the Supreme Court held in HaralwooH: 
school facilities may be deemed to be public forums only 
if school authorities have "by policy or by practice" opened 
those facilities "for indiscriminate use by the general public," 
. . .  o r  b y  s o m e  s e g m e n t  o f  t h e  p u b l i c ,  s u c h - a s  s t u d e n t  
organizations 781 
Since the Renton School District had not created a pubic forum it could exclude 
the religious group. Policy 6740 of the Renton School District only applied to 
student clubs in the high school. They had been consistent in applying the 
policy. Clubs were allowed to meet only after they received district approval. 
The requirements of the Equal Access Act did not apply because all the 
clubs at Lindbergh were related to the curriculum. This case was the first time 
the Equal Access Act had been used by a plaintiff in an attempt to force a high 
school to allow a Christian group to meet in a classroom on campus. 
780ibid.} 971. See also Bellv Little Axe Independent School District, 766 
F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1985); Nartowicz v. Clayton County School District, 736 
F.2d 646 (11th Cir. 1984); Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, 741 
F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 534,106 S.Ct. 
1326,89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock 
Independent School District, 669 F,2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982), cert, denied, 459 
U.S. 1155,103 S.Ct. 800, 74 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1983). 
78 lHazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,108 S.Ct. 
562, 568, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988). 
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Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v,. Mergens. 110 S.Ct. 
2356, 110 L.Ed.2d 191(1990). 
Facts 
Bridgett Mergens, a student at Westside High School, a public 
secondary school in Omaha, Nebraska, met with the principal and asked for 
permission to form a Christian club at school. The club was to be 
nondenominational and open to all students. Its purpose was to permit 
students to read and discuss the Bible, enjoy fellowship, and pray together. It 
would have the same privileges as all other Westside clubs, but it would not 
have a faculty sponsor. Her request was denied, first by the principal and then 
by the superintendent, on the grounds that a religious club at school would 
violate the establishment clause. 
Mergens appealed to the school board which supported the decision of 
the superintendent. She then challenged the decision in federal district court on 
the basis that it violated the Equal Access Act and her First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion. The school board responded 
that the Equal Access Act did not apply because Westside did not maintain a 
limited open forum, and even if the school did maintain such a forum, the act 
was unconstitutional. 
Decision 
The United States District Court held that the Equal Access Act did 
not apply because all student clubs at Westside High School were curriculum 
related. The students appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
which reversed the decision of the District Court. The Court of Appeals ruled 
that the purpose of the Equal Access Act was to prohibit discrimination 
against respondents' proposed club on the basis of its religious content, and 
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that the Act did not violate the establishment clause. On certiorari, Justice 
O'Connor delivered the opinion of the United States Supreme Court which held 
that: "(1) the scuba diving club, chess club, and service club were non 
curriculum related student groups, triggering district's obligations under the 
Equal Access Act, and (2) the Act does not violate the establishment 
clause."782 
Discussion 
Westside High School, a public secondary high school that receives 
federal financial assistance, permitted students, oil a voluntary basis, to form 
clubs and hold meetingsafter school hours on school property. There were 
approximately thirty groups, including a chess club, a scuba diving club, and a 
service group working with special education classes. Each club was required 
to have a sponsor. There were no written guidelines as to the formation of 
student clubs. Students wishing to form a club would present their request to a 
school official. The school official would decide whether the proposed club was 
consistent with school board policies and the district's commitment to 
teaching skills and values. 
A group of students at the high school requested permission to form a 
Christian club for the purpose of permitting students to read and discuss the 
Bible, enjoy fellowship, and pray together. The club was to be 
nondenominational and open to all students. It would have the same privileges 
as all other Westside clubs, but it would not have a faculty sponsor. 
School officials denied the request for the Christian club to meet citing 
782Boar(j of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 110 
S.Ct. 2356, (1990). 
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the establishment clause and the club's lack of a faculty sponsor. Members of 
the Christian club asserted their denial to meet on campus 
violated the Equal Access Act, which prohibits public 
secondary schools that receive federal assistance and that 
maintain a "limited open forum" from denying "equal access" 
to students who wish to meet with the forum on the basis of 
"religious, political, philosophical, or other content" of the 
speech at such meetings.783 
Justice O'Connor in delivering the majority opinion of the Court pointed 
out that the petitioners violated the Equal Access"Act by denying official 
recognition of the respondents' proposed club. A schools' equal access is 
triggered if the school permits one or more noncurriculum-related groups to 
meet on the school premises. The Equal Access Act did not define 
noncurriculum-related groups but that term is best interpreted through the 
act's language, logic, and nondiscriminatory purpose, and Congress' intent to 
mean any student group's subject matter that is not taught as a part on the 
regular school subject matter. 
Westside High School offered a limited open forum by permitting one or 
more noncurriculum groups to meet on campus. The denial by school officials 
for the religious group to meet on school premises during noninstructional time, 
as other student groups did, violated the Equal Access Act which prohibits 
school officials from discriminating against students based on the content of 
students' speech. 
The denial of the respondents' request to form a religious club was a 
denial of "equal access" to the schools limited open forum. Apparently, the 
783ibid., 2359. 
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school permitted the students to meet informally before or after school but 
they were seeking formal recognition so they would have the same privileges as 
other clubs, such as access to the intercom system, bulletin boards, school 
newspaper, and the annual Club Fair. Their denial based on the religious 
content of the meetings in the school's limited open forum violated the Equal 
Access Act. 
Justice O'Conner, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Wbite, and 
Justicce Black, concluded that Part HE of the Equal Access Act did not conflict 
with the Establishment Clause. They expressed a view that by applying the 
logic ofWidmar Vincent. 7 84 which applied the tripatite test of Lemon v. 
Kurtzman.785 the Equal Access Act in this case did not violate the 
Establishment Clause because it (1) served a secular purpose; (2) did not 
advance religion; (3) did not risk entanglement between government and 
religion. 
In dissenting, Justice Stevens asserted the majority had 
misinterrupted the intent of the Equal Access Act approved by the Congress of 
the United States. Did Congress intend to order every public high school that 
sponsors a chess club, a scuba diving club, or a French club, without having 
formal classes in those subjects, to open its doors to every religious, political, or 
social organization, no matter how controversial or distasteful its views may 
be? Justice Stevens stated: 
784widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271-275,102 S.Ct. 269 275-277, 
70 L.Ed.2d 440. 
785Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613, 91 S.Ct. 2105,1111, 
29 L.Ed.2d 745. 
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I think not. A fair review of the history to the Equal Acces 
Act..discloses that Congress intended to recognize a much 
narrower forum than the Court has legistated into existence 
today.78*> 
Praver at Athletic Events 
Pre v. Airline Independent School District. 563 F.Supp. 883 (1982). 
Facts 
An anonymous plaintiff brought action against a Texas school district 
for violation of constitutional rights based on recitation and singing of a school 
prayer on school district property. The following prayer was the source of 
controversy: "Dear God, please bless our school and all it stands for. Help 
keep us free from sin, honest and true, courage and faith to make our school 
the victor. In Jesus' name we pray, Amen."?87 These words were posted in 
block letters on the wall over the entrance to the gymnasium at Aldine Senior 
High School and recited or sung by students to music played by the Aldine 
School band at athletic events, pep rallies, and at graduation ceremonies. 
These school-sponsored events took place before or after regular school hours 
in the school gymnasium and at the football stadium which were the property 
of the school district. Frequently, the school principal or other school 
employees would initiate the recitation or singing of the school prayer. Even 
though students were required to assemble in the gymnasium for certain 
school programs, attendance at any event during which the prayer was to be 
786ibid., 2383. 
787£)oe v, Aldine Independent School District, 563 F.Supp. 883,884 
(1982). 
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recited or sung was voluntary. In addition, no one was forced to sing or recite 
the words, nor was anyone required to stand when the words were recited or 
sung. 
Decision 
The district court held that the practice or policy of reciting or singing 
a school prayer violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment, 
notwithstanding that the singing or recitation occurred at extracurricular 
events on school property where practice was state-initiated, encouraged, and 
supervised. The plaintiffs motion for summary judgment was granted. 
Discussion 
In this case, the court had to deal with two interrelated questions: 
(1) whether the activities of the defendants violated the 
establishment clause or (2) whether, as defendants contend, 
the restriction of those activities would mean an impermissible 
encroachment on the individual student's constitutional right to 
freely exercise his or her religion. 788 
There was no questions that the words of the Aldine school song constituted a 
prayer since they called on God for His blessing and contained an avowal of 
divine faith. In applying the Lemon test, the Aldine school song failed all three 
prongs. 
The defendants claimed that the Aldine school song was secular 
because it was intended to instill school spirit and pride. Its use would have the 
beneficial effect of increasing morale and reducing disciplinary problems in the 
school. The court responded that a school district or other governmental body 
788ibid., 885. 
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cannot seek to advance nonreligious goals and values, no matter how 
laudatory, through religious means. In Hall v. Bradshaw. the court stated: 
If a state could avoid the application of the first amendment in 
this manner [by using religious means to further nonreligious 
goals], any religious activity of whatever nature could be justified 
by public officials on the basis that it has a beneficial secular 
purposes.789 
Therefore, as a matter of law, the defendants claim fails the Supreme 
Court's secular purpose test. 
The defendants contended that singing or reciting the prayer neither 
advanced nor inhibited religion because the students were not required to 
participate and state employees only had a limited involvement. The 
defendants also pointed out that the challenged activities did not take place in 
a religious setting. The court found that the defendants could not satisfactorily 
defend the question of primary effect. The reason was that when viewed in its 
entirety, the natural consequences of these actions would be the advancement 
of religion by indicating to students that the state advocates religious belief. 
The defendants contended that they had avoided an excessive 
entanglement with religion by reciting the prayer only at times which did not 
encroach on the educational operation of the school, and both attendance and 
participation at events where the prayer was sung or recited was voluntary. 
Analysis of the entanglement issue was involved with procedural matters. The 
relevant examination was whether the state must provide supervision for 
religious activity.790 
789Hall v. Bradshaw, 630 F.2d 1018,1020-1021, (4th Cir. 1980). 
790Branc[on Vi Board of Education of Guilderland Central School 
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In this case it was apparent that Aldine High School personnel were 
active in their supervision of religious activity. The facts of Aldine were similar 
to those of Lubbock? 91 in which the court found that in compliance with Texas 
state law, the school district had provided supervision of students who were 
meeting voluntarily before and after school on school grounds for religious 
activity. In Lubbock the court stated: "If the state must so supervise, then 
church and state are excessively intertwined. "79 2 The ruling in Lubbock 
controls on the entanglement issue. Therefore, as a matter of law, the Aldine 
court concluded that the defendant did not avoid an excessive entanglement 
with religion and thus failed the third prong of the Lemon test. 
The defendants took the position that to limit the activity at issue 
would have been a violation of the students' rights to the free exercise of 
religion. However, the activity that the court addressed was not the issue of 
independent, unofficial invocation of God's help by students, but rather a 
recurring state-sponsored and supervised activity on school property during 
extracurricular events which were an important part of the school's program. 
The difference was important and controlling. "The former is an inviolable 
right; the latter, according to the purpose, effect, and entanglement analysis of 
the Supreme Court, is an impermissible establishment of religion."793 
District, 635 F.2d 971, 979 (2d Cir. 1980). 
79lLubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent School 
District, 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982). 
792ibid., 1047. 
793j)oe v. Adline Independent School District, 563 F. Supp. 883,888 
(1982). 
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Jaeer v. Douglas County School District. 862 F.2d 824 (11th Cir. 1989). 
Facts 
In the fall of 1985, Doug Jager, a member of the marching band, 
objected to his school principal about the practice of having pregame 
invocations delivered at home football games. The invocations often began 
with the words "let us bow or heads"794 or "iet us pray"795 and frequently 
made reference to Jesus Christ or ended with the words "in Jesus' name we 
pray. "796 These invocations were in conflict with the Jagers' sincerely held 
religious beliefs. The principal made the band director aware of Doug Jager's 
objections to the prayers. The band director witnessed to Doug on Christianity. 
Decision 
In the Fall of 1986, the Jagers filed a complaint in the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The court issued a 
temporary restraining order prohibiting the Douglas County School District 
from conducting or permitting invocations prior to any athletic event at the 
school stadium. 
The case was tried in the Fall of 1986 and on February 3,1987, the 
District Court 
(1) declared the pregame invocations unconstitutional, 
(2) denied the Jagers' request for a permanent injunction, 
(3) rejected the Jagers1 claim based on the Free Exercise of 
Religion Clause of the First Amendment, and (4) rejected the 
jager v. Douglas County School District, 862 F.2d 824, 826 (11th 
Cir. 1989) 
795ibid. 
?96lbid. 
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Jagers' claim that the School District violated the Georgia 
Constitution. 797 
Discussion 
In the Spring of 1986, the Douglas County School superintendent, the 
school system attorney, the Jagers and their counsel, and two ministers met 
and discussed two alternative proposals for changing the invocation practices. 
One proposal was a secular inspirational speech, which was acceptable to the 
Jagers. The other was an equal access plan that would retain some religious 
content which was rejected by the Jagers. 
The District Court held that the equal access plan, which involved 
randomly selecting innovation speakers, was constitutional on its face and did 
not violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment. On appeal the 
Jagers' challenged this holding. 
The Court of Appeals stated that the equal access plan was adopted 
with the purpose of endorsing and perpetuating religion. The District Court 
found that pregame invocations serve four purposes: 
(1) to continue a long standing custom and tradition; (2) to add 
a solemn and dignified tone to the proceedings; (3) to remind the 
spectators and players of the importance of sportsmanship and 
fair play, and (4) "to satisfy the genuine, good faith wishes on 
part of a majority of the citizens of Douglas County to publicly 
express support for Protestant Christianity. "798 
The Court of Appeals found that the equal access plan failed the first 
797ibid., 827. 
798ibid829. 
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two prongs of the Lemon? 9 9 test, secular purpose and primary effect. The 
court asserted that the equal access plan in this case was adopted with the 
purpose of endorsing and perpetuating religion. The school district's rejection 
of an alternative plan to have only secular invocations makes it clear that the 
school district's purpose for pregame invocations was religious. School 
district's claim that it was not entangled with religion because it did not 
monitor the content of the invocations and the Douglas County Ministerial 
Association no longer selected the invocation speaker or delivered the pregame 
prayer did not change the intent of the pregame invocations. 
The school district offered arguments claiming that the invocations at 
pregames were constitutional. Their first argument was that the pregame 
prayers occurred outside the instructional environment of the classrooms. The 
Doe court rejected this argument: 
Pep rallies, football games, and graduation ceremonies are 
considered to be an integral part of the school's extracurricular 
program and as such provide a powerful incentive for students 
to attend.... "It is the Texas compulsory education machinery 
that draws the students to the school events and provides any 
audience at all for the religious activities " Since these 
extracurricular activities were school sponsored and so closely 
identified with the school program, the fact that the religious 
activity took place in a nonreligious setting might create in a 
student's mind the impression that the state's attitude toward 
religion lacks neutrality.®^® 
The next argument from the school district was that football 
799Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2111, 
29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971) 
800dO6 V. Aldine Independent School District, 563 F.Supp. 883,887 
(S.D.Tex. 1982). 
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invocations did not invoke the teacher-student relationship, and were directed 
to a far less impressionable audience of adults and sixteen- to eighteen-year-
olds. However, the equal access plan did permit teachers to deliver religious 
invocations. The permitting of prayers by authority figures gave support to 
the idea that the state was endorsing religion. 
Another argument by the School District was that the invocations were 
constitutional since they were given at voluntary events. In upholding 
invocations at graduation ceremonies courts have stressed that attendance 
was voluntary. However, the Supreme Court and this court have not held that 
voluntary attendance makes prayers constitutional. The Supreme Court in 
Engel stated: "Neither the fact that the prayer may be denominationally 
neutral nor the fact that its observance on the part of the students is 
voluntary can serve to free it from the limitations of the establishment 
clause."® 01 
The final argument of the School District was that the school prayer 
cases constitute a de minimus violation of the establishment clause because 
they last from sixty to ninety seconds. The establishment clause does not 
focus on the amount of time for an activity, but rather examines the religious 
nature of the activity. As the Fourth Circuit stated in Bradshaw. "[a] prayer, 
because it is religious, does advance religion, and the limited nature of the 
encroachment does not free the state from the limitations of the establishment 
clause."802 
SOlEngel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430, 82 S.Ct. 1261,1266-1267, 8 
L.Ed.2d 601 (1962) 
802Hall v. Bradshaw, 630 F.2d 1018,1021 (4th Cir. 1980). 
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Religious SvmholR and Holidays 
Florev v. SiouxFalls School District 49-5. 464 F.Supp. 911 (1979). 
Facts 
The Sioux Falls public schools had presented a variety of Christinas 
assemblies for a number of years. During the 1977 Christmas season, two 
Sioux Falls kindergarten classes presented a Christmas assembly for parents. 
The assembly was filled with religious content including a responsive quiz 
between the teacher and the class. "The Beginners Christmas Quiz" consisted 
of the following: 
Teacher: Of whom did heav'nly angels sing, 
And news about His birthday bring? 
Class: Jesus 
Teacher: Now, can you name the little town 
Where they the Baby Jesus found? 
Class: Bethlehem 
Teacher: Where had they made a little bed 
For Christ, the blessed Savior's head? 
Class: hi a manger in a cattle stall. 
Teacher: What is the day we celebrate 
As birthday of this One so great? 
Class: Christmas.®® ̂  
Roger Florey, the father of Justin Florey, one of the kindergarten 
students in the program, made a complaint about the program. The 
803piorey v. Sioux Falls School District, 464 F.Supp 911 (1979). 
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superintendent in response to this complaint and others in the past about 
Christmas programs set up a citizens' committee to study the issue of church 
and state in relationship to school district functions. 
In the fall of 1978 the school board adopted the committee's policy 
statement and rules for observance of religious holidays. Plaintiffs brought 
suit against the school district claiming the policy and rules adopted by the 
school board violated the establishment lause of the First Amendment. They 
asked the court to prohibit the school board from enforcing and from failing to 
instruct all Sioux Falls public officials that all Christmas assemblies must be 
secular. 
Decision 
The United States District Court denied the plaintiffs request for a 
permanent injunction. The court held: 
that school board's rules, which made it abundantly clear 
that schools could observe holidays that had both a religious 
and secular significance, which sought to assure that schools 
could present holiday assemblies that contained religious art. 
literature, or music as long as such materials were presented 
in prudent and objective manner, and which allowed display 
of religious symbols under certain circumstances, did not 
violate the establishment clause.804 
Discussion 
At the beginning, the District Court noted that the Christmas program 
presented in 1977 clearly exceeded theboundary of what is constitutionally 
acceptable under the establishment clause. The new policy would not allow 
such a program since that program was neither prudent nor objective. The 
804ibid., 911. 
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new rules permitted the observance of holidays in Sioux Falls public schools 
that had a religious and secular basis, such as Christmas and Easter, but 
denied observance of holidays with a purely sectarian significance, such as 
Pentecost, Ash Wednesday, and Good Friday. The rules for observance of 
religious holidays in the Sioux Falls School District were as follows: 
1. The several holidays throughout the year which have a 
religious and a secular basis maybe observed in the 
public schools. 
2. The historical and contemporaiy values and the origin 
of religious holidays maybe explained in an unbiased 
and objective manner without sectarian indoctrination. 
3. Music, art, literature and drama having religious themes 
or basis are permitted as part of the curriculum for 
school-sponsored activities and programs presented in 
a prudent and objective manner and as a traditional 
part of the cultural and religious heritage of the 
particular holiday. 
4. The use of religious symbols such as a cross, menorah, 
crescent, Star of David, cr&che, symbols of Native 
American religions or other symbols that are a part of 
a religious holiday is permitted as a teaching aid or 
resource provided such symbols are displayed as an 
example of the cultural and religious heritage of the 
holiday and are temporary in nature. Among these 
holidays are included Christmas, Easter, Passover, 
Hannukah, St. Valentine's Day, St. Patrick's Day, 
Thanksgiving and Halloween. 
5. The school district's calendar should be prepared so as 
to minimize conflicts with religious holidays of all faiths.® 
The District Court concluded that if the above rules were properly 
applied the programs and treatment of religious subjects in the Sioux Falls 
public schools could withstand constitutional attack. In order to pass 
constitutional muster the challenged practice must be able to pass all three 
805^., 918. 
350 
prongs of the Lemon806 test, a secular purpose, primary effect neither 
prohibits nor inhibits religion, and no excessive entanglement with government. 
Religious institutions and orientations are an important part of the 
human experience, past and present. An education without this experience 
would be incomplete. "It is essential that the teaching about-scaA not of-
religion be conducted in a factual objective and respectful manner."®®^ 
Religion in the curriculum of the Sioux Falls School District shall be as 
follows: 
1. The District supports the inclusion of religious literature, 
music, drama and the arts in the curriculum and in 
activities provided it is intrinsic to the learning experience 
in the various fields of study and is presented objectively. 
2. The emphasis on religious themes in the arts, literature 
and history should be only as extensive as necessary for 
a balanced and comprehensive study of these areas. 
Such studies should never foster any particular religious 
tenets or demean any religious beliefs. 
3. Student-initiated expressions to questions or assignments 
which reflect their beliefs or non-beliefs about a religious 
theme shall be accommodated. For example, students are 
free to express religious belief or non-belief in compositions, 
art forms, music, speech and debate.^08 
The Sioux Falls School District recognized that traditions were a 
cherished part of community life and expressed an interest in keeping those 
806Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,612-613, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 
L.Ed.2d 745 (1971). 
SO^Florey v. Sioux Falls School District 49-5,464 F.Supp, 911, 918 
(1979). 
808ibid., 919. 
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traditions which were important to the community. These ceremonies should 
recognize the religious diversity of the community. 
Dedications and commencements in the Sioux Falls School District 
shall be as follows: 
1. A dedication ceremony should recognize the religious 
pluralism of the community and be appropriate to those 
who use the facility. An open invitation should be extended 
to all citizens to participate in the ceremony. 
2. Traditions, i. e., invocation and benediction, inherent in 
commencement ceremonies, should be honored in spirit of 
accommodation and good taste. 
3. Because the baccalaureate service is traditionally religious 
in nature, it should be sponsored by agencies separate from 
the Sioux Falls School District.®®^ 
Justice Jackson, in a concurring opinion in McCollum. made 
observations that are applicable to this case. He stated: 
Music without sacred music, architecture minus the 
cathedral, or painting without the scriptural themes would 
be eccentric and incomplete, even from a secular point of 
view The fact is that, for good or for ill, nearly everything 
in our culture worth transmitting, everything which gives 
meaning to life, is saturated with religious influences, derived 
from paganism, Judaism, Christianity-both Catholic and 
Protestant—and other faiths accepted by a large part of the 
world's peoples.^ 10 
809ibid. 
SlOMcCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 236,68 S.Ct. 461, 
477, 92 L.Ed. 649 (1948). 
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Stone v. Graham. 499 U.S. 39 (1980). 
Facts 
This case involved a Kentucky statute which required the posting of a 
copy of the Ten Commandments on the wall of each public school classroom in 
the State. The sixteen-inch by twenty-inch posters were purchased with 
private contributions. The state legislature required the following notation at 
the bottom of each display; "The secular application of the Ten 
Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of 
Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United States."® 11 
Petitioners sought an injunction to prohibit the enforcement of the statute, 
claiming that the statute violated the establishment and free exercise clauses 
of the First Amendment. 
Decision 
The state trial court upheld the statute passed by the State of 
Kentucky. The Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, in a split 
decision, affirmed the decision of the trial court. The United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to the Kentucky commandment case. The Supreme 
Court in a split decision, five to four, ruled that the Kentucky statute violated 
the establishment clause of the First Amendment. 
Discussion 
The trial court claimed that the statute requiring the posting of the Ten 
Commandments in public school classrooms served a secular purpose, even 
though they stated it was "self serving." The Supreme Court stated that the 
oilstone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). 
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purpose of posting the Ten Commandments in classroom was religious in 
nature. 
The Supreme Court had developed a three-part test for determining 
whether a challenged state statute violated the establishment clause of the 
First Amendment: 
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion...; finally the statute must not 
foster "an excessive entanglement with religion. "812 
If a statute fails either of the above, the statute must be struck down under 
the establishment clause. They concluded that the Kentucky statute requiring 
the posting of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms had no 
secular purpose, and was therefore unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Court pointed out that just because the trial court 
avowed the statute was secular did not avoid conflict with the First 
Amendment. The Supreme Court held the daily Bible reading in SchemppS 13 
unconstitutional, even though the school district had asserted a secular 
purpose of "the promotion of moral values, the contradiction to materialistic 
trends of our times, the perpetuation of our institutions and the teaching of 
literature. "814 
The Supreme Court said it did not matter that the posted copies of the 
Ten Commandments were financed by private funds; the mere posting of the 
812Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971). 
813Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
814ibid., 223. 
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copies in the classroom by requirement of the state legislature provides the 
"official support of the State ... Government" that the establishment clause 
prohibits.815 It was not important that the Bible verses were posted on the 
wall, rather than read aloud as in Schempp and Engfil for "it is no defense to 
urge that the religious practices here may be relatively minor encroachment of 
the First Amendment."® 16 
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist pointed out that: "The establishment 
clause does not require that the public sector be insulated from all things which 
may have a religious significance or origin."® As the Supreme Court had 
shown that "religion has been closely identified with our history and 
government"® and that "the history of man is inseparable from the history 
ofreligion,"®!^ Kentucky had decided to make students aware of this fact by 
showing the secular influence of the Ten Commandments. 
Lvnch v. Donnelly. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
Facts 
Each year the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, sponsored a Christmas 
display in a park owned by a nonprofit organization. The display, a tradition for 
forty or more years, included a Santa Claus house, a Nativity scene, a 
Sl^Ibid^ 222; See also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962). 
8!6lbid., 225. 
Sl^Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 46-47 (1980). 
®l®Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 212. 
8!9Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 434 (1962). 
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Christmas tree, and a "SEASONS GREETINGS" banner. The respondents 
challenged the Nativity scene in the display on the basis that it violated the 
establishment clause of the First Amendment, as made applicable to the 
states by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Decision 
The District Court upheld the challenge and permanently forbade the 
city from including the Nativity scene in the city display. This was affirmed by 
the Court of Appeals. On certiorari the Supreme Court ruled that the city of 
Pawtucket had not violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment 
and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Discussion 
Although not an education case, Lvnch jr. Donnelly is important to 
public education because it established that Christmas displays do not 
advance religion or create an excessive entanglement between church and 
state. The Supreme Court explained that the purpose of the First 
Amendment religious clauses is "to prevent as far as possible, the intrusion of 
either [the church or the state] into the precincts of the other."820 However, 
at the same time the Court has recognized that "total separation is not 
possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship between government and 
religious organizations is inevitable. "821 
^OLgjnon v Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971). 
821ibid. 
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County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union. Greater Pittsburgh 
Chapter. 109 S.Ct. 3086 (1989). 
Facts 
This litigation involved the constitutionality of two recurring holiday 
symbols on public property in downtown Pittsburgh. The first was a creche 
containing a nativity scene placed in a prominent place in the Allegheny 
County Courthouse. The Holy Name Society, a Catholic group, donated the 
crdche with a sign signifying such. The words "Gloria in Excelsis Deo," meaning 
"Gloiy to God in the Highest" were on a banner held by an angel. The second 
display was an eighteen-foot Chanukah menorah which was placed outside the 
City-County Building near a forty-five foot decorated Christmas tree. The 
menorah was owned by Chabad, a Jewish group, but the city stored, erected, 
and removed the menorah each year. At the foot of the Christmas tree was a 
sign with the mayor's name and a "salute to liberty." The American Civil 
Liberties Union and seven local residents challenged the constitutionality of 
the creche in the county courthouse and the menorah outside the city and 
county building as violations of the First Amendment made applicable to state 
government by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Decision 
The United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania, citing Lvnch.822 ruled in favor of the defendants. On appeal, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third District, also citing 
822Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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Lvnch.823 reversed and remanded the case. On certiorari the Supreme Court, 
by a vote of five to four, held that: "(1) display of creche violated 
establishment clause, and (2) display of menorah next to Christmas tree did 
not have unconstitutional effect of endorsing Christian and Jewish faiths."824 
The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed and remanded the cases to the 
Court of Appeals. 
Discussion 
Although, not an education case, this case helped to further define what 
is permissible under the establishment clause related to church and state 
relationships. In Lynch, the Supreme Court ruled that the use of a nativity 
scene in a Christmas display was permissible under the establishment clause 
of the First Amendment. The District Court cited Lvnch in deciding in favor of 
the defendants. The Court of Appeals, also citing Lvnch. distinguished this 
case from Lvnch and held that the creche and the menorah were impermissible 
governmental endorsement of Christianity and Judaism under the Lemon825 
test. 
In refining what unconstitutionally advances religion under the 
establishment clause, the Supreme Court has used the words endorsement, 
favoritism, preference, or promotion, but the primary element remains the 
same: "The Clause, at very least, prohibits government from appearing to 
823ibid. 
824county of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater 
Pittsburgh Chapter, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (1989). 
825Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,91 S.Ct. 2105,29 L.Ed.2d 745 
(1971). 
358 
take a position on questions of religious belief or from 'making adherence to a 
religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community.' 
»826 The Constitution requires that government remain secular, rather than 
affiliating itself with religious beliefs or institutions, explicitly to avoid 
discriminating against citizens on the basis of their religious faiths. Thus, the 
claims that keeping the government from celebrating Christmas as a religious 
holiday discriminates against Christians in favor of nonadherents are 
unfounded, since they run contrary to the fundamental assumption of the 
establishment clause. In contrast, limiting the government's own Christmas 
celebration to the holiday's secular aspects does not favor the religious beliefs 
of non-Christians over those of Christians, but simply allows the government 
to recognize the holiday without expressing an impermissible allegiance to 
Christian beliefs. 
In ruling on the use of the creche and the menorah in the Allegheny 
case, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals on the creche and 
affirmed on the menorah. In Lynch the Supreme Court had ruled that since 
the creche in that case was a part of a secular display it did not violate the 
Establishment Clause. Since the creche with the Christian message in 
Allegheny was the focus of the display in the courthouse its presence advanced 
religion in violation of the establishment clause. The menorah, a religious 
symbol, as a part of display on the grounds next to the Christmas tree, a 
secular symbol, was not in violation of the establishment clause. 
826Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
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Moment of Silence 
Gaines v. Anderson. 421 F.Supp. 337 (1976). 
Facts 
In Framingham, Massachusetts, twelve students who attended the 
public schools,challenged the constitutionality of a school board policy that 
required students to observe a minute of silence for the purpose of meditation 
or prayer. The policy was adopted by the school committee to comply with the 
Massachusetts law that required a period of silence at the beginning of the 
school day. 
Decision 
The Three^Judge District Court, District of Massachusetts, ruled that 
parents of the students would be permitted to join as plaintiffs. The District 
Court ruled that the statute did not violate the First Amendment, that the 
statute did not violate students' rights of free exercise of their religion, and that 
the statute did not prohibit or inhibit parental right to guide and instruct 
children in regard to religion. The District Court dismissed the complaint. 
Discussion 
The Massachusetts Legislature adopted a statute providing for a period 
of silence. Massachusetts General Laws chapter 71, section 1A reads: 
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all 
grades in all public schools the teacher in charge of the room 
in which each such class is held shall announce that a period 
of silence not to exceed one minute in duration shall be observed 
for meditation and no activities engaged in.^27 
827Qajneg V- Anderson, 421 F.Supp. 337, 339 (1976). 
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On January 12,1976, the Framingham School Committee passed a 
resolution to comply with the Massachusetts law. On January 27,1976, the 
school committee adopted guidelines to meet the statutory provisions. The 
established guidelines were implemented on February 2,1976, the day the 
twelve students initiated court action. 
Twelve students and their parents challenged the guidelines. The 
plaintiffs claimed that the statute as amended and the guidelines violated their 
rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments in the following manner: 
(1) they establish a religious exercise in the public schools 
in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, 
(2) they mandate a particular format for the religious exercise in 
violation of the First Amendment, and (3) they interfere with the 
parents' due process rights exclusively to supervise the religious 
upbringing of their children in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.828 
The District Court applied the first two prongs of the tripartite test. 
The court examined the legislative history of the statute and decided that the 
law had a neutral, secular purpose of promoting a reflective climate for study, 
self- discipline, and respect for authority. The court asserted that meditation is 
not necessarily religious-it encompasses serious reflection about either 
religious or secular topics. The court further stated that the statute's 
reference to prayer was not constitutionally fatal because it was used in the 
disjunctive, giving students a choice between meditation and prayer. 
828ibid., 339-340. 
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Beck v. McElrath. 548 F.Supp. 1161 (1982). 
Facts 
In 1982, the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a statute requiring 
that every public school class in the state begin the day with a period of silence 
not to exceed one minute for prayer meditation, or personal beliefs. Plaintiffs 
brought civil action against the state on the grounds that the statute was in 
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, and Article 1, Section 3 of the Tennessee Constitution. 
Decision 
The District Court ruled that the Tennessee statute did not meet the 
requirements of the establishment clause. The law was never meant to be 
neutral; thus the state was favoring and advancing religion. 
Discussion 
The 1982 Tennessee statute stated: 
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all 
grades in all public schools, the teacher in charge of the room 
in which such class is held shall announce that a period of 
silence not to exceed one minute in duration shall be observed 
for meditation or prayer or personal beliefs and during any 
period, silence shall be maintained.^29 
The court analyzed questions relating to the statute in terms of 
purpose and effect. The court pointed out that the statute did not merely call 
for a moment of silence, but rather a moment of silence to be used for 
"meditation or prayer or personal beliefs."830 Although two of the terms were 
829Bec]j v. McElrath, 548 F.Supp. 1161 (1982). 
830ibid., 1163. 
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secular, meditation and personal beliefs, the court was unable to agree that the 
statute reflected a clearly secular purpose. Thus the court stated: 
Individual terms within a statute are not to be construed in 
a purely abstract sense or in a vacuum, however. As all terms 
in the statute are viewed together and accorded reasonable 
meaning, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the purpose 
was advancement of religious exercises in the classroom.831 
Because of the ambiguous nature of the statute, the court explored the 
legislative intend of its sponsors. While the defendants asserted that the 
statute merely provided for a moment of silence, it is clear from the record that 
the "overwhelming intent among legislators supporting the bill, including the 
sponsors, was to establish prayer as a daily fixture in the public schoolrooms of 
Tennessee."832 in the words of one legislature, "If there is one thing the 
people of this state want, they want prayer in public schools."^33 
The defendants, like the defendants in Lubbock.834 contended that the 
statute was constitutionally sound because participation was voluntary.835 
The court disagreed. 
[A] mere cursory reading of the legislative history discloses 
that the purpose for which the statute was enacted remained 
constant-the legislature sought to set aside a time for daily 
83 l]bid. 
832fl)id. 
833ibid., 1164. 
834Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent School 
District, 669 F.2d 1038,1044 (1982). 
835Beck v. McElrath, 548 F. Supp. 1161,1164 (1982). 
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religious exercises in public schools.836 
Relying on the legislative intent, the court found the statute failed the 
purpose test. 
Primary effect was the next phase investigated. "The court is 
convinced that the primary effect of this statute must be the promotion of 
religious exercise."®^ 7 in reaching this decision, the court addressed the 
legislature's lack of guidelines for implementation. Without these guidelines, 
the statute could be implemented in a variety of ways varying from one 
classroom to another. One teacher could call for a moment of silence, another 
for meditation, and yet another, specifically for prayer. "Unavoidably, 
students will understand that they are encouraged, not only to be silent, but 
also to engage in religious exercise."838 
The judge decided that because the purpose and effect tests so clearly 
indicated a violation of the establishment clause it would not be necessary for 
the court to address the possibility of excessive entanglement. 839 
In light of conclusions discussed above, a detailed examination 
of potential administrative entanglements under the third prong 
of the Nvauist rLemonl test is not necessay here... Varying 
degrees of potential entanglement are as difficult to enumerate as 
are potential effect, and appear to be no less problematical.®^® 
SSBikid. 
837ibid., 1165. 
83811)1,1, 
83911)1(1 
840ibid. 
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The court concluded that legislation respecting the establishment of 
religion was unconstitutional no matter how popular a measure might be. 
Inasmuch as the legislation was not neutral, it had to be struck down as 
violative of the establishment clause. 
Duffy v. Las Cruces Public Schools. 557 F.Supp. 1013 (D.N.M. 1983). 
Facts 
Jerry Duffy, as a taxpayer and citizen, and on behalf of his son, 
brought suit against the Las Cruces Public School District and school board 
members challenging the constitutionality of the statute authorizing local 
school boards to implement a daily moment of silence in the public schools. His 
son was also a citizen of New Mexico and attended public school in the Las 
Cruces Public School District. 
Decision 
The District Court declared the challenged statute to be 
unconstitutional because the legislation had no secular purpose, 
impermissibly advanced religion, and resulted in excessive entanglement 
between church and state. 
Discussion 
In 1981, the New Mexico legislative body enacted a statute that 
provided for the following; 
Each local school board may authorize a period of silence 
not to exceed one minute at the beginning of the school day. 
This period may be used for contemplation, meditation or 
prayer, provided that silence is maintained and no activities 
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are undertaken.841 
William O'Donnell, a member of the House of Representatives, asked 
William McEuen, a ranking official in the state department of education, to 
draft a bill which would permit students to pray in school. In drafting the bill, 
McEuen relied heavily on the Massachusetts statute which was at issue in 
Gainea Anderson.842 in that case, the court upheld the constitutionality of 
a statute much like the one being challenged in this case. H. B. 205 was 
identical to the Massachusetts statute, with the exception that the word 
"contemplation" had been added in H. B. 205, purportedly to demonstrate the 
neutrality of the statute. Although there is no written legislative history of H. 
B. 205, clearly the intent was to establish a devotional exercise in the 
classrooms of New Mexico public schools. 
The defendants asserted that inclusion of the words "contemplation" 
and "meditation" constitutionally balanced legislatures with regard to the 
people's right to freedom of religion. Judge Burciaga was not swayed as 
indicated by the following statement: 
The Court views the inclusion of these words as a 
transparent ruse meant to divert attention from the statute's 
true purpose. Viewed in this light, it can hardly be said that 
the statute reflects sensitivity to the right to religious freedom. 
Indeed, it reflects the opposite.843 
84lDuffy v. Las Cruces Public Schools, 557 F.Supp. 1013,1015 (1983). 
842(jaines v. Anderson, 421 F.Supp. 337 (1976). 
843Duffy v> Las Cruces Public Schools, 557 F.Supp. 1013,1019 (1983). 
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Therefore, the court maintained the statute had no secular purpose. 
Moreover, the statute advanced religion in the public schools by allowing 
religious exercise on school campus during the instructional day and with 
teacher supervision. Teacher supervision created excessive entanglement. 
Walter v. West Virgin™ Board of Education. 610 F.Supp. 1169 (D.C.W.Va. 
1985). 
Facts 
La 1985. a group of parents challenged the constitutionality of 
legislative action providing prayer in schools. Through class action plaintiffs 
maintained the legislation be declared unconstitutional as First Amendment 
establishment. They also sought to have the Court permanently prohibit 
implementation of the Prayer Amendment in the public schools of West 
Virginia. 
Decision 
Judge Hallanan concluded that the West Virginia Prayer Amendment 
violated the First Amendments rights of the plaintiffs. Judge Hallanan granted 
plaintiffs relief for declaratory judgment and he ordered that defendants be 
enjoined and restrained from implementation of the Prayer Amendment. 
Finally, Judge Hallanan maintained that "nothing in this order prohibits or 
impedes the right of any West Virginia citizen, young or old, to pray in his or 
her own manner, any place, anytime."844 
Discussion 
The legislative body of the state of West Virginia enacted legislation, W. 
844walter v. West Virginia Board of Education, 610 F.Supp. 1169,1178 
(D.C.W.Va. 1985). 
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Va. Const. Art. HI, section 15-a, requiring the following: 
Public schools shall provide a designated brief time at the 
beginning of each school day for any student desiring to exercise 
their right to personal and private contemplation, meditation, 
or prayer. No student of a public school may be denied their right 
to personal and private contemplation, meditation or prayer nor 
shall any student be required or encouraged to engage in any 
given contemplation, meditation or prayer as a part of the school 
curriculum.® 4 5 
In the case at bar extensive hearings were held with school children and 
parents regarding their thoughts and feelings. Children and parents from 
various religious backgrounds testified in this case. One Jewish boy testified 
that another student said to him that "if I prayed all the time, maybe I could go 
to heaven with all the Christians when Jesus came for the second time instead 
of, as he put it, going down with all the other Jews."846 At this point another 
child joined the conservation and said something to the effect "Jews weren't 
worth saving because they killed Christ. "847 a Roman Catholic boy testified 
he was afraid to disobey teacher's religious directions because he might be 
punished for "doing wrong or disobeying the teacher."848 Parents testified 
against the Prayer Amendment. Representatives from the Baptist, Lutheran, 
Roman Catholic, Moslem, and Jewish faiths testified against the Prayer 
Amentment. In addition, professionals in teaching and psychology testified 
845ibid., 1170. 
846ibid., 1172. 
847n>id. 
848ibid. 1173. 
368 
against the Prayer Amendment. 
Citing other cases, the court, even though a majority of West Virginia 
citizens voted for the Prayer Amendment, had little difficulty reaching the 
decision that the legislation was First Amendment establishment. 
Wallace v. Jaffree. 705 F.2d 1526 (5th Cir. 1983), a f f d , 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
Facts 
In 1982, Ishamel Jaffree, the father of three elementary school children 
enrolled in Mobile County School System, Alabama, brought suit in federal 
district court challenging the constitutionality of three Alabama statutes. 
Statute 16-1-20, passed in 1978, provided for a period of "meditation."849 The 
1981 statute, 16-1-20.1, provided a period for "meditation" or "voluntary 
prayer. "850 The third statute, 16-1-20.2 passed in 1982, authorized teachers 
in public schools to lead students in voluntary prayer or in a prayer prescribed 
by the legislature.^ 1 He objected to activities which were occurring in his 
children's public schools. He claimed that teachers led regularly scheduled 
prayers which the children cited in unison. He pointed out that if the children 
did not participate, they were ostracized by their peers. He voiced his 
complaints to the teachers, the principals, and superintendent. Unable to 
obtain any satisfaction, he petitioned for relief. 
Decision 
After review, the District Court dismissed Jaffree's complaint. The 
849wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40 (1985). 
S^Olbid. 
8£>llbid. 
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case was appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in regard to 
statutes enacted in 1981 and 1982. The court ruled both statutes 
unconstitutional. The case was further appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court. In 1984, the Supreme Court unaminously affirmed the 
decision of the District Court and stated that the 1982 Alabama statute, 
section 16-1-20.2, was unconstitutional. In 1985, the Supreme Court in a six-
to-three vote, struck down the 1981 prayer statute, 16-1-20.1. 
Discussion 
At issue was the claim that several Alabama statutes were designed to 
return prayer to the public schools. Progressive legislation over a period of 
years confirmed this allegation. The first statute, section 16-1-20, enacted by 
the state legislature in 1978, required public school teachers to enforce a one-
minute period of silence for the purpose of "meditation. "8 5 2 Jn 1981, the 
legislature enacted a bill, section 16-1-20.1, that authorized only a period of 
silience for "meditation or voluntary prayer."853 jn 1982, a statute, section 
16-1-20.2, was passed that authorized teachers in public schools to lead 
students in voluntary prayer or in the following prayer prescribed by the 
legislature: 
Almighty God, You alone are our God. We acknowledge 
You as the Creator and Supreme Judge of the world. May 
Your Justice, Your truth, and Your peace abound this day 
in the hearts of our countrymen, in the counsels of our 
government, in the sanctity of our homes and in the 
classrooms of our schools in the name of our Lord. Amen.^54 
853ibid. 
854Ibid., 40-41. 
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In issuing a preliminary injunction the District Court found section 16-
1-20 constitutional, stating: "It is a statute which prescribes nothing more 
than a child in school shall have the right to meditate in silence and there is 
nothing wrong with a little meditation and quietness. "855 
The plaintiffs did not disagree with the judge's ruling. However, by 
applying the tripartite test, the court found the other two statutes promoted 
religious activity. The intent of each was to return prayer to the schools. 
In this case at bar the District Court did not find the statutes 
unconstitutional as First Amendment advancement. However, Justice Hand 
engaged in an unusal practice. Rejecting past Supreme Court decisions and 
after complete analysis of statutes and opinions, Justice Hand maintained the 
Supreme Court had erred in First Amendment church-state matters and thus 
past decisions did not apply to this case. He stated: 'This Court's independent 
review of the relevant historical documents and its reading of the scholarly 
analysis convinces it that the United States Supreme Court has erred in its 
reading of history."856 
Thus, Justice Hand's ideological bases provided no logic for him to issue 
an injunction. Moveover, Justice Hand maintained if the case was remanded 
by the Court of Appeal he would hold that secular humanism was a religion and 
was being promoted in schools and he would insist that public schools were 
855jaffree v, James, 544 F. Supp 727, 732 (S.D.Ala. 1982). 
v Board of School Commisssioners of Moblie County, 544 
F.Supp. 1104,1128 (1983). 
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advancing a religion. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit did reverse Justice 
Hand's decision. The appellate court using the tripartite test of Lemon I 
declared both statutes, section 16-1-20.1 and section 16-1-20.2 
unconstitutional. After examining Supreme Court church-state decisions, and 
especially within the historical context insisted that Justice Hand's decision 
was a fallacious interpretation of the First Amendment 
The Supreme Cout in 1984 with a nine to zero vote sustained, without 
comment, the Court of Appeals' decision that section 16-1-20.2 was 
unconstitutional. The Court had one more statute to examine—section 16-1-
20.1 regarding a moment of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer. "85 7 
However, before ruling on that question, Justice Stevens reviewed the Court's 
historical ideological bases on church-state and individual freedom. Justice 
Stevens said: 
how firmly embedded in our constitutional jurisprudence 
is the proposition that the several States have no greater 
power to restrain the individual freedoms protected by the 
First Amendment than does the Congress of the United 
States.^58 
Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the majority, held that 16-1-20.1, 
had no secular purpose, thus failing the first part of the tripartite test. A 
review of Legislative record revealed that "his purpose in sponsoring statute 
857wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S 38, 40 (1985). 
858ibid., 48-49. 
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16-1-20.1 was to return voluntary prayer to the public schools."859 Moreover, 
the Legislator wanted to "provide children the opportunity to share in their 
spiritual heritage of Alabama and of this country."860 Finding no secular 
purpose, the Supreme Court held the law was in violation of the Constitution. 
Finally, Justice Stevens pointed out that the 1978 statute was limited to 
"meditation" and the 1981 statute included "meditation or voluntary 
prayer."®®! Thus, by including prayer the statute was religious advancement. 
Justice O'Conner stated in a separate concurring opinion that: "Nothing 
in the United States Constitution as interpreted by this Court or in the laws of 
the State of Alabama prohibits public school students from voluntarily praying 
at anytime before, during, or after the school day."862 Justice O'Connor was 
expressing a new ideological concept--the endorsement test-the nature of 
religious endorsement as primary in analyzing rationale for practice and/or 
statutes. The endorsement test fit part two of Lemon nicely. 
Chief Justice Burger dissented along with and Justices Rehnquist and 
White. Their great concern encapsulated major fallacies in Lemon I test. 
Mav v. Cooperman. 780 F.2d. 240 (3rd Cir. 1985). 
Facts 
In 1982, the New Jersey General Assembly enacted a statute 
44^ 
SSOibid. 
8<31lbid., 40. 
862ibid.,67. 
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authorizing a minute of silence for "quiet and private contemplation or 
introspection.The statute was challenged by Jeffrey May, a teacher, and 
parents and their children. The parents and children, both religious and 
nonreligious, objected to what they regarded as either required participation in 
a religious activity, or endorsement of religion. When May, who considered the 
minute of silence as religious, had refused to conduct such an exercise, school 
officials threatened disciplinary action if he failed to comply. 
Decision 
The United States District Court maintained that the statute flunked 
the Lemon test in all three parts.864 On appeal to the United States Court of 
Appeals-Third Circuit-found a split three-judge panel with the majority 
sustaining the lower court's decision~the statute lacked a secular purpose. On 
appeal, the Supreme Court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction-
defendants, former officers of the New Jersey Senate and General Assembly, 
had lost their right to pursue the case. In 1986, the New Jersey Senate and 
General Assembly withdrew from the case.865 
Discussion 
With the enactment of this statute New Jersey continued efforts to 
return prayer back to the public school classroom. The district judge reviewed 
the history of the efforts to adopt similar legislation which would have revived 
prayer in public schools. Gubernatorial vetoes had occurred in 1969,1971, 
863May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d. 240, 241 (3rd Cir. 1985). 
864Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 
(1971). 
865Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 74-75 (1987). 
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1978, and 1981. Many other bills were introduced but failed. Several of the 
witnesses testified that on numerous occasions, Assemblyman Zangari, 
sponsor of the bill, had stated his purpose was to return prayer to the schools. 
Initially, the Governor of New Jersey vetoed the statute. The New 
Jersey Legislature enacted the following; 
Principals and teachers in each public elementary and 
secondaiy school of each school district in this State shall 
permit students to observe a one minute period of silence to 
be used solely at the discretion of the individual student, before 
opening exercise of each school day for quiet and private 
contemplation or introspection.866 
Also, the Attorney General had expressed his opinion that the bill was a 
violation of the First Amendment. The words "prayer" and "meditation" that 
had been ruled unconstitutional in Wallace Vj. Jaffree867 were omitted from 
this statute. 
Legislators and friends supporting the statute contended the statute 
was constitutional because there was no requirement basis to the statute-it 
was voluntary. Moreover, the statute provided "for quiet and private 
contemplation or introspection."868 Legislators and friends maintained the 
law's secular purpose was "providing a calm transition from nonschool life to 
school work. 
866May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240, 241 (3rd Cir. 1985). 
867wallace v.Jaflree, 705 F. 2d 1526 (5th Cir. 1983), affd., 472 U.S. 38 
(1985). 
868jviay v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240, 241 (3rd Cir. 1985). 
869ibid.,244. 
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The Court of Appeal (Third Circuit) sustained the lower court decision 
that the statute was First Amendment advancement. As already indicated, on 
appeal, the Supreme Court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction-
defendants who remained party to the suit had no legal standing to sue.870 
Secular Humanism 
Crockett v. Sorenson. 568 F.Supp 1422 (1983). 
Facts 
For over forty years, the Bristol Virginia public schools had provided a 
Bible class program to fourth and fifth grade students. The classes were 
sponsored by an alliance of Protestant ministers and it was responsible for 
selecting, hiring, supervising, and paying the teachers and preparing a course 
of study outline for the curriculum. Classes were voluntary and parents signed 
a request card to enroll children in Bible classes. The classes met forty-five 
minutes once a week. Until 1982, students not attending the Bible classes 
were assigned to the principal's office or the library. Since 1982, an attempt 
was made to provide the non-participating students more meaningful 
experience. They were sent to an extension center where, in theory, they 
choose one of several options. In reality, their choice was study hall or physical 
education, because other options were classes the students had already 
attended in regular curriculum. Parents of fifth grade student, Kathleen 
Crockett, challenged the program as violative of First Amendment 
advancement of religion. 
Decision 
Justice Kiser held that the establishment clause does permit a course in 
S^OKarcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 74-75 (1987). 
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the Bible to be taught in the public schools. However, Judge Kiser maintained 
that the Bible class for fourth and fifth grade students staffed 
and controlled by a ministerial alliance organization was a Constitutional 
violation—there was no secular purpose. 
Discussion 
By ruling in favor of the plaintiffs, Justice Riser's decision added 
fuel to the fire of those who claim that public schools are supporters of secular 
humanism. Justice Kiser reasoned: 
The First Amendment was never intended to insulate our public 
institutions from any mention of God, the Bible, or religion. When 
such insulation occurs, another religion, such as secular humanism, 
is effectively established.871 
In Torcaso (1961) at footnote eleven, the Supreme Court recognized 
that secular humanism is a religion analogous to Buddhism, Taoism,..., and 
others religions.872 Moreover, in Schempp .873 the Court in reply to Justice 
Stewart's well-reasoned dissent, stated: 
[i]t is insisted that unless these religious exercises are permitted, 
a "religion of secularism" is established. We agree of course that the 
State may not establish a "religion of secularism" in the sense of 
affirmatively opposing or showing hostility to religion, this "preferring 
those who believe in one religion over those who do believe. "8 7 4 
871Crockett v. Sorenson, 568 F.Supp. 1422, 1425 (1983). 
872Torcaso V. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.ll, 81 S.Ct. 1680,1684 
n. 11,6 L.Ed.2d 982 (1961). 
873Abington School District v. Schempp. 374 U.S. 203, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 
10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963). 
874lbid., 225,1573. 
377 
Thus Justice Riser acknowledged that establishment clause violations 
could occur and without hostilitytoward traditional theistic religions. Justice 
Kiser floated an interesting quote from Whitehead and Conlan to support his 
position: 
On the fundamental religious issue, the modern university 
intends to be, and supposes that it is, neutral, but is not. Certainly it 
neither inculcates nor expressly repudiates belief in God. But it does 
what is far more deadly than open rejection; it ignores Him It is 
in this sense that the university today is atheistic It is a fallacy 
to suppose that by omitting a subject you teach nothing about it. On 
the contraiy, you teach that it is to be omitted, and that it is 
therefore a matter of secondary importance. And you teach this not 
openly and explicitly, which would invite criticisiri, you simply take it 
for granted and therefore insinuate it silently, insidiously, and all but 
irresistibly.®1^ 
Even though the above logic applies to a university, Justice Kiser 
applied the concept to public schools-both are learning institutions. 
Knowledge provides a more complete analogy of western literature's influence 
on education. And no one is completely educated without this knowledge. And 
if the Bible course advanced literary and history knowledge, then it would pass 
constitutional muster. 
Grove v. Mead School District No. 354. 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir. 1985), 
cert.denied, 106 S.Ct. 85 ,88 L.Ed.2d 70. 
Facts 
In this 1983 case, a high school sophomore and English class was 
assigned Gordon Park's, The Learning Tree, a novel set against a background 
875crockett v. Sorenson, 568 F.Supp. 1422,1426 (1983). 
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of life in black rural America. After initially reading sections of the book, 
Cassie found the book repugnant to her religious beliefs. Cassie and mother 
protested to the teacher and Cassie received another assignment and was 
excused during discussions of The Learning Tree-however. Cassie chose to 
remain in class. In time, Mrs. Grove filed a formal complaint with the school 
system and lost on review~the school board accepted the review committee's 
recommendation that the book was appropriate. At this point the Groves filed 
action against the school board insisting the book violated First Amendment 
establishment clause. 
Decision 
The District Court found no Constitutional violation and granted 
summary judgment for the defendants. On appeal, Justice Wright, Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, maintained that the school board acted within scope 
of responsibility and violated no Constitutional imperative. Moveover, The 
Tiftaminp Tree did not establish a religion. 
Discussion 
Cassie and her mother insisted The T^minpr Tree had the "primary 
effect of inhibiting their religion, fundamentalist Christianity, and advancing 
the religion of secular humanism."® 7 6 in analyzing possible Free Exercise 
Clause violations Justice Wright investigated three facotrs: "(1) the extent of 
the burden upon the exercise of religion, (2) the existence of a compelling state 
interest justifying the burden, and (3) the extent to which accommodation of 
the complaint would impede the state's objectives."877 The Free Exercise 
876Qrove y Mead School District No.354 , 753 F.2d 1528,1534 (9th 
Cir. 1985). 
877n,id., 1533. 
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Clause issue was minimal-Cassie was provied an alternative assignment and 
permission to leave the classroom during discussion of The Learning Tree, thus 
no free exercise clause violation. Moreover, The Learning Tree contained minor 
religious efforts in providing a balanced education. Quoting Justice Jackson: 
"If we are to eliminate everything that is objectionable to any of [the religious 
bodies existing in the United States] or inconsistent with any of their doctrines, 
we will leave public education in shreds. "878 
Finally, Justice Wright acknowledged the book to be secular in nature— 
the eyes of a teenage boy in a working class black family. Justice Canby filed 
a concurring opinion focusing on the secular humanism issue. Justice Canby 
insisted that plaintiffs had erroneously made "secular" and "humanist" to be 
synonymous with "anti-religious."879 
Plaintiffs' had argued that secular humanism was a religion. Justice 
Canby suggested that plaintiffs' use of footnote eleven in Torcaso v^ 
WatkinsSSO was overboard. Continuing Justice Canby insisted that the 
definition of religion may be dependent on the type of case involved. In 
Torcaso.881 a Free Exercise case, a more liberal and expansive definition of 
religion might be acceptable, but "the same expansiveness in interpreting the 
878McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 235, 68 S.Ct. 461, 
477, 92 L.Ed. 649 (1948). 
879Qrove v. Mead School District No. 354,753 F.2d 1528,1535. (9th 
Cir. 1985). 
880Torcaso v. Watkins, 363 U.S. 488, 495 n. 11, 81 S.Ct. 1680, 1684 n. 
11, 6 L.Ed.2d 982 (1961). 
881lbid 
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establishment clause is simply untenable in an age of such pervasive 
governmental activity. "88 2 
Even though The Learning Tree contained minor anti-Christian 
features Justice Canby insisted religion was not the primary forcus of the 
book-thus, Justice Canby lamented "instead, the issue is whether its selection 
and retention by school officials 'communicatees] a message of government' of 
those elements."883 The T.earning Tree. Justice Canby insisted neither instills 
nor inhibits religion and is simply a book about the hardships of rural black life 
and culture. The book does not offend the First Amendment establishment 
clause. Finally, Justice Canby maintained: 
Distinctions must be drawn between those governmental 
actions that actually interfere with the exercise of religion, and 
those that merely require or result in exposure to attitudes and 
outlooks at odds with perspectives prompted by religion. Plaintiffs 
allege that they believe that "eternal religious consequences" would 
result from Cassie Grove's exposure to The Learning Tree. Such a 
belief might well require her being excused from such exposure. 
Mere offense, however, would not require her being excused, nor does 
mere offense at having The learning- Tree in the curriculum bring 
the free exercise clause to the aid of the plaintiffs. There has been no 
violation of free exercise in this case.884 
Mozert v. Hawking County Public Schools. 647 F.Supp 1194 (E.D.Tenn 1986), 
reversed (6th Cir. 1987). 
Facts 
In early 1983, the Hawkins County Public Schools adopted Holt, 
882Qrove v. Mead School District No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528,1537 (9th 
Cir. 1985). 
883ibid., 1539 
884ibid., 1543. 
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Rhinehart, and Winstion reading series, Riders on the Earth, for use in 
elementary grades, one through eight. Terms such as euthanasia, situational 
ethics, idol worship, witchcraft, and value clarification were reasons many 
parents objected to the reading series, initially students-parents who 
objected to the Holt series were given alternative reading assignments. In 
November 1983, the Hawkins County School Board suspended all alternative 
reading assignments. Students who refused to participate in the reading 
program were suspended from school. Many suspended students were either 
home schooled or enrolled in private religious schools, or attended school outside 
Hawkins County. 
On December 2,1983, the parents filed action against the school 
superintendent, school board, and four principals maintaining that plaintiffs 
had sincere religious beliefs which were contrary to values taught or inculcated 
in reading series. Requiring children to use the Holt reading series,without an 
alternative reading program was a clear violation of free exercise of religion 
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution. The parents insisted that schools should provide an alternative 
reading program. Moreover, school board should reimbuse plaintiffs for 
education expenses incurred when students were removed from public schools. 
Decision 
Initially, the District Court ruled against the plaintiffs, and granted 
school board motion for summary judgment on basis that reading series was 
neutral on religious issues. On appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals the 
District Court was reversed and the case remanded with instructions. The 
Circuit Court instructed the District Court: 
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to determine whether the school board's action did, in fact, 
create a burden on the plaintiffs' free exercise rights; and if so, 
whether the infringement was justified by a compelling state 
interest, and then whether the state used the least restrictive 
means of achieving that compelling interest.885 
On remand, the District Court held that the rights of the plaintiffs had 
been unconstitutionally violated—that Holt reading series might be religiously 
offensive to plaintiffs. 
Discussion 
As already indicated plaintiffs maintained that the Holt reading series 
presented a panoply of anti-Christian values-from situational ethics, idol 
worship, to being disobedient to parents. Exposure to anti-Christian ideology-
secular humanism-- was offensive and First Amendment Advancement of a 
religion-secular humanism. 
Early on, when parents protested the Holt series school board provided 
an alternative reading assignment and later rescended that policy. Parents 
responded by disallowing students to attend Holt series classes. School board 
responded by suspending students. In time, parents withdrew students from 
classes and enrolled them in alternative educational settings and filed suit 
against school board and requested suspension of the Holt series as religious 
advancement and requested reimbursement for money spent on alternative 
education of children. 
On remand and with instructions from the Circuit Court of Appeals the 
885Laurie Mesibov, "Tennessee Students Who Have Religious 
Objections to the Reading Textbooks May Be Taught Reading at Home," 
School Law Bulletin 18, no. 2 (Spring 1987): 37. 
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District Court found the Holt series offensive to plaintiffs religion-sincerely 
held religious beliefs. A critical issue in this case at bar was whether the state 
could establish a compelling rational for using the Holt series- school officials 
argued along three fronts: 
(1) Providing alternative programs would be difficult to 
administer; (2) it would be impossible to develop a program 
acceptable to the plaintiffs; and (3) if plaintiffs were allowed 
an alternative, the school would be flooded with similar requests 
for alternative programs.®®® 
The District Court, with Judge Hull writing the opinion, insisted there 
were many reading series approved for Tennessee schools and no one 
particular series was absolute. Moreover, while many educational consultants 
suggested that individual instruction would be better and with the first part of 
school official argument vanishing down the logic hole, Justice Hull suggested 
that: "Accommodating the beliefs of a small group of students involved in this 
case would not wreak havoc in the school system by initiating a barrage of 
requests for alternative reading materials."®®? 
Continuing Justice Hull suggested that no reading series might satistfy, 
plaintiffs then perhaps, should be given permission to instruct children at 
home. And, that was permissible acccording to Tennessee statute, "home 
schooling for a single subject was a reasonable alternative that would not 
8®6lbid. 
®®?Kristen Goldberg, "Textbooks Decision Fuels Debate on Role of 
Religion in Schools, Rights of Parents." Education Week 6, no. 9 November 5, 
1986): 18. 
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violate either plaintiffs' free exercise right or the establishment clause."®®® 
This remedy was suggested because "considerable evidence indicated that no 
single, secular reading series on the state's approval list would be acceptable to 
the plaintiffs without modifications."®®® 
Judge Hull limited the scope of his decision with the following: 
This opinion shall not be interpreted to require the school 
system to make this option available to any other person or to 
these plaintiffs for any other subject. Further accommodations, 
if they must be made, will have to be made on a case-by-case 
basis by the teachers, school administrators, board, and 
department of education in the exercise of the expertise, and 
failing that, by the Court.®®® 
Smith v.,. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County. 655 F.Supp., 939 
(S.D.Ala. 1987), reversed and remanded (11th Cir. 1987). 
Facts 
Douglas Smith and others filed a motion to intervene in the Jaffree®®! 
action insisting religious activity—secular humanism- in public schools 
violated their right to free exercise of religion. The District Court allowed them 
to intervene as plaintiffs. Among other concerns, plaintiffs insisted that 
Alabama's public school curriculum not only advanced religion-secular 
humanism- but "excluded history of the contributions of Christianity to the 
American way of life, denied to teachers and students free speech and free 
888Mesibov, "Tennessee Students," 38. 
®®®Goldberg, "Textbook Decision," 18 
®9®Ibid., 19. 
®91Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983). 
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exercise of their religion and violated the Code of Alabama."892 History, social 
studies, and home economics became the center of controversy. 
Decision 
This case emerged from an earlier Alabama case Jaffree \\ Jamgg893 
regarding prayer and meditation in Alabama classrooms. Justice Brevard 
Hand, the original judge in Jaffree.894 also presided in Smith .895 Justice 
Hand made a major decision early on in this case that "secular humanism" 
was a religion. Moreover, Justice Hand alter reviewing Alabama public school 
textbooks insisted the textbooks failed to acknowledge significant contributions 
made by religion in American life. Finally, Justice Hand maintained that fixed 
moral values—personal responsibilities-were missing— too much situational 
ethics. In effect the Alabama textbooks promoted a religion—secular 
humanism. For this, forty-four textbooks were banned in Alabama public 
schools (see Appendix B). On appeal the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit, Judge Johnson held that Alabama textbooks did not 
advance religion-secular humanism- or inhibit theistic religion in violation of 
the establishment clause, even assuming secular humanism was religion. The 
decision was reversed and remanded with directions. 
®92gmjtj1 v# Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 655 
F.Supp. 939, 940 (S.D.Ala. 1987). 
S93jaflj.ee v. James 544 F.Supp 727 (1982).. 
894ibid. 
895gmith v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 655 
F.Supp. 939 (S.D.Ala. 1987). 
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Discussion 
Plaintiffs, i. e., teachers, citizens, and others argued that Alabama 
textbooks were anti-Christian, i. e., "Lord's name in vain,"896 contrary to 
"Christian views,"897 promoted "secular humanism,"898 an(j held that 
"humans are strictly a result of some biological process and nothing more,"899 
affirmed "there are no absolutes, such as right and wrong."900 The state 
responded: (1) that textbooks had a secular purpose; (2) that if the state 
tried to satisfy all religious organizations then it would be difficult to administer 
schools; and (3) that even though social studies and history books did neglect 
contributions of religion the Alabama State Superintendent would begin to 
correct that situation. 
Expert witnesses appeared on both sides of the issue. For the 
humanists, attempts were made to (1) define humanism; (2) what Humanist. 
Manifesto II really proclaimed: "It is a scientific method of unfettered 
opportunity to investigate any domain of human interest without perceptions 
ofa religious nature,"901 and (3) within the humanists organizations there 
were differences regarding-whether secular humanism was a religion or not— 
the Humanists Association had "undertaken efforts to obtain First 
896ibid., 943. 
«97ibid. 
898ibid. 
899ibicL 
900ibid. 
901lbid., 967. 
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Amendment constitutional immunities and the protections afforded theistic 
religions. "902 
With all testimonies complete Justice Hand stamped his imprimatur on 
the case. This case, insisted Justice Hand ,"was not prayer in schools, not 
censorship of school materials, and not an attempt of narrow-minded or 
fanatical proreligionists to force a public school system to teach only those 
opinions and facts they find digestible. "903 This case turned on one major 
ideological consideration: Was secular humanism "religious advancement" 
within schools? Continuing Justice Hand after review of Supreme Court 
church-state decisions proclaimed secular humanism a religion for the following 
reasons: 
[MJakes a statement about supernatural existence a central 
pillar of its logic; defines the nature of man; sets forth a goal or 
purpose for individual and collective human existence; and 
defines the nature of the universe, and thereby delimits its 
purpose.904 
After insisting that secular humanism was a religion, Justice Hand 
examined textbooks and other school materials to see if they promoted religion-
-secular religion. Regarding social studies and history textbooks, Justice Hand 
made this analysis: 
Omissions, if sufficient, do affect a person's ability to develop 
religious beliefs and exercise that religious freedom guaranteed 
902ibid.,968. 
9<>3ibid., 972. 
904Ibid., 978. 
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by the Constitution. Do the omissions in these history books 
cross that threshold? For some of them, yes. In addition to 
omitting particular historical events with religious significance, 
these books uniformly ignore the religious aspects of most 
American culture.905 
For home economics textbooks Justice Hand concluded: "Teaching that 
moral choices are purely personal and can only be based on some autonomous, 
as yet undiscovered and unfulfilled inner self, is a sweeping fundamental belief 
that must not be promoted by the public schools."906 
Justice Hand in encapsulating his decision rejected using the Lemon 
tripartite test concluded that textbooks were religious establishment and 
violated the First Amendment Justice Hand concluded he was "thus 
compelled to grant plaintiffs their requested relief barring the further 
advancement of the tenets of the religion of secular humanism."907 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (Eleventh Circuit) rejected every 
imperative of Justice Hand's decision. First regarding what constitutes a 
religion the court said: 
The Supreme Court has never established a comprehensive 
test for determining the "delicate question" of what constitutes 
a religious belief for purposes of the first amendment, and we 
need not attempt to do in this case Appellees have failed to 
prove a violation of the establishment clause 908 
905Ibid., 985. 
906Ibid. 987. 
907lbid., 988. 
908smith v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 827 F.2d 
684, 689 (11th Cir. 1987). 
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The Court of Appeals reiterated validity of the Lemon tripartite test and 
spelled out the triparte test guidelines: 
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose: 
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 
"an excessive government entanglement with religion" of the first 
amendment.9^9 
Then the Court of Appeals reviewed several establishment clause cases 
Stone v. Graham 910 Marsh v. Chambers.9H and Grand Rapids School 
District v, Ball912 as examples of using Lemon critera. 
For the case at bar, however, the court could simply set the first part— 
"religious purpose"- and third part--"excessive entanglement" aside. All 
parties were in agreement and thus no issue. However, the second part-
"primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion"— was the primary concern. 
After reviewing all Alabama textbooks in question the Circuit Court insisted 
the home economics, social studies, and history textbooks did not violate the 
First Amendment establishment clause. The case was remanded once again 
to the District Court to dissolve the injunction and terminate the litigation. 
909Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105 2111, 29 
L.Ed. 745 (1971). 
91(>Stone v. Graham 449 U.S., 40-41,101 S.Ct. 192,193, 66 L.Ed.2d 
199 (1980). 
91lMarsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 103 S.Ct. 3330, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 
(1983). 
912Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373,383,105 S.Ct. 
3216, 3222, 87 L.Ed.2d 267 (1985). 
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Graduation Exercises 
Wood v. Mt. T^hannn School District. 342 F.Supp. 1293 (1972). 
Facts 
Amy Breecher and her parents brought a civil rights action against the 
school board to prohibit the inclusion of a pronouncement of an invocation and 
benediction at the high school graduation ceremonies to be conducted on June 
7,1972. They specifically claimed that having an invocation and a benediction 
as parts of the graduation ceremony amounts to the establishment of religion, 
impairment of freedom of religion, and an improper use of tax monies. 
Decision 
The District Court ruled the school district was not a "person" subject to 
suit under civil rights statute. It also ruled that where high school graduation 
is not required, the practice of including an invocation and a benediction by a 
clergyman did not violate the establishment or the free exercise clauses. Thus 
the complaint was dismissed. 
Discussion 
The court pointed out that since the graduation ceremonies were held 
after the conclusion of all formal requirements for graduation had been met 
they were purely voluntary ceremonies. There was no requirement to attend 
graduation ceremonies to receive a high school diploma. 
The fact that distinguishes this case from Engel. which required a state 
prayer as part of the formal school day, is that the program is ceremonial and 
not a part of the day-to-day routine of the school curriculum to which is 
attached compulsory attendance. 
The court recognized from Engel that the establishment clause is 
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violated even though there is no direct government compulsion. However, 
they decided since the graduation ceremony was voluntary and separate from 
the school routine, it did not violate any of the plaintiffs' First Amendment 
rights. 
On the issue of tax dollars the amount of money used in connection with 
the invocation and benediction would be de minimis. In short, plaintiffs' would 
not be hurt monetarily by the brief moments used by the invocation and 
benediction. 
The court concluded from the facts presented that the ceremony to be 
held is primarily secular. Therefore, the graduation ceremony in no way 
constitutes religious instruction. 
Lemke v. Black. 376 F.Supp. 87 (1974). 
Facts 
The 1973 graduating class of the Ashwaubenon High School voted to 
hold their graduation at the Nativity Roman Catholic Church. The 1974 
graduating class also voted to hold their ceremony at the same church. Two 
graduating seniors and the father of one of the students objected to holding a 
public school graduation in a Roman Catholic church. They sought a 
preliminary injunction to halt graduation in the church. 
Decision 
The District Court held that the proposed use of the Roman Catholic 
church for graduation was unconstitutional; therefore, the superintendent and 
the board members were ordered not to hold the graduation ceremony at the 
church involved. 
Discussion 
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Prior to 1973, graduation ceremonies were held in the high school gym 
or auditorium. In 1973, the graduating class held its graduation program in 
Nativity Roman Catholic Church. The 1974 graduating class again voted to 
to hold the ceremony at the same church. In both years, some members of the 
school district complained about holding the ceremony in a church. 
The defendants pointed out the Ashwaubenon High School graduation 
ceremony is the responsibility of graduating seniors. They select the site and 
are responsible for paying for the ceremony. Attendance is voluntary and no 
sanctions are imposed by the school board against students who do not attend. 
Chief Judge Reynolds asserted that in light of the circumstances in this 
case there is an unconstitutional relationship between church and state. 
There is conflict in the community over this issue. Some members of the 
community cannot attend the ceremony in a Catholic Church without violating 
their consciences. Holding the graduation program in a church cannot be 
permitted unless there is an overriding secular need to use those particular 
facilities. 
Allowing the students to plan the ceremony is not determinative. 
Graduation exercises are a normal and traditional function of the public 
schools in this state and the nation. School administrators cannot delegate the 
responsibility of planning a public activity to a nongovernmental body and 
allow that body to proceed in an unconstitutional manner. 
The fact that only a few students and members of the community 
objected is insignificant. As Justice Brennan stated in Schempp. it did not 
"matter that few children had complained of the practice, for the measure of 
seriousness of a breech of the establishment clause has never been thought to 
393 
be the number of people who complain of it."® 
The defendants' contention that student participation is voluntary is 
misleading. Graduation represents completion of several years of scholastic 
achievement and symbolizes transition into a more mature society than was 
previously available to the students. It is unfair to force any individual to 
violate his conscience in order to participate in such an important event in the 
individual'slife. 
There was no evidence the defendants or the students who planned the 
graduation exercises were motivated by religious beliefs. Rather, the decision 
to hold a public activity in a church was made in the midst of sectarian or 
religious opposition to that decision. Under these circumstances, it was only 
natural that the religious disputes would eventually become politicized. 
"History cautions that political fragmentation on sectarian lines must be 
guarded against."® 14 
Chief Judge Reynolds concluded that if the graduation program were 
held in the church the plaintiffs' constitutional rights and freedom of religion 
would be impaired. Therefore, the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary 
injunction to prohibit holding the graduation ceremony in a church was granted. 
Weist y. Mk Lebanon School District. 457 Pa 166 320 A.2d 362, cert denied, 
419 U.S. 967 (1974). 
Facts 
On April 26,1973, fifty-four students filed a complaint in equity asking 
913Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 264 (1963). 
^l^Waltz v fax Commission of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 
695 (1970). 
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the Court of Common Pleas, Civil Division of Allegheny County to prohibit the 
Mt. Lebanon School District from including an invocation and benediction at 
the graduation ceremonies of Mt. Lebanon High School scheduled for June 12, 
1973. The plaintiffs complained the inclusion of prayers violated the 
establishment clause and their free exercise rights of the First Amendment, 
and Article I, section 3, of the Pennsylvania Constitution. A three-judge court 
was specially convened to hear the case. 
Decision 
Judge Homer S. Brown, of the Court of Common Pleas, dismissed the 
complaint and the plaintiffs appealed. Chief Judge Jones of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court held that the case was technically moot because the students 
had already graduated; however, the court could not dismiss the appeal 
because of the short time between the commencement announcement and the 
actual commencement exercises. The inclusion of invocation and benediction 
at voluntaiy graduation exercises offended neither the free exercise nor the 
establishment clauses of the Federal Constitution nor that provision of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution governing free exercise and establishment of 
religion. 
Discussion 
The Mt. Lebanon School District had a sixty-year history of holding 
graduation exercises after seniors completed the required course of study. 
Attendance at the programs was voluntary, but approximately ninety percent 
of the graduation classes are in attendance. Students who do not attend may 
obtain their diplomas at the high school principal's office any time the day after 
commencement. 
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The trial court dismissed the appellants free exercise claim and the 
appeals court agreed. Since attendance at graduation was voluntary, there 
was no allegation or showing that the inclusion of an invocation and benediction 
in the commencement program would have any coercive effect upon the 
appellants in the practice of their religion. 
Using various sections of opinions of the Supreme Court, the appellants 
could gain support for their position on the establishment clause. However, the 
Court has ruled that even technical infringement upon the First Amendment 
need not be enjoined. Otherwise, in the words of Mr. Justice Douglas: 
Prayers in our legislative halls; the appeals to the Almighty 
in the messages of the Chief Executive; the proclamation 
making Thanksgiving Day a holiday, "'so help me God" in our 
courtroom oaths-these and all other references to the 
Almighty that run through our laws, our public rituals, or 
ceremonies would be flouting the First Amendment A 
fastidious atheist or agnostic could even object to the 
supplication with which the Court opens each session: "God 
save the United States and this Honorable Court."915 
The appellants' claim on violation of the establishment clause was also 
dismissed. The District Court reasoned the commencement program was 
strictly a public ritual or ceremony and did not serve to advance religion. The 
Court of appeals agreed that the commencement program is a permissible 
accommodation between church and state. 
The appellants' third claim was thatthe invocation and benediction at 
the high school commencement was in derogation of Article I, section 3, of the 
915Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-313, 72 S.Ct. 679, 683, 96 
L.Ed. 954 (1952). 
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Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874, which reads as follows: 
All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship 
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; 
no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect or support 
any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his 
consent; no human authority can, in any case whatever, control 
or interfere with the rights of conscience, and no preference 
shall ever be given by law to any religious establishment or modes 
ofworship.916 
The lower court did not feel the invocation and benediction was the type of 
exercise at which this section of the Pennsylvania Constitution was aimed; 
therefore, they dismissed the appellants' claim. The appeals court affirmed the 
decision of the lower court. 
Grossberg v. Deusebio. 380 F.Supp. 285 (E.D.Va. 1974). 
Facts 
In 1974, students who were members of the graduating class at 
Douglas Freeman High School, a public high school in Henrico County, Virginia, 
requested that an audible prayer not be a part of the upcoming graduation 
ceremony. The School Board of Henrico County refused to prohibit the 
inclusion of an invocation and a benediction at the graduation program. The 
high school students and their parents sought injunctive relief against the 
school board because the inclusion of an invocation and a benediction in the 
graduation program would be an infringement of their rights of religious liberty. 
Decision 
The District Court concluded that with the evidence available at the 
hearing on the motion for preliminary injection there was not sufficient threat 
916weist v. Mt. Lebanon School District, 320 A.2d 362, 366 (1974). 
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of establishment of religion to warrant a preliminary to prohibit an invocation 
and a benediction from the upcoming graduation program. 
Discussion 
The high school had a history of including an invocation and a 
benediction in the graduation exercises. The decision to have a prayer was 
made by the senior class acting through class representatives. All expenses 
except diplomas were the responsibility of the senior class. Attendance at 
graduation was voluntary and seniors not attending could pick up their 
diplomas at any time after the graduation ceremony or have the diplomas 
mailed to them. 
Plaintiffs claimed the inclusion of an audible prayer at the upcoming 
graduation program by the defendants would constitute a "law respecting the 
establishment of religion. "917 The establishment clause prohibits the 
government from aligning itself with any or all religions. "When government 
... allies itself with one particular form of religion, the inevitable result is that 
it incurs 'the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those who held contrary 
beliefs.' "918 
An invocation is a prayer, and it is hard to believe the purpose or effect 
of allowing a prayer being anything other than the advancement of religion. 
The defendants claimed that they were not responsible for the invocation since 
it was voted on by the senior class. They could not get out of the responsibility 
917Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F.Supp. 285, 287 (E.D.Va. 1974). 
918Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 221-222, 83 
S.Ct 1560,1571,10 L.Ed. 844 (1063). 
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of the invocation because the graduation ceremony was held on public school 
grounds, administered by public school personnel, with diplomas awarded by 
the administration. No vote of the majority of the senior class could absolve 
conduct which abridges constitutional rights. 
Defendants pointed out that invocations similar to theirs have a long 
history in this country. Invocations to open state and federal legislative 
chambers are commonplace. Three lower courts which addressed prayers in 
graduation programs found them to be permissible. 
"The history of man is inseparable from the history of religion. "919 The 
District Court could not conclude that the state through the school board was 
so enmeshed in religious affairs as to warrant its intervention. The court 
refused to grant injunctive relief for the plaintiffs. The court also denied the 
defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff action for failing to state a claim on 
which relief could be granted, because if granted, it would change what was a 
preliminary hearing into a final adjudication on the merits. The District Court 
left open the opportunity for the plaintiffs to present further evidence. 
Graham v. Central Community School District of Decatur. 608 F.Supp. 531 
(D.C.Iowa 1985). 
Facts 
A civil rights action was filed by Robert Graham, father of Rebecca 
Graham, a senior at Central Decatur High School, challenging the 
constitutionality of including an invocation and a benediction as a part of the 
high school graduation ceremonies conducted by the school district. Central 
919Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 434,, 82 S.Ct. 1261,1268, 8 L.Ed.2d 
601 (1962). 
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Decatur High School is the only public high school in the school district. For at 
least twenty years, the defendant's graduation ceremonies have been opened 
by an invocation prayer by a Christian minister and closed by a Christian 
minister's benediction. The plaintiff asked that the invocation and benediction 
be removed from the graduation ceremonies. 
Decision 
The District Court ruled that the inclusion of the religious invocation 
and benediction violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment. It 
was the judgment of the court that the defendant is prohibited from including in 
its graduation exercises this year and subsequent years any religious 
invocation or religious benediction. 
Discussion 
The defendants emphasized the graduation exercise was a voluntary 
ceremony which seniors were not required to attend in order to receive a 
diploma. By shifting sponsorship for the graduation program to the Ministerial 
Alliance, school authorities erroneously assumed that the exercises would pass 
constitutional muster. 
Plaintiff Robert Graham testified that he is a Unitarian Universalist, 
and that he is personally offended by the use of Christian prayers at public 
school functions including graduation exercises. Three expert witnesses were 
called by the plaintiff; all of them opined that invocations and benedictions at 
graduation exercises serve a religious purpose, not a secular purpose. All three 
opined that a public school offering an invocation and benediction at public 
school events, such as graduation exercises, is advocating religion. 
Only two witnesses testified for the defendant, Virginia Webb, a 
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member of the defendant's board of directors, and Thomas Spear, the 
defendant's new superintendent. Mrs. Webb gave no opinion as to the purpose 
of the invocation and benediction at graduation exercises. She stated as far as 
she knows the school has always done it. Superintendent Spear testified that 
during his education career he has attended many graduation exercises, and 
each one began with an invocation and ended with a benediction. He opined 
that the main purpose of having an invocation and benediction in graduation 
exercises is "tradition." He also testified that he believes that it lends a 
"serious note" to the ceremony. He also stated he does many things in school 
requiring a "serious note," and that he does them without an invocation in 
advance. He also testified that in his opinion the invocation and benediction 
also serve a religious purpose. 
The court decision in this case was based on the evidence developed at 
the hearing and on applying the evidence to the three-part Lemon test. By 
applying the tripartite test, the court concluded the invocation and benediction 
served a Christian, but not a secular purpose. The trial court also believed the 
practices in question had the primary effect of advancing religion. Since the 
plaintiffs did not question the issue of excessive entanglement, the court did not 
rule on that issue. 
Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools. 610 F.Supp. 43 (W.D.Mich. 1985), rev'd, 
822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987). 
Facts 
Two public school districts in Michigan regularly included an invocation 
and a benediction in their graduation ceremonies. Both programs were held at 
outdoor facilities with attendance being voluntary. Attendance was in no way 
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a condition for receiving a diploma. 
At Plainwell High School the invocation and benediction were given by 
two students chosen from a group of honor students. The students determined 
the contents of the invocation and benediction. 
At Portage Central High School the content of the graduation ceremony 
was organized and developed by the graduating seniors. For at least fifteen 
years they had elected to include an invocation and a benediction in the 
commencement program. Senior class representatives had chosen local 
ministries and clergy to deliver the invocation and the benediction. 
In 1985, action was brought challenging the use of an invocation and a 
benediction at high school graduation ceremonies. The plaintiffs contended the 
prayers violated the religious clauses of the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. 
Decision 
The District Court concluded the inclusion of an invocation and a 
benediction in a high school graduation ceremony advanced a secular purpose, 
and did not have the primary effect of advancing religion and did not foster 
excessive government entanglement with religion. The court found the 
inclusion of a prayer was both religious and ceremonial. In this case there was 
no claim that the school district was using the prayers to convert the audience 
to accept the tenets of any particular faith. Using the above reasoning the 
District Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims on the merits. 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth District 
held that: 
(1) ceremonial invocations and benedictions could be 
delivered at high school commencement ceremonies without 
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violating First Amendment, provided they preserved 
substances of principle of equal liberty of conscience, and 
(2) invocations and benedictions in question violated First 
Amendment in that they symbolically placed Government's 
seal of approval on Christian view of religion. 
The Court of Appeals found that the prayers used in the graduation 
ceremonies violate the establishment clause because of their expressly 
Christian content. The decision of the District Court was reversed and 
remanded to the District Court for further proceeding and the granting of 
equitable relief. 
Discussion 
The practice in Steinwell High School permitted a brief invocation and 
benediction by a graduating senior, with no censorship of the prayers by the 
school administration. The custom in Portage Central High School called for 
recitation of an invocation and a benediction by members of the clergy selected 
by representatives of the graduating class. The minister was not asked to 
present the prayers for approval, but he was asked to keep them brief and 
"nondenominational." In supporting these practices, the court stressed four 
general factors: 
. . .  a t t e n d a n c e  a t  g r a d u a t i o n  i s  v o l u n t a r y ;  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  
parents and other adults minimizes the proselytizing potential 
of the prayers; the prayers are isolated events that take only 
a few moments once a year, rather than daily rituals; and no 
evidence suggested that speakers had intended to use prayers 
to promote particular religious beliefs.920 
The school boards argued that the limitations on school prayer 
920Benjamjn b. Sendor, "Religion and the Public Schools," Education 
Law m North Carolina. 1 (January 1988): 16-7. 
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developed for officially sponsored classroom prayer under a series of cases 
beginning with Engd^^l simply did not apply because graduation prayers are 
only annual occasions of a festive, celebratory nature. They pointed out that 
voluntary graduation programs held in auditoriums or athletic stadiums, with 
parents and friends in attendance, were different from the classroom. 
The plaintiffs, using the same line of Supreme Court school prayer 
decisions as well as the decision in Graham^22 prohibiting prayer at 
commencement decisions, argued to the contrary. They asserted that all 
invocations and benedictions in the school context that invoke the image of God 
or Supreme Being, including sectarian, Christian, Jewish or other invocations 
of the deity, violate the First Amendment. The contended that the graduation 
exercises, like regular school classes, were directed at public school children. 
They claimed the same First Amendment values of liberty of conscience, state 
neutrality and noninterference with religion that prohibit school prayer should 
also be applied to invocations and benedictions at graduation exercises. 
The District Court concluded that the annual graduation exercises in 
this case were analogous to the legislative and judicial sessions referred to in 
Marsh9%3 and should be governed by the same principles. To entirely prohibit 
the long established tradition of invocations at graduation exercises while 
supporting the tradition of invocations forjudges, legislators, and public 
92lEngel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 82 S.Ct.1261, 8 L.ed.2d 601 (1962). 
922(5-rajiam v Central Community School District of Decatur, 608 
F.Supp. 531 (D.C.Iowa 1985). 
923Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,103 S.Ct. 3330, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 
(1983). 
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officials did not seem to be a consistent application of the principle of equal 
liberty of conscience. 
In the same vein, the invocations and benedictions delivered at 
graduation exercises should not be framed in language unacceptable under 
Marsh. The invocations and benedictions delivered at the two high schools did 
not pass the Marsh test because they were framed in language that placed the 
government's seal of approval of the Christian view rather than civil 
invocations and benedictions used in public legislative and judicial sessions 
described in Marsh. 
Sands v. Morongo Unified School District. 262 Cal.Rptr. 452 (Cal.Ct.App. 
1989). 
Facts 
James Sands and Jean Bertelette, taxpayers, sued the school district 
for declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking to prohibit the school district from 
including invocations and benedictions in public high school graduation 
ceremonies. The four high schools in the school district traditionally included 
an invocation and a benediction in graduation ceremonies. Typically, the 
invocations and benedictions included a prayer. 
Decision 
The Superior Court of San Bernardino County, California, prohibited 
the school district from including invocations and benedictions in the four public 
high school in the school district and the school district appealed. The Court of 
Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, held that nonsectarian invocations and 
benedictions did not violate the establishment clause of First Amendment or 
provisions of the California Constitution prohibiting the school district from 
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aiding a religious or sectarian purpose or teaching sectarian or denominational 
doctrine in common schools. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the 
lower court. 
Discussion 
The plaintiff brought suit under a California statute that allowed 
citizens to challenge governmental action which would otherwise go 
unchallenged in the courts because of the standing requirement. The school 
district claimed the plaintiffs did not have a personal interest in the case since 
they did not have children attending the school district. The school district 
misconstrued the ruling in Blgir^24 that allowed a taxpayer to bring a lawsuit 
even though there was no individual damage. Plaintiffs as taxpayers had a 
statutory right to bring this suit. 
Plaintiffs challenged the graduation prayers under both the federal and 
state constitutions. As an administrative act, a graduation ceremony must 
comply with state and federal standards. Courts have held that the 
establishment clause does not prohibit legislative sessions from opening with a 
religious invocation. In this case, the school district suggested the court should 
follow the principles set forth in Marsh.925 rather than the principles 
established by Lemon.̂  2 6 The court choose to use the Lemon test. In 
examining other court decisions related to invocations and benedictions, 
924Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal.3d 258, 96 Cal.Rptr. 42, 486 P.2d 1242 
(1971). 
925Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,103 S.Ct. 3330, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 
(1983). 
926Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed2d 745 
(1971). 
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includingBennett.9 2 7 the only other case in California which ruled invocations 
and benedictions violated state and federal Constitutions, the court concluded 
that in this case the invocations and benedictions had a secular purpose, did 
not prohibit or advance religion, and would not excessively involve the school 
district with religion. The Supreme Court had not yet considered the 
constitutionality of religious invocation and benedictions at public high school 
graduation ceremonies. 
Lee v. Weisman. 902 F.2d 1090 (1st. Cir. 1990), 112 S.Ct. 2649 (1992). 
Facts 
For years, invocations and benedictions had been a part of the 
graduation ceremonies in the Providence, Rhode Island, school system. High 
school and middle school principals of public schools were permitted to invite 
local clergy to deliver the prayers. Principal Robert E. Lee, Deborah 
Weisman's principal, gave the rabbi a pamphlet containing guideline to use in 
developing nonsectarian prayers. 
In 1989, four days before graduation, Deborah Weisman, a Nathan 
Bishop Middle School student in Providence, Rhode Island, and her parents 
sought a temporary restraining order forbidding public school officials from 
incorporating prayers in the graduation ceremony. Shortly before the 
ceremony, the District Court denied the motion of the Weisman family for lack 
of adequate time to consider it. Deborah and her family attended the 
graduation exercise, and the rabbi gave the prayers. The rabbi gave thanks to 
God for "the legacy of America, where diversity is celebrated and the rights of 
927j5ennett v. Livermore Unified School District, 238 Cal. Rptr. 819 
(CaLApp. 1 Dist. 1987). 
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minorities are protected."®28 
Subsequently, Weisman sought a permanent injunction barring 
Providence public school officials from inviting clergy to deliver invocations and 
benedictions at future graduations. It seemed likely that such prayers would 
be conducted at Deborah's high school graduation. 
Decision 
The District Court prohibited school officials from continuing the use of 
invocations and benedictions at graduation ceremonies on the grounds that it 
violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment. On appeal, the 
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the District Court. Petition for 
certiorari was granted. In a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court held that 
allowing prayers at graduation exercises is unconstitutional. 
Discussion 
For years, courts in many areas of the country had wrestled with the 
inclusion of invocations and benedictions as a part of graduation ceremonies. 
The court decisions were about equally divided as to whether the prayers in 
graduation ceremonies were constitutional or unconstitutional. This landmark 
case is important because it was the first case on graduation prayers to reach 
the Supreme Court. Many observers feared the decision of the Court would 
destroy forty years of separation between church and state and turn toward 
some form of accommodation of religion in the public schools. Their fears were 
founded on the pressures of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush who 
pushed for a constitutional amendment to return prayers to the public schools. 
928Nancy Gibbs, "America's Holy War," Tim** 138, no. 23 (December 9, 
1991) 62. 
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In holding thatthe inclusion of prayers by clergy as part of an official 
public school graduation ceremony is prohibited by the establishment clause, 
the Supreme Court gave the following reasons: 
(a) The Court chose not to revisit the tripartite test developed in 
Lemon.929 The government's desire to accommodate the free exercise of 
religion does not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the 
establishment clause. The establishment clause guarantees that the 
government cannot force anyone to support or participate in religion or its 
exercise or otherwise act in a way which "establishes a [state] religion or 
religious faith, or tends to do so."930 
(b) The attempt by the school officials to make the prayers 
nonsectarian and acceptable to most people did not relieve the state, acting 
through the school system. The state could not establish an official or civic 
religion as a way of avoiding the establishment of religion. 
(c) The establishment clause was developed to protect citizens against 
an indoctrination or coercion of religion. The prayer cases ofEng§l931 an(j 
Schempp932 protected the indirect coercion of elementary and secondary 
students. Arguing that the prayers were of a de minimis character does not 
excuse a prayer from violating the objectors' rights. 
929Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 
(1971). 
930Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678,104 S.Ct. 1355,1361, 79 
L.Ed2d 604 (1984). 
93lEngel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 82 S.Ct. 1261, 8 LEd.2d 601 (1962). 
932Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,83 S.Ct. 1560, 
10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963). 
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(d) The Court rejected the petitioner's argument thatmaking the 
graduation exercises voluntary excused the threat of coercion. It pointed out 
that in our society graduation is one of life's most significant occasions and 
there is much peer pressure on students to attend graduation ceremonies. The 
Court also emphasized that the state failed to acknowledge that what for 
many was a spiritual imperative was for the Weismans religious conformance 
required by the state. 
(e) Constitutional differences between the public school system and a 
session of a state legislature distinguish this case from Marsh.933 in public 
schools students are a captive audience required to follow school policies. 
Graduation is one of the most important events for students to attend. In a 
state legislature's opening, adults are in an atmosphere where they are free to 
enter and leave with little comment and for any number of reasons. 
For the separationists the decision in Lee934 was a great victory, to 
the accommodationists a great defeat. The debate is not over;the conservative 
Christian fundamentalists are still seeking a constitutional amendment to 
return prayer to the public schools. 
Jones Clear Creek Independent School District. 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 
1991), 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992). 
Facts 
Traditionally, Clear Lake High School included in its graduation 
ceremonies invocations and benedictions voluntarily written and delivered by 
933Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,103 S.Ct 3330, 77 L.Ed.2d 
1019 (1983). 
934L.ee v. Weisman, 112 S.Ct. 2649 (1992). 
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members of the graduating senior class. Before 1986,, Clear Lake graduation 
invocations included overt references to Christianity. In 1986 Clear Lake's 
graduation invocation mentioned "Lord," "Gospel," "Amen," and God's 
omnipotence. Two graduating seniors and their fathers claimed that Clear 
Creek's policy and actions of permitting invocations consisting of traditionally 
Christian prayer at high school graduation ceremonies violated the 
establishment clause of the First Amendment. They brought suit against the 
school district to prohibit it from permitting invocations and benedictions at 
high school graduation ceremonies. 
Decision 
The District Court ruled in favor of the school district and denied the 
students and their parents injunctive and declaratory relief from the Clear 
Creek invocation and benediction policy. On appeal, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the decision of the District Court. The students and their parents 
petitioned for writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court of the United States 
granted the petition, vacated the judgment, and remanded. On remand, the 
Court of Appeals held that: 
(1) primary effect of resolution was secular; (2) resolution's 
proscription of sectarianism did not in itself excessively 
entangle government with religion; (3) resolution was not an 
unconstitutional endorsement of religion by the government, as 
it merely permitted nonsectarian, nonproselytizing invocation 
if the seniors chose to have one; and (4) resolution did not 
unconstitutionally coerce participation of objectors in a 
government-directed formal religious exercise.935 
For the second time, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's 
93 5jones v Clear Creek, 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992) 
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judgment and denied the students and their parents injunctive and declaratory 
relief from the Resolution. 
Discussion 
On December 5,1987, three weeks before the case was to be tried in 
District Court, Clear Creek's Board of Trustees adopted a resolution which 
provided: 
1. The use of an invocation and/or benediction at high school 
graduation exercises shall rest with the discretion of the 
graduating senior class, with the advice and counsel of the 
senior class principal; 
2. The invocation and benediction, if used, shall be given by a 
student volunteer; and 
3. Consistent with the principle of equal liberty of conscience, 
the invocation and benediction shall be nonsectarian and 
nonproselytizing in nature.936 
The resolution was adopted by the Clear Creek Independent School District at 
the request of its attorney. He used the judge's opinion in Stein937 to draft the 
resolution for the Clear Creek Independent School District. 
In reviewing the finding of the District Court the Court of Appeals 
applied the Lemon®38 test, rather than the historical approach in Marsh.939 
936jones v. Clear Creek, 930 F.2d 416, 417 (5th Cir. (1991). 
937gtein v. Plain well Community Schools, 610 F.Supp 43 (W.D.MICH. 
1985), rev'd, 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987). 
938Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 
(1971). 
939Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,103 S.Ct. 3330, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 
(1983). 
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The Court of Appeals concluded the resolution served a secular purpose, its 
primary purpose was to solemnize graduation ceremonies, not advance 
religion, and requiring the invocation and benediction to be nonsectarian and 
nonproselytizing in nature did not excessively entangle the government with 
religion. The Court of Appeals found that Lgg940 did not render Clear Creek's 
invocation policy unconstitutional. In Lee the Supreme Court struck down a 
Rhode Island school's practice of inviting clergy members to a graduation 
ceremony and providing guidelines for an invocation. The Supreme Court did 
not rule on prayers written and delivered by students themselves. In this case 
the prayers were student initiated and delivered by student volunteers. The 
resolution did not require a prayer but permitted one if so desired by the 
seniors. 
Harris v. Joint School District No 241. 821 F.Supp. 638 (9th Cir. 1994). 
Facts 
In this 1994 case, students and a parent of students challenged the 
inclusion of prayer in their high school graduation ceremony. They asserted 
that the inclusion of prayer violated the Idaho Constitution and the 
establishment clause of the United States Constitution. 
Decision 
Although the District Court declined to review state law claims, it 
concluded that prayers did not violate the establishment clause. On appeal, 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the inclusion of 
school prayer in the Grangeville High School graduation exercises violated the 
940Lee v Weisman, 112 S.Ct. 2649,120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992). 
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establishment clause. 
Discussion 
The school district asserted that since the Grangeville High School 
senior class planned the graduation program, including making the decision to 
include or not to include a prayer during graduation, the inclusion of prayer was 
not unconstitutional. Intervenors contended that students have a right under 
the free speech and free exercise clauses to the Constitution to have a prayer 
during graduation exercises. The plaintiffs claimed the seniors did not control 
all parts of graduation exercises. Furthermore, some students voted against 
the inclusion of prayer in the graduation program. Finally, the plaintiffs 
asserted that under the current school policy, school officials would permit the 
senior class to plan a graduation program equivalent to a religious service. 
The Ninth Circuit, relying on Lee,941 considered the extent of state 
involvement in the graduation program as well as the obligation of students to 
participate in the activity. The court noted that the seniors had the authority 
to plan graduation only because the school permitted them to exert such 
authority. In addition, the school maintained some control over the speeches, 
timing, and content of the program. Further, the school district provided the 
facility and other expenses, and graduation programs were paid for by money 
the senior class was allotted from student registration funds. The court further 
concluded that students were obligated to attend the graduation program and 
participate by at least maintaining a respectful silence during graduation 
prayers. Using Leg,942 the court concluded that the facts demonstrated state 
94lLee v. Weisman, 112 S.Ct. 2649 (1992). 
942u3jtL 
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involvement and obligatory student participation in the religious activity. 
On the issue of free speech and free exercise claims, the court observed 
that students were free to worship before and after graduation. The court 
further concluded, since the planning of state-controlled, state-sponsored 
events such as graduation was involved, the establishment clause applied. 
Distribution of Religious Literature 
Gideon Bibles 
Tudor v. Board of Education. 14 N.J. 31,100 A.2d 857 (1953). 
Facts 
The plaintiff, Bernard Tudor, of the Jewish faith, claimed that the 
distribution of the Gideon Bible to children of the Jewish faith violated the 
teachings, tenets, and principles of Judaism, while plaintiff Ralph Lecoque, of 
the Catholic faith, claimed its distribution to children of the Catholic faith 
violated the teaching, tenets and principles of Catholicism. After the action 
commenced, the child of Ralph Lecoque transferred from public school to a 
Catholic parochial school; therefore, his action as a parent became moot. 
Originally, the State of New Jersey was named as a defendant party, but was 
dismissed from the action. 
On the advice of legal counsel, the Rutherford Board of Education 
developed a distribution system for the Gideon Bibles in grades five through 
eight. Before the books were distributed, parents had to sign for their children 
to receive the Gideon Bibles. 
Decision 
A temporary injunction was granted to halt the distribution in the 
schools. After a hearing, the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, ruled in 
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favor to the school board and lifted the injunction. On appeal, the court 
reinstated the injunction as requested, and the case was heard by the New 
Jersey Supreme Court. The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the 
distribution of the Gideon Bibles violated the constitutions of New Jersey and 
the federal government. 
Discussion 
The New Jersey Supreme Court saw the practice of distributing Gideon 
Bibles as sectarian. The defendant school board was accused of showing a 
preference by permitting the distribution of the King James Version which was 
unacceptable to Catholics and Jews. This practice violated the mandate of the 
First Amendment, as applied to states by the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibiting the making of any law "respecting an establishment of religion,"943 
and the requirement of Article I, paragraph 4 of the New Jersey Constitution 
that "there shall be no establishment of one religious sect, in preference to 
another. "944 As stated by Mr. Justice Black in his majority opinion in 
Everson: 
"The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment 
means at least this: "Neither a state nor the Federal Government 
can set up a church, nor can they pass laws which aid one religion, 
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."945 
Mr. Justice Douglas in his mfyority opinion in Zorach stated: "The government 
943Tudor v. Board of Education, 100 A.2d 857, 864 (N.J. 1953). 
944ibid. 
945Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1,15 (1947). 
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must be neutral when it comes to competition between sects."946 
The court insisted that activities, especially those of a religious nature 
which separated and excluded some children from the mainstream, were 
constitutionally questionable. 
When... a small minority of the pupils in the public school 
is excluded, for any cause, from a stated school exercise, 
particularly when such cause is apparent hostility to the Bible 
which a majority of the pupils have been taught to revere, from 
that moment the excluded pupil loses caste with his fellow, and 
is liable to be regarded with aversion, and subjected to reproach 
and insult. But it is a sufficient refutation of the argument that 
the practice in question tends to destroy the equality of the 
pupils which the constitution seeks to establish and protect, 
and puts a portion of them to serious disadvantage in many 
ways with respect to the others. (At 44 N.W. 975)947 
Distribution of the Gideon Bible was judged to be more than an 
accommodation of religion. The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the 
distribution of the Gideon Bibles violated the constitutions of New Jersey and 
the federal government. 
Bereer v. Rensselaer Central School Corporation. 982 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir. 
1993). 
Facts 
In the fall of 1989, Allen Berger sent a letter to the Rensselaer Central 
School Corporation requesting they discontinue the practice of permitting 
Gideons to distribute Bibles to fifth grade students. The board of education 
946zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314, 72 S.Ct. 679,684,96 L.Ed. 
954, 962 (1952). 
947state ex rel. Weiss v. District Board, 76 Wis. 2177,44 N.W. 967, 7 
L.R.A. 330 (S.Ct. 1890). 
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discussed the letter and decided not to alter its policy regarding the Gideons. 
There were no guidelines in the policy to assist the superintendent and the 
principal on how to exercise their discretion except the general reminder to act 
in students' best interests. The policy did not cover when nonschool personnel 
could make presentations and distributions during time ordinarily reserved for 
instruction. The superintendent and the principal had total discretion to grant 
or deny access to school property. 
Unable to get the school board to change its policy of distribution of 
Bibles by the Gideons, Allen Berger filed suit on behalf of his children, Moriah 
and Joshua Berger, seeking to have the corporation's practice declared 
unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment directive that 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. "9 48 
Decision 
The District Court dismissed the Bergers' suit on summary judgment. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that the District 
Court had erred in finding no establishment clause violation under Lemon 949 
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the District Court in ruling 
classroom distribution of Gideon Bibles to fifth grade public school students 
violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment. The Rensselaer 
Central School Corporation petitioned for a rehearing en banc, and the petition 
was denied. 
94&U. s. Constitution. Amendment. I. 
949Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 
(1971). 
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Discussion 
There was no difficulty with the Rensselaer Central School Corporation 
distribution policy until Mr. Berger protested to the corporation. The policy in 
question did not treat religion directly; therefore, on its face there were no 
establishment clause concerns. The Bergers' concern was the distribution of 
Gideon Bibles to fifth grade students. In 1985, Allen Berger's first grade son 
Joshua and other students received a book, My Favorite Book, published by 
the Jesus Love Foundation. Mr. Berger thought the book was 
nondenominational but religious in its treatment of citizenship and lifestyle. 
He did not protest the book. In 1989, Mr. Berger did challenge the board policy 
on the distribution of Gideon Bibles on behalf of his children, Moriah and Joshua 
Berger. 
Having opened the school property to nonschool personnel, the school 
system was obligated to treat all speakers equally. In this case the Bibles 
were distributed by Gideons, not school personnel, but for young children in 
classrooms it may be difficult to distinguish the difference. 
The school system claimed that it was neutral in reference to the 
distribution policy and that it could not exclude the Gideons without engaging in 
content discrimination, yet by her own admission, the superintendent had 
excluded at least one publication and that she would exclude groups she found 
offensive to the "moral being" of children. 
The defendants used Wiclmar 950 for the proposition that having opened 
its classroom for public use, it was required to keep the invitation open to all, 
950widmar V. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,102 S.Ct. 269, 70L.Ed.2d 440 
(1981). 
419 
including the Gideons. There is one mty'or difference between this case and 
WiHmnr. In Wirimar the organization sought access to the school facilities 
after school. In this case, the Gideons sought access to the school facilities 
during school hours. The fifth grade students were a captive audience. 
The analogous case is not Widmar but McCollum v. Board of 
Education.951 In MnCnllum nonschool employees used the public schools in 
Illinois to advance their religious doctrine. The Gideons used the public schools 
of Rensselaer to distribute religious materials to fifth graders. 
The defendant was also wrong in thinking that the First Amendment 
interest in free expression automatically rules over the First Amendment 
prohibition on state-sponsored religious activity. The opposite is true in the 
coercive context of public schools. The conflict between free speech and the 
establishment clause interest is the result of most religious activity being 
expressive. This expression maybe suppressed in the government's vigilance 
to remain neutral toward religion. More specifically, the First Amendment is 
intended to restrict the religious activity of the government not the religious 
activity of individuals. As the Supreme Court stated in Engel: 
It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each 
separate government in this country should stay out of the 
business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave 
that purely religious function to the people themselves and 
to those the people choose to look to for religious guidance.952 
The conflict arises when individuals unduly involve the government in 
95lMcCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203,68 S.Ct. 461, 92 
L.Ed. 649 (1948). 
952Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435, 82 S.Ct. 1261,1269 (1962). 
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their expressive rights. In this case the defendant's attempt to remove the 
establishment clause jurisprudence must fail. A public school cannot sponsor 
nonreligious speech in an attempt to remove an endorsement of religion 
forbidden under the establishment clause. 
The Rensselaer Central School Corporation acted with state authority 
by permitting the Gideons into the public schools; therefore, its actions were 
subject to the dictates of the First Amendment. Under the establishment 
clause, "the government may not aid one religion, aid all religions or favor one 
religion over another. "953 The Supreme Court stated in Zorach: 
There cannot by the slightest doubt that the First Amendment 
reflects the philosophy that Church and State should be separated. 
And so far as interference with the "free exercise" of religion and 
an "establishment" of religion are concerned, the separation must be 
complete and unequivocal. The First Amendment, within the scope 
of its coverage permits no exception; the prohibition is absolute. 
The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all 
respects there shall be a separation of Church and State. Rather, 
it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there 
shall be no concert or union or dependency one on the other. That 
is the common sense of the matter.954 
The Court of Appeals compared Rennselaer to Lee.955 Lee and 
Rensselaer were both resolved without using Lemon:** 5 6 however, Lemon 
953Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1,15, 67 S.Ct. 504, 511, 91 
L.Ed 711 (1947). 
954Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312, 72 S.Ct. 679, 683, 96 L.Ed. 
954 (1952). 
955Lee v. Weisman, 112 St.Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992). 
956Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 
(1971). 
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remains the law of the land. Even though the District Court decision in 
Rensselaer was rendered before Lee, the District Court erred in finding no 
establishment clause violation under Lemon. 
Such a decision is tone deaf to the Constitution's mandate that 
the government must not establish a state religion, and is utterly 
insensitive to the special concern about coercive influences on 
impressionable public school children. "9£>7 
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the District Court and ruled that 
the Gideons could not distribute Bibles in Rensselaer public schools during 
class time for nonpedagogical purposes. 
Other Materials 
Burch v. Barker. 651 F.Supp. 1149 (W.D.Was. 1987). 
Facts 
Five students had distributed an anonymous newspaper, Bad Astra, 
without knowledge of school authorities. The general content of the articles in 
the paper was critical of the school administration policy. It contained no 
profanity or obscene language. 
Students had produced the newspaper, Bad Astra, at their own expense 
and off school property. The paper was delivered to school by the mother of 
one of the student authors. Approximately three hundred and fifty copies of 
the newspaper were distributed on the school grounds. The mother, who was 
president of the Lindbergh High School Parent Teacher Association, put a 
copy of the newspaper in the mailboxes of faculty and staff members. 
957Berger v. Rensselaer Central School Corporation, 982 F.2d 1160, 
1169 (7th Cir. 1993). 
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Several days after the distribution of the newspaper, school authorities 
identified the student authors who had used pen names. The students were 
disciplined in the form of a letter of reprimand to be placed in each student 
author's school record. The student authors appealed to the superintendent 
who supported the principal's disciplinary action. They did not appeal to the 
School Board as required by the old policy. Before, during, and after the 
distribution ofBad Astra, the Renton School Board and School Superintendent 
were in the process of revising the old policy. The new policy also required 
approval of student writings before distribution on school grounds. Present and 
former students and their parents sued the school district, the principal, the 
superintendent, and the board of directors challenging high school policy 
requiring prior approval before distribution of written materials. 
Decision 
The United States District Court for the Western District of 
Washington held that: 
(1) new high school prior restraint policy, as a whole, was 
substantially constitutional; (2) that portion of policy 
prohibiting dissemination of unapproved written material on 
school premises or in a manner reasonably calculated to arrive 
on school premises was unconstitutional; (3) that portion of 
policy prohibiting expression that encourages actions which 
endanger health and safety of students was unconstitutionally 
vague; (4) that portion of policy governing procedure was 
unconstitutional to the extent it did not provide time limits for 
decision making at every level of the appeal process; (5) question 
of facial constitutionality of old policy was moot; (6) failure of 
present and former high school students and parents to exhaust 
administrative remedies did not preclude consideration of 
constitutionality of policy as applied to the student authors; and 
(7) old policy was constitutionally applied.^ 58 
958Burch v. Barker. 651 F.Supp. 1149 (W.D.Was. 1987) 
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Discussion 
The court was faced with two distinct questions of law: (1) the 
constitutionality of the new policy regulations 5220,5220R, and 1130 and 
constitutionality of the old policy regulation 5133. The first question was the 
constitutionality of the new policy. Following the history of interest balancing 
test of the First Amendment there is no clear-cut answer to this question. 
Substantially, the court found the new policy to be constitutionally sound; 
however, some of the provisions of regulation 5220R were vague and needed to 
be revised to satisfy constitutional requirements. 
A strong presumption against prior approval restraint of speech can be 
traced to the earliest days of the United States, and this presumption applies 
to children as well as adults. Secondary students do not "shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school house 
gate.A policy of prior restraint in a secondary school is not 
unconstitutional per se. However, the burden is on the defendants to prove 
that a prior approval requirement is needed. 
This court found that the uncensored writing of students could create a 
substantial disruption with the operation of the school or impinge on the rights 
of other students at Lindbergh High School. The court realized that a student 
who was willing to knowingly publish obscenity would probably be as likely 
also toviolate the prior approval requirement. However, school authorities who 
use a prior approval process have a constitutional obligation to attempt to 
959rinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 
U.S. 503, 506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 736, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). 
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handle potential harm in any reasonable way before resorting to prohibiting 
distribution of written materials on school grounds. 
In this case there was testimony at the trial concerning the 
community's right to monitor speech in the school. The community does have 
the right and responsibility to make decisions concerning public education and 
school authorities have the right to reasonably control the time, place, and 
manner of distribution of student underground newspapers. 
However, regardless of community sentiment, neither the community nor 
school authorities have the right to use a prior approval policy to censor 
student-written materials except in certain specifically excepted instances 
when no time, place, or manner regulations would avert potential harm. 
Although, in this case the court found the prior approval requirement 
constitutional, school officials should follow this maxim: "When in doubt, do not 
censor. 60 
Although the court found the new policy substantially acceptable, 
several provisions were impermissibly vague. The first paragraph under the 
provision entitled "Distribution of Written Material," Regulation 5220R, 
prohibits distribution of unapproved written material on school premises "or in 
a manner reasonably calculated to arrive on school premises."961 School 
officials have no right to control dissemination of student-written material off 
school premises. 
Number seven under the section of Regulation 5220R entitled, 
"Conditions which may cause verbal or written expression to be restricted or 
960£}urch v. Barker, 651 F.Supp. 1149,1155 (W.D.Wash. 1987). 
961ibid. 
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prohibited," allows prohibition of an expression that "encourages actions which 
endanger the health and safety of students. "962 The court concluded this 
provision was too vague and was also redundant. 
The last paragraph of this section states in part: 
In order for verbal or written expression to be disruptive 
or hazardous, there must exist clear and specific facts 
upon which it would judge that a clear and present likelihood 
of an immediate and substantial disruption would result if 
expression were allowed to occur.963 
The second question facing the court was the constitutionality of the old 
policy, Regulation 5133. This involved a three-part inquiry. The first inquiry 
was whether or not the court could rule upon the facial constitutionality of the 
old policy. This was a moot point, since the old policy had not been used since 
the introduction of the new policy on August 13,1983. 
The second inquiry dealt with the plaintiffs' failure to exhaust state 
administration remedies. The old policy provided for appeals to the principal, 
the superintendent, and the school board. In this case the plaintiffs appealed 
to the principal and the superintendent, but failed to appeal to the school 
board. The question was whether or not failure to exhaust the administrative 
remedies of Regulation 5133 precluded consideration of the constitutionality of 
the old policy as applied to the student authors. The court determined that it 
did not. 
The plaintiffs did not deny that the student authors violated Regulation 
962ibid., 1155-56. 
963ibid„ 1156. 
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5133, or that the disciplinary action taken by the principal was appropriate if 
the old policy was applied to the student authors in a constitutional manner. 
Instead, the issue was whether Regulation 5133 was constitutional as it was 
applied to the student authors. The court concluded that school board 
administrative remedies did not have to be exhausted before the issue may be 
considered. 
The final question was whether or not Regulation 5133 was 
constitutional as applied to the student plaintiffs. The question was a very 
narrow one which only applied to this case. Students were disciplined for 
failure to submit Bad Astra to the school board and because they did not sign 
the articles appearing in Bad Astra. If they had presented Bad Astra to the 
principal and had approval denied, but continued to distribute the newspaper, 
the court would have been faced with the task of determining whether or not 
the criteria and procedures of the old policy were constitutional. 
The court held that Regulation 5133 was applied to the student authors 
in a constitutional manner. The court did not interfere with the disciplinary 
action of the principal. It was suggested that the defendants may wish to 
consider voluntarily removing the discipline letters from the student authors' 
files for the assistance the student authors gave to the school board in 
developing a new policy. 
Thompson v. Waynesboro Area School District. 673 F.Supp. 1379 
(M.D.Pa. 1987). 
Facts 
On April 28,1986, Bryan Thompson and Marc Shunk, students at 
Antietam Junior High School, distributed copies of a newspaper entitled Issues 
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and Answers in the hallway before school began. Issues and Answers was a 
religious newspaper published in Illinois by a group know as "Student Action 
for Christ." The newspaper contained articles and cartoons which supported 
religious tenets such as a personal relationship with God and adherence to the 
principles of the Bible. Thompson's and Shunk's reason for distributing Issues 
and Answers was to communicate the Christian message to fellow students. 
A teacher gave the principal, Robert Mesaros, a copy of the newspaper. 
The principal consulted with the superintendent and met with Bryan 
Thompson and Thompson's father on April 28,1986, concerning the 
newspaper. The principal claimed that there was a school policy which 
required prior preview before distributing literature. 
The next day the principal wrote a memorandum to the Thompsons 
outlining certain restrictions which would be imposed on further distributions of 
Issues and Answers. Bryan would only be permitted to distribute Issues and 
Answers before 7:50 a. m. outside the school building, on the sidewalk and the 
parking lot. During the school day Biyan would be required to keep extra 
copies in his locker. The reason for this action was a policy which required prior 
approval before materials could be displayed, posted, or distributed on school 
property. In the past, the principal had generally prohibited nonstudent groups 
from distributing literature which was not sponsored by the school. 
On May 8,1986, Bryan Thompson, Marc Shunk, and Christopher Eakle 
again distributed copies of Issues and Answers in the hallways before the 
opening of school. A teacher asked the three boys to stop giving out the 
newspapers. They continued to distribute papers and were approached by an 
assistant principal. They were placed on in-class suspension and informed by 
428 
the principal that if they continued to disregard his instructions for distributing 
the newspapers they would no longer be allowed to distribute Issues and 
Answers at any time. 
On May 12,1986, March Shunk and Bryan Thompson again distributed 
Issues and Answers in the hallways before school. Again they were confronted 
by a teacher and taken to the principal's office. This time they were placed in 
in-school suspension for the entire day and the principal informed the parents 
in writing that the reason for the boy's suspension was "willfiil disregard for 
school district policy and direct disobedience to [Mesaros1] directive"964 
Students brought suit against the school district alleging that limitations 
placed on students' distribution of religious newspapers violated their First 
Amendment rights. 
Decision 
On motions for summary judgment by both the plaintiffs and defendants 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania ruled 
that: 
(1) students' distribution of religious newspapers in the 
hallways of a junior high school during noninstructional time 
was not a "meeting" under the Equal Access Act, therefore not 
protected by Act; (2) school district violated students' freedom 
of speech in violation of First Amendment by restricting students' 
distribution of religious literature to area outside school; and 
(3) school district did not violate the students' First Amendment 
right to free exercise of religion by requiring the students to 
distribute religious newspapers outside school building.965 
96Thompson v. Waynesboro Area School District* 673 F. Supp. 1379, 
1381 (M.D.Pa. 1987). 
965ibid., 1379. 
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Discussion 
In addition to the conditions surrounding the plaintiffs' distribution of 
Issues and Answers, other issues were relevant to the claims made by the 
plaintiffs. For example, students at Antietam Junior High School had the 
opportunity to participate in noncurriculum activities such as student clubs 
which met after school. The newspaper was one such club, which published a 
school newspaper entitled Round-Up. A faculty member from the English 
curriculum supervised the Round-Up staff which was made up of students. 
The school newspaper was distributed to students during homeroom. It 
contained articles, poems, and lists prepared by students. The school principal 
supervised its content for the purpose of removing or editing materials which 
were obscene, libelous, or substantially disruptive. The plaintiffs did not 
request permission to form a club or to meet during the after-school activity 
period. 
Four issues were raised for the court to address: 
whether the distribution by plaintiffs of a religious 
newspaper in the hallways of Antietam Junior High School 
during noninstructional time is conduct which is protected by 
the Equal Access Act, whether defendant created a public 
forum at Antietam Junior High School throught its policies with 
respect to student activities, whether the restrictions which 
defendant placed on plaintiffs' distribution of Issues and Answers 
are constitutionally valid in context to the forum which exists at 
Antietam Junior High School; and whether defendant's restrictions 
infringe unconstitutionally on plaintiffs' right to exercise their religion 
freely.966 
The court concluded that the distribution of Issues and Answers did not 
fall under the protection of the Equal Access Act. Rather than seeking to 
966ibid., 1382. 
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obtain a meeting place for religious activity, the plaintiffs chose to place 
themselves in a position where many students were likely to pass. 
The defendants argued that they had not created a limited open forum 
that covered the plaintiffs activities. However, the defendants did not argue 
that they had no limited open forum. In fact, there were twenty-nine 
noncurriculum student clubs meeting on school premises twice a week during 
noninstructional time. 
The defendants did not contest that the distribution by plaintiffs of 
Issues and Answers is not speech protected by the First Amendment. In 
Martin Vj. Struthers^? the Supreme Court clearly held that the right to free 
speech includes the right to distribute literature. The court concluded that the 
distribution of the religious newspaper by the plaintiffs was a form of protected 
speech. 
The plaintiffs had restricted their activities to the hallways of Antietam 
Junior High School; however, the parties apparently rested their arguments on 
the assumption that the plaintiffs sought general access to the school. 
Therefore, the court focused its forum analysis on the entire school rather than 
limiting itself to the hallways. 
A seminal case involving freedom of speech is Tinker Pes Moines 
Independent Community School District.968 In that case students sued the 
school district for prohibiting them from wearing black armbands in protest of 
967Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 63 S.Ct. 863, 87 L.Ed. 1313 
(1943). 
v Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 
U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). 
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the Vietnam War. The Supreme Court began with a very basic statement 
that, 
First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment, are available to 
teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either 
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of speech or expression at the school house gate.969 
In Wirtmar v^ Vincent.9?0 an evangelical Christian organization brought 
action against the University of Missouri claiming that the school had violated 
their free speech by denying them access to university facilities. The Court 
held that the university had created an open or public forum for use by student 
groups. 
In a more current opinion, Perry Education Association Vj. Perry Local 
Educators' Association.®? 1 the Supreme Court summarized the different 
types of forums. "The 'quintessential' or traditional, public forum is a place 
such as a street or park which has been traditionally held open to the public for 
purposes of assembly, communication of thoughts, and discussion of public 
issues."® 72 The second type of forum is "public property which the State has 
opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity."®  ̂The Court 
969ibid„ 506. 
970widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 
(1981). 
971perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association, 
460 U.S. 37,103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d794 (1983). 
972itod.,45. 
973n,id. 
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realized that the created public forum may be limited for use by certain 
groups and that if the public forum is a limited one," the constitutional right of 
access would in any event extend only to other entities of similar 
character .  "9 "7 4  The final  type of  forum is  the nonpublic  forum, property. .  
which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication... 
"975 
In Perrv the issue involved a school district's interschool mailing system. 
The Court held that mailing system was not a public forum because it was not 
open for use by the general public. 
Bender ^ Willinmapnr* Area School District^?6 is somewhat analogous 
to this case. In Bender students were denied permission to meet at the 
defendant's high school for purposes of praying and reading the Bible. 
The District Court held that denying access to the group was unconstitutional 
because the school had created a limited open forum by establishing an 
activity hour in which over twenty other student groups participated. 
The court concluded by applying WiHmar and the decision of the District 
Court in Bender to this case the defendants did not violate the establishment 
clause of the First Amendment by permitting the distribution of Issues and 
Answers in Antietam Junior High School. The court found that the defendant 
974ibid.,48 
975ibid.,46. 
976Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, 563 F.Supp. 697 
(M.D.Pa. 1983), rev'd, 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984, vacated, 475 U.S. 534,106 
S.Ct. 1326,89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986), reh'gdenied, U.S. , 106 S. Ct. 2003, 
90 L.Ed.2d 682 (1986). 
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had established a limited public forum at the school and the plaintiffs, as 
students of the school, would be free to distribute their literature in that forum 
according to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. Such a policy 
would pass the Lemon977 test of secular purpose, advancement or inhibition 
of religion, and entanglement. 
The court held that the defendant did not unconstitutionally infringe on 
plaintiffs' right of free exercise of religion by requiring them to distribute Issues 
and Answers outside the school building. The records showedd that the 
plaintiffs were not asked to neglect their religious beliefs or forfeit the state 
benefit of an education. Plaintiffs were just required to select either another 
area or another method in which to continue the conduct mandated by their 
beliefs. 
Bible Study Courses 
Wilev v.Franklin. 486 F.Supp. 133 (E. D. Tenn. 1979) ("Wiley I"); 474 
F.Supp.525 (1980) ("Wiley II"); 497 F.Supp. 390 (1980) ("Wiley HI"). 
Facts 
In this case students and their parents initiated action against the 
boards of education and their members for declaratory and injunctive relief to 
prohibit the sponsoring of a course of Bible study and instruction in city and 
county elementary schools. The cases were combined for trial. The plaintiffs 
contended that the defendant Boards of Education of Chattanooga and 
Hamilton County, Tennessee, and their membership had violated their 
religious freedom. 
977Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612, 613, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2111, 
29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971). 
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Decision 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee 
found that the Bible study courses were not primarily history, literature, or 
otherwise secular, but rather were of a religious nature and that the courses 
tended to advance the Christian religious faith. Also, with a Bible study 
committee independent of the boards setting curriculum and selecting, training, 
and supervising teachers, the Bible study programs constituted an excessive 
entanglement between government and religion. The District Court held that 
the Bible study courses previously taught, including the modifications made in 
the 1978-79 school year violated the religious freedom provisions of the First 
Amendment. 
Discussion 
The Bible study courses were stayed for forty-five days to permit the 
boards of education to devise, adopt, and submit to the District Court the 
following changes in the elementary school Bible study courses: 
(1) Establish uniform minimum standards for the selection 
and employment of persons teaching Bible study courses in 
the elementary grades, which standards shall specifically 
exclude as a condition of selection for employment any 
religious test, any profession of faith or any prior or present 
religious affiliation. 
(2) Establish a procedure for the release and replacement 
of all teacher currently teaching Bible study courses in the 
elementary grades who do not meet the minimum standards 
adopted pursuant to paragraph (1) above, such release and 
replacement to be accomplished within a period of 30 days 
after the Court shall have approved the uniform minimum 
teacher standards. 
(3) Establish a plan whereby the school board or some 
duly designated school staff member or other school personnel 
shall, without participation by any nonschool personnel or 
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organization, select and employ all Bible study course teachers 
and effect the placement, training and supervision of all such 
teachers. 
(4) Revise the Bible study course curriculum currently 
used in elementary school grades so as to eliminate all lesson 
titles whose only reasonable interpretation and message is 
a religious message and which lessons are not reasonably 
capable of being taught within the confines of a secular 
course in history, literature or other secular subject matter 
normally included within or recognized as suitable for and 
elementary school curriculum.^?8 
None of the foregoing instructions prevented the defendant school 
boards from entering into an agreement with any individual or organization 
including the Public School Study Committee for the funding of the elementary 
school courses. Also, the instructions of the District Court did not bother with 
elective polices and practice already in effect. 
The school board made the instructed revisions. In the second stage of 
the suit, Wilev v^ Franklin .979 the District Court reviewed the revised Bible 
course guidelines. The District Court held that the proposed curriculum 
guidelines would be approved if: (1) under the teacher standards, the part that 
gave permission for employment of Bible teachers with only 12 hours in Bible 
literature were eliminated; (2) the court retained jurisdiction of the lawsuit 
during the initial year of operation of the court-approved plan for Bible Studies; 
(3) the proposed lesson on teaching of the resurrection of Jesus as recounted 
in the New Testament was eliminated. The court warned the school boards 
that: 
978wiley v. Franklin, 468 F.Supp 133,152 (1979). 
979wiley v. Franklin, 474 F.Supp. 525 (1979). 
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The ultimate test of the constitutionality of any course of 
instruction founded upon the Bible must depend upon classroom 
performance. It is that which is taught in the classroom that 
renders a course so founded constitutionally permissible or 
constitutionally impermissible. If that which is taught seeks 
either to disparage or to encourage a commitment to a set of 
religious beliefs, it is constitutionally impermissible in a public 
school setting. If that which is taught avoids such religious 
instruction and is confined to objective and non-devotional 
instruction in biblical literature, biblical history, and biblical 
social customs, all with the purpose of helping students gain 
"a greater appreciation of the Bible as a great work of literature" 
and source of "countless works of literature, art, and music" or 
of assisting students acquire "greater insight into the many 
historical events recorded in the Bible" or of affording students 
greater insight into the "many social customs upon which the 
Bible has had a significant influence," all as proposed in the 
Curriculum Guide, no constitutional barrier would arise to 
classroom instruction.^®® 
After the school boards used the revised guidelines for Bible study 
courses for one year, the District Court in the third stage ofWilev Vj. 
Franklin.981 found no violation of the First Amendment in the Bible study 
courses as taught and conducted in the Chattanooga public elementary 
schools; therefore, they denied the plaintiffs' motion to enjoin that program. 
On the other hand, the District Court found that three lessons taught in the 
elementary schools of Hamilton County were religious in nature; therefore, 
they granted the plaintiffs motion to enjoin that program. 
980ibid„ 631. 
981 Wiley v. Franklin, 497 F.Supp. 390 (1980). 
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Crockett Y J . Sorenson. 568 F.Supp 1422 (1983). 
Facts 
The parents of a fifth grade student challenged the constitutionality of a 
Bible study program for fourth and fifth grade students in the public schools of 
Bristol, Virginia. The Bible teaching classes had been provided for over forty 
years. The classes were taught for forty-five minutes once a week in six 
elementary schools. Classes were voluntary and students did not receive a 
grade or academic credit for the classes. 
Decision 
The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, 
Justice Kiser, held that the courses were a violation of the United States 
Constitution because there was no secular purpose and control had been 
relinquished by the state. However, Justice Kiser maintained: 
The First Amendment was never intended to insulate our 
public institutions from any mention of God, the Bible or religion, 
because when such insulation occurs, another religion, such as 
secular humanism, is effectively established.982 
The court did support the legality of Bible study in the schools when the 
purpose was educational and not religious. 
Discussion 
A ministerial alliance had complete control over staffing and curricular 
decisions for the program. In 1978, another private group, the Bristol Council 
of Religious Education, began sponsoring the program. In 1982, the group was 
982ibid., 1425. 
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renamed Bible Teaching in the Public Schools. Members of the group were 
ministers and lay representatives from the different Protestant denominations 
in the area. 
The Ministerial Association had prepared a course of study outline, 
objectives to be taught, materials to be used, and the portions of the Bible to be 
taught. Teachers used the outline from its inception until 1982 with no 
substantial modifications. Until February 1982, the class routine consisted of 
Bible teaching, prayers and singing of hymns. After February 1982, the 
prayers and singing of hymns were discontinued from the program. Although 
not specified by the Ministerial Association, teachers used the King James 
version of the Bible. 
Classes were voluntary and parents signed a request card to enroll 
children in Bible classes. Until 1982, students not attending the Bible classes 
were assigned to the principal's office or the library. Since 1982, an attempt 
was made to give the nonparticipating students a more meaningful experience. 
They were sent to the extension center where, in theory, they choose one of 
several options. In reality, their choice was study hall or physical education 
because the other options were classes the students had already 
attended in regular curriculum. 
There was a certain amount of pressure for the students to enroll in the 
Bible classes, not from school officials or Bible teachers, but peer pressure 
from fellow students. This was demonstrated during the 1982-83 school year 
when only eighteen of589 fourth and fifth grade students in the elementary 
schools chose not to participate in the Bible classes. 
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Compulsory Attendance 
Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
Facts 
Parents were seeking voluntary exclusion from public school after the 
eighth grade. Wisconsin's compulsory attendance law required students to 
attend public or private school until reaching the age of sixteen. 
Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller, Old Order Amish members, and Adin 
Yutzy, a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, refused to 
send their children to school beyond the eighth grade. They defended their 
position on the basis that Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law 
violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Decision 
The men were convicted in Green County Court of violating Wisconsin's 
compulsory school-attendance law and were each fined five dollars. On appeal 
the Wisconsin Circuit Court also ruled against Yoder, Miller, and Yutzy. The 
case was appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court,which reversed the 
decision of the lower courts and ruled in favor of the respondents. On petition 
by the State of Wisconsin, the Supreme Court of the United States granted a 
writ of certiorari to review a decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court which 
ruled that convictions of Amish parents for violating the State's compulsory 
school-attendance law were invalid under the free exercise clause of the First 
Amendment as applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
Supreme Court agreed with the ruling of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 
Discussion 
This is a landmark case dealing with compulsory attendance in conflict 
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with established religious beliefs. When the case was appealed to the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, the Amish brought in expert witnesses to testify on 
their way of life. Dr. John Hostetler testified that: 
Amish society emphasizes informal learning-through-
doing; a life of "goodness," rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, 
rather than technical knowledge; community welfare, rather 
than competition; and separated from, rather than integration 
with, contemporary worldly society. 
Formal high school education beyond the eighth grade is 
contrary to Amish beliefs, not only because it places Amish 
children in an environment hostile to Amish beliefs with 
increasing emphasis on competition in class work and sports 
and with pressure to conform to the styles, manners, and 
the ways of the peer group, but also because it takes them 
away from their community, physically and emotionally, 
during the crucial and formative adolescent period of life.983 
It was pointed out that the Amish were not opposed to schooling, since 
their children did attend elementary school. They agreed that their children 
needed the basic skills in the "three R's" in order to the read the Bible, be good 
farmers and citizens, and be able to communicate with the non-Amish people 
in the course of daily life. 
It was further emphasized that sending Amish children to high school 
may not only cause psychological harm to Amish children, but may eventually 
destroy their way of life which had remained constant for many years. Aided 
by a three hundred year history as an identifiable religious group and a long 
history as a successful and self-sufficient segment of American society, the 
Amish have demonstrated their religious beliefs and their way of life. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized the importance of the state's 
983wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 211 (1972). 
441 
compulsory school-attendance laws and, at the same time, recognized the 
importance of the Amish being able to keep their children out of school beyond 
the eighth grade. After reviewing the case, the United States Supreme Court 
agreed with the ruling of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The Supreme Court 
held: 
1. The State's interest in universal education is not 
totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on other 
fundamental rights, such as those specifically protected by the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional 
interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of 
their children.984 
2. Respondents have amply supported their claim that 
enforcement of the compulsory formal education requirement 
after the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy 
the free exercise of their religious beliefs.985 
3. Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable 
religious sect and a long history as a successful and self-sufficient 
segment of American society, the Amish have demonstrated the 
sincerity of their religious beliefs, the interrelationship of belief 
with their mode of life, the vital role that belief and daily conduct 
play in the continuing survival of Old Order Amish communities, 
and the hazards present by the State's enforcement of a statute 
generally valid as to others, Beyond this, they have carried the 
difficult burden of demonstrating the adequacy of their alternative 
mode of continuing informal vocational education in terms of the 
overall interests that the State relies on in support of its program 
of compulsory high school education. In light of this showing, and 
weighing the minimal difference between what the State would 
require and what the Amish already accept, it was incumbent 
on the State to show more particularity how its admittedly 
strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely 
984^., 213-215. 
985ibid., 215-219. 
affected by granting an exemption to the Amish.986 
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4. The State's claim that it is empowered, as parens patriae, 
to extend the benefit of secondaiy education of children regardless 
of the wishes of their parents cannot be sustained against a free 
exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, for the Amish 
have introduced convincing evidence that accommodating their 
religious objections by forgoing one or two additional years of 
compulsory education will not impair the physical or mental 
health of the child, or result in an inability to be self-supporting 
or to discharge the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, or 
in any other way materially detract from the welfare of society.987 
Duro v. District Attorney. Second Judicial District of North Carolina. 712 F.2d 
96 (4th Cir. 1983). 
Facts 
In this North Carolina case, Peter Duro, parent, initiated action against 
the district attorney because he alleged that the North Carolina compulsory 
attendance law infringed on his religious beliefs. Duro and his wife were 
members of the Pentecostal Church which did not require children to be taught 
at home. In fact, the majority of the members who attended the Pentecostal 
Church with the Duros enrolled their children in a public school. 
Duro and his wife had six children, five of whom were of school age. He 
refused to enroll his children in either a public or private school. Duro stated 
that exposing his children to those of different religious beliefs would corrupt 
his children. He was opposed to what he termed the "unisex movement where 
you can't tell the difference between boys and girls and the promotion of 
986ibid., 219-229, 234-236. 
987ibid., 229-234. 
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secular humanism ."988 Duro also objected to physicians and refused medical 
attention for all physical ailments because he believed the Lord would heal any 
problem. 
Mrs. Duro attempted to teach the children in the home, even though 
she did not posses a teaching certificate and had never been trained as a 
teacher. She used the same self-teaching program that was used by the only 
private school in the county. 
Decision 
The District Court granted summaryjudgment for Duro and the district 
attorney appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth District 
reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court. The Supreme Court of the United 
States denied certiorari to the case. 
Discussion 
The District Court relied heavily on Yoder^89 jn ruling that North 
Carolina's compulsory law was unconstitutional, as it applied to Duro. The 
District Court concluded that Duro, like the parents in Yoder. expressed a 
sincere religious belief that school enrollment would corrupt his children. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that the District 
Court had misinterpreted Yoder in applying it to the present case. In balancing 
Duro's interest against North Carolina's interest in compulsory education, the 
Court of Appeals found the balance tips in favor of the state. 
The Court of Appeals found this case was distinguishable from the 
988DUTO v. District attorney, Second Jucdicial District of North 
Carolina, 712 F.2d 96, 97 (4th Cir. 1983). 
989wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.205 (1972). 
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situation in Yoder. Unlike the Amish, the Duros were not members of a 
community which has existed for three hundred years and has a history of 
being a successful segment of American society. The Amish sent their children 
to school through the eighth grade. Duro refused to send his children to public 
or private school for any length of time, yet he expected them to be a part of 
the modern world by the age of eighteen. He had not shown that home 
instruction would adequately equip his children to be self-sufficient individuals 
in modern society or enable them to participate intelligently in thepolitical 
system, which, as the Supreme Court stated, is a compelling interest of the 
state. 
Tmmiinisflfrinna 
Avard Vj. Dupuis. 376 F.Supp. 479 (D.N.H. 1974). 
Facts 
John Avard, a six-year-old kindergarten student, was dismissed from 
school in Manchester, New Hampshire, because his parents had failed to 
comply with the state's immunization laws. The statute provided for 
exemptions based on medical and religious reasons with local school boards 
having discretion to determine whether a child may be excused from 
immunizations. The father asked for and was denied an exemption for religious 
reasons. He then challenged the constitutionality of the standard which 
allowed religious exemptions. The plaintiff sought an injunction against the 
local school board prohibiting the dismissal of his child for failure to comply 
with the state statute. 
Decision 
The court ruled that the portion of the state statue which allowed local 
445 
school boards to exempt children for religious reason was unconstitutional. The 
remaining portion of the state statute remained in effect; thus, the court denied 
an injunction against the local school board. 
Discussion 
In 1971, New Hampshire passed a state statute, NH RSA 200:38, for 
the control and prevention of communicable diseases. In September of 1973, 
John Avard's father was informed that John would have to be vaccinated in 
order to be permitted to remain in school. John's father applied for a religious 
exemption. On December 10,1973, the local school board denied his request, 
and he appealed to the State Board of Education which reaffirmed the denial. 
On January 14,1974, the local school board reaffirmed its earlier decision and 
dismissed John from school until he was vaccinated. 
The New Hampshire statute, NH RSA 200:38, for the control and 
prevention of communicable provided as follows: 
I. All children shall be immunized prior to school entrance 
according to the current recommendations of the state 
public health agency. 
II. Any child may be exempted from the above immunizations 
requirements if he presents evidence from his physician 
that immunization will be detrimental to his health. A child 
may be excused from immunization for religious reasons at 
the discretion of the local school board. 
HI. All children shall be examined prior to school entrance to 
detect symptoms of tuberculosis and may be periodically 
examined during his [sic] school experience.990 
The plaintiff contended that section two of the NH RSV 200:38 was 
990Avard v. Dupuis, 376 F.Supp. 479, 481 (1974). 
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unconsitutional because it was vague for lack of standards and thus in conflict 
with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendant's 
counsel conceded that there were no standards or guidelines for the local board 
to follow in granting exemptions to the statute. Since the plaintiff did not have 
standards to follow in knowing what material to present to the local board to 
request an exemption, the court concluded that section two of the statute was 
unconstitutionally vague and in violation of the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment However, the court decided that since the intent of 
the legislature was to protect the health of school children, ruling the section 
granting religious exemption invalid did not significantly impair the rest of the 
statute. Therefore, the court ruled that the remaining sections of the statute . 
would remain in effect and denied the plaintiffs request for an injunction 
against the local school board prohibiting the dismissal of John Avard from 
attendance in the Manchester public schools. 
Brown v. Stone. 378 So.2d 218 (Miss. 1979). 
Facts 
Chad Allan Brown, six-year-old son of Charles H. Brown, was denied 
admission to school because he had not been vaccinated against those diseases 
specified under Senate Bill No. 2650 (Mississippi Code Annotated section 41-
23-37), enacted April 21,1978. His father did not permit his son to be 
vaccinated because of his own strong and sincere religious beliefs that he 
actively practiced and followed. He was a member of the Church of Christ, a 
religious body, which did not teach against the use of medicines, immunizations 
or vaccinations prescribed by a physician. The father had sought a religious 
exemption to excuse his son from vaccination but it was denied because the 
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certificate did not comply with Senate Bill No. 2650. The father brought suit 
against the Houston Municipal Separate School District seeking an injunction 
to force the board of trustees to admit his son as a student without compliance 
with the immunization requirements of Misissippi Code Annotated section 41-
23-37. He claimed the code was invalid because it forced complainants to join 
a religious organization in order to practice their religious tenets and the denial 
of admission of his son violated the complainants' rights protected by the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Decision 
The Chancery Court of Chickasaw County, Mississippi ruled in favor of 
the Houston Municipal Separate School District and the father appealed to the 
Mississippi Supreme Court. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that: 
(1) statute requiring immunization against certain crippling 
and deadly diseases before child could be admitted to school 
served overriding and compelling public interest; (2) to extent 
that statute could conflict with religious beliefs of parents, 
interest of school children prevailed; (3) statute was reasonable 
and constitutional exercise of police power; and (4) provision of 
statute providing exception for immunization requirement 
based on religious beliefs was in violation of equal protection 
clause.991 
The Mississippi Supreme Court held that to exempt from immunization for 
religious reason was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it affirmed 
the decision of the lower court. 
Discussion 
A certificate of exemption was filed by the minister of the Church of 
991grown v. Stone, 378 So.2d 218 (Miss. 1979). 
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Christ in which he stated that the Church of Christ as a religious body does not 
teach against the use of medicines, immunization, or vaccination as prescribed 
by a duly licensed physician. He also emphasized that their local chiropractor, 
Mr. Charles H. Brown, a member of the Church of Christ, had strong 
convictions against the use of any kind of medications and they respected his 
views. 
The main purpose of the Mississippi Legislature in the passage of 
Senate Bill 2650, Mississippi Annotated section 41-23-37, was to afford 
protection for school children against crippling and deadly diseases by 
immunization. The Mississippi statute stated: 
Except as provided hereinafter, it shall be unlawful for 
any child to attend any school, kindergarten or similar type 
facility intended for the instruction of children (hereinafter 
called "schools"), either public or private, unless they shall 
first have been vaccinated against those diseases specified 
by the State Health Officer. 
A certificate of exemption from vaccination for medical 
reasons may be offered on behalf of a child by a duly licensed 
physician and may be accepted by the local health officer when, 
in his opinion, such exemption will not cause undue risk to the 
community. A certificate of religious exemption may be offered 
on behalf of a child by an officer of a church of a recognized 
denomination. This certificate shall certify that parents or 
guardians of the child are bona fide members of a recognized 
denomination whose religious teachings require reliance on 
prayer or spiritual means of healing.992 
The court recognized that immunization has been done effectively and 
safely over a period of years. If the religious exemptions to immunizations 
were granted only to member of certain recognized sects or denominations 
992ibid.,219. 
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whose doctrines forbid it, and, as contended by appellants, whose private and 
personal religious beliefs will not permit them to permit immunization of their 
children. The religious exemptions would have defeated the purpose of the 
Mississippi immunization statute. 
The court pointed out that in cases too numerous to mention, it has 
been held, in effect, that a person's right to exhibit religious freedom ceases 
when it infringes on the rights of others. The United States Supreme Court 
stated in Prince Commonwealth of Massachusetts: "The right to practice 
religion freely does not include the liberty to expose the community or the child 
to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death."993 Earlier in 
Jacobson \\ Commonwealth of Massachusetts.994 the United States 
Supreme Court held that a state law requiring compulsory immunization did 
not deny a citizen of liberty guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 
The Misissippi Supreme Court held that to exempt from immunization 
for religious reason was a violation to the Fourteenth Amendment However, 
the court held that all other provisions of the statute were valid and 
constitutional and embodied a reasonable exercise of the police power of the 
state. Therefore, they affirmed the decision of the lower court. 
Handle v. Artier. 625 v. F.Supp. 1259 (S.D.Ohio 1985). 
Facts 
In this 1985 case, parents of Stanley and Tisha Hanzel, in New 
993prjnce v< Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct., 
88 L.Ed. 645 (1944). 
994jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 25 S.Ct. 
358, 49 L.Ed. 643 (1905). 
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Lebanon, Ohio, challenged the state statute, Ohio Rev. Code section 3313. 
671(A), of requiring immunization before children could enter public school. 
They filed a complaint seeking either that the Ohio immunization statute be 
declared unconstitutional or that declaratory judgment be issued that the 
parents' personal beliefs amount to good cause for children to be exempted 
from immunization. They also complained that their rights to privacy, due 
process, and equal protection were infringed upon by the Ohio statute requiring 
immunization. Parents also sought a permanent injunction against expulsion 
of their children from the public schools. Plaintiffs' children would be allowed to 
remain in school without being immunized, pending a decision in the case. 
Decision 
The District Court rejected motion for summary judgment for the 
plaintiffs but agreed to accept motion for summary judgment from the 
defendant. The District Court held that: 
(1) statute did not violate privacy rights of the children; 
(2) no fundamental right was burdened to implicate due 
process; and (3) grant of "good cause" exemptions to those 
with religious reasons did not make denial to those children 
an equal protection violation.®®^ 
Discussion 
The parent's belief in "chiropractic ethics" did not permit them to allow 
their children to receive immunizations. Chiropractic ethics is a belief which 
teaches that injection of foreign substances into the body is of no benefit and 
can only be harmful. Stanley and Tisha Hanzel's mother met with the 
995jjanzel v. Arter, 625 F.Supp. 1259,1260 (S.D. Ohio 1985). 
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superintendent and explained why her children could not be immunized. She 
also sent two letters to the superintendent in which she repeated that her 
personal philosophy and belief in chiropractic ethics had led her to refuse 
immunization for her children, and she requested an exemption from 
vaccination under provision of Ohio statute, Ohio Rev. Code section 3313.671 
(AX3), related to exemptions. An informal hearing was held in which she 
repeated her views against immunization. After the hearing, the 
superintendent informed the plaintiffs in writing that their belief in chiropractic 
ethics did not constitute "good cause" for their children under Ohio statute, and 
that their children would have to be immunized in order to remain in the public 
schools. 
The Ohio statute gave local boards of education the authority to make 
rules to insure the immunization of public school students. There was an 
exemption to the immunization requirement, Ohio Rev. Code Section 3313.671 
(A) (3), which provided; 
A pupil who presents a written statement of his parent 
or guardian in which the parent or guardian otgects to the 
immunization for good cause, including religious conviction, 
is not required to be immunized.99(3 
Parents challenged the immunization requirement of privacy grounds, 
contending that the constitutional right to privacy was broad enough to apply 
to the decision to subject one's children to immunization. If the right of privacy 
were to protect individual decisions relating to immunization, then such 
decisions would implicate a "fundamental right." There is no mention of a right 
996ibid> 
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of privacy in the United States Constitution and the Supreme Court has not 
recognized a general right to privacy. Rather, the Supreme Court has found 
the right of privacy to protect certain individual decisions. While protecting 
several aspects of personal choice, the Constitution does not protect all 
aspects of individual privacy. 
Long before the concern of the right of privacy, in Jacobson y. 
Massachusetts.997 a Massachusetts resident urged the Supreme Court to 
invalidate a compulsory vaccination statute on the basis that the statute 
amounted to a deprivation of liberty and that it was hostile to the individual's 
own freedom of care for his or her body. The Supreme Court rejected the 
challenge, holding that the Constitution's guarantee of liberty did not include an 
absolute right to individual freedom from restraint, and that the collective 
interest in health and safety outweighed the petitioner's interest. 
In deciding bodily integrity, the Jacobson court's view was quoted in Roe 
V;. Wgde.998 Justice Blackmun in attempting to describe the parameters of a 
woman's right to abortion stated: 
In fact, it is not clear to us that the claim asserted by 
some amici that one has an unlimited right to do with one's 
body as one pleases bears a close relationship to the right of 
privacy previously articulated in the Court's decision. The 
Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this kind 
in the past.999 
997jacobSon v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 S.Ct. 358, 361, 49 
L.Ed. 643 (1905). 
998rog v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705. 
999ibid. 
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The District Court concluded that since the defendants had only 
granted two exemptions for "good cause" at the filing of the motion in this case 
it was unnecessary to resolve the issue of whether the immunization decision 
was encompassed within the right of privacy. The statute did not violate the 
rights of the children. 
The plaintiffs argued that Section 3313.671 (AX3) as applied by Dr. 
Arter and ratified by the defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment's 
guarantee of due process. The plaintiffs did not contend they were not given 
an opportunity to be heard, rather the statutory exemption to Ohio's 
immunization requirement authorizes local school officials to burden a 
fundamental right without providing guidelines for the officials' exercise of 
authority. The plaintiffs contended that, as in Cantweli^QQQ and 
Niemotko.1001 defendant's lack of guidelines for what constitutes "good 
cause" for exemptions from vaccination was also unconstitutional given the 
"close parallel" between the cited cases and the present case. The District 
Court did not agree. It stated both cases did involve the exercise of 
administrative discretion, the place of religious beliefs in our constitutional 
framework, and the protection accorded them, are without parallel in the realm 
of secular beliefs. They cited Yoder^QQ^ in which the Supreme Court reflected 
the view that, "even if the values and objectives of two groups are identical, 
lOOOcantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 99, 84 L.Ed. 1213 
(1940). 
lOOlNiemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268,269, 71 S.Ct. 325, 326, 95 
L.Ed. 267 (1951). 
1002wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 
(1972). 
454 
their claims will receive differing treatment under the Constitution depending 
on whether or not their claims are based upon religious tenets. "1003 The 
District Court did not accept the due process claim of the plaintiffs. 
The plaintiffs claimed the defendants had violated the equal protection 
clause of Fourteenth Amendment by denying them an exemption accorded to 
similarly situated individuals. Once again the District Court disagreed. Using 
the Supreme Court ruling in Yoder.lQQ^ they stated that, "philosophical 
beliefs do not receive the same deference in our legal system as do religious 
beliefs, even when the aspirations flowing from each such set of beliefs 
coincide."100£> The District Court concluded the defendants did not violate the 
plaintiffs' right to the equal protection of the laws. 
1003£[anzel v. Arter, 625 F.Supp. 1259 (S.D.Ohio 1985). 
l°04wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,92 S.Ct. 1526,32 L.Ed.2d 15 
(1972). 
1005fjanzel v. Arter, 625 F. Supp. 1259 (S.D.Ohio 1985). 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary 
The upheaval of political, economic, and social conditions in Europe that 
led to the Renaissance and Protestant Reformation aided the settlement of 
this country. Early settlers brought to this country their religious beliefs and 
practices. One of the early reasons for establishing public schools was to teach 
children to read the Bible to save them from Satan. The Bible and other 
religious materials were used in teaching children to read. 
During the one hundred fifty years of colonization, the colonists 
transplanted an educational system based on home, church, and school. The 
home was the main source for educating the youth, followed by the church, and 
then the schools. The early colonial schools were seen as instruments of 
religion which over a period of many years became instruments of the state. 
During the seventeenth century, many ethnic groups settled in the new 
world, but the English culture became the dominant force for law, language, 
and custom. The Puritans, who settled in New England, had the greatest 
influence on the course of American education. 
By the eighteenth century, three types of schools had emerged in 
America. New England was dominated by strong Calvinistic ideas of a 
religious state, supporting a system of common schools, higher Latin Schools, 
and colleges, both for religious and civic needs. The parochial school practice 
dominated the middle colonies and stood for church control of all educational 
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effort. It resented interference from the state and stood as a stumbling block 
to state organization and control of education. The third type of educational 
practice was conceived by the Church of England as public education mainly 
for orphans and children of the poor for which the State was under little or no 
obligation to support. Middle- and upper-class children attended private 
schools or were taught by tutors in their homes. 
By 1750, the religious motive for maintaining schools began to wane. 
The American Revolution was disastrous to all types of schools. Due to the 
harsh conditions of the war, including finances, education can best be 
described as almost nonexistent. Educational opportunities continued to 
decline after the war. 
At the end of the war, the newly formed federal government was heavily 
in debt and struggling to survive. The leaders in the states as well as the 
nation, who were responsible for the government, were too preoccupied with 
problems of organization, finance, and order to think much about other things. 
After government issues were settled, leading statesmen of the time began to 
express a need for general education. 
Educated men developed the Constitution of the United States, but the 
viovdeducation is not mentioned. Considering the time, it is not surprising that 
the founders of the American republic did not deem the subject of public 
education important enough to warrant consideration in the Constitutional 
Convention or the Constitution. Education of the period was mainly a private 
matter and mainly under the control of the various churches. The leaders were 
products of the old aristocratic doctrine of education, of the theory that schools 
were intended for the leaders and for those who could afford the privilege of 
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education. Fortunately, there were notable exceptions who supported a 
general education and promotion of science and literature. They realized that 
education for all the people was necessary to the survival of the republic. 
The federal government's first involvement in education was in the 
settlement of the land west of the Alleghenies and east of the Mississippi River. 
In 1785, Congress through, "Congressional Townships," provided that the 
sixteenth township was to be used for school support. In adopting the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, Congress expanded the land grants in each 
state, except Texas (which owned its own land when admitted), and West 
Virginia and Maine (which were carved out of other states). 
By 1820, state constitutional recognition of education was found in 
thirteen of twenty-three states. Seven states-Massachusetts, Maine, 
Connecticut, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, and Vermont-had statutes 
establishing school systems. The schools were supported through a variety of 
school-finance schemes-property tax, education "fee" or tuition, fishing tax, 
salt-working tax, lotteries, funds from congressional and state land grants, 
occupational tax, insurance-premium tax, bank tax, and liquor tax. In 1836, 
the federal treasury surplus was distributed to the states for education 
purposes. 
The American school system began in the 1800s and has been evolving 
since. Religious instruction consumed a major portion of time and effort in 
American education in the 1800s. Educational leaders such as Horace Mann, 
W. T. Harris, and Elisha Potter, however, insisted on teaching moral values 
instead of sectarian religion. 
By 1840, church-state separation had occurred in every state in the 
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nation. The differences between Protestants and Catholics over separation of 
church and state were becoming an important philosophical issue among 
educational leaders. The secularization of the public schools moved in two 
distinct fronts--(l) the curriculum, and (2) school finance. According to Mann, 
public education religious instruction should give to all "so much religious 
instruction as is compatible with the rights of others and with the genius of the 
government." He believed there was a common core of Christian religious 
beliefs that could be taught in the common school without objection, and that it 
was up to the home and the church to elaborate on these commonly held 
beliefs. He supported a nonsectarian doctrine that would exclude specific 
sectarian doctrines or man-made creeds. 
The Catholic Church and Catholic parents were not interested in 
nonsectarian instruction. The Catholic Church wanted either the right to bring 
their own dogma into the public schools for the teaching of their children, or a 
part of the public school funds for the support of Catholic parochial schools. 
American Protestantism, because of the principle of separation of church and 
state, or because of antagonism, would not yield to either demand. Protestants 
were even willing to remove Protestant religion from the schools, which 
resulted in the secularization of public education in America. 
Western migration in the latter part of the nineteenth century brought 
about social and cultural upheaval when masses of people from different 
backgrounds shared ideas. Sectarian principles were modified as civilization 
moved westward and developed new cultures. 
Twentieth-century education emerged from a period of unrest in the 
1890s when there appeared to be a profound realization on the part of 
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American leaders and the general public that a major transformation had 
been fashioned in American society. The great social trend and experimental 
teaching at the turn of the century influenced public school curricula. In 
addition, urbanization, mass immigration, enormous industrial growth, 
increased railroad travel, and newspaper circulation were themselves agents 
of change for the American population. The ordinary American citizen was 
beginning to worry about what kind of world the twentiethcentury would bring. 
Americans looked more and more to schools as a catalyst for addressing 
social problems. The increasing number of children entering school was reason 
for concern. In 1890, less than seven percent of adolescents from fourteen to 
seventeen attended school. Four decades later more than half of adolescents 
fourteen to seventeen were enrolled in high school. 
Industrial and social growth in post-war America caused lay people and 
educators to examine the content of study in educational courses. Production 
of automobiles and other products through assembly-line procedures provided 
the incentive for industrial growth, making available more money to spend and 
a freer atmosphere in society. Education became synonymous with social and 
economic mobility. 
Many of the previously accepted education practices were questioned 
and reassessed by legislative action or by court action. American schools 
mirrored the problems that were common in the larger society. As the nation 
grew and the population increased, individual states assumed the responsibility 
to provide public education for their children based on the Tenth Amendment. 
The states were only restricted in action by the provisions of the United States 
Constitution and by subsequent acts of the state's legislature. 
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Today, school boards and school administrators are empowered to 
provide a comprehensive education for each child. Developing the curriculum 
offerings is often easier said than done. One area that has caused much 
difficulty is how to handle religious activities in public schools. Few topics stir 
human emotions more strongly than the mention of religious activities in the 
public schools. 
Beginning in the 1940s, individuals (through civil liberty groups and 
sectarian organizations) challenged religious activities in the public schools. 
The challenges often led to court decisions which established precedents for 
future school board policy considerations. Consistently, the court decisions 
have established and maintained a wall of separation between church and 
state. 
Judicial decisions consistently maintained that religious activities are 
unconstitutional in public schools. Judicial decisions have ruled that it is 
constitutional to teach about religion but not to teach religion in public schools. 
Schools, as public institutions, operate in total society and experience 
pressures and influences from both sectarian and secular groups. The scope of 
this study is limited to a review of religious influences on public schools. 
Chapter II provided a review of the professional literature concerning the 
development of public schools and their conflicts with religious activities. 
Chapter III provided the legal aspects of religious activities in the public 
schools. Chapter IV reviewed and analyzed significant judicial court decisions 
establishing precedents in cases involving religious activities in the public 
schools. 
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Questions and Answers 
In the introductory material in Chapter I, some basic questions relating 
to the topic of this dissertation were proposed. Discussion developed around 
those four questions will provide insight concerning religious activities in the 
public schools. 
1. What legal guidelines can be set forth to aid school officials in policy­
making and practices of raliffinn in the public schools? 
The major judicial decisions have ruled that it is unconstitutional for 
public school officials to accommodate religious activities in public schools. 
School officials must remain neutral in religious activities. At present, school 
officials need to apply the tripartite test to decide whether religious activities 
will pass constitutional muster. If a religious activity fails any part of the test, 
it is unconstitutional. 
2. What are the maior legal issues regarding rfilitrinn in the curriculum of 
public schools? 
Moment of silence, prayers, equal access, graduation exercises and 
student initiated prayers in public schools are legal issues causing the most 
discussion today. One alternative for satisfying interest in religion in public 
schools is to add Bible courses to the curriculum as electives in social studies. 
These courses teach Bible from a historical and literary point of view. Major 
judicial decisions have ruled that it is constitutional to teach about religion, but 
not to advance any particular religious belief. 
Moment of silence is one issue where state statutes and school board 
policies have tried to accommodate individuals wishing to return prayers to the 
classrooms. Federal courts have consistently ruled that it is permissible to 
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have a moment of silence, provided it is nonstructured, and no one is given 
instructions on how to observe it. 
Prayers in public schools were ruled unconstitutional in 1962. Again in 
1963, the Supreme Court held that school-sponsored prayer is 
unconstitutional. This ruling should have ended the conflict related to prayers 
in the public schools. However, the debate over this issue continues. 
In the 1980s there was much confusion about whether it was 
constitutional for religious groups to meet on school grounds. Regarding 
religious groups meeting on school grounds, the passage of the Equal Access 
Act of 1984 by the United States Congress gave religious groups permission to 
meet on school grounds provided the schools had a limited open forum. 
Religious activities such as invocations, religious songs, and 
benedictions have been a part of graduation exercises for many years. In the 
1970s, students and their parents began challenging the constitutionality of 
prayers in graduation exercises. Even though federal courts have not been 
consistent in their rulings, the Supreme Court ruling in Lee Weismanheld 
that prayers as a part of graduation exercises are unconstitutional. However, 
if the graduation prayers are student initiated, they may be deemed 
constitutional. 
3. Are there discernible patterns and trends that are identified from 
analysis of judicial decisions? 
The federal courts have not always been consistent in their decisions 
regarding religious activities. No geographic area, grade level, or educator is 
immune from being challenged if they practice religious activities that are in 
conflict with the religious provisions of the First Amendment of the United 
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States Constitution. 
Emerging as the most litigous today are moment of silence, prayers, 
equal access, graduation exercises, and student initiated prayers in public 
schools. During the 1995 session, the North Carolina General Assembly 
debated making a moment of silence mandatory in the public schools of North 
Carolina. Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the United States House of 
Representatives, proposed introducing a constitutional amendment in the one 
hundred fourth Congress to return prayer to the classrooms. 
4. Based on established legal precedents, what are the legally 
acceptable criteria for permitting religious practices in the curriculum of 
public schools? 
It is permissible to teach about religion but not to teach religion in the 
public schools. Religious symbols for religious holidays are permissible if they 
are used to show religious customs and not to advance a particular religious 
doctrine. The legally acceptable criteria forjudging whether a religious activity 
is constitutional is the tripartite test. Public schools must be neutral regarding 
religious activities. 
Conclusions 
An analysis of judicial court decisions does not always reveal consistent 
and definitive solutions for resolving litigious issues. The time, place, and 
particular set of circumstances involved account for the sometimes varied 
rulings by the courts. The following general conclusions, however can be made 
concerning the legal aspects of religious activities in the nation's public schools. 
1. Courts are likely to become involved in the daily operation and 
administration of public schools when the constitutionality of a statute and/or 
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a school board policy is in question or when constitutional rights of students 
and/or employees are an issue. 
2. Parents' rights to determine the course of education of their children 
in the public schools as opposed to school board authority or teacher judgment 
to prescribe curricula are likely to continue to be litigated. 
3. The courts have consistently upheld the right of the state 
legislatures to specify certain subject matter for all children. 
4. School-sponsored prayer and Bible reading for devotional purposes or 
to advance a particular religion are unconstitutional. 
5. Silent voluntary prayer is, and always has been, constitutional. 
6. It is constitutional to release school students from public school 
attendance to attend religious classes off the school campus; however, it is 
unconstitutional to release students for on-campus religious instruction, 
including shared time programs. 
7. To determine the constitutionality of a religious activity, the courts 
will often apply the tripartite test-secular purpose, inhibits or advances 
religion, and excessive government entanglement. 
8. Religious symbols may be displayed in public schools if they are used 
to teach about religious customs, depict art, culture, or literary works, and not 
advance any particular religious belief. 
9. Evolution may be taught in the public schools as a scientific theory, 
however, teaching balanced treatment of scientific creationism is 
unconstitutional. 
10. It is unconstitutional to require students to participate in school 
activities that conflict with sincerely held religious beliefs. 
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11. Academic courses in religion are constitutional if the courses are 
used to teach about religion but not teach religion. 
12. Distribution of religious materials in public schools is 
unconstitutional. 
13. It is permissible for school officials to present instructional 
materials that some individuals or groups may find in conflict with their 
religious beliefs. 
14. School curriculum decisions should be based on secular reasons. 
15. Religious groups may use school facilities for meetings provided the 
school has a limited open forum. 
16. Secular humanism is a term used by religious groups to denote that 
theistic religious activities have been removed from the public schools. 
Recommendations 
Based on a review of the professional literature and an analysis of 
judicial rulings in the federal court system the following recommendations are 
offered: 
1. School boards should take a leadership seminar in cultural diversity, 
especially as it relates to religious activities, in order to create a more sensitive 
environment regarding minority religious activities. 
2. School personnel should be educated about the legalities of what is 
permissible related to religion in the public school curriculum. 
3. School boards and school administrators should be aware of the 
plurality of religious beliefs in the school district and adopt written policies that 
are neutral in intent and effect. 
4. School boards and administrators should guarantee that policies 
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dealing with religious activities are legal as interpreted by the courts. 
5. School boards and administrators should not adopt any policy or 
promote any activity which requires students to participate in a school 
sponsored prayer. 
6. School boards and administrators should develop, adopt, and 
implement a policy that provides a procedure for responding to challenges that: 
(a) instructional materials allegedly advances or prohibits religion, (b) 
curricular or extracurricular activities advances or prohibits religion, and (c) 
particular courses or specific course content advances or prohibits religion. 
7. School boards and administrators shoidd ensure that the scientific 
theory of evolution is taught as science. Any Biblical interpretation of 
creationism should be addressed in literature, social science, or comparative 
religion courses. 
8. School boards and administrators should ensure students and 
employees that they will not be required to participate in any school sponsored 
activities that are in conflict with sincerely held religious beliefs. 
9. School boards and administrators should have a community schools 
contact person that has ready access to local media, community group leaders, 
and parent groups so that false information and misunderstandings can be 
quickly corrected. 
10. School boards and administrators should have a formal policy to 
obtain in writing any charges made against school personnel or the 
instructional program regarding religious activities for students and employees. 
11. School boards and administrators should be sensitive to the 
complaints from all groups within the community. School boards and 
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administrators should take appropriate action if constitutional rights of 
students and employees are violated. School personnel should not, however, 
make changes in constitutionally justifiable activities simply because of 
community pressure. 
12. School boards and administrators should have a clearly defined 
policy concerning the use of school facilities. Fee schedules for the use of school 
facilities should be established and administered equally for all groups, whether 
civic or religious. 
13. School boards and administrators should make policies based on 
First Amendment guarantees that are beyond the reach of public sentiment 
and cannot be compromised by personal, political, or religious ideology. 
14. School boards and administrators should be aware that celebration 
of holidays having a secular connotation is constitutional, while the celebration 
of holidays of purely religious nature is unconstitutional. 
15. School boards and administrators providing religious studies in the 
curriculum should ensure that the program is a secular study about religion 
rather than a program that advances a religious doctrine. 
16. School boards and administrators should not permit the distribution 
of religious materials or the posting of announcements promoting religious 
activities on or off school grounds. 
17. School boards and administrators should not deny religious groups 
from meeting on the school campus if the school has a limited open forum. 
18. School boards and administrators should change the names of 
sectarian breaks from school to secular names. Examples: Change 
Christmas Holidays to Winter Break, and Easter Holidays to Spring Break. 
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19. School boards and administrators should accommodate the 
religious holidays of all students and employees. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
While no school board can guarantee that students' religious rights will 
not be violated, school boards and administrators can reduce the probability by 
being current on the issues relating to religious activities in the public school 
curriculum. It is imperative that school boards and administrators protect the 
constitutional rights of all students and school personnel. 
Today, members of the Supreme Court are not in total agreement on 
religious issues in the public schools. The tripartite test is still used as a 
measurement in ruling on cases involving religion in the public schools. 
Another chapter is yet to be written on how the Court will swing in the future. 
Continued pressure from Christian fundamentalist conservative groups may 
sway the Court to their position. 
Further study is recommended to assist school boards and 
administrators in developing, adopting, and implementing policy to address the 
issues emerging from recent judicial decisions that, while protecting individual 
religious rights, do not give religious concerns control over all secular interests 
in the public schools. It is recommended therefore that studies be undertaken 
of the following subjects: 
1. The current Supreme Court's attitude toward accommodation of 
religious activities in public schools. 
2. The current impact of the Christian fundamentalist movement 
on public schools. 
3. Teachers', administrators', students', and parents', attitudes 
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toward religious activities in the public schools. 
Cases charging secular humanism is being promoted as a secular 
religion over sectarian religion in public schools. 
Whether judicial imperatives and legislation are being followed by 
school administrators relating to religious activities in the public 
school curriculum. 
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POSTSCRIPT 
What never fits neatly into formal research is an analysis of why issues, 
especially in this case, religious issues continue to arise. One would think that 
after over two hundred years of religious controversy and litigation we would 
have already resolved all the religious issues. Alas though, there has been a 
dramatic increase in religious activities within public schools and litigation. 
The recent surge in the mid 1960s and continuing in 1995 tracks the rise of a 
new historical period called the "Information Age." Narrow religious and ethnic 
ideologies collide head-on with the rise of the information age and nowhere is 
this more felt than in American public education. 
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IREDELL-STATEVILLE SCHOOLS 
SCHOOL PRAYER POLICY 
PURPOSE 
The Iredell-Statesville Schools hereby adopts a policy regarding religious 
activities at school and at school-sponsored events. The policy has several 
purposes. One purpose is to reflect the desires of the citizens in the 
communities which the school system serves. A second purpose is to allow 
constitutionally permissible, student-initiated prayer or religious activity at 
school and school-sponsored events. A further purpose of the policy is to 
guarantee students, faculty members and others attending school-sponsored 
events the opportunity to exercise in a constitutionally permissible manner 
their right to freedom of speech and free exercise of religion. Finally, it is a 
purpose of the policy to safeguard against any action by school personnel 
which would constitute an "establishment of religion" as that term has been 
interpreted by the federal and state appellate courts. 
The desires of citizens in the communities which the school system 
serves regarding religious activities at school and at school sponsored events 
may change from time to time. Likewise, it is anticipated that the definition of 
a constitutionally permissible religious activity at school and at school 
sponsored events may change due to subsequent federal and state appellate 
court decisions. It is expected that this policy may be modified in the future. 
POLICY 
It is the general policy of the Iredell-Statesville Schools to permit and 
encourage among its students religious education and expression which are 
lawful and constitutionally permissible. By way of example, and not of 
limitation, the following conduct shall be permitted at school and at school 
sponsored events: 
1. Prayer before and after school hours on school premises. 
2. During school hours, individual prayer which is not disruptive 
to the normal operation of the school and not monitored or 
influenced by school personnel. 
3. A moment of silence at the beginning of the school day or at 
school with sponsored events on or off campus; the moment of 
silence to comply with North Carolina General Statute 115C-47 
(29). 
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4. Prayer by athletic team members, if student initiated and not 
controlled or influenced by school personnel. 
5. Prayer by individual spectators or groups of spectators at 
school -sponsored events, if initiated by spectators and not 
controlled or influenced by school personnel. 
6. Prayer at parent-teacher organization meetings, if member 
initiated not influenced by school personnel. 
7. Prayer at open meetings of the Iredell-Statesville Board of 
Education. 
8. Wearing of T-shirts displaying a religious theme. 
9. Distribution of religious literature by students before and after 
normal school hours in a manner that will not create an unsafe 
condition for fellow students, school personnel, and others 
properly on school premises. 
10. Use of school facilities for religious purposes consistent with 
facility use guideline of the Iredell-Statesville Schools. 
11. Student-initiated prayer or religious activity at school or at 
school sponsored events which is not controlled or influenced 
by schoolpersonnel and which does not disrupt or hinder the 
normal operation of school and which does not disrupt or 
hinder school sponsored events is permissible. 
By way of example, and not of limitation, the following conduct shall not 
be permitted on school premises and at school sponsored events. 
1. Prayer during school horn's which is initiated, controlled or 
influenced by school personnel. 
2. At school sponsored events held either on or off school 
premises, prayer which is controlled or influenced in any way 
be school personnel. This would include all high school 
athletic events. However, a moment of silence complying 
with North Carolina General Statute 115C-47 (2) shall be 
permissible. 
3. At baccalaureate services, prayer which is controlled or 
influenced in any way by school personnel. However, a moment 
of silence complying with North Carolina Statute 115C-47 (29) 
shall be permissible. 
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The permissibility of conduct not specifically listed in this policy shall be 
determined on a case-by-case basis. Determination shall be made by the 
Iredell-Statesville Board of Education after recommendation by the 
Superintendent. The superintendent's recommendation shall (a) attempt to 
promote religious education and expression among students while Ob) 
complying with applicable federal and state appellate court decisions. 
Source: Iredell-Statesville Board of Education Policy Manual, Iredell-
Statesville Board of Education, P. O. Box 911, Statesville, North 
Carolina 28677 
APPENDIX B 
TEXTBOOKS BANNED IN ALABAMA 
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I. Social Studies: 
Publisher 
Houghton Mifflin 
Laidlaw 
Rand McNaily 
Scott Foresman 
Steck 
Date 
Published 
1980 
1981 
1980 
1979 
1981 
Titles and Grade Levels 
At Home. At School (1): In Our 
Community (2): Ourselves and 
Others (3): Our Home, the Earth 
(4); America. Past and Present (5): 
Around Our World (6) 
Understanding? People (1): Under­
standing Families (2): Understand­
ing Communities (3): Understand­
ing Regions of the Earth (4): Under­
standing Our Country (5): Under­
standing the World (6) 
You and Me (1): Here We Are (2): 
Our Land (3); Where On Earth (4); 
Across America (&)• World Views (6) 
Social Studies (1-6) 
Our Family (1): Our Neighborhoods 
(2); Our Communities Our 
Country Today (4): Our Country's 
History (5): Our World Today (6) 
II. History: 
Publisher 
Globe 
Harcourt, Brace, 
Jovanovich 
HoltRinehart 
& Winston 
Houghton Mifflin 
Date 
Published 
1979 
1977 
1978 
1981 
Titles and Grade Levels 
Exploring Our Nation's History (11) 
Rise of the American Nation (11) 
People and Our Country d 1 ̂  
These United States (11) 
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Laidlaw 1981 
Macmillan 1981 
Merrill 1978 
Scott, Foresman 1980 
Silver Burdett 1979 
HI. Home Economics: 
Date 
Publisher Published 
Bennett 1981 
Ginn 1983 
Goodheart-Wilcox 1979 
1981 
McGraw-Hill 1985 
A History of Our American 
Republic (11) 
History of a Free People (11) 
America Is (11) 
The American Dream (11) 
Our Ampriran Heritage (9-12) 
Titles and Grade Levels 
Today's Teen (8-12) 
Caring. Deciding and Growing (9-12) 
Contemporary Living (8-12) 
Homemfiking: Skills for Everyday 
Living (9-12) 
Teen Guide (8-12) 
Source: Smith v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County. 655 
F.Supp. 939, 988-989 (S.D.Ala 1987). 
